Although it is commonly accepted that Darwinian evolution could select for true common-sense beli... more Although it is commonly accepted that Darwinian evolution could select for true common-sense beliefs, it is altogether less certain that the same can be said for other classes of beliefs, such as moral or religious beliefs. This issue takes centre stage in debates concerning evolutionary debunking arguments against religious beliefs, where the rationality of beliefs is often dependent upon their production by an evolved faculty that is sensitive to truth. In this article, we consider whether evolution selected for true religious beliefs. We begin by highlighting the relevance of this question for broader philosophy of religion, then present a dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments for and against the proposition that true religious beliefs generate pragmatic success and hence can be selected for by evolution.
Rebus Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Religion, 2021
Most arguments against theistic belief argue on the metaphysical level.[1] They argue that one or... more Most arguments against theistic belief argue on the metaphysical level.[1] They argue that one or more phenomena (e.g. evil, the hiddenness of God, etc.) are incompatible or very hard to reconcile with God’s existence (see Chapter 4). The arguments I discuss below, however, are epistemological arguments.[2] They do not conclude that God does not exist, but that belief in God is not rational or not justified. In other words, if one of these arguments is successful, then even if God does exist, it still would not be rational for us to believe that he does. As all debunking arguments do, the arguments I discuss below aim to show that religious belief is (often) based on bad evidence or bad grounds. The arguments I discuss refer to new scientific developments. The science can be taken to show that there is something fundamentally wrong with how theistic beliefs are formed.
Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR)
argue that there is something about the ... more Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR)
argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes
it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the
internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this
disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning
and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I
draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR
theories argue for the naturalness of religious belief in at least three
ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of
cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases.
I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding
framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by
the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework
makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for
religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for
religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can
incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more
flexibility.
I argue that deeply ingrained dispositions to do evil do not render moral perfection impossible. ... more I argue that deeply ingrained dispositions to do evil do not render moral perfection impossible. I discuss various accounts of moral perfection and the evidence from cognitive (neuro)science that points towards a strong disposition for evil. Afterwards, I discuss three strategies that can allow humans to overcome their evil dispositions. These are: cognitive enhancement, avoiding triggering situations and structural solutions.
In this response article, I argue that Launonen’s criticisms either are beyond the scope
of my ar... more In this response article, I argue that Launonen’s criticisms either are beyond the scope of my argument in chapter 5 of Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion or wrongfully presume that evolutionary explanations exhaustively explain religious beliefs. I also criticize Launonen’s claim that arguments in terms of divine design are preferable to arguments in terms of truth-tracking cognitive mechanisms.
Abstract
I argue that arguments for the existence of God provide indirect support for the existen... more Abstract I argue that arguments for the existence of God provide indirect support for the existence of other supernatural beings such as spirits. I defend three arguments: (i) the existence of spirits is more likely if there is a supernatural realm; (ii) an omnibenevolent God makes use of supernatural messengers; (iii) sacred scriptures attest to the existence of spirits. I defend all arguments and defend them against objections.
The literature on cognitive biases is vastly expanding. The contribution of cognitive biases to t... more The literature on cognitive biases is vastly expanding. The contribution of cognitive biases to the formation of beliefs and the process of believing (cf. Seitz et al., 2016; Angel, 2017;) is well documented. Well-documented examples are the confirmation bias (Mahoney, 1977), and the self-serving bias (Campbell and Sedikides, 1999). Most of the literature focuses on testing the existence and salience of various cognitive biases. Fewer authors focus on the causes of cognitive biases. This paper compares two mutually conflicting accounts of how cognitive biases arise. A first argues that (most) cognitive biases are part of the general human cognitive makeup, which is innate or emerges as humans mature. A second argues that cognitive biases are acquired throughout a human's lifespan and development. Below, I present examples of both accounts and reasons favoring each of both accounts.
The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Religion, 2022
This chapter critically discusses three epistemic arguments that draw on CSR theories. Two argume... more This chapter critically discusses three epistemic arguments that draw on CSR theories. Two arguments argue against the rationality of religious beliefs and one argues in favor of it. The chapter argues that all three arguments either fail or do not allow strong conclusions about the rationality of religious belief.
I argue that deeply ingrained dispositions to do evil do not render moral perfection impossible. ... more I argue that deeply ingrained dispositions to do evil do not render moral perfection impossible. I discuss various definitions of moral perfection and the evidence from cognitive (neuro)science that points towards s strong, hard to overcome disposition for evil. Afterwards, I discuss three strategies that can allow humans to overcome their evil dispositions. These are: cognitive enhancement, avoiding triggering situations and structural solutions.
Although it is commonly accepted that Darwinian evolution could select for true common-sense beli... more Although it is commonly accepted that Darwinian evolution could select for true common-sense beliefs, it is altogether less certain that the same can be said for other classes of beliefs, such as moral or religious beliefs. This issue takes centre stage in debates concerning evolutionary debunking arguments against religious beliefs, where the rationality of beliefs is often dependent upon their production by an evolved faculty that is sensitive to truth. In this article, we consider whether evolution selected for true religious beliefs. We begin by highlighting the relevance of this question for broader philosophy of religion, then present a dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments for and against the proposition that true religious beliefs generate pragmatic success and hence can be selected for by evolution.
Rebus Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Religion, 2021
Most arguments against theistic belief argue on the metaphysical level.[1] They argue that one or... more Most arguments against theistic belief argue on the metaphysical level.[1] They argue that one or more phenomena (e.g. evil, the hiddenness of God, etc.) are incompatible or very hard to reconcile with God’s existence (see Chapter 4). The arguments I discuss below, however, are epistemological arguments.[2] They do not conclude that God does not exist, but that belief in God is not rational or not justified. In other words, if one of these arguments is successful, then even if God does exist, it still would not be rational for us to believe that he does. As all debunking arguments do, the arguments I discuss below aim to show that religious belief is (often) based on bad evidence or bad grounds. The arguments I discuss refer to new scientific developments. The science can be taken to show that there is something fundamentally wrong with how theistic beliefs are formed.
Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR)
argue that there is something about the ... more Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR)
argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes
it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the
internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this
disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning
and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I
draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR
theories argue for the naturalness of religious belief in at least three
ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of
cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases.
I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding
framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by
the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework
makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for
religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for
religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can
incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more
flexibility.
I argue that deeply ingrained dispositions to do evil do not render moral perfection impossible. ... more I argue that deeply ingrained dispositions to do evil do not render moral perfection impossible. I discuss various accounts of moral perfection and the evidence from cognitive (neuro)science that points towards a strong disposition for evil. Afterwards, I discuss three strategies that can allow humans to overcome their evil dispositions. These are: cognitive enhancement, avoiding triggering situations and structural solutions.
In this response article, I argue that Launonen’s criticisms either are beyond the scope
of my ar... more In this response article, I argue that Launonen’s criticisms either are beyond the scope of my argument in chapter 5 of Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion or wrongfully presume that evolutionary explanations exhaustively explain religious beliefs. I also criticize Launonen’s claim that arguments in terms of divine design are preferable to arguments in terms of truth-tracking cognitive mechanisms.
Abstract
I argue that arguments for the existence of God provide indirect support for the existen... more Abstract I argue that arguments for the existence of God provide indirect support for the existence of other supernatural beings such as spirits. I defend three arguments: (i) the existence of spirits is more likely if there is a supernatural realm; (ii) an omnibenevolent God makes use of supernatural messengers; (iii) sacred scriptures attest to the existence of spirits. I defend all arguments and defend them against objections.
The literature on cognitive biases is vastly expanding. The contribution of cognitive biases to t... more The literature on cognitive biases is vastly expanding. The contribution of cognitive biases to the formation of beliefs and the process of believing (cf. Seitz et al., 2016; Angel, 2017;) is well documented. Well-documented examples are the confirmation bias (Mahoney, 1977), and the self-serving bias (Campbell and Sedikides, 1999). Most of the literature focuses on testing the existence and salience of various cognitive biases. Fewer authors focus on the causes of cognitive biases. This paper compares two mutually conflicting accounts of how cognitive biases arise. A first argues that (most) cognitive biases are part of the general human cognitive makeup, which is innate or emerges as humans mature. A second argues that cognitive biases are acquired throughout a human's lifespan and development. Below, I present examples of both accounts and reasons favoring each of both accounts.
The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Religion, 2022
This chapter critically discusses three epistemic arguments that draw on CSR theories. Two argume... more This chapter critically discusses three epistemic arguments that draw on CSR theories. Two arguments argue against the rationality of religious beliefs and one argues in favor of it. The chapter argues that all three arguments either fail or do not allow strong conclusions about the rationality of religious belief.
I argue that deeply ingrained dispositions to do evil do not render moral perfection impossible. ... more I argue that deeply ingrained dispositions to do evil do not render moral perfection impossible. I discuss various definitions of moral perfection and the evidence from cognitive (neuro)science that points towards s strong, hard to overcome disposition for evil. Afterwards, I discuss three strategies that can allow humans to overcome their evil dispositions. These are: cognitive enhancement, avoiding triggering situations and structural solutions.
The book 'Knowledge, Belief and God' is a major output of the research project 'New Directions in... more The book 'Knowledge, Belief and God' is a major output of the research project 'New Directions in Religious Epistemology', led by John Hawthorne at Oxford University. Many of the papers in the volume are drawn from the closing conference in 2015. The project and the book have the aim of forwarding research on religious epistemology by incorporating recent developments in epistemology, such as defeatism, modal accounts of knowledge, Bayesianism and social epistemology. Below, I aim to assess whether the book is successful in this regard.
Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion, 2016
I review the book 'Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion After 25 Years'. I give ... more I review the book 'Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion After 25 Years'. I give a thematic overview and critically discuss some recurrent ideas.
Review of James van Slyke's book 'The Cognitive Science of Religion' (2011)
forthcoming in the... more Review of James van Slyke's book 'The Cognitive Science of Religion' (2011)
forthcoming in the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Book review of The Philosophical Challenge From China; an edited volume that aims to enrich Weste... more Book review of The Philosophical Challenge From China; an edited volume that aims to enrich Western philosophy with Chinese thought.
New Approaches to the Scientific Study of Religion, 2021
This unique and pioneering book critically appraises current work from both the cognitive science... more This unique and pioneering book critically appraises current work from both the cognitive science of religion and the evolutionary study of religion. It addresses the question: Why does the believer possess supernatural or religious beliefs in the combined context of his cognitive biases, their adaptive usefulness measured in terms of survival and reproduction, and the impact of social learning and cultural traits? The authors outlines a pluralistic approach to the study of religion that does not treat religion as an accidental by-product but an adaptation selected by natural selection.
Chapters discuss the role of religious components for the evolution of cooperation and altruism, and explore the development of atheism and secular ideas, in cognitive and evolutionary terms. Topics such as the usefulness of religion, the transmission of religious beliefs, and a Darwinian approach to religion are among those addressed. Contrary to standard views, religious biases are regarded as shaped by cultural influences and not merely by natural dispositions.
This monograph will particularly appeal to researchers who are looking for a scientific explanation of religion and religious beliefs but who do not stop at the level of narrow cognitive and evolutionary accounts. The work will also be of interest to students of philosophy, sociology, religious studies, theology, or anthropology who seek to explain such fascinating, complex, and unequivocal phenomena as religion and religious components.
This book considers whether recent theories from Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) undermine ... more This book considers whether recent theories from Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) undermine the epistemic status of religious belief. After introducing the key theories in the growing area of CSR, Hans Van Eyghen explores some of the epistemic questions surrounding CSR, including: Is CSR incompatible with the truth of religious belief? How might CSR show that religious belief is unreliably formed? And, finally, does CSR undermine the justification of religious belief by religious experiences? In addressing these questions, he demonstrates how CSR does not undermine the epistemic bases for religious belief.
This book offers a clear and concise overview of the current state of cognitive science of religion and will be of particular interest to scholars working in philosophy and epistemology of religion.
Table of contents
Introduction: Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion 1. Introduction: What is debunking? 2. What is religious belief? 3. The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) 4. Are CSR and religious beliefs incompatible? 5. Does CSR show that supernatural belief is unreliably formed? 6. Does CSR undermine religious experiences? 7. Does CSR undermine the Consensus Gentium Argument? 8. Conclusion Bibliography Index
It is widely thought that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) may have a bearing on
the epist... more It is widely thought that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) may have a bearing on the epistemic status of religious beliefs and on other topics in philosophy of religion. Epistemologists have used theories from CSR to argue both for and against the rationality of religious beliefs, or they have claimed that CSR is neutral vis-à-vis the epistemic status of religious belief. However, since CSR is a rapidly evolving discipline, a great deal of earlier research on the topic has become dated. Furthermore, most of the debate on the epistemic consequences of CSR has not taken into account insights from the philosophy of science, such as explanatory pluralism and explanatory levels. This volume overcomes these deficiencies.
This volume brings together new philosophical reflection on cognitive science of religion (CSR). It examines the influence of cognitive science of religion (CSR) theories on the epistemic status of religious beliefs; it discusses its impact on philosophy of religion; and it offers new insights for CSR. The book addresses the question of whether or not the plurality of theories in CSR makes epistemic conclusions about religious belief unwarranted. It also explores the impact of CSR on other topics in philosophy of religion like the cognitive consequences of sin and naturalism. Finally, the book investigates what the main theories in CSR aim to explain, and addresses the strengths and weaknesses of CSR.
Uploads
Papers by Hans Van Eyghen
argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes
it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the
internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this
disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning
and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I
draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR
theories argue for the naturalness of religious belief in at least three
ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of
cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases.
I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding
framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by
the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework
makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for
religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for
religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can
incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more
flexibility.
of my argument in chapter 5 of Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion or wrongfully
presume that evolutionary explanations exhaustively explain religious beliefs. I also
criticize Launonen’s claim that arguments in terms of divine design are preferable to
arguments in terms of truth-tracking cognitive mechanisms.
I argue that arguments for the existence of God provide indirect support for the existence of other supernatural beings such as spirits. I defend three arguments: (i) the existence of spirits is more likely if there is a supernatural realm; (ii) an omnibenevolent God makes use of supernatural messengers; (iii) sacred scriptures attest to the existence of spirits. I defend all arguments and defend them against objections.
argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes
it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the
internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this
disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning
and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I
draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR
theories argue for the naturalness of religious belief in at least three
ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of
cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases.
I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding
framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by
the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework
makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for
religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for
religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can
incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more
flexibility.
of my argument in chapter 5 of Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion or wrongfully
presume that evolutionary explanations exhaustively explain religious beliefs. I also
criticize Launonen’s claim that arguments in terms of divine design are preferable to
arguments in terms of truth-tracking cognitive mechanisms.
I argue that arguments for the existence of God provide indirect support for the existence of other supernatural beings such as spirits. I defend three arguments: (i) the existence of spirits is more likely if there is a supernatural realm; (ii) an omnibenevolent God makes use of supernatural messengers; (iii) sacred scriptures attest to the existence of spirits. I defend all arguments and defend them against objections.
forthcoming in the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Chapters discuss the role of religious components for the evolution of cooperation and altruism, and explore the development of atheism and secular ideas, in cognitive and evolutionary terms. Topics such as the usefulness of religion, the transmission of religious beliefs, and a Darwinian approach to religion are among those addressed. Contrary to standard views, religious biases are regarded as shaped by cultural influences and not merely by natural dispositions.
This monograph will particularly appeal to researchers who are looking for a scientific explanation of religion and religious beliefs but who do not stop at the level of narrow cognitive and evolutionary accounts. The work will also be of interest to students of philosophy, sociology, religious studies, theology, or anthropology who seek to explain such fascinating, complex, and unequivocal phenomena as religion and religious components.
This book offers a clear and concise overview of the current state of cognitive science of religion and will be of particular interest to scholars working in philosophy and epistemology of religion.
Table of contents
Introduction: Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion
1. Introduction: What is debunking?
2. What is religious belief?
3. The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR)
4. Are CSR and religious beliefs incompatible?
5. Does CSR show that supernatural belief is unreliably formed?
6. Does CSR undermine religious experiences?
7. Does CSR undermine the Consensus Gentium Argument?
8. Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
pre-order here: https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/arguing-from-cognitive-science-of-religion-9781350100299/
the epistemic status of religious beliefs and on other topics in philosophy of religion.
Epistemologists have used theories from CSR to argue both for and against the
rationality of religious beliefs, or they have claimed that CSR is neutral vis-à-vis the
epistemic status of religious belief. However, since CSR is a rapidly evolving discipline,
a great deal of earlier research on the topic has become dated. Furthermore, most of
the debate on the epistemic consequences of CSR has not taken into account insights
from the philosophy of science, such as explanatory pluralism and explanatory levels.
This volume overcomes these deficiencies.
This volume brings together new philosophical reflection on cognitive science of
religion (CSR). It examines the influence of cognitive science of religion (CSR) theories
on the epistemic status of religious beliefs; it discusses its impact on philosophy of
religion; and it offers new insights for CSR. The book addresses the question of whether or not the plurality of theories in CSR makes epistemic conclusions about religious belief unwarranted. It also explores the impact of CSR on other topics in philosophy of religion like the cognitive consequences of sin and naturalism. Finally, the book investigates what the main theories in CSR aim to explain, and addresses the strengths and weaknesses of CSR.