Cet article cherche a examiner la these fondamentale de Neue Phanomenologie in Frankreich, selon ... more Cet article cherche a examiner la these fondamentale de Neue Phanomenologie in Frankreich, selon laquelle la specificite du mouvement phenomenologique recent en France consisterait a decrire le « phenomene phenomenologique » d’une nouvelle maniere et precisement selon son « evenementialite ». A cette fin, il ne suffit pas simplement de reconstruire ou de resumer cette these telle qu’elle est exposee dans l’ouvrage, mais il est egalement necessaire de construire de maniere progressive le concept general d’evenement et celui de « phenomene phenomenologique » concu selon son evenementialite. Cette etude essaie de repondre aux trois questions suivantes : qu’est-ce que la « nouvelle phenomenologie en France » ; qu’entend-t-on couramment par « evenement » ? ; comment cette transformation du concept phenomenologique de phenomene motive-t-elle une reorganisation remarquable de sa methode, a laquelle Janicaud a reproche d’etre un « tournant theologique » ?
Phänomenologie und spekulativer Realismus. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism. Phénoménologie et réalisme spéculatif, 2021
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the proximity and distance between phenomenology and Ga... more The aim of this paper is to shed light on the proximity and distance between phenomenology and Gabriel’s “new realism,” with special regard to the metaphysical problem of the world. Whereas the seemingly “idealist” or “constructivist” position of phenomenology claims that there must be a world, Gabriel will support the contrary thesis, i.e., that there is no world at all – the so-called “no-world-view” thesis, according to which we would fail victim to a metaphysical illusion, if we assumed the “existence” of the world. We will clarify however that both positions are not so contradictory, as they might seem to be at first glance, given that phenomenology is also trying to invalidate and control a phantasmal metaphysics of the world. The very difference between the two positions consists rather in the respective ways in which they try to avoid a metaphysical illusion of the world: that is, while Gabriel considers the “world” as a false problem of metaphysics, phenomenology offers us a non-metaphysical concept of the world.
Keywords: the world, metaphysics, new-realism, constructivism, fields of sense, no-world-view, phenomenology of the world, normativity, modality, relativism.
This paper offers a general outline and characterization of the idea of 'phenomenology of transce... more This paper offers a general outline and characterization of the idea of 'phenomenology of transcendental mediality' in the works of Yoshihiro NITTA (1929-2020), whose contribution to phenomenological philosophy consists in the radical reflection and analysis of the very issue of phenomenology: the analysis of appearance-Erscheinen-in its facticity and mediality. For this purpose, we will especially focus on Nitta's philosophical relation-determined by 'proximity and distance'-to two phenomenologists, i.e., Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink. First, we are going to show that Nitta accepts Fink's conception of appearance as 'absolute medium', which, according to Fink, renders possible all entities about which we meaningfully speak. Secondly, we will discuss the phenomenological conception of facticity in the late Husserl, a theme central in Nitta, carefully employed in order to refine Fink's idea and to develop his 'phenomenology of transcendental mediality'.
HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology (Special Issue: Phenomenology and German Classical Philosophy), 2015
In this paper I outline main theses of Fink’s phenomenological interpretation of antian transcend... more In this paper I outline main theses of Fink’s phenomenological interpretation of antian transcendental philosophy. My aim is to clarify how and to what extent Kant’s hilosophy determines Fink’s «phenomenology of enworlding [Verweltlichung]». First, I show the very starting point and original motivations of Fink’s interpretation of Kant. I proceed by examining the contexts in which Fink refers to Kant’s arguments in the Antinomy of Pure Reason and showing that in these contexts Fink is dealing with a
specific philosophical issue, namely, how to conceive of the totality of the «absolute stream of lived experiencing [der absolute Erlebnisstrom]», an issue the late Husserl struggled with. To solve this difficult problem, one needs, according to Fink, to commit oneself to an ontological reflection on the very difference between the intra-temporal entities and time itself. Fink seeks to find a clue to resolve this problem in Kant’s cosmological antinomy: in effect, the latter is based, for Fink, on Kant’s profound distinction between the intra-worldly entities and the world as such («cosmological difference»). Second, I study Fink’s criticism of Kant and how he argues for its phenomenological validity. Further, I show that Fink does not accept Kant’s «Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism» which offers, according to Kant, the key for the solution to the cosmological antinomy or transcendental illusion. In other words, Fink refuses the Kantian claim according to which the source of the antinomy is nothing but pure eason as the upper faculty of dialectical reasoning. Now, it is on the basis of his phenomenological idealism, which defends an enworlded conception of transcendental subjectivity, that Fink criticizes Kant’s account of a worldles subjectivity. Thus, third, I sketch Fink’s phenomenology of enworlding as well as his new solution for the cosmological antinomy. Fink based the very origin of the transcendental illusion of cosmological antinomy on the phenomenon of the world in its specific mode of appearing, which he calls «withdrawing [Entzug or “Entziehung”]». By examining his description of it, one can easily show and justify the profound difference Fink’s phenomenological interpretations of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (who is exposing his cosmological phenomenology) and Heidegger’s (whose goal is to found his hermeneutico-phenomenological idea of fundamental ontology), even if they both agree that the relevance of Kant’s philosophy as a whole does not lie in its epistemology but in its providing a new foundation for metaphysics. I conclude by stating that Fink’s cosmological phenomenology, which is often criticized because of its speculative character, is based not so much on Hegel’s idea of dialectic,
as on Kant’s (i.e., as profoundly revised by Fink’s phenomenology).
Key words: World, transcendental idealism, metaphysics, totality, cosmological dialectic (antinomy), transcendental illusion, phenomenology of enworlding.
Notre étude cherche à examiner la thèse fondamentale de Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich , selon... more Notre étude cherche à examiner la thèse fondamentale de Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich , selon laquelle la spécificité du mouvement phénoménologique récent en France consiste à décrire le phénomène phénoménologique d’une nouvelle manière et précisément dans son « événementialité ». À cette fin, il ne suffit pas simplement de reconstruire ou de résumer cette thèse telle qu’elle est exposée dans l’ouvrage, mais il est également nécessaire de construire de manière progressive le concept général d’événement et celui de phénomène phénoménologique dans son événementialité. L’approche du « phénomène en tant qu’événementiel » dans la « nouvelle phénoménologie en France » demeure en effet toujours « opératoire » plutôt que « thématique ». Autrement dit, Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich ne cherche pas à entreprendre une exposition panoramique du paysage de la phénoménologie française contemporaine, mais tente avant tout de déceler le « concept opératoire » caché sans lequel ce mouvement philosophique ne serait pas possible.
Notre étude essayera de répondre aux trois questions suivantes. (1) Qu’est-ce que la « nouvelle phénoménologie en France » ? Ou, plus précisément, dans quels contextes est-il possible de rendre compte de cette « nouvelle phénoménologie » ? (2) Qu’entend-t-on couramment par « événement » ? Il faudra également esquisser très brièvement une préhistoire de la conception du phénomène en tant que l’événementiel, qui deviendra le concept-clé dans la « nouvelle phénoménologie en France ». (3) Comment cette transformation du concept de phénomène phénoménologique motive-t-elle une réorganisation remarquable de sa méthode, à laquelle Janicaud reproche d’être un « tournant théologique » ?
Nous reconnaissont que la phénoménologie est un des plus grands mouvements de la philosophie cont... more Nous reconnaissont que la phénoménologie est un des plus grands mouvements de la philosophie contemporaine, mais il n’empêche qu’on se demande toujours « qu’ est-ce que un phénomène » ou précisément « que signifient des notions de phénomène en phénoménologie ». Car une siècle de la phénoménologie se caractérise, dans un point de vue, par des débats à propos de cela qui ne s’arrêtaient jamais. Edmund Husserl, le fondateur de la phénoménologie contemporaine, était critiqué toujours, on le sais, par des argements philosophiques divers comme celui d’ Heidegger etc. Surtout il s’agit ici de la théorie husserlienne d’intuition et réflexion qui détermine sa notion de phénomène. S’il est vrai que les phénoménologues, comme Eugen Fink et Michel Henry, ont osé ne pas simplement défendre le statut philosophique de la phénoménologie confrontant aux critiques, mais aussi refondre la phénoménologie husserlienne, il faudra clarifier des notions de phénomène chez Fink et Henry pour comparer avec celle d’Husserl. Prenant pour le fil conducteur la notion du « voir (Sehen, Schauen)» qu’Husserl revendique pour la description de sens et d’accomplissement du veçu (Vollzug des Erlebnisses), notre étude élucide en quoi consistent les contributions finkiennes et henryennes pour une refondation de la phénoménologie husserlienne et nous verrons aussi ses limites.
Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fi... more Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fink: This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world. Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
Entgegenwärtigung bei Husserl und Fink:
In der vorliegenden Abhandlung zielt der Verfasser dar... more Entgegenwärtigung bei Husserl und Fink:
In der vorliegenden Abhandlung zielt der Verfasser darauf ab, sozusagen „Nähe und Distanz“ zwischen dem späten Husserl und frühen Fink kurz darzustellen. Hierbei gilt der Begriff „Entgegenwärtigung“ als Leitfaden unserer Analyse. Denn darin sieht man deutlich, wie sich Fink, der noch etwa 25 Jahr alt war, von Husserl auf einer entscheidenden Weise „distanziert“. Während Husserl unter diesem ungewöhlichen Ausdruck das Phänomen der „intentionalen Verweisungen“ in ihrer zeitlich identifizierenden Funktion versteht, stellt Fink die These auf, dass es das ursprüngliche Phänomen gibt, das der „intentionalen Verweisung“ zugrundliegt. Das nennt Fink „Entgegenwärtigung“, die sich als „Zugangsbewußtsein zu den Zeithorizonten“ charakterisieren läßt. Diese „Entgegenwärtigung“ eröffnet als „Zugangsbewußtsein“ die manigfaltigen Zeithorizonten bzw. „Welten“ in ihrer mannigfaltigen Zeitlichkeit, in denen wir leben.
Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fi... more Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fink:
This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.
Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fi... more Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fink:
This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.
Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
Cet article cherche a examiner la these fondamentale de Neue Phanomenologie in Frankreich, selon ... more Cet article cherche a examiner la these fondamentale de Neue Phanomenologie in Frankreich, selon laquelle la specificite du mouvement phenomenologique recent en France consisterait a decrire le « phenomene phenomenologique » d’une nouvelle maniere et precisement selon son « evenementialite ». A cette fin, il ne suffit pas simplement de reconstruire ou de resumer cette these telle qu’elle est exposee dans l’ouvrage, mais il est egalement necessaire de construire de maniere progressive le concept general d’evenement et celui de « phenomene phenomenologique » concu selon son evenementialite. Cette etude essaie de repondre aux trois questions suivantes : qu’est-ce que la « nouvelle phenomenologie en France » ; qu’entend-t-on couramment par « evenement » ? ; comment cette transformation du concept phenomenologique de phenomene motive-t-elle une reorganisation remarquable de sa methode, a laquelle Janicaud a reproche d’etre un « tournant theologique » ?
Phänomenologie und spekulativer Realismus. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism. Phénoménologie et réalisme spéculatif, 2021
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the proximity and distance between phenomenology and Ga... more The aim of this paper is to shed light on the proximity and distance between phenomenology and Gabriel’s “new realism,” with special regard to the metaphysical problem of the world. Whereas the seemingly “idealist” or “constructivist” position of phenomenology claims that there must be a world, Gabriel will support the contrary thesis, i.e., that there is no world at all – the so-called “no-world-view” thesis, according to which we would fail victim to a metaphysical illusion, if we assumed the “existence” of the world. We will clarify however that both positions are not so contradictory, as they might seem to be at first glance, given that phenomenology is also trying to invalidate and control a phantasmal metaphysics of the world. The very difference between the two positions consists rather in the respective ways in which they try to avoid a metaphysical illusion of the world: that is, while Gabriel considers the “world” as a false problem of metaphysics, phenomenology offers us a non-metaphysical concept of the world.
Keywords: the world, metaphysics, new-realism, constructivism, fields of sense, no-world-view, phenomenology of the world, normativity, modality, relativism.
This paper offers a general outline and characterization of the idea of 'phenomenology of transce... more This paper offers a general outline and characterization of the idea of 'phenomenology of transcendental mediality' in the works of Yoshihiro NITTA (1929-2020), whose contribution to phenomenological philosophy consists in the radical reflection and analysis of the very issue of phenomenology: the analysis of appearance-Erscheinen-in its facticity and mediality. For this purpose, we will especially focus on Nitta's philosophical relation-determined by 'proximity and distance'-to two phenomenologists, i.e., Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink. First, we are going to show that Nitta accepts Fink's conception of appearance as 'absolute medium', which, according to Fink, renders possible all entities about which we meaningfully speak. Secondly, we will discuss the phenomenological conception of facticity in the late Husserl, a theme central in Nitta, carefully employed in order to refine Fink's idea and to develop his 'phenomenology of transcendental mediality'.
HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology (Special Issue: Phenomenology and German Classical Philosophy), 2015
In this paper I outline main theses of Fink’s phenomenological interpretation of antian transcend... more In this paper I outline main theses of Fink’s phenomenological interpretation of antian transcendental philosophy. My aim is to clarify how and to what extent Kant’s hilosophy determines Fink’s «phenomenology of enworlding [Verweltlichung]». First, I show the very starting point and original motivations of Fink’s interpretation of Kant. I proceed by examining the contexts in which Fink refers to Kant’s arguments in the Antinomy of Pure Reason and showing that in these contexts Fink is dealing with a
specific philosophical issue, namely, how to conceive of the totality of the «absolute stream of lived experiencing [der absolute Erlebnisstrom]», an issue the late Husserl struggled with. To solve this difficult problem, one needs, according to Fink, to commit oneself to an ontological reflection on the very difference between the intra-temporal entities and time itself. Fink seeks to find a clue to resolve this problem in Kant’s cosmological antinomy: in effect, the latter is based, for Fink, on Kant’s profound distinction between the intra-worldly entities and the world as such («cosmological difference»). Second, I study Fink’s criticism of Kant and how he argues for its phenomenological validity. Further, I show that Fink does not accept Kant’s «Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism» which offers, according to Kant, the key for the solution to the cosmological antinomy or transcendental illusion. In other words, Fink refuses the Kantian claim according to which the source of the antinomy is nothing but pure eason as the upper faculty of dialectical reasoning. Now, it is on the basis of his phenomenological idealism, which defends an enworlded conception of transcendental subjectivity, that Fink criticizes Kant’s account of a worldles subjectivity. Thus, third, I sketch Fink’s phenomenology of enworlding as well as his new solution for the cosmological antinomy. Fink based the very origin of the transcendental illusion of cosmological antinomy on the phenomenon of the world in its specific mode of appearing, which he calls «withdrawing [Entzug or “Entziehung”]». By examining his description of it, one can easily show and justify the profound difference Fink’s phenomenological interpretations of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (who is exposing his cosmological phenomenology) and Heidegger’s (whose goal is to found his hermeneutico-phenomenological idea of fundamental ontology), even if they both agree that the relevance of Kant’s philosophy as a whole does not lie in its epistemology but in its providing a new foundation for metaphysics. I conclude by stating that Fink’s cosmological phenomenology, which is often criticized because of its speculative character, is based not so much on Hegel’s idea of dialectic,
as on Kant’s (i.e., as profoundly revised by Fink’s phenomenology).
Key words: World, transcendental idealism, metaphysics, totality, cosmological dialectic (antinomy), transcendental illusion, phenomenology of enworlding.
Notre étude cherche à examiner la thèse fondamentale de Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich , selon... more Notre étude cherche à examiner la thèse fondamentale de Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich , selon laquelle la spécificité du mouvement phénoménologique récent en France consiste à décrire le phénomène phénoménologique d’une nouvelle manière et précisément dans son « événementialité ». À cette fin, il ne suffit pas simplement de reconstruire ou de résumer cette thèse telle qu’elle est exposée dans l’ouvrage, mais il est également nécessaire de construire de manière progressive le concept général d’événement et celui de phénomène phénoménologique dans son événementialité. L’approche du « phénomène en tant qu’événementiel » dans la « nouvelle phénoménologie en France » demeure en effet toujours « opératoire » plutôt que « thématique ». Autrement dit, Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich ne cherche pas à entreprendre une exposition panoramique du paysage de la phénoménologie française contemporaine, mais tente avant tout de déceler le « concept opératoire » caché sans lequel ce mouvement philosophique ne serait pas possible.
Notre étude essayera de répondre aux trois questions suivantes. (1) Qu’est-ce que la « nouvelle phénoménologie en France » ? Ou, plus précisément, dans quels contextes est-il possible de rendre compte de cette « nouvelle phénoménologie » ? (2) Qu’entend-t-on couramment par « événement » ? Il faudra également esquisser très brièvement une préhistoire de la conception du phénomène en tant que l’événementiel, qui deviendra le concept-clé dans la « nouvelle phénoménologie en France ». (3) Comment cette transformation du concept de phénomène phénoménologique motive-t-elle une réorganisation remarquable de sa méthode, à laquelle Janicaud reproche d’être un « tournant théologique » ?
Nous reconnaissont que la phénoménologie est un des plus grands mouvements de la philosophie cont... more Nous reconnaissont que la phénoménologie est un des plus grands mouvements de la philosophie contemporaine, mais il n’empêche qu’on se demande toujours « qu’ est-ce que un phénomène » ou précisément « que signifient des notions de phénomène en phénoménologie ». Car une siècle de la phénoménologie se caractérise, dans un point de vue, par des débats à propos de cela qui ne s’arrêtaient jamais. Edmund Husserl, le fondateur de la phénoménologie contemporaine, était critiqué toujours, on le sais, par des argements philosophiques divers comme celui d’ Heidegger etc. Surtout il s’agit ici de la théorie husserlienne d’intuition et réflexion qui détermine sa notion de phénomène. S’il est vrai que les phénoménologues, comme Eugen Fink et Michel Henry, ont osé ne pas simplement défendre le statut philosophique de la phénoménologie confrontant aux critiques, mais aussi refondre la phénoménologie husserlienne, il faudra clarifier des notions de phénomène chez Fink et Henry pour comparer avec celle d’Husserl. Prenant pour le fil conducteur la notion du « voir (Sehen, Schauen)» qu’Husserl revendique pour la description de sens et d’accomplissement du veçu (Vollzug des Erlebnisses), notre étude élucide en quoi consistent les contributions finkiennes et henryennes pour une refondation de la phénoménologie husserlienne et nous verrons aussi ses limites.
Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fi... more Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fink: This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world. Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
Entgegenwärtigung bei Husserl und Fink:
In der vorliegenden Abhandlung zielt der Verfasser dar... more Entgegenwärtigung bei Husserl und Fink:
In der vorliegenden Abhandlung zielt der Verfasser darauf ab, sozusagen „Nähe und Distanz“ zwischen dem späten Husserl und frühen Fink kurz darzustellen. Hierbei gilt der Begriff „Entgegenwärtigung“ als Leitfaden unserer Analyse. Denn darin sieht man deutlich, wie sich Fink, der noch etwa 25 Jahr alt war, von Husserl auf einer entscheidenden Weise „distanziert“. Während Husserl unter diesem ungewöhlichen Ausdruck das Phänomen der „intentionalen Verweisungen“ in ihrer zeitlich identifizierenden Funktion versteht, stellt Fink die These auf, dass es das ursprüngliche Phänomen gibt, das der „intentionalen Verweisung“ zugrundliegt. Das nennt Fink „Entgegenwärtigung“, die sich als „Zugangsbewußtsein zu den Zeithorizonten“ charakterisieren läßt. Diese „Entgegenwärtigung“ eröffnet als „Zugangsbewußtsein“ die manigfaltigen Zeithorizonten bzw. „Welten“ in ihrer mannigfaltigen Zeitlichkeit, in denen wir leben.
Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fi... more Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fink:
This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.
Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fi... more Transcendental Illusion and Phenomenological Originality – The World-Experience in Husserl and Fink:
This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.
Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
Im Folgenden wird die späte Philosophie Finks als transzendental-phänomenologisches Weltdenken be... more Im Folgenden wird die späte Philosophie Finks als transzendental-phänomenologisches Weltdenken bestimmt, das eine fundamentale Revision des Begriffs des Phänomens sowie der (transzendentalen) Phänomenologie Husserlscher und Heideggerischer Provenienz vornimmt. Um den philosophischen Anspruch dieses Denkens systematisch darzulegen, wird Finks Interpretation von Fragmenten Heraklits, in denen Fink einen wesentlichen Leitfaden findet, um seinen eigenen Welt- und Phänomenbegriff zu entwickeln und zu erproben, unter zwei Aspekten herangezogen: Zum einen legt Fink Heraklits Physis-Begriff als Welt aus, die als Ursprungsdimension des Seins der ontologischen Differenz vorausgeht und ihr zugrunde liegt, und zum anderen betont Fink, dass schon Heraklit die Erscheinungsweise der als Welt verstandenen Physis als Entzug oder Verbergung erkannte. In diesem Zusammenhang wird die Transformation des hänomenbegriffes ersichtlich, die Finks phänomenologische Analyse des Spiels bewirkt hat, und man kann deutlich sehen, inwiefern Fink in Nähe und in Distanz sowohl zu Husserl als auch zu Heidegger steht.
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Keywords: the world, metaphysics, new-realism, constructivism, fields of sense, no-world-view, phenomenology of the world, normativity, modality, relativism.
specific philosophical issue, namely, how to conceive of the totality of the «absolute stream of lived experiencing [der absolute Erlebnisstrom]», an issue the late Husserl struggled with. To solve this difficult problem, one needs, according to Fink, to commit oneself to an ontological reflection on the very difference between the intra-temporal entities and time itself. Fink seeks to find a clue to resolve this problem in Kant’s cosmological antinomy: in effect, the latter is based, for Fink, on Kant’s profound distinction between the intra-worldly entities and the world as such («cosmological difference»). Second, I study Fink’s criticism of Kant and how he argues for its phenomenological validity. Further, I show that Fink does not accept Kant’s «Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism» which offers, according to Kant, the key for the solution to the cosmological antinomy or transcendental illusion. In other words, Fink refuses the Kantian claim according to which the source of the antinomy is nothing but pure eason as the upper faculty of dialectical reasoning. Now, it is on the basis of his phenomenological idealism, which defends an enworlded conception of transcendental subjectivity, that Fink criticizes Kant’s account of a worldles subjectivity. Thus, third, I sketch Fink’s phenomenology of enworlding as well as his new solution for the cosmological antinomy. Fink based the very origin of the transcendental illusion of cosmological antinomy on the phenomenon of the world in its specific mode of appearing, which he calls «withdrawing [Entzug or “Entziehung”]». By examining his description of it, one can easily show and justify the profound difference Fink’s phenomenological interpretations of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (who is exposing his cosmological phenomenology) and Heidegger’s (whose goal is to found his hermeneutico-phenomenological idea of fundamental ontology), even if they both agree that the relevance of Kant’s philosophy as a whole does not lie in its epistemology but in its providing a new foundation for metaphysics. I conclude by stating that Fink’s cosmological phenomenology, which is often criticized because of its speculative character, is based not so much on Hegel’s idea of dialectic,
as on Kant’s (i.e., as profoundly revised by Fink’s phenomenology).
Key words: World, transcendental idealism, metaphysics, totality, cosmological dialectic (antinomy), transcendental illusion, phenomenology of enworlding.
Notre étude essayera de répondre aux trois questions suivantes. (1) Qu’est-ce que la « nouvelle phénoménologie en France » ? Ou, plus précisément, dans quels contextes est-il possible de rendre compte de cette « nouvelle phénoménologie » ? (2) Qu’entend-t-on couramment par « événement » ? Il faudra également esquisser très brièvement une préhistoire de la conception du phénomène en tant que l’événementiel, qui deviendra le concept-clé dans la « nouvelle phénoménologie en France ». (3) Comment cette transformation du concept de phénomène phénoménologique motive-t-elle une réorganisation remarquable de sa méthode, à laquelle Janicaud reproche d’être un « tournant théologique » ?
This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.
Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
In der vorliegenden Abhandlung zielt der Verfasser darauf ab, sozusagen „Nähe und Distanz“ zwischen dem späten Husserl und frühen Fink kurz darzustellen. Hierbei gilt der Begriff „Entgegenwärtigung“ als Leitfaden unserer Analyse. Denn darin sieht man deutlich, wie sich Fink, der noch etwa 25 Jahr alt war, von Husserl auf einer entscheidenden Weise „distanziert“. Während Husserl unter diesem ungewöhlichen Ausdruck das Phänomen der „intentionalen Verweisungen“ in ihrer zeitlich identifizierenden Funktion versteht, stellt Fink die These auf, dass es das ursprüngliche Phänomen gibt, das der „intentionalen Verweisung“ zugrundliegt. Das nennt Fink „Entgegenwärtigung“, die sich als „Zugangsbewußtsein zu den Zeithorizonten“ charakterisieren läßt. Diese „Entgegenwärtigung“ eröffnet als „Zugangsbewußtsein“ die manigfaltigen Zeithorizonten bzw. „Welten“ in ihrer mannigfaltigen Zeitlichkeit, in denen wir leben.
(本論において筆者は、晩年のフッサールの思想と初期フィンクの思想のあいだに認められる、いわば「近さと隔たり」を簡潔に提示することを試みる。この課題の遂行に際して、「脱現在化」という概念が手引きとなる。というのも、この概念の検証を通じて、フィンク―25歳に漸く達しようかという頃のフィンク―とフッサールのある決定的な「隔たり」を明瞭に見て取ることができるからである。フッサールがこの「脱現在化」という聞き馴れない表現でもって、時間的同一化綜合の働きとしての「志向的指示」現象のことを考えているのに対して、フィンクは、このような「志向的指示」を基礎づける根源的な現象というものがあると主張する。そのような根源的な現象のことを「脱現在化」であるとフィンクは呼び、この「脱現在化」とは、「時間地平への接近意識」であると性格づけている。このような「接近意識」としての「脱現在化」は、われわれ自身がそのうちに生きている多様な時間地平あるいは時間的多様性としての「世界」への開けの意識のことである。)
This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.
Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.
Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
Keywords: the world, metaphysics, new-realism, constructivism, fields of sense, no-world-view, phenomenology of the world, normativity, modality, relativism.
specific philosophical issue, namely, how to conceive of the totality of the «absolute stream of lived experiencing [der absolute Erlebnisstrom]», an issue the late Husserl struggled with. To solve this difficult problem, one needs, according to Fink, to commit oneself to an ontological reflection on the very difference between the intra-temporal entities and time itself. Fink seeks to find a clue to resolve this problem in Kant’s cosmological antinomy: in effect, the latter is based, for Fink, on Kant’s profound distinction between the intra-worldly entities and the world as such («cosmological difference»). Second, I study Fink’s criticism of Kant and how he argues for its phenomenological validity. Further, I show that Fink does not accept Kant’s «Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism» which offers, according to Kant, the key for the solution to the cosmological antinomy or transcendental illusion. In other words, Fink refuses the Kantian claim according to which the source of the antinomy is nothing but pure eason as the upper faculty of dialectical reasoning. Now, it is on the basis of his phenomenological idealism, which defends an enworlded conception of transcendental subjectivity, that Fink criticizes Kant’s account of a worldles subjectivity. Thus, third, I sketch Fink’s phenomenology of enworlding as well as his new solution for the cosmological antinomy. Fink based the very origin of the transcendental illusion of cosmological antinomy on the phenomenon of the world in its specific mode of appearing, which he calls «withdrawing [Entzug or “Entziehung”]». By examining his description of it, one can easily show and justify the profound difference Fink’s phenomenological interpretations of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (who is exposing his cosmological phenomenology) and Heidegger’s (whose goal is to found his hermeneutico-phenomenological idea of fundamental ontology), even if they both agree that the relevance of Kant’s philosophy as a whole does not lie in its epistemology but in its providing a new foundation for metaphysics. I conclude by stating that Fink’s cosmological phenomenology, which is often criticized because of its speculative character, is based not so much on Hegel’s idea of dialectic,
as on Kant’s (i.e., as profoundly revised by Fink’s phenomenology).
Key words: World, transcendental idealism, metaphysics, totality, cosmological dialectic (antinomy), transcendental illusion, phenomenology of enworlding.
Notre étude essayera de répondre aux trois questions suivantes. (1) Qu’est-ce que la « nouvelle phénoménologie en France » ? Ou, plus précisément, dans quels contextes est-il possible de rendre compte de cette « nouvelle phénoménologie » ? (2) Qu’entend-t-on couramment par « événement » ? Il faudra également esquisser très brièvement une préhistoire de la conception du phénomène en tant que l’événementiel, qui deviendra le concept-clé dans la « nouvelle phénoménologie en France ». (3) Comment cette transformation du concept de phénomène phénoménologique motive-t-elle une réorganisation remarquable de sa méthode, à laquelle Janicaud reproche d’être un « tournant théologique » ?
This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.
Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
In der vorliegenden Abhandlung zielt der Verfasser darauf ab, sozusagen „Nähe und Distanz“ zwischen dem späten Husserl und frühen Fink kurz darzustellen. Hierbei gilt der Begriff „Entgegenwärtigung“ als Leitfaden unserer Analyse. Denn darin sieht man deutlich, wie sich Fink, der noch etwa 25 Jahr alt war, von Husserl auf einer entscheidenden Weise „distanziert“. Während Husserl unter diesem ungewöhlichen Ausdruck das Phänomen der „intentionalen Verweisungen“ in ihrer zeitlich identifizierenden Funktion versteht, stellt Fink die These auf, dass es das ursprüngliche Phänomen gibt, das der „intentionalen Verweisung“ zugrundliegt. Das nennt Fink „Entgegenwärtigung“, die sich als „Zugangsbewußtsein zu den Zeithorizonten“ charakterisieren läßt. Diese „Entgegenwärtigung“ eröffnet als „Zugangsbewußtsein“ die manigfaltigen Zeithorizonten bzw. „Welten“ in ihrer mannigfaltigen Zeitlichkeit, in denen wir leben.
(本論において筆者は、晩年のフッサールの思想と初期フィンクの思想のあいだに認められる、いわば「近さと隔たり」を簡潔に提示することを試みる。この課題の遂行に際して、「脱現在化」という概念が手引きとなる。というのも、この概念の検証を通じて、フィンク―25歳に漸く達しようかという頃のフィンク―とフッサールのある決定的な「隔たり」を明瞭に見て取ることができるからである。フッサールがこの「脱現在化」という聞き馴れない表現でもって、時間的同一化綜合の働きとしての「志向的指示」現象のことを考えているのに対して、フィンクは、このような「志向的指示」を基礎づける根源的な現象というものがあると主張する。そのような根源的な現象のことを「脱現在化」であるとフィンクは呼び、この「脱現在化」とは、「時間地平への接近意識」であると性格づけている。このような「接近意識」としての「脱現在化」は、われわれ自身がそのうちに生きている多様な時間地平あるいは時間的多様性としての「世界」への開けの意識のことである。)
This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.
Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
This paper holds that the philosophical relation between Husserl’s and Fink’s phenomenological philosophies can be characterized in terms of proximity and distance. We proceed by focusing on the philosophical foundation of their projects and, in particular, on the Kantian notion of “transcendental illusion,” which they use, though in different manners, as a way of determining purely philosophical illusions – a preliminary task to found transcendental phenomenology proper. We select this Kantian notion as a central theme inasmuch as it concerns the metaphysical problematic of the world. Our analysis shows that Fink defends the Husserlian thesis that the world is not merely an “idea of pure reason”(Kant), but an experience. In effect, the world is necessarily pregiven to us, though anonymously, in an intentional experience; in other words, intentional experience without the pregiven world is, according to the late Husserl, unthinkable. Fink’s characterization of world-experience is radically different from Husserl’s. This difference or distance comes from Fink’s conception of “enworlding” [Verweltlichung], i.e., the self-actualization of constituting subjectivity in the world-actualization. Fink’s very idea of this type of correlation has two specific enabling functions: (1) the world’s originally enframing function [die ursprünglich einrahmende Funktion] of the entity into the world itself and (2) the event-like character of the “intruding” [Eindringen] of the subject into the world. Therefore, we conclude that Fink’s phenomenological contribution to philosophy consists not only in his genuine reflection on, and analysis of, the phenomenological conception of correlation at the deep level of world-experience, but also in his metaphysical reformulation of the traditional concept of the world.
Keywords: transcendental illusion, transcendental idealism, intentional correlation, world-experience, origin of the world, access to time-horizons, event.
Welt verstandenen Physis als Entzug oder Verbergung erkannte. In diesem Zusammenhang wird die Transformation des hänomenbegriffes
ersichtlich, die Finks phänomenologische Analyse des Spiels bewirkt hat, und man kann deutlich sehen, inwiefern Fink in Nähe und in Distanz sowohl zu Husserl als auch zu Heidegger steht.