My research interests include non-state/hybrid actors across the Middle East and North Africa, military strategy and its future, geopolitics and the dynamics of civil war violence. I am fluent in German, English, French, Arabic and Italian, and based between Paris, Vienna and the Middle East.
The current conflict in Yemen, which began in 2014, has been well-mapped by a number of distinct ... more The current conflict in Yemen, which began in 2014, has been well-mapped by a number of distinct initiatives. There are daily maps detailing the presence of armed groups, the activities of NGOs, the distribution of public goods, and – most commonly – territorial control. This increase of maps has been driven by the explosion of available data as well as the availability of (open-source) mapping software, although there has been a lower proliferation of maps for Yemen relative to other conflicts, like Syria.
This paper will argue that the wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist)-doctrine, implemente... more This paper will argue that the wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist)-doctrine, implemented in the Iranian revolution in 1979 through Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s efforts, is not in rupture but in continuity with the Shiite tradition, as the scope of guardianship (wilaya) or what was earlier designated ‘deputyship’ (niyaba) of the jurist, expanded continuously throughout Shiite political thought and history. Although the fact that the jurists started to lead the Shiites in the political sphere in 1979 was new, the ongoing expansion of deputyship (niyaba) and subsequent wilaya (guardianship) saw its logical outcome in the 1979 version through the incremental seizure of more and more authority by the jurists.
This paper will argue that neoclassical realism suits itself very well for the study of grand str... more This paper will argue that neoclassical realism suits itself very well for the study of grand strategy. Situated at the nexus between systemic forces and domestic forces, neoclassical realism, in this paper conceived as an extension of structural realism, has similar assumptions to Grand Strategy study with regards to how Foreign policy setting works in practice. To show why neoclassical realism fares better than structural realism, in the study of Grand Strategy, I will start with an extensive discussion about the differences between structural realism and neoclassical realism. After that, I will determine how neoclassical realism can serve well in studying the subject matter. Following, I will outline contributions by authors who had applied neoclassical realism to the study of Grand Strategy to get a grasp of its rich research programme. Throughout the paper, I will deduce some shortcomings and pitfalls of neoclassical realism-among them the problem of theorization, predictability and proliferation of variables.
“I’m Zaydi, no problem. But when you come and tell me, ‘You are a polytheist (mušrik) an innovato... more “I’m Zaydi, no problem. But when you come and tell me, ‘You are a polytheist (mušrik) an innovator in religion (mubtadiʾ), and your forefather went astray (aid l-dalāl),’ I will automatically question who I am and begin returning to my roots. This was one of the most important reasons that brought Zaydism back to life.” -----
I will start with an introduction of the history of the Zaydi faith and its fundamental theological doctrines, continue with an outline of the 1000 years Imamate until the coup in 1962 and subsequent civil war, before analysing the trail to the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen which provided new space for political activism that was cannily exploited by Zaydi activists. Then I will shed light on the Saʿdah wars (2004-2010) through which the Zaydi revival managed to develop a powerful social revolutionary and political component and solidified the Houthi movement. The concluding chapter will deal with the ‘fall’ of President Saleh in 2011 and the Zaydi revivalism which gained momentum thereafter, shedding light on the 2012 declaration by senior Zaydi scholars voicing preference for the Imamate as preferred political identity. (Dorlian 2013: 210)
In this essay, we try to investigate whether we now live in a unipolar or multipolar world and ho... more In this essay, we try to investigate whether we now live in a unipolar or multipolar world and how deterrence changed through the change of the system, if it changed at all. How nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence are in interplay is examined, although we mainly focus on nuclear deterrence since all great powers possess nuclear weapons. Then, preconditions for deterrence in the new system will be presented before blazing the trail to challenges and shortcomings such as false warning incidents and human recklessness. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of Artificial Intelligence and Cybersecurity on nuclear deterrence will be examined before giving a short outlook to future developments.
This essay tries to investigate whether just war criteria and current International Law can serve... more This essay tries to investigate whether just war criteria and current International Law can serve as a tool to limit the enormous scope of cyber-operations and its legitimate defensive responses. More light will be shed on the question of jus ad bellum than on jus in bello, based on the hypothesis that the former poses a more fundamental problem, above all with regards to the “attribution problem”. As Dever & Dever (2013) state, cyber defense models “rely heavily upon the advancement of technological capability to assist with the ever vexing issue of attribution.” (Robinson/Jones/Janicke 2015: 87) Friesen (2009) agrees with the statement, adding that the inability to attribute a cyber attack stands in the way of regulating cyber warfare. (ibid.)
Elucidating the most serious issue with regards to the permissibility of the use of force, the “attribution problem” (Barrett 2015: 387), will then lead us to analyse the relation between attribution & deterrence. We will see that increasing protection trumps attribution and the responsive use of force, although attribution remains crucial for deterrence issues. Following neo-realist assumptions that states with more power and better technology may intentionally falsely identify less powerful states or groups as perpetrators to legitimately wage retributive cyber-strikes to expand their interest and increase their relative capabilities, international solutions modelled on UNSC-R 1373 are briefly presented to serve as a solution to the multi-faceted issue.
Das Paper analysiert historische Interpretationen des Koranverses 2:256 - "In der Religion gibt e... more Das Paper analysiert historische Interpretationen des Koranverses 2:256 - "In der Religion gibt es keinen Zwang...". Korankommentare von Fakhr ad-Din al-Razi und Ibn Ashuur werden genauer analysiert und in den historischen Kontext mit anderen Kommentaren von at-Tabari, az-Zamakshari, Sayyid Qutb, u.vm. gesetzt.
As the offensive to reconquer Idlib starts, it is useful to recall that the notion of 'Useful Syr... more As the offensive to reconquer Idlib starts, it is useful to recall that the notion of 'Useful Syria' as geographic reference to the population-rich axis of Aleppo-Homs-Damascus, as well as the coastal areas of Latakia and Tartus, does not accurately reflect the regime´s intention of reconquering all of Syria. This makes the Idlib offensive not the end of the civil war, but merely its next stage that will be followed by further regime manoeuvring and fighting to retake the country´s north and east. It makes more sense to reconceptualie 'Useful Syria' in terms of loyalty, i.e. as reference to the regime's policies to consolidate its power by rewarding loyalty and punishing 'betrayal'.
This article is part of my work at the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Clingendael Institute in The Hague
In 1972 Saddam Hussein told the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council: “we all love Iraq; one atom ... more In 1972 Saddam Hussein told the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council: “we all love Iraq; one atom of it is equivalent to one atom of enriched uranium.” (p.44) Notwithstanding this opulent rhetoric, there was no green light for a nuclear weapons program until Hussein formally seized power at the end of the 70s. Throughout the 60s and 70s, the Iraqi nuclear program could be described as ‘Unclear Physics’, as Braut-Hegghammer indicates. With the title of the book, she refers to an anecdote, according to which the secretary of leading Iraqi nuclear physicist Jafar Dhiya Jafar erroneously typed the heading ‘Department of Unclear Physics’ instead of ‘Department of Nuclear Physics’. Jafar drily told a colleague that this was an accurate characterization of the program. (p.42)
How can ‘Unclear Physics’ be an accurate characterization of the two nuclear programs?
‘Globalizing Capital’, as the title indicates, is about the role that changes in international ca... more ‘Globalizing Capital’, as the title indicates, is about the role that changes in international capital movements had in shaping the international currency regime and which implications this has for international trade. Barry Eichengreen tries to understand the drastic shift to floating exchange rates after the failure of Bretton Woods. The usual argument is that because international capital mobility increased, a shift from fixed to flexible exchange rates was the inevitable result. The author objects. To understand the move from pegged-but-adjustable rates under Bretton Woods to floating exchange rates or hard-pegged currencies one needs to historically analyse the evolution of the international monetary system and avoid concluding that increased capital flows were the only variable that pressured governments to give up pegged-but-adjustable exchange rates.
كان فرغ جيبك يكثر عيبك - If your pockets get empty, your faults will be many.
This Libyan prover... more كان فرغ جيبك يكثر عيبك - If your pockets get empty, your faults will be many.
This Libyan proverb which the author uses himself before the table of contents magnificently summarizes the whole book and anticipates the conclusion. If the oil boom (or other sources that enable abundant foreign income) stalls in distributive states, also called rentier states, such as Libya, the whole country will face problems. Attempts of economic liberalisation are often doomed to fail due to two crucial points: the absence of proper institutions to regulate the liberalisation and the problem of having to reduce the payment of rents to supporting political coalitions. The absence of regulating institutions is caused by the absence of extractive practices such as taxes because the foreign income on natural resources allows the state to finance its activities without having to rely and bargain with its population which would produce these regulating institutions-as for example happened in Europe. Instead, the regime of the distributive state is able to buy off political support. The second problem comes into play here: in times of crisis, the regime usually needs to cut government spending to remain economically sustainable. As in distributive states, power by the regime is usually exchanged for wealth with crucial groups, cutting spending might heavily endanger the regimes stability as these groups/coalitions will reclaim their power and usually (try) to overthrow the regime.
The current conflict in Yemen, which began in 2014, has been well-mapped by a number of distinct ... more The current conflict in Yemen, which began in 2014, has been well-mapped by a number of distinct initiatives. There are daily maps detailing the presence of armed groups, the activities of NGOs, the distribution of public goods, and – most commonly – territorial control. This increase of maps has been driven by the explosion of available data as well as the availability of (open-source) mapping software, although there has been a lower proliferation of maps for Yemen relative to other conflicts, like Syria.
This paper will argue that the wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist)-doctrine, implemente... more This paper will argue that the wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist)-doctrine, implemented in the Iranian revolution in 1979 through Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s efforts, is not in rupture but in continuity with the Shiite tradition, as the scope of guardianship (wilaya) or what was earlier designated ‘deputyship’ (niyaba) of the jurist, expanded continuously throughout Shiite political thought and history. Although the fact that the jurists started to lead the Shiites in the political sphere in 1979 was new, the ongoing expansion of deputyship (niyaba) and subsequent wilaya (guardianship) saw its logical outcome in the 1979 version through the incremental seizure of more and more authority by the jurists.
This paper will argue that neoclassical realism suits itself very well for the study of grand str... more This paper will argue that neoclassical realism suits itself very well for the study of grand strategy. Situated at the nexus between systemic forces and domestic forces, neoclassical realism, in this paper conceived as an extension of structural realism, has similar assumptions to Grand Strategy study with regards to how Foreign policy setting works in practice. To show why neoclassical realism fares better than structural realism, in the study of Grand Strategy, I will start with an extensive discussion about the differences between structural realism and neoclassical realism. After that, I will determine how neoclassical realism can serve well in studying the subject matter. Following, I will outline contributions by authors who had applied neoclassical realism to the study of Grand Strategy to get a grasp of its rich research programme. Throughout the paper, I will deduce some shortcomings and pitfalls of neoclassical realism-among them the problem of theorization, predictability and proliferation of variables.
“I’m Zaydi, no problem. But when you come and tell me, ‘You are a polytheist (mušrik) an innovato... more “I’m Zaydi, no problem. But when you come and tell me, ‘You are a polytheist (mušrik) an innovator in religion (mubtadiʾ), and your forefather went astray (aid l-dalāl),’ I will automatically question who I am and begin returning to my roots. This was one of the most important reasons that brought Zaydism back to life.” -----
I will start with an introduction of the history of the Zaydi faith and its fundamental theological doctrines, continue with an outline of the 1000 years Imamate until the coup in 1962 and subsequent civil war, before analysing the trail to the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen which provided new space for political activism that was cannily exploited by Zaydi activists. Then I will shed light on the Saʿdah wars (2004-2010) through which the Zaydi revival managed to develop a powerful social revolutionary and political component and solidified the Houthi movement. The concluding chapter will deal with the ‘fall’ of President Saleh in 2011 and the Zaydi revivalism which gained momentum thereafter, shedding light on the 2012 declaration by senior Zaydi scholars voicing preference for the Imamate as preferred political identity. (Dorlian 2013: 210)
In this essay, we try to investigate whether we now live in a unipolar or multipolar world and ho... more In this essay, we try to investigate whether we now live in a unipolar or multipolar world and how deterrence changed through the change of the system, if it changed at all. How nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence are in interplay is examined, although we mainly focus on nuclear deterrence since all great powers possess nuclear weapons. Then, preconditions for deterrence in the new system will be presented before blazing the trail to challenges and shortcomings such as false warning incidents and human recklessness. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of Artificial Intelligence and Cybersecurity on nuclear deterrence will be examined before giving a short outlook to future developments.
This essay tries to investigate whether just war criteria and current International Law can serve... more This essay tries to investigate whether just war criteria and current International Law can serve as a tool to limit the enormous scope of cyber-operations and its legitimate defensive responses. More light will be shed on the question of jus ad bellum than on jus in bello, based on the hypothesis that the former poses a more fundamental problem, above all with regards to the “attribution problem”. As Dever & Dever (2013) state, cyber defense models “rely heavily upon the advancement of technological capability to assist with the ever vexing issue of attribution.” (Robinson/Jones/Janicke 2015: 87) Friesen (2009) agrees with the statement, adding that the inability to attribute a cyber attack stands in the way of regulating cyber warfare. (ibid.)
Elucidating the most serious issue with regards to the permissibility of the use of force, the “attribution problem” (Barrett 2015: 387), will then lead us to analyse the relation between attribution & deterrence. We will see that increasing protection trumps attribution and the responsive use of force, although attribution remains crucial for deterrence issues. Following neo-realist assumptions that states with more power and better technology may intentionally falsely identify less powerful states or groups as perpetrators to legitimately wage retributive cyber-strikes to expand their interest and increase their relative capabilities, international solutions modelled on UNSC-R 1373 are briefly presented to serve as a solution to the multi-faceted issue.
Das Paper analysiert historische Interpretationen des Koranverses 2:256 - "In der Religion gibt e... more Das Paper analysiert historische Interpretationen des Koranverses 2:256 - "In der Religion gibt es keinen Zwang...". Korankommentare von Fakhr ad-Din al-Razi und Ibn Ashuur werden genauer analysiert und in den historischen Kontext mit anderen Kommentaren von at-Tabari, az-Zamakshari, Sayyid Qutb, u.vm. gesetzt.
As the offensive to reconquer Idlib starts, it is useful to recall that the notion of 'Useful Syr... more As the offensive to reconquer Idlib starts, it is useful to recall that the notion of 'Useful Syria' as geographic reference to the population-rich axis of Aleppo-Homs-Damascus, as well as the coastal areas of Latakia and Tartus, does not accurately reflect the regime´s intention of reconquering all of Syria. This makes the Idlib offensive not the end of the civil war, but merely its next stage that will be followed by further regime manoeuvring and fighting to retake the country´s north and east. It makes more sense to reconceptualie 'Useful Syria' in terms of loyalty, i.e. as reference to the regime's policies to consolidate its power by rewarding loyalty and punishing 'betrayal'.
This article is part of my work at the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Clingendael Institute in The Hague
In 1972 Saddam Hussein told the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council: “we all love Iraq; one atom ... more In 1972 Saddam Hussein told the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council: “we all love Iraq; one atom of it is equivalent to one atom of enriched uranium.” (p.44) Notwithstanding this opulent rhetoric, there was no green light for a nuclear weapons program until Hussein formally seized power at the end of the 70s. Throughout the 60s and 70s, the Iraqi nuclear program could be described as ‘Unclear Physics’, as Braut-Hegghammer indicates. With the title of the book, she refers to an anecdote, according to which the secretary of leading Iraqi nuclear physicist Jafar Dhiya Jafar erroneously typed the heading ‘Department of Unclear Physics’ instead of ‘Department of Nuclear Physics’. Jafar drily told a colleague that this was an accurate characterization of the program. (p.42)
How can ‘Unclear Physics’ be an accurate characterization of the two nuclear programs?
‘Globalizing Capital’, as the title indicates, is about the role that changes in international ca... more ‘Globalizing Capital’, as the title indicates, is about the role that changes in international capital movements had in shaping the international currency regime and which implications this has for international trade. Barry Eichengreen tries to understand the drastic shift to floating exchange rates after the failure of Bretton Woods. The usual argument is that because international capital mobility increased, a shift from fixed to flexible exchange rates was the inevitable result. The author objects. To understand the move from pegged-but-adjustable rates under Bretton Woods to floating exchange rates or hard-pegged currencies one needs to historically analyse the evolution of the international monetary system and avoid concluding that increased capital flows were the only variable that pressured governments to give up pegged-but-adjustable exchange rates.
كان فرغ جيبك يكثر عيبك - If your pockets get empty, your faults will be many.
This Libyan prover... more كان فرغ جيبك يكثر عيبك - If your pockets get empty, your faults will be many.
This Libyan proverb which the author uses himself before the table of contents magnificently summarizes the whole book and anticipates the conclusion. If the oil boom (or other sources that enable abundant foreign income) stalls in distributive states, also called rentier states, such as Libya, the whole country will face problems. Attempts of economic liberalisation are often doomed to fail due to two crucial points: the absence of proper institutions to regulate the liberalisation and the problem of having to reduce the payment of rents to supporting political coalitions. The absence of regulating institutions is caused by the absence of extractive practices such as taxes because the foreign income on natural resources allows the state to finance its activities without having to rely and bargain with its population which would produce these regulating institutions-as for example happened in Europe. Instead, the regime of the distributive state is able to buy off political support. The second problem comes into play here: in times of crisis, the regime usually needs to cut government spending to remain economically sustainable. As in distributive states, power by the regime is usually exchanged for wealth with crucial groups, cutting spending might heavily endanger the regimes stability as these groups/coalitions will reclaim their power and usually (try) to overthrow the regime.
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Papers by Matthias Sulz
I will start with an introduction of the history of the Zaydi faith and its fundamental theological doctrines, continue with an outline of the 1000 years Imamate until the coup in 1962 and subsequent civil war, before analysing the trail to the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen which provided new space for political activism that was cannily exploited by Zaydi activists. Then I will shed light on the Saʿdah wars (2004-2010) through which the Zaydi revival managed to develop a powerful social revolutionary and political component and solidified the Houthi movement. The concluding chapter will deal with the ‘fall’ of President Saleh in 2011 and the Zaydi revivalism which gained momentum thereafter, shedding light on the 2012 declaration by senior Zaydi scholars voicing preference for the Imamate as preferred political identity. (Dorlian 2013: 210)
Elucidating the most serious issue with regards to the permissibility of the use of force, the “attribution problem” (Barrett 2015: 387), will then lead us to analyse the relation between attribution & deterrence. We will see that increasing protection trumps attribution and the responsive use of force, although attribution remains crucial for deterrence issues. Following neo-realist assumptions that states with more power and better technology may intentionally falsely identify less powerful states or groups as perpetrators to legitimately wage retributive cyber-strikes to expand their interest and increase their relative capabilities, international solutions modelled on UNSC-R 1373 are briefly presented to serve as a solution to the multi-faceted issue.
This article is part of my work at the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Clingendael Institute in The Hague
Book Reviews by Matthias Sulz
How can ‘Unclear Physics’ be an accurate characterization of the two nuclear programs?
This Libyan proverb which the author uses himself before the table of contents magnificently summarizes the whole book and anticipates the conclusion. If the oil boom (or other sources that enable abundant foreign income) stalls in distributive states, also called rentier states, such as Libya, the whole country will face problems. Attempts of economic liberalisation are often doomed to fail due to two crucial points: the absence of proper institutions to regulate the liberalisation and the problem of having to reduce the payment of rents to supporting political coalitions. The absence of regulating institutions is caused by the absence of extractive practices such as taxes because the foreign income on natural resources allows the state to finance its activities without having to rely and bargain with its population which would produce these regulating institutions-as for example happened in Europe. Instead, the regime of the distributive state is able to buy off political support. The second problem comes into play here: in times of crisis, the regime usually needs to cut government spending to remain economically sustainable. As in distributive states, power by the regime is usually exchanged for wealth with crucial groups, cutting spending might heavily endanger the regimes stability as these groups/coalitions will reclaim their power and usually (try) to overthrow the regime.
I will start with an introduction of the history of the Zaydi faith and its fundamental theological doctrines, continue with an outline of the 1000 years Imamate until the coup in 1962 and subsequent civil war, before analysing the trail to the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen which provided new space for political activism that was cannily exploited by Zaydi activists. Then I will shed light on the Saʿdah wars (2004-2010) through which the Zaydi revival managed to develop a powerful social revolutionary and political component and solidified the Houthi movement. The concluding chapter will deal with the ‘fall’ of President Saleh in 2011 and the Zaydi revivalism which gained momentum thereafter, shedding light on the 2012 declaration by senior Zaydi scholars voicing preference for the Imamate as preferred political identity. (Dorlian 2013: 210)
Elucidating the most serious issue with regards to the permissibility of the use of force, the “attribution problem” (Barrett 2015: 387), will then lead us to analyse the relation between attribution & deterrence. We will see that increasing protection trumps attribution and the responsive use of force, although attribution remains crucial for deterrence issues. Following neo-realist assumptions that states with more power and better technology may intentionally falsely identify less powerful states or groups as perpetrators to legitimately wage retributive cyber-strikes to expand their interest and increase their relative capabilities, international solutions modelled on UNSC-R 1373 are briefly presented to serve as a solution to the multi-faceted issue.
This article is part of my work at the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Clingendael Institute in The Hague
How can ‘Unclear Physics’ be an accurate characterization of the two nuclear programs?
This Libyan proverb which the author uses himself before the table of contents magnificently summarizes the whole book and anticipates the conclusion. If the oil boom (or other sources that enable abundant foreign income) stalls in distributive states, also called rentier states, such as Libya, the whole country will face problems. Attempts of economic liberalisation are often doomed to fail due to two crucial points: the absence of proper institutions to regulate the liberalisation and the problem of having to reduce the payment of rents to supporting political coalitions. The absence of regulating institutions is caused by the absence of extractive practices such as taxes because the foreign income on natural resources allows the state to finance its activities without having to rely and bargain with its population which would produce these regulating institutions-as for example happened in Europe. Instead, the regime of the distributive state is able to buy off political support. The second problem comes into play here: in times of crisis, the regime usually needs to cut government spending to remain economically sustainable. As in distributive states, power by the regime is usually exchanged for wealth with crucial groups, cutting spending might heavily endanger the regimes stability as these groups/coalitions will reclaim their power and usually (try) to overthrow the regime.