Papers by Benjamin Sparkes
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Questions are often used for purposes other than simply obtaining information. They can be design... more Questions are often used for purposes other than simply obtaining information. They can be designed to trip the answerer up, or to make them look good. In this paper, we investigate how machine learning techniques can be applied to this classification problem. We show that sentiment analysis techniques are effective at the problem of determining whether a given question is helpful or unhelpful. This provides a good basis for further investigation, since sentiment analysis techniques can be applied to help determine appropriate responses to questions.
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We implement as basic model of inferring preference from choice, where the objects of preference ... more We implement as basic model of inferring preference from choice, where the objects of preference are distinguished from the objects of choice.
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A short term paper covering some aspects of Veltman’s ‘Making Counterfactual Assumptions’
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Other by Benjamin Sparkes
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Talks by Benjamin Sparkes
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Drafts by Benjamin Sparkes
In this paper I get confused about closure and factivity. More specifically. . .
The paper is co... more In this paper I get confused about closure and factivity. More specifically. . .
The paper is comprised of two sections: In section I, I argue that the problem of scepticism can arise independently form the closure of knowledge under known entailment. The section begins with a non-standard approach to deriving a sceptical paradox, via the factivity of knowledge, and builds a case for the problem of scepticism arising from closure before arguing against the general permissibility of this reasoning. In short, I propose the factual claim that I am not a brain-in-a-vat is as problematic as the epistemic claim that I know I am not a brain-in-a-vat. This paper does not give a response to sceptical challenges. Indeed, I feel the intuitive pull against both the factual and epistemic claims, though it is not clear that everyone does, and attempt to bolster these intuitions with additional argumentation. However, I assume that one does, at least, feel the pull of the latter intuition. My goal is to highlight the assumptions about knowledge that the sceptic can draw upon to raise sceptical doubts, and observe certain consequences of these assumptions. I conclude this section by showing scepticism in the context of factivity is stronger than scepticism in the context of closure, in the sense that the latter follows from the former, and explore the relationship between factivity and closure. In section II, I argue that the observations developed in section I lead to issues with relevant alternative analyses of knowledge. I begin by developing these in the context of Schaffer contrastive analysis of knowledge, before extending the line of argument to relative alternative analyses in general. I conclude this section and the paper by showing how Wright analysis of warrant transmission may be used to identify the issues in sceptical paradoxes as arising from the factivity of knowledge, thereby giving a framework to analyse the issues raised in section I. This paper, therefore, does not seek to give a response to issues raised by scepticism. Our goal, rather, is to show that these issues can be raised independently from the closure of knowledge under known entailment, and further, from what is typically taken to be a fundamental conceptual truth about knowledge—i.e. that it is a factive mental state—an explore certain consequences of this observation.
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Papers by Benjamin Sparkes
Other by Benjamin Sparkes
Talks by Benjamin Sparkes
Drafts by Benjamin Sparkes
The paper is comprised of two sections: In section I, I argue that the problem of scepticism can arise independently form the closure of knowledge under known entailment. The section begins with a non-standard approach to deriving a sceptical paradox, via the factivity of knowledge, and builds a case for the problem of scepticism arising from closure before arguing against the general permissibility of this reasoning. In short, I propose the factual claim that I am not a brain-in-a-vat is as problematic as the epistemic claim that I know I am not a brain-in-a-vat. This paper does not give a response to sceptical challenges. Indeed, I feel the intuitive pull against both the factual and epistemic claims, though it is not clear that everyone does, and attempt to bolster these intuitions with additional argumentation. However, I assume that one does, at least, feel the pull of the latter intuition. My goal is to highlight the assumptions about knowledge that the sceptic can draw upon to raise sceptical doubts, and observe certain consequences of these assumptions. I conclude this section by showing scepticism in the context of factivity is stronger than scepticism in the context of closure, in the sense that the latter follows from the former, and explore the relationship between factivity and closure. In section II, I argue that the observations developed in section I lead to issues with relevant alternative analyses of knowledge. I begin by developing these in the context of Schaffer contrastive analysis of knowledge, before extending the line of argument to relative alternative analyses in general. I conclude this section and the paper by showing how Wright analysis of warrant transmission may be used to identify the issues in sceptical paradoxes as arising from the factivity of knowledge, thereby giving a framework to analyse the issues raised in section I. This paper, therefore, does not seek to give a response to issues raised by scepticism. Our goal, rather, is to show that these issues can be raised independently from the closure of knowledge under known entailment, and further, from what is typically taken to be a fundamental conceptual truth about knowledge—i.e. that it is a factive mental state—an explore certain consequences of this observation.
The paper is comprised of two sections: In section I, I argue that the problem of scepticism can arise independently form the closure of knowledge under known entailment. The section begins with a non-standard approach to deriving a sceptical paradox, via the factivity of knowledge, and builds a case for the problem of scepticism arising from closure before arguing against the general permissibility of this reasoning. In short, I propose the factual claim that I am not a brain-in-a-vat is as problematic as the epistemic claim that I know I am not a brain-in-a-vat. This paper does not give a response to sceptical challenges. Indeed, I feel the intuitive pull against both the factual and epistemic claims, though it is not clear that everyone does, and attempt to bolster these intuitions with additional argumentation. However, I assume that one does, at least, feel the pull of the latter intuition. My goal is to highlight the assumptions about knowledge that the sceptic can draw upon to raise sceptical doubts, and observe certain consequences of these assumptions. I conclude this section by showing scepticism in the context of factivity is stronger than scepticism in the context of closure, in the sense that the latter follows from the former, and explore the relationship between factivity and closure. In section II, I argue that the observations developed in section I lead to issues with relevant alternative analyses of knowledge. I begin by developing these in the context of Schaffer contrastive analysis of knowledge, before extending the line of argument to relative alternative analyses in general. I conclude this section and the paper by showing how Wright analysis of warrant transmission may be used to identify the issues in sceptical paradoxes as arising from the factivity of knowledge, thereby giving a framework to analyse the issues raised in section I. This paper, therefore, does not seek to give a response to issues raised by scepticism. Our goal, rather, is to show that these issues can be raised independently from the closure of knowledge under known entailment, and further, from what is typically taken to be a fundamental conceptual truth about knowledge—i.e. that it is a factive mental state—an explore certain consequences of this observation.