My own conclusion is that “One ought to be moral” makes no sense at all unless the “ought” has th... more My own conclusion is that “One ought to be moral” makes no sense at all unless the “ought” has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette. I am, therefore putting forward quite seriously a theory that disallows the possibility of saying that a man ought (free unsubscripted “ought“) to have ends other than those he does have.- Philippa FootH.A. Prichard's “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, like Descartes Meditations, is remembered better for the skeptical moment in the author's thinking than for its unskeptical conclusions. Prichard's paper is complicated, but the lore about its message is simple. The lore is that Prichard pointed out that in trying to vindicate the reason-giving power of morality we might do so by appealing to moral norms or to non-moral norms. If we appeal to moral norms, then we are only justifying a standard in terms of that standard and just about any old standard coul...
We argue that Parfit's "Triviality Objection" against some naturalistic views of no... more We argue that Parfit's "Triviality Objection" against some naturalistic views of normativity is not compelling. We think that once one accepts, as one should, that identity statements can be informative in virtue of their pragmatics and not only in virtue of their semantics, Parfit's case against naturalism can be overcome
These are boom years for the study of the virtues. Several new books have recently appeared that ... more These are boom years for the study of the virtues. Several new books have recently appeared that bring to the literature new ways of under-standing virtue and new ways of developing virtue theoretical ap-proaches to morality. This new work presents a richly interesting cluster of ...
I am most grateful for the interesting critique Teresa Robertson has given my paper. 2 Obviously,... more I am most grateful for the interesting critique Teresa Robertson has given my paper. 2 Obviously, she thinks that I made too many mistakes for my own arguments to demonstrate the conclusion I was after: roughly that Williams' internalism is false because it commits the conditional fallacy. I will try to address some of Roberton's criticisms of my particular arguments towards that conclusion in a moment. But I am heartened that she thinks that it is nonetheless true that internalism has troubles from such a direction. In this she joins ...
Many philosophers maintain that neither one’s reasons for action nor well-being are ever grounded... more Many philosophers maintain that neither one’s reasons for action nor well-being are ever grounded in facts about what we desire or favor. Yet our reasons to eat a flavor of ice cream we like rather than one we do not seem an obvious counter-example. I argue that there is no getting around such examples and that therefore a fully stance independent account of the grounding of our reasons is implausible. At least in matters of mere taste our “stance” plays a normative role in grounding reasons.
This paper will consider a broad objection against subjective accounts of reasons for action. I w... more This paper will consider a broad objection against subjective accounts of reasons for action. I will conclude, tentatively, that there is no telling objection in the neighborhood where many have thought there was. The objection is this. Subjectivists have generally been clear that the concerns that allegedly determine one's practical reasons are counterfactual concerns. Typically, for example, it is held that such concerns must be informed. But subjectivists have had little to say about what else must go right besides having good information if the ...
... My suggestion is only that the kind of being Korsgaard is talking about is the kind of being ... more ... My suggestion is only that the kind of being Korsgaard is talking about is the kind of being we become as we mature, and ... Velleman argues ''that assessing rival principles of practical reasoning is a job for theoretical rather than practical reasoning,'' taking David Gauthier as his ...
1. Introduction David Sobel and Steven Wall, 2. Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality M... more 1. Introduction David Sobel and Steven Wall, 2. Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality Michael Bratman, 3. Reasons: practical and adaptive Joseph Raz, 4. The explanatory role of being rational Michael Smith, 5. Practical competence and fluent agency Peter Railton, 6. Practical conditionals James Dreier, 7. Authority and second-personal reasons for acting Stephen Darwall, 8. Promises, reasons, and normative powers Gary Watson, 9. Regret and irrational action Justin D†Arms and Daniel Jacobson, 10. Mackie†s motivational argument Philip Clark, 11. ...
PDC Homepage Home » Products » Purchase. LOGIN; PRODUCTS: All Products; Online Resources; Journal... more PDC Homepage Home » Products » Purchase. LOGIN; PRODUCTS: All Products; Online Resources; Journals & Series; Digital Media; Books & Reference Works. MEMBERSHIPS: Societies & Associations; Conference Registrations. ...
The recent ethical writings of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen outline a powerful alternative to ... more The recent ethical writings of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen outline a powerful alternative to both welfarist consequentialist ethical theories and Rawlsian approaches. 2 We can perhaps best see the attractions of their view by seeing how it responds to alleged problems for these rival approaches.
My own conclusion is that “One ought to be moral” makes no sense at all unless the “ought” has th... more My own conclusion is that “One ought to be moral” makes no sense at all unless the “ought” has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette. I am, therefore putting forward quite seriously a theory that disallows the possibility of saying that a man ought (free unsubscripted “ought“) to have ends other than those he does have.- Philippa FootH.A. Prichard's “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, like Descartes Meditations, is remembered better for the skeptical moment in the author's thinking than for its unskeptical conclusions. Prichard's paper is complicated, but the lore about its message is simple. The lore is that Prichard pointed out that in trying to vindicate the reason-giving power of morality we might do so by appealing to moral norms or to non-moral norms. If we appeal to moral norms, then we are only justifying a standard in terms of that standard and just about any old standard coul...
We argue that Parfit's "Triviality Objection" against some naturalistic views of no... more We argue that Parfit's "Triviality Objection" against some naturalistic views of normativity is not compelling. We think that once one accepts, as one should, that identity statements can be informative in virtue of their pragmatics and not only in virtue of their semantics, Parfit's case against naturalism can be overcome
These are boom years for the study of the virtues. Several new books have recently appeared that ... more These are boom years for the study of the virtues. Several new books have recently appeared that bring to the literature new ways of under-standing virtue and new ways of developing virtue theoretical ap-proaches to morality. This new work presents a richly interesting cluster of ...
I am most grateful for the interesting critique Teresa Robertson has given my paper. 2 Obviously,... more I am most grateful for the interesting critique Teresa Robertson has given my paper. 2 Obviously, she thinks that I made too many mistakes for my own arguments to demonstrate the conclusion I was after: roughly that Williams' internalism is false because it commits the conditional fallacy. I will try to address some of Roberton's criticisms of my particular arguments towards that conclusion in a moment. But I am heartened that she thinks that it is nonetheless true that internalism has troubles from such a direction. In this she joins ...
Many philosophers maintain that neither one’s reasons for action nor well-being are ever grounded... more Many philosophers maintain that neither one’s reasons for action nor well-being are ever grounded in facts about what we desire or favor. Yet our reasons to eat a flavor of ice cream we like rather than one we do not seem an obvious counter-example. I argue that there is no getting around such examples and that therefore a fully stance independent account of the grounding of our reasons is implausible. At least in matters of mere taste our “stance” plays a normative role in grounding reasons.
This paper will consider a broad objection against subjective accounts of reasons for action. I w... more This paper will consider a broad objection against subjective accounts of reasons for action. I will conclude, tentatively, that there is no telling objection in the neighborhood where many have thought there was. The objection is this. Subjectivists have generally been clear that the concerns that allegedly determine one's practical reasons are counterfactual concerns. Typically, for example, it is held that such concerns must be informed. But subjectivists have had little to say about what else must go right besides having good information if the ...
... My suggestion is only that the kind of being Korsgaard is talking about is the kind of being ... more ... My suggestion is only that the kind of being Korsgaard is talking about is the kind of being we become as we mature, and ... Velleman argues ''that assessing rival principles of practical reasoning is a job for theoretical rather than practical reasoning,'' taking David Gauthier as his ...
1. Introduction David Sobel and Steven Wall, 2. Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality M... more 1. Introduction David Sobel and Steven Wall, 2. Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality Michael Bratman, 3. Reasons: practical and adaptive Joseph Raz, 4. The explanatory role of being rational Michael Smith, 5. Practical competence and fluent agency Peter Railton, 6. Practical conditionals James Dreier, 7. Authority and second-personal reasons for acting Stephen Darwall, 8. Promises, reasons, and normative powers Gary Watson, 9. Regret and irrational action Justin D†Arms and Daniel Jacobson, 10. Mackie†s motivational argument Philip Clark, 11. ...
PDC Homepage Home » Products » Purchase. LOGIN; PRODUCTS: All Products; Online Resources; Journal... more PDC Homepage Home » Products » Purchase. LOGIN; PRODUCTS: All Products; Online Resources; Journals & Series; Digital Media; Books & Reference Works. MEMBERSHIPS: Societies & Associations; Conference Registrations. ...
The recent ethical writings of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen outline a powerful alternative to ... more The recent ethical writings of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen outline a powerful alternative to both welfarist consequentialist ethical theories and Rawlsian approaches. 2 We can perhaps best see the attractions of their view by seeing how it responds to alleged problems for these rival approaches.
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