My current research focuses on the epistemology of modality, essence, and grounding Phone: 3107217367 Address: Department of Philosophy 1 Washington Square San Jose, Ca 95192
The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an... more The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an intriguing hypothesis about the nature of human minds that rests on functionalism about various components of mindedness. In this paper we present the Advaita Vedānta account of perception as continuous-part extension against the backdrop of panpsychism. We argue that this view is interesting because it allows us to see how an extended mind style hypothesis can be argued for against the backdrop of panpsychism, as opposed to functionalism.
There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention o... more There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998–2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we callthe problem of modal epistemic friction(PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yieldmodal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality.
Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths are true in virtue of, grounded in, or exp... more Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths are true in virtue of, grounded in, or explained by essentialist truths has been under attack. In what follows we offer two responses to the wave of criticism against his view. While the first response is pretty straightforward, the second is based on the distinction between, what we call, Reductive Finean Essentialism and Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism. Engaging the work of Bob Hale on Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism, we aim to show that the arguments against Fine's view are unconvincing, while we acknowledge the presence of a deep standoff between the two views.
There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention o... more There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998–2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction (PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality.
Tim Crane (The problem of perception. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (... more Tim Crane (The problem of perception. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2011 ed). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2011/entries/perception-problem/, 2011) distinguishes between the metaphysical problem of perception and the epistemological problem of perception. The metaphysical problem can be articulated as a function of the joint inconsistency between several theses concerning the nature of perception, such as the openness to the world thesis and the transparency of experience thesis. Disjunctivism holds that veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences are distinct in some important way. Disjunctivism is often offered as a solution to the metaphysical problem of perception as well as a response to scepticism. In this comparative-philosophical-exploratory essay, I argue that on the basis of a specific reading of the Nya ¯ya misplacement theory of illusion one can generate a specific kind of disjunctivism about perception, which I call causal disjunctivism. Causal disjunctivism is distinct from Duncan Pritchard's epistemic disjunctivism, and John McDowell's metaphysical disjunctivism. The core idea of causal disjunctivism is that the processes that bring about veridical perception are distinct from the process that bring about non-veridical perception at the level of causal generation. Second, on the basis of causal disjunctivism, I go on to show that it offers a plausible solution to the metaphysical problem of perception.
The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an... more The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an intriguing hypothesis about the nature of human minds that rests on functionalism about various components of mindedness. In this paper we present the Advaita Vedānta account of perception as continuous-part extension against the backdrop of panpsychism. We argue that this view is interesting because it allows us to see how an extended mind style hypothesis can be argued for against the backdrop of panpsychism, as opposed to functionalism.
The modality of a statement or proposition S is the manner in which S's truth ho... more The modality of a statement or proposition S is the manner in which S's truth holds. Statements or propositions can be either necessary, possible, or contingent. For example, while the statement 'Aristotle is Plato's student' is actually true, it is only contingently true. It is possible that ...
Page 1. ANAND JAYPRAKASH VAIDYA THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF LOGIC Received 10 November 2004; r... more Page 1. ANAND JAYPRAKASH VAIDYA THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF LOGIC Received 10 November 2004; received in revised version 25 July 2005 1. THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF LOGIC In the philosophy ...
... Correspondence to: Anand J. Vaidya, San Jose State University Philosophy, 1 Washington Squa... more ... Correspondence to: Anand J. Vaidya, San Jose State University Philosophy, 1 Washington Square, San Jose, CA 95192, United States. Email: anand.vaidya@sjsu.edu Anand J. Vaidya is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at San Jose State University. ...
Attention, Not Self (OUP 2017) by Jonardon Ganeri is a path breaking book in the field of cross-c... more Attention, Not Self (OUP 2017) by Jonardon Ganeri is a path breaking book in the field of cross-cultural and multi-disciplinary philosophy. In this review I attend to his discussion of attentional epistemology and the importance of the varieties of attention he discusses, in particular intimation.
The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an... more The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an intriguing hypothesis about the nature of human minds that rests on functionalism about various components of mindedness. In this paper we present the Advaita Vedānta account of perception as continuous-part extension against the backdrop of panpsychism. We argue that this view is interesting because it allows us to see how an extended mind style hypothesis can be argued for against the backdrop of panpsychism, as opposed to functionalism.
There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention o... more There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998–2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we callthe problem of modal epistemic friction(PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yieldmodal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality.
Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths are true in virtue of, grounded in, or exp... more Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths are true in virtue of, grounded in, or explained by essentialist truths has been under attack. In what follows we offer two responses to the wave of criticism against his view. While the first response is pretty straightforward, the second is based on the distinction between, what we call, Reductive Finean Essentialism and Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism. Engaging the work of Bob Hale on Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism, we aim to show that the arguments against Fine's view are unconvincing, while we acknowledge the presence of a deep standoff between the two views.
There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention o... more There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998–2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction (PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality.
Tim Crane (The problem of perception. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (... more Tim Crane (The problem of perception. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2011 ed). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2011/entries/perception-problem/, 2011) distinguishes between the metaphysical problem of perception and the epistemological problem of perception. The metaphysical problem can be articulated as a function of the joint inconsistency between several theses concerning the nature of perception, such as the openness to the world thesis and the transparency of experience thesis. Disjunctivism holds that veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences are distinct in some important way. Disjunctivism is often offered as a solution to the metaphysical problem of perception as well as a response to scepticism. In this comparative-philosophical-exploratory essay, I argue that on the basis of a specific reading of the Nya ¯ya misplacement theory of illusion one can generate a specific kind of disjunctivism about perception, which I call causal disjunctivism. Causal disjunctivism is distinct from Duncan Pritchard's epistemic disjunctivism, and John McDowell's metaphysical disjunctivism. The core idea of causal disjunctivism is that the processes that bring about veridical perception are distinct from the process that bring about non-veridical perception at the level of causal generation. Second, on the basis of causal disjunctivism, I go on to show that it offers a plausible solution to the metaphysical problem of perception.
The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an... more The extended mind hypothesis for the case of belief, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), is an intriguing hypothesis about the nature of human minds that rests on functionalism about various components of mindedness. In this paper we present the Advaita Vedānta account of perception as continuous-part extension against the backdrop of panpsychism. We argue that this view is interesting because it allows us to see how an extended mind style hypothesis can be argued for against the backdrop of panpsychism, as opposed to functionalism.
The modality of a statement or proposition S is the manner in which S's truth ho... more The modality of a statement or proposition S is the manner in which S's truth holds. Statements or propositions can be either necessary, possible, or contingent. For example, while the statement 'Aristotle is Plato's student' is actually true, it is only contingently true. It is possible that ...
Page 1. ANAND JAYPRAKASH VAIDYA THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF LOGIC Received 10 November 2004; r... more Page 1. ANAND JAYPRAKASH VAIDYA THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF LOGIC Received 10 November 2004; received in revised version 25 July 2005 1. THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF LOGIC In the philosophy ...
... Correspondence to: Anand J. Vaidya, San Jose State University Philosophy, 1 Washington Squa... more ... Correspondence to: Anand J. Vaidya, San Jose State University Philosophy, 1 Washington Square, San Jose, CA 95192, United States. Email: anand.vaidya@sjsu.edu Anand J. Vaidya is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at San Jose State University. ...
Attention, Not Self (OUP 2017) by Jonardon Ganeri is a path breaking book in the field of cross-c... more Attention, Not Self (OUP 2017) by Jonardon Ganeri is a path breaking book in the field of cross-cultural and multi-disciplinary philosophy. In this review I attend to his discussion of attentional epistemology and the importance of the varieties of attention he discusses, in particular intimation.
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