The European Union (EU) project of combining a single market with a
common currency was incomplet... more The European Union (EU) project of combining a single market with a common currency was incomplete from its inception. This article shows that the incompleteness of the governance architecture of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was both a cause of the euro crisis and a characteristic pattern of the policy responses to the crisis. We develop a “failing forward” argument to explain the dynamics of European integration using recent experience in the eurozone as an illustration: Intergovernmental bargaining leads to incompleteness because it forces states with diverse preferences to settle on lowest common denominator solutions. Incompleteness then unleashes forces that lead to crisis. Member states respond by again agreeing to lowest common denominator solutions, which address the crisis and lead to deeper integration. To date, this sequential cycle of piecemeal reform, followed by policy failure, followed by further reform, has managed to sustain both the European project and the common currency. However, this approach entails clear risks. Economically, the policy failures engendered by this incremental approach to the construction of EMU have been catastrophic for the citizens of many crisis-plagued member states. Politically, the perception that the EU is constantly in crisis and in need of reforms to salvage the union is undermining popular support for European integration.
The European Union (EU) project of combining a single market with a
common currency was incomplet... more The European Union (EU) project of combining a single market with a common currency was incomplete from its inception. This article shows that the incompleteness of the governance architecture of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was both a cause of the euro crisis and a characteristic pattern of the policy responses to the crisis. We develop a “failing forward” argument to explain the dynamics of European integration using recent experience in the eurozone as an illustration: Intergovernmental bargaining leads to incompleteness because it forces states with diverse preferences to settle on lowest common denominator solutions. Incompleteness then unleashes forces that lead to crisis. Member states respond by again agreeing to lowest common denominator solutions, which address the crisis and lead to deeper integration. To date, this sequential cycle of piecemeal reform, followed by policy failure, followed by further reform, has managed to sustain both the European project and the common currency. However, this approach entails clear risks. Economically, the policy failures engendered by this incremental approach to the construction of EMU have been catastrophic for the citizens of many crisis-plagued member states. Politically, the perception that the EU is constantly in crisis and in need of reforms to salvage the union is undermining popular support for European integration.
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common currency was incomplete from its inception. This article shows that
the incompleteness of the governance architecture of Europe’s Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) was both a cause of the euro crisis and a characteristic
pattern of the policy responses to the crisis. We develop a “failing forward”
argument to explain the dynamics of European integration using recent
experience in the eurozone as an illustration: Intergovernmental bargaining
leads to incompleteness because it forces states with diverse preferences
to settle on lowest common denominator solutions. Incompleteness
then unleashes forces that lead to crisis. Member states respond by
again agreeing to lowest common denominator solutions, which address
the crisis and lead to deeper integration. To date, this sequential cycle of
piecemeal reform, followed by policy failure, followed by further reform, has
managed to sustain both the European project and the common currency.
However, this approach entails clear risks. Economically, the policy failures
engendered by this incremental approach to the construction of EMU have
been catastrophic for the citizens of many crisis-plagued member states. Politically, the perception that the EU is constantly in crisis and in need of reforms to salvage the union is undermining popular support for European
integration.
common currency was incomplete from its inception. This article shows that
the incompleteness of the governance architecture of Europe’s Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) was both a cause of the euro crisis and a characteristic
pattern of the policy responses to the crisis. We develop a “failing forward”
argument to explain the dynamics of European integration using recent
experience in the eurozone as an illustration: Intergovernmental bargaining
leads to incompleteness because it forces states with diverse preferences
to settle on lowest common denominator solutions. Incompleteness
then unleashes forces that lead to crisis. Member states respond by
again agreeing to lowest common denominator solutions, which address
the crisis and lead to deeper integration. To date, this sequential cycle of
piecemeal reform, followed by policy failure, followed by further reform, has
managed to sustain both the European project and the common currency.
However, this approach entails clear risks. Economically, the policy failures
engendered by this incremental approach to the construction of EMU have
been catastrophic for the citizens of many crisis-plagued member states. Politically, the perception that the EU is constantly in crisis and in need of reforms to salvage the union is undermining popular support for European
integration.