Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy , 2023
Entry for the Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (eds., M. Sellers, S. K... more Entry for the Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (eds., M. Sellers, S. Kirste).
In The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, edited by Justin Khoo a... more In The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, edited by Justin Khoo and Rachel Sterken.
Co-authored with Veronica Ivy (Rachel McKinnon). In Microaggressions and Philosophy, edited by La... more Co-authored with Veronica Ivy (Rachel McKinnon). In Microaggressions and Philosophy, edited by Lauren Freeman and Jeanine Weekes Schroer.
Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics and Social Justice , 2018
Invited chapter for: Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics and Social Justice, edited by Kendy Hess, Vio... more Invited chapter for: Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics and Social Justice, edited by Kendy Hess, Violetta Igneski, and Tracy Isaacs. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Forthcoming 2018)
One striking feature of any anti-oppression movement is the range of people who understand themselves as acting jointly within them. In feminist action, for instance, people are situated differently along lines of race, class, sexuality, immigration and citizenship status, physical and mental ability, and, of course, gender. Such differences descriptively and normatively impact what it means for an agent to engage in joint actions. In order to understand how agents act together, we must first understand how agents share intentions. However, standard accounts of shared intention begin from an agent-neutral stance, wherein agents have no substantive identity or social location. This methodology fails to consider the social situation of agents, unjustified power relations between agents, and the impact that such inequalities have one’s agency. Broadly conceived, my project calls into doubt any account of shared intention that presupposes the agent-neutral methodology of ideal theory. The idealizing conditions required by such a methodology result in accounts of shared intention for which there are, at best, few actual instances. If our goal is to understand how real people share intentions in the actual world, then this methodology prevents us from doing so.
Microaggressions are a new moral category that refers to the subtle yet harmful forms of discrimi... more Microaggressions are a new moral category that refers to the subtle yet harmful forms of discriminatory behavior experienced by members of oppressed groups. Such behavior often results from implicit bias, leaving individual perpetrators unaware of the harm they have caused. Moreover, microaggressions are often dismissed on the grounds that they do not constitute a real or morally significant harm. My goal is therefore to explain why microaggressions are morally significant and argue that we are responsible for their harms. I offer a conceptual framework for microaggressions, exploring the central mechanisms used for identification and the empirical research concerning their harm. The cumulative harm of microaggressions presents a unique case for understanding disaggregation models for contributed harms, blame allocation, and individual responsibility within structural oppression. Our standard moral model for addressing cumulative harm is to hold all individual contributors blameworthy for their particular contributions. However, if we aim to hold people responsible for their unconscious microaggressions and address cumulative harm holistically, this model is inadequate. Drawing on Iris Marion Young's social connection model, I argue that we, as individual perpetrators of microaggressions, have a responsibility to respond to the cumulative harm to which we have individually contributed.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy , 2023
Entry for the Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (eds., M. Sellers, S. K... more Entry for the Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (eds., M. Sellers, S. Kirste).
In The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, edited by Justin Khoo a... more In The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, edited by Justin Khoo and Rachel Sterken.
Co-authored with Veronica Ivy (Rachel McKinnon). In Microaggressions and Philosophy, edited by La... more Co-authored with Veronica Ivy (Rachel McKinnon). In Microaggressions and Philosophy, edited by Lauren Freeman and Jeanine Weekes Schroer.
Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics and Social Justice , 2018
Invited chapter for: Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics and Social Justice, edited by Kendy Hess, Vio... more Invited chapter for: Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics and Social Justice, edited by Kendy Hess, Violetta Igneski, and Tracy Isaacs. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Forthcoming 2018)
One striking feature of any anti-oppression movement is the range of people who understand themselves as acting jointly within them. In feminist action, for instance, people are situated differently along lines of race, class, sexuality, immigration and citizenship status, physical and mental ability, and, of course, gender. Such differences descriptively and normatively impact what it means for an agent to engage in joint actions. In order to understand how agents act together, we must first understand how agents share intentions. However, standard accounts of shared intention begin from an agent-neutral stance, wherein agents have no substantive identity or social location. This methodology fails to consider the social situation of agents, unjustified power relations between agents, and the impact that such inequalities have one’s agency. Broadly conceived, my project calls into doubt any account of shared intention that presupposes the agent-neutral methodology of ideal theory. The idealizing conditions required by such a methodology result in accounts of shared intention for which there are, at best, few actual instances. If our goal is to understand how real people share intentions in the actual world, then this methodology prevents us from doing so.
Microaggressions are a new moral category that refers to the subtle yet harmful forms of discrimi... more Microaggressions are a new moral category that refers to the subtle yet harmful forms of discriminatory behavior experienced by members of oppressed groups. Such behavior often results from implicit bias, leaving individual perpetrators unaware of the harm they have caused. Moreover, microaggressions are often dismissed on the grounds that they do not constitute a real or morally significant harm. My goal is therefore to explain why microaggressions are morally significant and argue that we are responsible for their harms. I offer a conceptual framework for microaggressions, exploring the central mechanisms used for identification and the empirical research concerning their harm. The cumulative harm of microaggressions presents a unique case for understanding disaggregation models for contributed harms, blame allocation, and individual responsibility within structural oppression. Our standard moral model for addressing cumulative harm is to hold all individual contributors blameworthy for their particular contributions. However, if we aim to hold people responsible for their unconscious microaggressions and address cumulative harm holistically, this model is inadequate. Drawing on Iris Marion Young's social connection model, I argue that we, as individual perpetrators of microaggressions, have a responsibility to respond to the cumulative harm to which we have individually contributed.
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Papers by Christina Friedlaender
One striking feature of any anti-oppression movement is the range of people who understand themselves as acting jointly within them. In feminist action, for instance, people are situated differently along lines of race, class, sexuality, immigration and citizenship status, physical and mental ability, and, of course, gender. Such differences descriptively and normatively impact what it means for an agent to engage in joint actions. In order to understand how agents act together, we must first understand how agents share intentions. However, standard accounts of shared intention begin from an agent-neutral stance, wherein agents have no substantive identity or social location. This methodology fails to consider the social situation of agents, unjustified power relations between agents, and the impact that such inequalities have one’s agency. Broadly conceived, my project calls into doubt any account of shared intention that presupposes the agent-neutral methodology of ideal theory. The idealizing conditions required by such a methodology result in accounts of shared intention for which there are, at best, few actual instances. If our goal is to understand how real people share intentions in the actual world, then this methodology prevents us from doing so.
One striking feature of any anti-oppression movement is the range of people who understand themselves as acting jointly within them. In feminist action, for instance, people are situated differently along lines of race, class, sexuality, immigration and citizenship status, physical and mental ability, and, of course, gender. Such differences descriptively and normatively impact what it means for an agent to engage in joint actions. In order to understand how agents act together, we must first understand how agents share intentions. However, standard accounts of shared intention begin from an agent-neutral stance, wherein agents have no substantive identity or social location. This methodology fails to consider the social situation of agents, unjustified power relations between agents, and the impact that such inequalities have one’s agency. Broadly conceived, my project calls into doubt any account of shared intention that presupposes the agent-neutral methodology of ideal theory. The idealizing conditions required by such a methodology result in accounts of shared intention for which there are, at best, few actual instances. If our goal is to understand how real people share intentions in the actual world, then this methodology prevents us from doing so.