Capt (SA Navy) Dr Dries Putter is a senior lecturer at the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, the Naitonal Security Hu, University of Canberra and the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA). His PhD focussed on Defence Knowledge Management. He holds several master’s degrees - MBL degree from UNISA, MM(S) degree from the University of the Witwatersrand and an MMil (cum laude) from the University of Stellenbosch and a Bachelor of Military Science degree (1994). Capt (SAN) Dr Dries Putter joined the South African National Defence Force as a SA Navy Marine in 1988, served as a Marine Instructor and later as a Naval Officer with deployments on the SAS Drakensberg, SAS Maria van Riebeeck, SA Sederberg, SAS Tafelberg and SAS Protea. During 1998 he joined Defence Intelligence community, and in 2001 he joined Special Forces Brigade research and development team. Since 2003 he served at the Secretariat for Defence in various positions focussing on defence policy, strategy, defence industry, intellectual property and knowledge management. He represented Defence Material Division at the Wassenaar Arrangement Expert Meetings in Vienna since 2016. Capt (SAN) Dr Putter holds best student awards for the Advanced Intelligence Course for International Students (1999)
Drones in the African Battle Spaces The African battle spaces are currently, and increasingly so,... more Drones in the African Battle Spaces The African battle spaces are currently, and increasingly so, cluttered with the use of drones of all sizes and configurations. Countries such as Nigeria,
The prospect of extra-terrestrial (outer space) armed conflict between major powers is a real pos... more The prospect of extra-terrestrial (outer space) armed conflict between major powers is a real possibility. As early as 1966, an Outer Space Treaty was signed by over 100 countries in response to such a possibility. In 2019, NATO declared outer space a new potential war zone or military operational domain alongside air, land, sea, and cyberspace. This new war zone is mainly a strategic frontier, exclusively dominated by a few global superpowers. It would be naive to think that global superpowers’ wars fought in outer space will not have a detrimental socio-economic effect on non-participating countries. On the contrary, an outer space war will have dire consequences for the developing world, such as South Africa. This article is descriptive and explanatory in nature and analyses the potential risks of a twenty-first-century space war to South Africa's national security. It provides a deeper understanding by contextualising the international legal regulation of the military use of space, the use of force against the architecture of space resources, technological advances in satellite systems and weapons, the current geopolitical tensions between the major superpowers related to space and highlights South Africa's international relations with some of these global superpowers.
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2022
A summary of counterintelligence threat chokepoints from the perspectives of the United States, I... more A summary of counterintelligence threat chokepoints from the perspectives of the United States, Israel, the European Union, Nordic countries, and South Africa are presented. These chokepoints seem to stem from geopolitical competitiveness and manifest as espionage, subversion, terrorism, and covert action in any accessible domain possible. The discussion of threat focus areas has been chosen after consideration of the ontology of such threats, including new security challenges like hybrid threats, grey-zone influences, and some specific threats propagated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The discussion concludes with a brief view on counterintelligence threat enablers, accelerators, and effects. The aim is to provide a comparative view of existing counterintelligence threats, agendas, and threat responses to increase both awareness and resilience.
Globally, changes in technology have always shaped the intelligence collection environment. South... more Globally, changes in technology have always shaped the intelligence collection environment. South Africa is no different. The emergence of satellite imagery had a significant influence on the Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) capabilities and, similarly, the emergence of the telegram and later the telephone had and equally significant effect on the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) environment. With communications being revolutionised by mobile technology that include recording, geo-positioning and photography, collection and distribution are ubiquitous. Smart mobile communication technology is also the driver of social media everywhere, at all ages, state, and non-state, non-stop. More recently, Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) has had the same significant influence on the collection of intelligence in general. Globally several examples of the successful exploitation of SOCMINT can be found internationally, it would be surprising if South Africa is not a statistic of this phenomenon ...
Hybrid warfare is gaining traction globally as the preferred option for conducting malicious stat... more Hybrid warfare is gaining traction globally as the preferred option for conducting malicious statecraft in the grey zone between peace and war. University of Canberra professor Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Stellenbosch University lecturer Dries Putter believe that two recent incidents of suspected sabotage at Eskom are examples of “hybrid attacks”. They define hybrid attacks as using unconventional methods to disrupt and disable an opponent without engaging in open hostilities. Such hybrid warfare is often associated with terrorism. Source: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/energy/427090-eskom-sabotage-that-nearly-caused-stage-6-load-shedding-is-hybrid-warfare.html In one incident at Matimba power station in November, a team had been working on the station’s dry cooling fans when they dropped an extension cord onto the unit 2 transformer.
This caused a flash, which tripped the station board and shut down all cooling to units 1, 2, and 3, leading to all three shutting down.
Hybrid warfare is an international phenomenon that is gaining significant traction as the preferr... more Hybrid warfare is an international phenomenon that is gaining significant traction as the preferred option with which to engineer change and to conduct malicious statecraft in the grey zone between peace and war. There is a growing international trend in attacking specific national vulnerabilities within the national power grid critical infrastructure.
The South African Defence Technology and Industrial Sector (SA DTIS) can be considered central to... more The South African Defence Technology and Industrial Sector (SA DTIS) can be considered central to the defence and security complex, economic growth, new technology development and foreign policy of South Africa. Yet, the SA DTIS is in disrepair due to economic pressure and global defence technology and industrial market dynamics, fuelling perceptions that the SA DTIS (typically the State Owned Enterprises) is an economic, defence and security liability. Reversing this situation, from a BRICS perspective, requires a detailed understanding of the prevailing strategic defence technology and industrial business environment, policy approaches and strategic business levers used and preferred internationally and amongst the BRICS States to unlock relationship building and capability development thrust. As such, the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 called for research on BRICS partnership building. Thus, this thesis focuses on BRICS DTIS bilateral relations, specifically - which strategic business levers are prudent to establish bilateral defence technology and industrial partnerships between South Africa and the BRIC States? A qualitative research methodology and case study research approach/design, calibrated by a relativist worldview and social constructivist paradigm, was used to render rich description. Using questionnaires (open-ended inquiry) allowed eighteen DTIS-related experts participation in the study and rigour to the findings of the thesis. The SA DTIS role in the BRICS DTIS ecosystem is described as being a gateway to the African DTIS market segments and a possible collaboration - and supply chain partner for niche technologies-, product systems- and integration services development. Bilateral collaboration was found to be the preferred level of inclusion, based on the discretionary and securitised nature of each DTIS. In the quest for self-sufficiency and/or domination, the strategic motive for bilateral DTIS collaboration is to attain competitive/comparative advantage within a competitive timeframe. The crystallisation of bilateral DTIS partnerships from multilateral alliances such as BRICS is calibrated significantly by the level of asymmetry between prospective partners, national interest, the quest for foreign policy flexibility and military autonomy, national DTIS policy objectives, technology and products niches, and preference for strategic business levers. BRICS States were found to all subscribe to liberal (at least a hybrid) DTIS development approach that allows for a dynamic mix of the facets mentioned above. Within these dynamics possible drivers of bilateral partnerships are the adoption of an idealist approach and liberal/hybrid DTIS policy, continuous investment in the DTIS and militaries, nurturing Tier 1 and/or 2 industrial capabilities, promoting the use of strategic business levers (joint ventures (JVs), technology transfer, foreign direct investment and mergers and acquisitions), recognising the role of Government in developing the DTIS, overlapping market segments, respect for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), amongst others. BRICS DTISs share the ambition to be self-sufficient. Some are ambitious to be dominant also. These drivers and ambitions provide short- to medium-term SA DTIS collaboration development opportunities in the quest for BRIC self-sufficiency/dominance ambitions. Bilateral partnerships barriers relates to asymmetry, differences in approaches to arms control and associated governance, funding asymmetries, a gradually deteriorating SA DTIS contrasted by a rapidly developing BRIC DTISs, divergent national policy frameworks, the short-term nature of SA DTIS opportunities, abuses of IPR (typically China) – all problematic considering the current state of the South African economy and its DTIS. In the short- to medium-term JVs attracted preference as a strategic business lever for bilateral BRICS DTIS partnerships - primarily with Brazil and India. This said, it should not be assumed that bilateral DTIS partnerships between South Africa and the individual BRIC States will be mutually beneficial, no matter the strategic business levers employed, due to the complexity of international DTIS collaboration.
Key Words: BRICS, South African Defence Industry, Defence Industry.
This article argues that both Russia and China will re-invigorate and expand their international ... more This article argues that both Russia and China will re-invigorate and expand their international espionage activities. Russia's renewed vigour in engaging in aggressive espionage campaigns is due to the current setbacks that it is facing as a result of its ill-fated invasion of Ukraine. The sanction-induced prohibitions that limit access to state-of-the-art technologies will unleash renewed enthusiasm to obtain these latest technologies by covert means, be it HUMINT and/or cyberespionage. The future robustness of China's aggressive espionage activities is projected to be fuelled by its systematic 'decoupling' from those nations leading in science, engineering and technology, such as the United States, as well as the growing opposition to the use of developmental institutions such as the Confucius Institute and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as intelligence collection platforms. This article is a pre-print.
Drones in the African Battle Spaces The African battle spaces are currently, and increasingly so,... more Drones in the African Battle Spaces The African battle spaces are currently, and increasingly so, cluttered with the use of drones of all sizes and configurations. Countries such as Nigeria,
The prospect of extra-terrestrial (outer space) armed conflict between major powers is a real pos... more The prospect of extra-terrestrial (outer space) armed conflict between major powers is a real possibility. As early as 1966, an Outer Space Treaty was signed by over 100 countries in response to such a possibility. In 2019, NATO declared outer space a new potential war zone or military operational domain alongside air, land, sea, and cyberspace. This new war zone is mainly a strategic frontier, exclusively dominated by a few global superpowers. It would be naive to think that global superpowers’ wars fought in outer space will not have a detrimental socio-economic effect on non-participating countries. On the contrary, an outer space war will have dire consequences for the developing world, such as South Africa. This article is descriptive and explanatory in nature and analyses the potential risks of a twenty-first-century space war to South Africa's national security. It provides a deeper understanding by contextualising the international legal regulation of the military use of space, the use of force against the architecture of space resources, technological advances in satellite systems and weapons, the current geopolitical tensions between the major superpowers related to space and highlights South Africa's international relations with some of these global superpowers.
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2022
A summary of counterintelligence threat chokepoints from the perspectives of the United States, I... more A summary of counterintelligence threat chokepoints from the perspectives of the United States, Israel, the European Union, Nordic countries, and South Africa are presented. These chokepoints seem to stem from geopolitical competitiveness and manifest as espionage, subversion, terrorism, and covert action in any accessible domain possible. The discussion of threat focus areas has been chosen after consideration of the ontology of such threats, including new security challenges like hybrid threats, grey-zone influences, and some specific threats propagated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The discussion concludes with a brief view on counterintelligence threat enablers, accelerators, and effects. The aim is to provide a comparative view of existing counterintelligence threats, agendas, and threat responses to increase both awareness and resilience.
Globally, changes in technology have always shaped the intelligence collection environment. South... more Globally, changes in technology have always shaped the intelligence collection environment. South Africa is no different. The emergence of satellite imagery had a significant influence on the Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) capabilities and, similarly, the emergence of the telegram and later the telephone had and equally significant effect on the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) environment. With communications being revolutionised by mobile technology that include recording, geo-positioning and photography, collection and distribution are ubiquitous. Smart mobile communication technology is also the driver of social media everywhere, at all ages, state, and non-state, non-stop. More recently, Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) has had the same significant influence on the collection of intelligence in general. Globally several examples of the successful exploitation of SOCMINT can be found internationally, it would be surprising if South Africa is not a statistic of this phenomenon ...
Hybrid warfare is gaining traction globally as the preferred option for conducting malicious stat... more Hybrid warfare is gaining traction globally as the preferred option for conducting malicious statecraft in the grey zone between peace and war. University of Canberra professor Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Stellenbosch University lecturer Dries Putter believe that two recent incidents of suspected sabotage at Eskom are examples of “hybrid attacks”. They define hybrid attacks as using unconventional methods to disrupt and disable an opponent without engaging in open hostilities. Such hybrid warfare is often associated with terrorism. Source: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/energy/427090-eskom-sabotage-that-nearly-caused-stage-6-load-shedding-is-hybrid-warfare.html In one incident at Matimba power station in November, a team had been working on the station’s dry cooling fans when they dropped an extension cord onto the unit 2 transformer.
This caused a flash, which tripped the station board and shut down all cooling to units 1, 2, and 3, leading to all three shutting down.
Hybrid warfare is an international phenomenon that is gaining significant traction as the preferr... more Hybrid warfare is an international phenomenon that is gaining significant traction as the preferred option with which to engineer change and to conduct malicious statecraft in the grey zone between peace and war. There is a growing international trend in attacking specific national vulnerabilities within the national power grid critical infrastructure.
The South African Defence Technology and Industrial Sector (SA DTIS) can be considered central to... more The South African Defence Technology and Industrial Sector (SA DTIS) can be considered central to the defence and security complex, economic growth, new technology development and foreign policy of South Africa. Yet, the SA DTIS is in disrepair due to economic pressure and global defence technology and industrial market dynamics, fuelling perceptions that the SA DTIS (typically the State Owned Enterprises) is an economic, defence and security liability. Reversing this situation, from a BRICS perspective, requires a detailed understanding of the prevailing strategic defence technology and industrial business environment, policy approaches and strategic business levers used and preferred internationally and amongst the BRICS States to unlock relationship building and capability development thrust. As such, the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 called for research on BRICS partnership building. Thus, this thesis focuses on BRICS DTIS bilateral relations, specifically - which strategic business levers are prudent to establish bilateral defence technology and industrial partnerships between South Africa and the BRIC States? A qualitative research methodology and case study research approach/design, calibrated by a relativist worldview and social constructivist paradigm, was used to render rich description. Using questionnaires (open-ended inquiry) allowed eighteen DTIS-related experts participation in the study and rigour to the findings of the thesis. The SA DTIS role in the BRICS DTIS ecosystem is described as being a gateway to the African DTIS market segments and a possible collaboration - and supply chain partner for niche technologies-, product systems- and integration services development. Bilateral collaboration was found to be the preferred level of inclusion, based on the discretionary and securitised nature of each DTIS. In the quest for self-sufficiency and/or domination, the strategic motive for bilateral DTIS collaboration is to attain competitive/comparative advantage within a competitive timeframe. The crystallisation of bilateral DTIS partnerships from multilateral alliances such as BRICS is calibrated significantly by the level of asymmetry between prospective partners, national interest, the quest for foreign policy flexibility and military autonomy, national DTIS policy objectives, technology and products niches, and preference for strategic business levers. BRICS States were found to all subscribe to liberal (at least a hybrid) DTIS development approach that allows for a dynamic mix of the facets mentioned above. Within these dynamics possible drivers of bilateral partnerships are the adoption of an idealist approach and liberal/hybrid DTIS policy, continuous investment in the DTIS and militaries, nurturing Tier 1 and/or 2 industrial capabilities, promoting the use of strategic business levers (joint ventures (JVs), technology transfer, foreign direct investment and mergers and acquisitions), recognising the role of Government in developing the DTIS, overlapping market segments, respect for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), amongst others. BRICS DTISs share the ambition to be self-sufficient. Some are ambitious to be dominant also. These drivers and ambitions provide short- to medium-term SA DTIS collaboration development opportunities in the quest for BRIC self-sufficiency/dominance ambitions. Bilateral partnerships barriers relates to asymmetry, differences in approaches to arms control and associated governance, funding asymmetries, a gradually deteriorating SA DTIS contrasted by a rapidly developing BRIC DTISs, divergent national policy frameworks, the short-term nature of SA DTIS opportunities, abuses of IPR (typically China) – all problematic considering the current state of the South African economy and its DTIS. In the short- to medium-term JVs attracted preference as a strategic business lever for bilateral BRICS DTIS partnerships - primarily with Brazil and India. This said, it should not be assumed that bilateral DTIS partnerships between South Africa and the individual BRIC States will be mutually beneficial, no matter the strategic business levers employed, due to the complexity of international DTIS collaboration.
Key Words: BRICS, South African Defence Industry, Defence Industry.
This article argues that both Russia and China will re-invigorate and expand their international ... more This article argues that both Russia and China will re-invigorate and expand their international espionage activities. Russia's renewed vigour in engaging in aggressive espionage campaigns is due to the current setbacks that it is facing as a result of its ill-fated invasion of Ukraine. The sanction-induced prohibitions that limit access to state-of-the-art technologies will unleash renewed enthusiasm to obtain these latest technologies by covert means, be it HUMINT and/or cyberespionage. The future robustness of China's aggressive espionage activities is projected to be fuelled by its systematic 'decoupling' from those nations leading in science, engineering and technology, such as the United States, as well as the growing opposition to the use of developmental institutions such as the Confucius Institute and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as intelligence collection platforms. This article is a pre-print.
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Papers by Dries Putter
They define hybrid attacks as using unconventional methods to disrupt and disable an opponent without engaging in open hostilities. Such hybrid warfare is often associated with terrorism.
Source: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/energy/427090-eskom-sabotage-that-nearly-caused-stage-6-load-shedding-is-hybrid-warfare.html
In one incident at Matimba power station in November, a team had been working on the station’s dry cooling fans when they dropped an extension cord onto the unit 2 transformer.
This caused a flash, which tripped the station board and shut down all cooling to units 1, 2, and 3, leading to all three shutting down.
The SA DTIS role in the BRICS DTIS ecosystem is described as being a gateway to the African DTIS market segments and a possible collaboration - and supply chain partner for niche technologies-, product systems- and integration services development. Bilateral collaboration was found to be the preferred level of inclusion, based on the discretionary and securitised nature of each DTIS. In the quest for self-sufficiency and/or domination, the strategic motive for bilateral DTIS collaboration is to attain competitive/comparative advantage within a competitive timeframe. The crystallisation of bilateral DTIS partnerships from multilateral alliances such as BRICS is calibrated significantly by the level of asymmetry between prospective partners, national interest, the quest for foreign policy flexibility and military autonomy, national DTIS policy objectives, technology and products niches, and preference for strategic business levers. BRICS States were found to all subscribe to liberal (at least a hybrid) DTIS development approach that allows for a dynamic mix of the facets mentioned above.
Within these dynamics possible drivers of bilateral partnerships are the adoption of an idealist approach and liberal/hybrid DTIS policy, continuous investment in the DTIS and militaries, nurturing Tier 1 and/or 2 industrial capabilities, promoting the use of strategic business levers (joint ventures (JVs), technology transfer, foreign direct investment and mergers and acquisitions), recognising the role of Government in developing the DTIS, overlapping market segments, respect for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), amongst others. BRICS DTISs share the ambition to be self-sufficient. Some are ambitious to be dominant also. These drivers and ambitions provide short- to medium-term SA DTIS collaboration development opportunities in the quest for BRIC self-sufficiency/dominance ambitions. Bilateral partnerships barriers relates to asymmetry, differences in approaches to arms control and associated governance, funding asymmetries, a gradually deteriorating SA DTIS contrasted by a rapidly developing BRIC DTISs, divergent national policy frameworks, the short-term nature of SA DTIS opportunities, abuses of IPR (typically China) – all problematic considering the current state of the South African economy and its DTIS.
In the short- to medium-term JVs attracted preference as a strategic business lever for bilateral BRICS DTIS partnerships - primarily with Brazil and India. This said, it should not be assumed that bilateral DTIS partnerships between South Africa and the individual BRIC States will be mutually beneficial, no matter the strategic business levers employed, due to the complexity of international DTIS collaboration.
Key Words: BRICS, South African Defence Industry, Defence Industry.
Recent publications by Dries Putter
They define hybrid attacks as using unconventional methods to disrupt and disable an opponent without engaging in open hostilities. Such hybrid warfare is often associated with terrorism.
Source: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/energy/427090-eskom-sabotage-that-nearly-caused-stage-6-load-shedding-is-hybrid-warfare.html
In one incident at Matimba power station in November, a team had been working on the station’s dry cooling fans when they dropped an extension cord onto the unit 2 transformer.
This caused a flash, which tripped the station board and shut down all cooling to units 1, 2, and 3, leading to all three shutting down.
The SA DTIS role in the BRICS DTIS ecosystem is described as being a gateway to the African DTIS market segments and a possible collaboration - and supply chain partner for niche technologies-, product systems- and integration services development. Bilateral collaboration was found to be the preferred level of inclusion, based on the discretionary and securitised nature of each DTIS. In the quest for self-sufficiency and/or domination, the strategic motive for bilateral DTIS collaboration is to attain competitive/comparative advantage within a competitive timeframe. The crystallisation of bilateral DTIS partnerships from multilateral alliances such as BRICS is calibrated significantly by the level of asymmetry between prospective partners, national interest, the quest for foreign policy flexibility and military autonomy, national DTIS policy objectives, technology and products niches, and preference for strategic business levers. BRICS States were found to all subscribe to liberal (at least a hybrid) DTIS development approach that allows for a dynamic mix of the facets mentioned above.
Within these dynamics possible drivers of bilateral partnerships are the adoption of an idealist approach and liberal/hybrid DTIS policy, continuous investment in the DTIS and militaries, nurturing Tier 1 and/or 2 industrial capabilities, promoting the use of strategic business levers (joint ventures (JVs), technology transfer, foreign direct investment and mergers and acquisitions), recognising the role of Government in developing the DTIS, overlapping market segments, respect for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), amongst others. BRICS DTISs share the ambition to be self-sufficient. Some are ambitious to be dominant also. These drivers and ambitions provide short- to medium-term SA DTIS collaboration development opportunities in the quest for BRIC self-sufficiency/dominance ambitions. Bilateral partnerships barriers relates to asymmetry, differences in approaches to arms control and associated governance, funding asymmetries, a gradually deteriorating SA DTIS contrasted by a rapidly developing BRIC DTISs, divergent national policy frameworks, the short-term nature of SA DTIS opportunities, abuses of IPR (typically China) – all problematic considering the current state of the South African economy and its DTIS.
In the short- to medium-term JVs attracted preference as a strategic business lever for bilateral BRICS DTIS partnerships - primarily with Brazil and India. This said, it should not be assumed that bilateral DTIS partnerships between South Africa and the individual BRIC States will be mutually beneficial, no matter the strategic business levers employed, due to the complexity of international DTIS collaboration.
Key Words: BRICS, South African Defence Industry, Defence Industry.