Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai)

Plotinus is known as both a philosopher and a mystic, and it is crucial to explain his mysticism of henosis in the light of his metaphysics of the One. In this dissertation I investigate Plotinus’ mysticism on this approach, while emphasizing that the Enneads is a text of mystical teaching which mediates the reality of henosis by giving spiruitual guidance. Thus, my investigation is orientated by two questions: First, what are the methods of Plotinus’ mystical teaching? Second, how do these methods relate to henosis as their desired goal? I explain these questions in the light of Plotinus’ metaphysics, according to which the One is both transcendent and immanent such that man cannot and need not know It. The conclusions reached are as follows: The methods taught by Plotinus are the practices of philosophy and negative theology, which aim at knowing intelligible beings and the transcendent One. However, these practices do not help man to attain henosis, but remind him that his failure to attain henosis pertains to his natural condition in which he is united with the One. Plotinus’ mystical teaching aims not at transforming man’s finite nature, but at changing man’s preconceptions concerning henosis.

This article inquires into the specific differences between Plotinus’ and Dionysius’ negative theologies and their contemporary philosophical significance. The comparative analysis looks beyond their general similarities to focus on their respective features. Its main thesis is that while Dionysius’ negative theology aims at attaining mystical knowledge of God, Plotinus’ version is intended to dispel the illusion that man can attain henosis. The contemporary interpretation puts Plotinus’ and Dionysius’ negative theologies in the context of analytic epistemology. It is suggested that while both can be understood as criticism of the epistemology of propositional religious belief, Dionysius’ analysis of mystical knowledge of God is closer to virtue epistemology and Plotinus’ approach to man’s ignorance of the One more similar to knowledge-first epistemology.

It is often said that the best system account of laws (BSA) needs supplementing with a theory of perfectly natural properties. The 'strength' and 'simplicity' of a system is language-relative and without a fixed vocabulary it is impossible to compare rival systems. Recently a number of philosophers have attempted to reformulate the BSA in an effort to avoid commitment to natural properties. I assess these proposals and argue that they are problematic as they stand. Nonetheless, I agree with their aim, and show that if simplicity is interpreted as 'compression', algorithmic information theory provides a framework for system comparison without the need for natural properties. Keywords: laws of nature; best system account; natural properties; algorithmic information theory; invariance theorem. RESUMEN: A menudo se dice que la explicación de las leyes del mejor sistema (BSA) requiere ser completada con una teoría de las propiedades perfectamente naturales. La 'fuerza' y la 'simplicidad' de un sistema son relativas a un lenguaje y sin un vocabulario fijo es imposible comparar sistemas rivales. Recientemente, varios filósofos han in-tentado reformular la BSA en un esfuerzo por evitar el compromiso con las propiedades naturales. Aquí valoro estas propuestas y argumento que son problemáticas en su forma actual. Sin embargo, comparto su objetivo y muestro que si la simplicidad es interpretada como 'compresión', la teoría algorítmica de la información pro-porciona un marco para la comparación sin necesidad de apelar a propiedades naturales. Palabras clave: Leyes de la naturaleza, explicación del mejor sistema, propiedades naturales, teoría algorítmica de la infor-mación, teorema de invariancia.

It has been argued that the fundamental laws of physics do not face a 'problem of provisos' equivalent to that found in other scientific disciplines (Earman, Roberts and Smith 2002) and there is only the appearance of exceptions to physical laws if they are confused with differential equations of evolution type (Smith 2002). In this paper I argue that even if this is true, fundamental laws in physics still pose a major challenge to standard Humean approaches to lawhood, as they are not in any obvious sense about regularities in behaviour. A Humean approach to physical laws with exceptions is possible, however, if we adopt a view of laws that takes them to be the algorithms in the algorithmic compressions of empirical data. When this is supplemented with a distinction between lossy and lossless compression, we can explain exceptions in terms of compression artefacts present in the application of the lossy laws.

This new study provides a refreshing look at the issue of exceptions and shows that much of the problem stems from a failure to recognize at least two kinds of exception-ridden law: ceteris paribus laws and ideal laws. Billy Wheeler offers the first book-length discussion of ideal laws. The key difference between these two kinds of laws concerns the nature of the conditions that need to be satisfied and their epistemological role in the law's formulation and discovery. He presents a Humean-inspired approach that draws heavily on concepts from the information and computing sciences. Specifically, Wheeler argues that laws are best seen as algorithms for compressing empirical data and that ideal laws are needed as 'lossy compressors' for complex data.

Major figures in the metaphysics of science receive special attention such as Ronald Giere, Bas van Fraassen, Nancy Cartwright, David Lewis and Marc Lange. This book is essential reading for philosophers of science and will interest metaphysicians, epistemologists and others interested in applying concepts from computing to traditional philosophical problems.

*pdf of book cover only
Book available to purchase at: https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319995632

It has been argued that the use of big data in scientific research obviates the need for causal knowledge in making sound predictions and interventions. Whilst few accept that this claim is true, there is an ongoing discussion about what effect, if any, big data has on scientific methodology, and in particular, the search for causes. One response has been to show that the automated analysis of big data by a computer program can be used to find causes in addition to mere correlations. However, up until now it has only been demonstrated how this can be achieved with respect to difference-making causes. Yet it is widely acknowledged that scientists need evidence of both “difference-making” and “production” in order to infer a genuine causal link. This paper fills in the gap by outlining how computer-assisted discovery in big data can find productive causes. This is achieved by developing an inference rule based on a little-known causal process theory: the information transmission account.

Computer models and simulations have provided enormous benefits to researchers in the natural and social sciences, as well as many areas of philosophy. However, to date, there has been little attempt to use computer models in the development and evaluation of metaphysical theories. This is a shame, as there are good reasons for believing that metaphysics could benefit just as much from this practice as other disciplines. In this paper I assess the possibilities and limitations of using computer models in metaphysics. I outline the way in which different kinds of model could be useful for different areas of metaphysics, and I illustrate in more detail how agent-based models specifically could be used to model two well-known theories of laws: David Lewis's "Best System Account" and David Armstrong's "Nomic Necessitation" view. Some logically possible processes cannot be simulated on a standard computing device. I finish by assessing how much of a threat this is to the prospect of metaphysical modeling in general.

The algorithmic theory of laws claims that the laws of nature are the algorithms in the best possible compression of all empirical data. This position assumes that the universe is compressible and that data received from observing it is easily reproducible using a simple set of rules. However, there are three sources of evidence that suggest that the universe as a whole is incompressible. The first comes from the practice of science. The other two come from the nature of the universe itself: the presence of chaotic behavior and the nature of quantum systems also suggests that the universe is incompressible. This paper evaluates these sources and argues that none provides a convincing case to reject the algorithmic theory of laws.

Is it possible to gain knowledge about the real world based solely on experiences in virtual reality? According to one influential theory of knowledge, you cannot. Robert Nozick's truth-tracking theory requires that, in addition to a belief being true, it must also be sensitive to the truth. Yet beliefs formed in virtual reality are not sensitive: in the nearest possible world where P is false, you would have continued to believe that P. This is problematic because there is increasing awareness from philosophers and technologists that virtual reality is an important way in which we can arrive at beliefs and knowledge about the world. Here I argue that a suitably modified version of Nozick's sensitivity condition is able to account for knowledge from virtual reality.

We are becoming increasingly dependent on robots and other forms of artificial intelligence for our beliefs. But how should the knowledge gained from the "say-so" of a robot be classified? Should it be understood as testimonial knowledge, similar to knowledge gained in conversation with another person? Or should it be understood as a form of instrument-based knowledge, such as that gained from a calculator or a sundial? There is more at stake here than terminology, for how we treat objects as sources of knowledge often has important social and legal consequences. In this paper, I argue that at least some robots are capable of testimony. I make my argument by exploring the differences between instruments and testifiers on a well-known account of knowledge: reliabilism. On this approach, I claim that the difference between instruments and testifiers as sources of knowledge is that only the latter are capable of deception. As some robots can be designed to deceive, so they too should be recognized as testimonial sources of knowledge.

Humans are becoming increasingly dependent on the 'say-so' of machines, such as computers, smartphones, and robots. In epistemology, knowledge based on what you have been told is called 'testimony' and being able to give and receive testimony is a prerequisite for engaging in many social roles. Should robots and other autonomous intelligent machines be considered epistemic testifiers akin to those of humans? This chapter attempts to answer this question as well as explore the implications of robot testimony for the criminal justice system. Few are in agreement as to the 'types' of agents that can provide testimony. The chapter surveys three well-known approaches and shows that on two of these approaches being able to provide testimony is bound up with the possession of intentional mental states. Through a discussion of computational and folk-psychological approaches to intentionality, it is argued that a good case can be made for robots fulfilling all three definitions.

That many of our most successful scientific theories involve one or more idealizations poses a challenge to traditional accounts of theory confirmation. One popular response amongst scientific realists is the "Improvement Model of Confirmation": if tightening up one or more of the idealizations leads to greater predictive accuracy, then this supports the belief that the theory's inaccuracy is a result of its idealizations and not because it is wrong. In this article I argue that the improvement model is deeply flawed and that therefore idealizations continue to undermine "success-to-truth" arguments for scientific realism.

Machines, instruments and tools offer many benefits, but according to the classical Daoists-Laozi and Zhuangzi-they can also interfere with living a life in harmony with nature. Despite this, the Zhuangzi offers numerous stories of individuals who use technologies whilst exemplifying the virtues of a sage, although how this is achieved is not well understood. I examine two recent interpretations and argue that they are problematic on both philosophical and interpretative grounds. In their place I offer a new solution based on comparing Zhuangzi with recent studies of the effects of the internet on the way we think.

The issue of rationality has received significant attention in the study of classical Chinese philosophy from comparative perspectives. As classical Chinese philosophy is considered fundamentally different from Western philosophy, it is believed to hold potentials for gaining insights on the limitations of Western understandings of the nature of rationality (Clarke, 2000,
p. 13; Hall & Ames, 1995, p. 114). Based on observations of the differences between Chinese and Western philosophies in reasoning and argumentation, some scholars have come to the conclusion that ancient Chinese philosophy did not have rationality or, less radically, at least had a different paradigm of rationality. Roger T. Ames (1992), for example, argues that Chinese philosophy does not accord with the Western standard of rationality. Detailed elaborations of this theory are offered by David L. Hall and Ames. According to them, rationality emerged once but did not survive in China; and even the Chinese protorational thinking did not resemble Western rationality. The Western paradigm of rationality, Hall and Ames argue, is marked by the use of logical arguments, which is nonetheless absent in Chinese philosophy (Hall & Ames, 1995, pp. 54, 65; 1998, pp. 130–131).
The theory that Chinese philosophy is nonrational or that it features a different kind of rationality yields the perspective that rationality may not be universal: it may be culturally relative or a product of historical contingence (Hall & Ames, 1995, p. 114). If this is the case, we should then rethink the norm of rationality and reflect upon the cultural or historicallimitations of the proposed characterizations of rationality through reconstructing “Chinese rationality.”
In this chapter, however, I do not attempt to examine what “Chinese rationality” might be or in what ways Chinese philosophy may challenge the current scholarship of rationality, nor do I try to argue for or against the theory that Chinese philosophy is nonrational or exemplifies an alternative paradigm of rationality. Instead, I focus on the methodology of identifying a different rationality. I will first explain why classical Chinese philosophy, the Zhuangzi’s philosophy in particular, is often judged to be lacking in rationality or representing an alternative paradigm of rationality. I will then argue that these reasons are methodologically questionable.

This essay offers an experimental interpretation for Mengzi’s孟子ren-yi仁義 discourses, reading them as strategic prescriptions akin to those presented in classical strategic manuals. However, rather than arguing that it is the correct interpretation of Mengzi, I use it to highlight the ambiguity of Mengzi’s discourses. This ambiguity, I argue, motivated Zhuangzi’s 莊子criticisms of moral language abuse and rationalizes some early narratives about Mengzi.

My paper is divided into three sections, which discuss, in turn, the referents, connotations, and significances of the pejorative “ru-mo”. I argue in the first section that the
expression “ru-mo” in early texts does not always unambiguously and exclusively denote what modern scholars might identify as Ruists and Mohists. While I believe that its referents may at times include figures typically deemed as Ruist and Mohist thinkers, I also
wish to stress that its referential scope is sometimes blurrier than or even different from that of “Ruists and Mohists”. Next, I argue that early Chinese may not have always used the expression “ru-mo” to mean “ru and mo”. In a similar vein, I do not want to suggest that early Chinese categorically would not have applied “ru-mo” to what they regarded as the ru or the mo. Nonetheless, I would like to emphasize that early Chinese authors frequently employed this expression to indicate their suspicion or contempt of the intended referents. In a nutshell, “ru-mo” might have carried certain pejorative connotations. These pejorative connotations indicate that the expression “ru-mo” cannot always be understood as meaning simply “ru and mo” – otherwise we would also need to conclude that both “ru” and “mo” were primarily pejorative, too. Finally, I will use the Shiji as a case study to argue how my observation of the pejorative use of “ru-mo” is relevant to the research of
early intellectual taxonomy.

Anecdotal narrative as a rhetorical, hermeneutical, literary, or argumentative device, is ubiquitous in early Chinese texts. Throughout these texts, we encounter and re-encounter many anecdotes through re-narration and allusion. Many essays in the present volume contain examples of these recurrent or stock anecdotes.  As these essays demonstrate, stock anecdotes often served as analogies, precedents, or historical allusions that were employed to illustrate ruling principles, elaborate moral norms, amplify arguments, or explicate canonical citations. Being evoked to support a wide range of positions, rather than as subjects of primary interest, the details (of plots, scenes, or wordings) of stock anecdotes could be adapted, abridged, or even omitted for each incarnation.
Some modified details in a version of a stock anecdote could appear quite trivial, yet upon close examination, these details reveal what might be otherwise overlooked about the history and thought of the text in which they occur. The case study examined in the current essay is a version of a stock anecdote — Mozi’s rescue of the state of Song — as it appears in Mozi 墨子 (Master Mo) chapter 50, titled “Gongshu” 公輸 after the surname of one of the main protagonists in the chapter. (Hereafter I will refer to the chapter as Mozi 50). As this “Gongshu” version is included in the book Mozi, scholars generally think, implicitly or not, that it was composed or edited by a Mohist author with the intent of illustrating or reiterating the standpoints of the Mozi. Yet, by paying close attention to the details of its ending, we discover that they contain conceptual and perspectival elements that depart from the rest of the Mozi. More specifically, we will see that the anecdote employs the concepts shen 神 (invisible) and ming 明 (visible) differently from other Mozi chapters and it praises Mozi for his lack of recognition. This praise spells out a view in conflict with the typical Mohist view of the positive correlation between one’s merit and one’s esteem. Such a conceptual pairing of shen and ming and the celebration of an unrecognized Mozi do not cohere with the rest of Mozi, but they do resonate with other discourses in the received Shizi 尸子 (Master Shi), Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals of Mr. Lü), and Huainanzi 淮南子 (The Master of Huainan). These discourses all refer to Mozi (and Kongzi 孔子 [Confucius] in conjunction), and they advocate ideas that are more generally associated with Daoism than with Mohism.
These particulars carry implications for the research on Mozi as an evolving text  and on the history of Mohist thought.  They suggest that the ending of the “Gongshu” anecdote might have been added to Mozi 50 after the completion and circulation of the main body of the anecdote, or that the ending might have been adapted by subsequent editors whose thought was somehow affiliated with a type of Daoism,  or that Mozi 50 was composed by a Mohist author whose discursive habit or standpoint departed from the majority of Mohist authors. Thus, this case study of Mozi 50 might either show a glimpse of how an early (perhaps pre-Han) Mozi may have differed from the received version as we know it  or reveal the diversity (e.g. the Daoist influence) of early Mohist thought.
This paper first describes the discontinuity between the body and the ending of the “Gongshu” anecdote, and highlights the “un-Mohist” concepts and perspectives in the anecdotal ending. In the second step I trace the “un-Mohist” elements in the Shizi, Lüshi chunqiu, and Huainanzi discourses, in an attempt to explain the rupture between the body and the ending of the “Gongshu” anecdote, interpret the “un-Mohist” message conveyed by the “Gongshu” ending, and indicate the Daoist tinges surrounding these discourses.