This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although... more This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although they may explain various religious beliefs, they are weak at explaining religious experiences—including the very perception-like experiences that believers often take as grounding their belief in God. The account argues that cognitive science of religion (CSR) to date provides neither the full-blown concept of a deity nor dedicated cognitive resources for arriving at the perception of one. The gap is not inevitable, however: it is shown how certain religious experiences could indeed qualify as direct perceptions of God, on a traditional model of perception. Moreover, one can explain how humans acquired the conceptual and computational resources to perceive supernatural beings by supposing that human beings have actually interacted with such beings in evolutionarily significant ways throughout history. The chapter closes with some epistemic implications of looking at CSR in this “reforme...
A BSTRACT The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosoph... more A BSTRACT The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name ‘taking tense seriously’; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the ...
There's a problem with my attempt to define the ancestral of a certain causal relation in (D14). ... more There's a problem with my attempt to define the ancestral of a certain causal relation in (D14). Felix Schweitzer pointed it out to me, and I'm grateful for correspondence with him about how best to fix it. Here's what I should have said:
In the case of homeomerous K-stuff, every proper part of a stage must itself be a stage of some K-stuff; and if the larger stage is a stage of some stuff that persists, this smaller stage must also be a stage of some stuff that persists — since any gain or loss of some K yields a slightly different mass of K. Consequently, every proper part of a stage must be causally connected to earlier and later K-stages, if it is to be a temporal part of some persisting K. This requirement is met by first defining “proximate” intrinsic causes, and then the ancestral of this relation.
(D13) Stage x of a mass of K is a proximate intrinsic cause of stage y of a mass of K =df (1) x and y are both stages of masses of K, (2) stage x is an intrinsic cause of stage y, and (3) for every u such that u is a proper part of the substrate of x, there is a v such that: (a) v is a proper part of the substrate of y, and (b) u is an intrinsic cause of v.
(D14) Stage x of a mass of K is an intrinsic causal ancestor of stage y of a mass of K =df x is a member of every set of stages S which is such that: (1) every member is a stage of a mass of K, (2) y is a member of S, and (3) for all stages u and v, if u is a member of S and v is a proximate intrinsic cause of u, then v is a member of S.
I will say that x is intrinsically causally connected to y just in case either x is an intrinsic causal ancestor of y, or vice versa.
Consider two of the central features of a Cartesian physics, for instance: There are no absolute ... more Consider two of the central features of a Cartesian physics, for instance: There are no absolute atomic bits of matter -- no particles indivisible but extended, nor indivisible because unextended. And there can be no vacuum; rather, ...
Howard Robinson's *From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance* contains two quite differ... more Howard Robinson's *From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance* contains two quite different arguments from the vagueness of composite objects to the conclusion that I am not a physical object at all. One of them, developed over the course of several chapters, takes the following form: All composite physical objects (and only composite physical objects are candidates to be a human being) are non-fundamental; non-fundamental things are inevitably vague in various ways; this vagueness shows that we must "make a conceptual interpretation of them", treating them as "artefacts of conceptualisation"; and this in turn precludes our identifying ourselves with any such things. Some interesting morals fall out of close consideration of Robinson's argument; but, in the end, materialists can reasonably resist it.
This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although... more This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although they may explain various religious beliefs, they are weak at explaining religious experiences—including the very perception-like experiences that believers often take as grounding their belief in God. The account argues that cognitive science of religion (CSR) to date provides neither the full-blown concept of a deity nor dedicated cognitive resources for arriving at the perception of one. The gap is not inevitable, however: it is shown how certain religious experiences could indeed qualify as direct perceptions of God, on a traditional model of perception. Moreover, one can explain how humans acquired the conceptual and computational resources to perceive supernatural beings by supposing that human beings have actually interacted with such beings in evolutionarily significant ways throughout history. The chapter closes with some epistemic implications of looking at CSR in this “reforme...
This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although... more This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although they may explain various religious beliefs, they are weak at explaining religious experiences—including the very perception-like experiences that believers often take as grounding their belief in God. The account argues that cognitive science of religion (CSR) to date provides neither the full-blown concept of a deity nor dedicated cognitive resources for arriving at the perception of one. The gap is not inevitable, however: it is shown how certain religious experiences could indeed qualify as direct perceptions of God, on a traditional model of perception. Moreover, one can explain how humans acquired the conceptual and computational resources to perceive supernatural beings by supposing that human beings have actually interacted with such beings in evolutionarily significant ways throughout history. The chapter closes with some epistemic implications of looking at CSR in this “reforme...
A BSTRACT The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosoph... more A BSTRACT The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name ‘taking tense seriously’; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the ...
There's a problem with my attempt to define the ancestral of a certain causal relation in (D14). ... more There's a problem with my attempt to define the ancestral of a certain causal relation in (D14). Felix Schweitzer pointed it out to me, and I'm grateful for correspondence with him about how best to fix it. Here's what I should have said:
In the case of homeomerous K-stuff, every proper part of a stage must itself be a stage of some K-stuff; and if the larger stage is a stage of some stuff that persists, this smaller stage must also be a stage of some stuff that persists — since any gain or loss of some K yields a slightly different mass of K. Consequently, every proper part of a stage must be causally connected to earlier and later K-stages, if it is to be a temporal part of some persisting K. This requirement is met by first defining “proximate” intrinsic causes, and then the ancestral of this relation.
(D13) Stage x of a mass of K is a proximate intrinsic cause of stage y of a mass of K =df (1) x and y are both stages of masses of K, (2) stage x is an intrinsic cause of stage y, and (3) for every u such that u is a proper part of the substrate of x, there is a v such that: (a) v is a proper part of the substrate of y, and (b) u is an intrinsic cause of v.
(D14) Stage x of a mass of K is an intrinsic causal ancestor of stage y of a mass of K =df x is a member of every set of stages S which is such that: (1) every member is a stage of a mass of K, (2) y is a member of S, and (3) for all stages u and v, if u is a member of S and v is a proximate intrinsic cause of u, then v is a member of S.
I will say that x is intrinsically causally connected to y just in case either x is an intrinsic causal ancestor of y, or vice versa.
Consider two of the central features of a Cartesian physics, for instance: There are no absolute ... more Consider two of the central features of a Cartesian physics, for instance: There are no absolute atomic bits of matter -- no particles indivisible but extended, nor indivisible because unextended. And there can be no vacuum; rather, ...
Howard Robinson's *From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance* contains two quite differ... more Howard Robinson's *From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance* contains two quite different arguments from the vagueness of composite objects to the conclusion that I am not a physical object at all. One of them, developed over the course of several chapters, takes the following form: All composite physical objects (and only composite physical objects are candidates to be a human being) are non-fundamental; non-fundamental things are inevitably vague in various ways; this vagueness shows that we must "make a conceptual interpretation of them", treating them as "artefacts of conceptualisation"; and this in turn precludes our identifying ourselves with any such things. Some interesting morals fall out of close consideration of Robinson's argument; but, in the end, materialists can reasonably resist it.
This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although... more This chapter focuses on a gap in existing cognitive scientific explanations of religion: although they may explain various religious beliefs, they are weak at explaining religious experiences—including the very perception-like experiences that believers often take as grounding their belief in God. The account argues that cognitive science of religion (CSR) to date provides neither the full-blown concept of a deity nor dedicated cognitive resources for arriving at the perception of one. The gap is not inevitable, however: it is shown how certain religious experiences could indeed qualify as direct perceptions of God, on a traditional model of perception. Moreover, one can explain how humans acquired the conceptual and computational resources to perceive supernatural beings by supposing that human beings have actually interacted with such beings in evolutionarily significant ways throughout history. The chapter closes with some epistemic implications of looking at CSR in this “reforme...
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Papers by Dean Zimmerman
In the case of homeomerous K-stuff, every proper part of a stage must itself be a stage of some K-stuff; and if the larger stage is a stage of some stuff that persists, this smaller stage must also be a stage of some stuff that persists — since any gain or loss of some K yields a slightly different mass of K. Consequently, every proper part of a stage must be causally connected to earlier and later K-stages, if it is to be a temporal part of some persisting K. This requirement is met by first defining “proximate” intrinsic causes, and then the ancestral of this relation.
(D13) Stage x of a mass of K is a proximate intrinsic cause of stage y of a mass of K =df (1) x and y are both stages of masses of K, (2) stage x is an intrinsic cause of stage y, and (3) for every u such that u is a proper part of the substrate of x, there is a v such that: (a) v is a proper part of the substrate of y, and (b) u is an intrinsic cause of v.
(D14) Stage x of a mass of K is an intrinsic causal ancestor of stage y of a mass of K =df x is a member of every set of stages S which is such that: (1) every member is a stage of a mass of K, (2) y is a member of S, and (3) for all stages u and v, if u is a member of S and v is a proximate intrinsic cause of u, then v is a member of S.
I will say that x is intrinsically causally connected to y just in case either x is an intrinsic causal ancestor of y, or vice versa.
In the case of homeomerous K-stuff, every proper part of a stage must itself be a stage of some K-stuff; and if the larger stage is a stage of some stuff that persists, this smaller stage must also be a stage of some stuff that persists — since any gain or loss of some K yields a slightly different mass of K. Consequently, every proper part of a stage must be causally connected to earlier and later K-stages, if it is to be a temporal part of some persisting K. This requirement is met by first defining “proximate” intrinsic causes, and then the ancestral of this relation.
(D13) Stage x of a mass of K is a proximate intrinsic cause of stage y of a mass of K =df (1) x and y are both stages of masses of K, (2) stage x is an intrinsic cause of stage y, and (3) for every u such that u is a proper part of the substrate of x, there is a v such that: (a) v is a proper part of the substrate of y, and (b) u is an intrinsic cause of v.
(D14) Stage x of a mass of K is an intrinsic causal ancestor of stage y of a mass of K =df x is a member of every set of stages S which is such that: (1) every member is a stage of a mass of K, (2) y is a member of S, and (3) for all stages u and v, if u is a member of S and v is a proximate intrinsic cause of u, then v is a member of S.
I will say that x is intrinsically causally connected to y just in case either x is an intrinsic causal ancestor of y, or vice versa.