I am a lecturer in philosophy at the Paris-Sorbonne University, and member of the SND (Sciences, Norms, Decisions) research team. My research interests pertain to the philosophy of groups and sociality in general. It includes: - Definitions of cooperation and collective action - Rational explanations of cooperation - Epistemic aspects of cooperation - Collective reasoning - Psychological factors of cooperation - Group selection and group adaptation - Social epistemology
The Genial Gene is an ambitious, intriguing and rather controversial book. Roughgarden seeks to e... more The Genial Gene is an ambitious, intriguing and rather controversial book. Roughgarden seeks to establish what she sees as a radical new theory, called 'social selection', as an alternative to orthodox neo-Darwinist ideas about co-operative and social behaviour, particularly in ...
In his ‘Cooperation as joint action’, Tuomela presents a we-mode account of cooperation, which he... more In his ‘Cooperation as joint action’, Tuomela presents a we-mode account of cooperation, which he argues has several advantages over an individual account. This commentary examines to what extent this is true. In particular, I assess three related characteristics of we-mode joint action: its possible rationality, its greater efficiency, and its alleged irreducibility to purely individual properties, which are recurring points of the article.
Pour que l'on puisse dire que des individus ont coopere, quels doivent etre leurs etats menta... more Pour que l'on puisse dire que des individus ont coopere, quels doivent etre leurs etats mentaux et leurs relations, quelles actions doivent-ils accomplir ? Et comment expliquer qu'ils choisissent de cooperer au prix de certains risques ? Ces deux questions de definition et d'explication, bien qu'au centre des theories de la cooperation humaine, sont traditionnellement traitees de facon independante. Ce travail se propose de concilier ces deux aspects par l'etude d'une forme cruciale de cooperation minimale dans un cadre unifie mobilisant notamment des outils de theorie des jeux. L'analyse detaillee des concepts fondamentaux lies a la cooperation (objectifs collectifs et connaissance commune), alliee a l'elaboration d'une explication rationnelle et cognitivement realiste du comportement cooperatif dans des contextes strategiques statique et dynamique (a partir des notions-cles d'identification et de perception de groupe), menent ainsi a une def...
We argue that recent game theoretic approaches to social norms differ on some fundamental issues,... more We argue that recent game theoretic approaches to social norms differ on some fundamental issues, our focus being on recent accounts by Ken Binmore and Cristina Bicchieri. After a brief introduction, we present the deepest cause for their disagreement, namely whether the action of norms should be modelled as a one-shot game, the option favoured by Bicchieri, or by a repeated game, as Binmore does. Although these choices appear to leave room for the two accounts to be complementary, we then argue that this is not possible. First, differing attitudes to modelling punishment, a central feature of all informal work on social norms, prevent any straightforward integration of the two theories. Second, the solution cannot consist in merely choosing between the two accounts, as they both fail to deal with the way in which triggered norms depend on context, in static as well as diachronic frameworks.
The repeated attempts to characterise joint action have displayed a common trend towards minimali... more The repeated attempts to characterise joint action have displayed a common trend towards minimalism – whether they focus on minimal situations, minimal characterisations, cognitively minimal agents or minimal cognitive mechanisms. This trend also appears to lead to pluralism: the idea that joint action may receive multiple, equally valid characterisations. In this paper, I argue for a pluralist stance regarding joint action, although one stemming from maximalism. After describing three cases of “maximal” joint action – demonstrations, deliberations and free collective improvisation – that stretch our conceptual characterisations of joint action, I introduce and defend contextual minimalism, which focuses on joint actions occurring in contexts from which the factors that typically favour successful cooperation are absent. Although maximalist as compared to the other forms of minimalism, contextual minimalism does fit the minimalist trend and its recent emphasis on specific cognitive ...
Intuitivement, les concepts de sens commun et de connaissance commune semblent proches. Leurs ana... more Intuitivement, les concepts de sens commun et de connaissance commune semblent proches. Leurs analyses philosophiques traditionnelles les font pourtant fortement diverger. Le sens commun est polysémique et possède une dimension sociologique : il peut faire référence à une communauté des sens, à un sens de la communauté, à un sens partagé au sein d'une communauté. La connaissance commune - une connaissance entièrement publique, transparente - décrit précisément un état épistémique collectif spécifique. Cet article montre que ces divergences ne sont qu'apparentes en révélant des points de convergence significatifs entre les deux concepts. En particulier, le sens commun inclut souvent une connaissance commune ; et la connaissance commune ne saurait exister sans un certain sens commun sous-jacent. De façon secondaire, l'analyse montre par l'exemple que les différences entre les versions d'un concept en philosophie analytique formelle et en philosophie non formelle pe...
This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by ... more This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by (i) highly unspecific goals and (ii) the unavailability of shared plans. For example, walking together just for the sake of walking together with no specific destination or path in mind provides an ordinary example of FIJAs, along with examples in the arts, e.g., collective free improvisation in music, improv theater, or contact improvisation in dance. We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such as Bratman's rule them out because the latter require a capacity for planning that is idle in the case of FIJAs. This argument is structurally similar to arguments for minimalist accounts of joint action (e.g., based on joint actions performed by children before they develop a full-fledged theory of mind), and this invites a parallel minimalist account, which we provide in terms of a specific kind of shared intentions that do not require plan states. We further argue that the resulting minimalist account is different in kind from the sort of minimalism suggested by developmental considerations and conclude in favor of a pluralistic minimalism, according to which there are several ways for an account of joint action to be minimal.
The Genial Gene is an ambitious, intriguing and rather controversial book. Roughgarden seeks to e... more The Genial Gene is an ambitious, intriguing and rather controversial book. Roughgarden seeks to establish what she sees as a radical new theory, called 'social selection', as an alternative to orthodox neo-Darwinist ideas about co-operative and social behaviour, particularly in ...
In his ‘Cooperation as joint action’, Tuomela presents a we-mode account of cooperation, which he... more In his ‘Cooperation as joint action’, Tuomela presents a we-mode account of cooperation, which he argues has several advantages over an individual account. This commentary examines to what extent this is true. In particular, I assess three related characteristics of we-mode joint action: its possible rationality, its greater efficiency, and its alleged irreducibility to purely individual properties, which are recurring points of the article.
Pour que l'on puisse dire que des individus ont coopere, quels doivent etre leurs etats menta... more Pour que l'on puisse dire que des individus ont coopere, quels doivent etre leurs etats mentaux et leurs relations, quelles actions doivent-ils accomplir ? Et comment expliquer qu'ils choisissent de cooperer au prix de certains risques ? Ces deux questions de definition et d'explication, bien qu'au centre des theories de la cooperation humaine, sont traditionnellement traitees de facon independante. Ce travail se propose de concilier ces deux aspects par l'etude d'une forme cruciale de cooperation minimale dans un cadre unifie mobilisant notamment des outils de theorie des jeux. L'analyse detaillee des concepts fondamentaux lies a la cooperation (objectifs collectifs et connaissance commune), alliee a l'elaboration d'une explication rationnelle et cognitivement realiste du comportement cooperatif dans des contextes strategiques statique et dynamique (a partir des notions-cles d'identification et de perception de groupe), menent ainsi a une def...
We argue that recent game theoretic approaches to social norms differ on some fundamental issues,... more We argue that recent game theoretic approaches to social norms differ on some fundamental issues, our focus being on recent accounts by Ken Binmore and Cristina Bicchieri. After a brief introduction, we present the deepest cause for their disagreement, namely whether the action of norms should be modelled as a one-shot game, the option favoured by Bicchieri, or by a repeated game, as Binmore does. Although these choices appear to leave room for the two accounts to be complementary, we then argue that this is not possible. First, differing attitudes to modelling punishment, a central feature of all informal work on social norms, prevent any straightforward integration of the two theories. Second, the solution cannot consist in merely choosing between the two accounts, as they both fail to deal with the way in which triggered norms depend on context, in static as well as diachronic frameworks.
The repeated attempts to characterise joint action have displayed a common trend towards minimali... more The repeated attempts to characterise joint action have displayed a common trend towards minimalism – whether they focus on minimal situations, minimal characterisations, cognitively minimal agents or minimal cognitive mechanisms. This trend also appears to lead to pluralism: the idea that joint action may receive multiple, equally valid characterisations. In this paper, I argue for a pluralist stance regarding joint action, although one stemming from maximalism. After describing three cases of “maximal” joint action – demonstrations, deliberations and free collective improvisation – that stretch our conceptual characterisations of joint action, I introduce and defend contextual minimalism, which focuses on joint actions occurring in contexts from which the factors that typically favour successful cooperation are absent. Although maximalist as compared to the other forms of minimalism, contextual minimalism does fit the minimalist trend and its recent emphasis on specific cognitive ...
Intuitivement, les concepts de sens commun et de connaissance commune semblent proches. Leurs ana... more Intuitivement, les concepts de sens commun et de connaissance commune semblent proches. Leurs analyses philosophiques traditionnelles les font pourtant fortement diverger. Le sens commun est polysémique et possède une dimension sociologique : il peut faire référence à une communauté des sens, à un sens de la communauté, à un sens partagé au sein d'une communauté. La connaissance commune - une connaissance entièrement publique, transparente - décrit précisément un état épistémique collectif spécifique. Cet article montre que ces divergences ne sont qu'apparentes en révélant des points de convergence significatifs entre les deux concepts. En particulier, le sens commun inclut souvent une connaissance commune ; et la connaissance commune ne saurait exister sans un certain sens commun sous-jacent. De façon secondaire, l'analyse montre par l'exemple que les différences entre les versions d'un concept en philosophie analytique formelle et en philosophie non formelle pe...
This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by ... more This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by (i) highly unspecific goals and (ii) the unavailability of shared plans. For example, walking together just for the sake of walking together with no specific destination or path in mind provides an ordinary example of FIJAs, along with examples in the arts, e.g., collective free improvisation in music, improv theater, or contact improvisation in dance. We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such as Bratman's rule them out because the latter require a capacity for planning that is idle in the case of FIJAs. This argument is structurally similar to arguments for minimalist accounts of joint action (e.g., based on joint actions performed by children before they develop a full-fledged theory of mind), and this invites a parallel minimalist account, which we provide in terms of a specific kind of shared intentions that do not require plan states. We further argue that the resulting minimalist account is different in kind from the sort of minimalism suggested by developmental considerations and conclude in favor of a pluralistic minimalism, according to which there are several ways for an account of joint action to be minimal.
Coen offers a unified explanation of natural selection, development, learning and cultural change... more Coen offers a unified explanation of natural selection, development, learning and cultural change, based on seven fundamental principles: population variation, persistence, reinforcement, competition, cooperation, combinatorial richness and recurrence. I discuss whether all seven principles are justified, successfully fit the four processes, encompass life processes only, and have any strong explanatory import. I find each of these claims doubtful.
Marcher ensemble, porter une table à plusieurs, participer à une manifestation, et même discuter,... more Marcher ensemble, porter une table à plusieurs, participer à une manifestation, et même discuter, sont autant d’exemples de coopération humaine – d’action conjointe. Par opposition, les mouvements d’une foule dans la rue, la course simultanée d’individus vers un abri lorsque l’orage se déclare ne sont que des actions collectives. Mais comment distinguer les unes des autres? Quand pouvons-nous dire que des personnes ont vraiment agi ensemble? Et comment expliquer qu’ils coopèrent même lorsque le risque d’échec est considérable? Cet ouvrage se propose de répondre à ces questions, en se penchant sur toutes les dimensions de la coopération : les buts collectifs, la connaissance commune, ainsi que les facteurs psychologiques, cognitifs et stratégiques qui la favorisent. À partir de notions telles que l’identification de groupe, on défendra en particulier la thèse que certains types d’actions de masse, comme les manifestations, peuvent constituer des exemples légitimes de coopération.
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Papers by Cédric Paternotte