I'm Professor of Applied Philosophy at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, and Senior Research Fellow at Jesus College, Oxford. My research lies in practical and normative ethics and currently focuses on the ethics of modifying human behaviour, whether through biological or psychological means.
In this chapter, I examine three deontological objections to adblocking: the objection from prope... more In this chapter, I examine three deontological objections to adblocking: the objection from property (according to which adblocking involves accessing another’s property without satisfying the conditions placed on such access by the owner), the objection from complicity (according to which, by blocking ads, consumers become complicit in wrongdoing of adblocking software providers), and the objection from freeriding (according to which adblocking consumers free-ride on other consumers who allow ads to be served). I argue that, though these objections plausibly establish the moral impermissibility of some instances of adblocking, they do not, even collectively, establish a blanket moral prohibition on adblocking, as it is currently done.
Crutchfield and Redinger argue that consciousness-altering chemical restraints are less “liberty-... more Crutchfield and Redinger argue that consciousness-altering chemical restraints are less “liberty-intrusive” (or as we will sometimes put it, just less “intrusive”) than physical restraints. Physical restraints are “devices applied to the patient to limit their movement” (Crutchfield and Redinger 2024, 3). Consciousness-altering chemical restraints chemically “affect what particular conscious state one is in” (6, original emphasis), but do not render the patient unconscious. Crutchfield and Redinger claim that, while physical restraints intrude on basic liberties, consciousness-altering chemical restraints (CACRs) do not (necessarily) do so, and are therefore less intrusive.
We raise some doubts about Crutchfield and Redinger’s argument for this alleged difference between CACRs and physical restraints.
There is growing interest in the use of neurointerventions to reduce the risk that criminal offen... more There is growing interest in the use of neurointerventions to reduce the risk that criminal offenders will reoffend. Commentators have raised several ethical concerns regarding this practice. One prominent concern is that, when imposed without the offender’s valid consent, neurointerventions might infringe offenders’ right to bodily integrity. While it is commonly held that we possess a moral right to bodily integrity, the extent to which this right would protect against such neurointerventions is as-yet unclear. In this paper, we will assess whether, why, and how severely three forms of neurointervention might infringe the right to bodily integrity. We show that the severity of the infringement of the right to bodily integrity differs across different forms of neurointervention. Moreover, we argue that mental and behavioral effects of neurointerventions could in some cases be relevant to determining the severity of infringements of the right to bodily integrity.
The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based ... more The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive libertyoften framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.
In recent years, there has been increased academic interest in the human right to freedom of thou... more In recent years, there has been increased academic interest in the human right to freedom of thought (RFoT). Scholars from various disciplines are currently debating the content and scope of this right. In his annual thematic report of 2021, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief paid explicit and comprehensive attention to the RFoT, encouraging further clarification of the content and scope of the right. This paper aims to contribute to this end, setting the stage for further research, by offering a multidisciplinary analysis of the RFoT’s scope, relation to other rights, practical significance and moral foundations.
In this chapter, I examine three deontological objections to adblocking: the objection from prope... more In this chapter, I examine three deontological objections to adblocking: the objection from property (according to which adblocking involves accessing another’s property without satisfying the conditions placed on such access by the owner), the objection from complicity (according to which, by blocking ads, consumers become complicit in wrongdoing of adblocking software providers), and the objection from freeriding (according to which adblocking consumers free-ride on other consumers who allow ads to be served). I argue that, though these objections plausibly establish the moral impermissibility of some instances of adblocking, they do not, even collectively, establish a blanket moral prohibition on adblocking, as it is currently done.
Crutchfield and Redinger argue that consciousness-altering chemical restraints are less “liberty-... more Crutchfield and Redinger argue that consciousness-altering chemical restraints are less “liberty-intrusive” (or as we will sometimes put it, just less “intrusive”) than physical restraints. Physical restraints are “devices applied to the patient to limit their movement” (Crutchfield and Redinger 2024, 3). Consciousness-altering chemical restraints chemically “affect what particular conscious state one is in” (6, original emphasis), but do not render the patient unconscious. Crutchfield and Redinger claim that, while physical restraints intrude on basic liberties, consciousness-altering chemical restraints (CACRs) do not (necessarily) do so, and are therefore less intrusive.
We raise some doubts about Crutchfield and Redinger’s argument for this alleged difference between CACRs and physical restraints.
There is growing interest in the use of neurointerventions to reduce the risk that criminal offen... more There is growing interest in the use of neurointerventions to reduce the risk that criminal offenders will reoffend. Commentators have raised several ethical concerns regarding this practice. One prominent concern is that, when imposed without the offender’s valid consent, neurointerventions might infringe offenders’ right to bodily integrity. While it is commonly held that we possess a moral right to bodily integrity, the extent to which this right would protect against such neurointerventions is as-yet unclear. In this paper, we will assess whether, why, and how severely three forms of neurointervention might infringe the right to bodily integrity. We show that the severity of the infringement of the right to bodily integrity differs across different forms of neurointervention. Moreover, we argue that mental and behavioral effects of neurointerventions could in some cases be relevant to determining the severity of infringements of the right to bodily integrity.
The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based ... more The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive libertyoften framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.
In recent years, there has been increased academic interest in the human right to freedom of thou... more In recent years, there has been increased academic interest in the human right to freedom of thought (RFoT). Scholars from various disciplines are currently debating the content and scope of this right. In his annual thematic report of 2021, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief paid explicit and comprehensive attention to the RFoT, encouraging further clarification of the content and scope of the right. This paper aims to contribute to this end, setting the stage for further research, by offering a multidisciplinary analysis of the RFoT’s scope, relation to other rights, practical significance and moral foundations.
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Papers by Tom Douglas
We raise some doubts about Crutchfield and Redinger’s argument for this alleged difference between CACRs and physical restraints.
We raise some doubts about Crutchfield and Redinger’s argument for this alleged difference between CACRs and physical restraints.