Robert Buch/Nicola Zambon (Eds.), Hans Blumenberg und die Phänomenologieänomenologie (Phänomenologische Forschungen 2023/2), pp. 39-58, 2023
How can historical change be thought, in a very concrete way? How do we philosophically arrive at... more How can historical change be thought, in a very concrete way? How do we philosophically arrive at concepts that represent this change and at the same time grant reliability in an idealistic sense? This means that idealities must endure in the course of history and at the same time grant the possibility of historical change. If the problem of historicity is addressed in this way, a theory of history has to mediate between statics and dynamics. It has to grant both the stability and dynamics that are needed to ‘transport’ thoughts across generations and epochs. As I intend to show, Hans Blumenberg’s concept of historicity is based on these assumptions. The article starts from a transcendental account of the lifeworld and links it to Edmund Husserl’s Urstiftung in order to illustrate how historicity and historical change can be conceptualized philosophically.
Hans Blumenberg distinguished four different concepts of rcality. On a first look, these reality ... more Hans Blumenberg distinguished four different concepts of rcality. On a first look, these reality concepts draw on a historical dimension. However, I try to show that they also allow for a systematic connection. Assuming a close link between Blumenberg's thinking and (Husserlian) transcendental phenomenology, I consider the phenomenological conception of consciousness and its performances to be a guiding principle leading to such a systematic connection. Thus, one aim of my contribution consists in furnishing an epistemological approach to Blumenberg's conception of reality. Then, I turn to the question as to how something finds its way into the phenomenological process of constitution at all. Taking 'self-evidence' (Selbstverständlichkeit) and 'non-self-evidence' (Unselbstverständlichkeit) as key notions, I scrutinize the way an object crosses the threshold towards phenomenality. In the conclusion, I try to lay out a minimum determination for that which is denominated 'real' from a phenomenological perspective.
Robert Buch/Nicola Zambon (Eds.), Hans Blumenberg und die Phänomenologieänomenologie (Phänomenologische Forschungen 2023/2), pp. 39-58, 2023
How can historical change be thought, in a very concrete way? How do we philosophically arrive at... more How can historical change be thought, in a very concrete way? How do we philosophically arrive at concepts that represent this change and at the same time grant reliability in an idealistic sense? This means that idealities must endure in the course of history and at the same time grant the possibility of historical change. If the problem of historicity is addressed in this way, a theory of history has to mediate between statics and dynamics. It has to grant both the stability and dynamics that are needed to ‘transport’ thoughts across generations and epochs. As I intend to show, Hans Blumenberg’s concept of historicity is based on these assumptions. The article starts from a transcendental account of the lifeworld and links it to Edmund Husserl’s Urstiftung in order to illustrate how historicity and historical change can be conceptualized philosophically.
Hans Blumenberg distinguished four different concepts of rcality. On a first look, these reality ... more Hans Blumenberg distinguished four different concepts of rcality. On a first look, these reality concepts draw on a historical dimension. However, I try to show that they also allow for a systematic connection. Assuming a close link between Blumenberg's thinking and (Husserlian) transcendental phenomenology, I consider the phenomenological conception of consciousness and its performances to be a guiding principle leading to such a systematic connection. Thus, one aim of my contribution consists in furnishing an epistemological approach to Blumenberg's conception of reality. Then, I turn to the question as to how something finds its way into the phenomenological process of constitution at all. Taking 'self-evidence' (Selbstverständlichkeit) and 'non-self-evidence' (Unselbstverständlichkeit) as key notions, I scrutinize the way an object crosses the threshold towards phenomenality. In the conclusion, I try to lay out a minimum determination for that which is denominated 'real' from a phenomenological perspective.
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