Principia: an international journal of epistemology, 2020
A given explanatory theory T falls into circular reasoning if the only way to determine its expla... more A given explanatory theory T falls into circular reasoning if the only way to determine its explanandum is through the application of T. To find an (often previous) underlying theory T′ that determines T′s explanandum helps us save T from this accusation of circularity. We follow the structuralist view of theories in presenting and dealing with this issue, by applying it to particular theories. More specifically, we focus on the relationship between the Darwinian theory of common ancestry and the determination of homologies.
In this paper, we present a way to translate the metainferences of a mixed metainferential system... more In this paper, we present a way to translate the metainferences of a mixed metainferential system into formulae of an extended-language system, called its associated σ-system. To do this, the σ-system will contain new operators (one for each satisfaction standard), called the σ operators, which represent the notions of "belonging to a (given) satisfaction standard". We first prove, in a model-theoretic way, that these translations preserve (in)validity. That is, that a metainference is valid in the base system if and only if its translation is a tautology of its corresponding σ-system. We then use these results to obtain other key advantages. Most interestingly, we provide a recipe for building unlabeled sequent calculi for σ-systems. We then exemplify this with a σ-system useful for logics of the ST family, and prove soundness and completeness for it, which indirectly gives us a calculus for the metainferences of all those mixed systems. Finally, we respond to some possible objections and show how our σ-framework can shed light on the "obeying" discussion within mixed metainferential contexts.
La memética constituye un enfoque sobre la evolución cultural que se ha encontrado en el foco de ... more La memética constituye un enfoque sobre la evolución cultural que se ha encontrado en el foco de la discusión y recolectado críticas de diverso tipo en las últimas décadas. El propósito de nuestro trabajo consiste en indagar si, más allá de las críticas y defensas existentes, puede considerarse que existe actualmente algún programa de investigación que pueda caracterizarse adecuadamente como memético. Nos centraremos, específicamente, en el ámbito del estudio de la evolución cultural de los cantos de aves, pues allí algunos autores han utilizado la palabra «meme» para referirse a los ítems culturales bajo estudio. Sin embargo, no todos utilizan la palabra, pues, probablemente por su carácter controversial, ha caído en desuso. Eso implica que para cumplir con el objetivo de nuestro trabajo no pueda apelarse a análisis bibliométricos. Por este motivo elucidaremos los diferentes sentidos en los que puede caracterizarse a la memética. Nuestro objetivo es defender que en el área de cantos de aves se pueden encontrar investigaciones que responden a la perspectiva memética en todos los sentidos señalados. Texto del resumen en castellano o en el idioma que está redactado.
Principia an International Journal of Epistemology, 2020
A given explanatory theory T falls into circular reasoning if the only way to determine its expla... more A given explanatory theory T falls into circular reasoning if the only way to determine its explanandum is through the application of T. To find an (often previous) underlying theory T ′ that determines T ′ s explanandum helps us save T from this accusation of circular-ity. We follow the structuralist view of theories in presenting and dealing with this issue, by applying it to particular theories. More specifically, we focus on the relationship between the Darwinian theory of common ancestry and the determination of homologies.
Resumen En el presente trabajo se analiza la controversia existente en el marco de la sistemática... more Resumen En el presente trabajo se analiza la controversia existente en el marco de la sistemática biológica en torno al estatus de la cladística. La utilización del método de parsimonia para la reconstrucción filogenética ha sido defendida apelando a un principio metodológico de simplicidad, así como a principios fácticos externos a la propia sistemática. Se propone aquí un nuevo tipo de enfoque, que consiste en considerarla una teoría fáctica, siendo su aplicación justificada por su éxito empírico. Para defender este punto se brindará una reconstrucción formal estructuralista de la cladística, que ayudará a clarificar cuáles son sus afirmaciones fácticas centrales. A su vez, se muestra cómo estos principios fácticos han sido utilizados para contrastar a tal teoría utilizando filogenias experimentales. Palabras clave: cladística-estructuralismo metateórico-parsimonia.
El objetivo de este artículo es analizar qué quiere decir capturar una teoría (se utilizará la ar... more El objetivo de este artículo es analizar qué quiere decir capturar una teoría (se utilizará la aritmética como ejemplo paradigmático) por medio de un sistema axiomático formal. Se considerarán para ello dos enfoques, que pueden denominarse “semántico” y “sintáctico”, tanto en términos de sus ventajas como de sus limitaciones. El enfoque semántico (presupuesto por Barrio y Da Ré en este volumen y expuesto en la primera sección), entiende la expresabilidad como una restricción de la clase de los modelos; se muestra que esta concepción lleva a tres clases distintas de limitaciones expresivas. En la segunda sección se examinan -y finalmente rechazan- algunos posibles caminos de solución a estos problemas. En la última sección se ofrecen objeciones a las alternativas restantes y en base a ellas se elabora el enfoque sintáctico que liga la noción de captura a la de prueba de las oraciones relevantes. También se argumenta que desde este marco pueden evitarse algunas de las limitaciones del enfoque semántico.
In this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language... more In this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language involves fully specifying its inferential characteristics within the logic. To do this, we examine a recent proposal by Berto (2014) for a paraconsistent rejection, which — according to him — avoids paradox, even when introduced into a language that contains self-reference and a transparent truth predicate. We will show that this proposal is inadequate because it is too incomplete. We argue that the reason it avoids trouble is that the inferential characteristics of the new operator are left (mostly) unspecified, exporting the task of specifying them to metaphysicians. Additionally, we show that when completing this proposal with some plausible rules for the rejection operator, paradoxes do arise. Finally, we draw some more general implications from the study of this example.
In this article, I develop three conceptual innovations within the area of formal metatheory, and... more In this article, I develop three conceptual innovations within the area of formal metatheory, and present a computer program, called Reconstructor, that implements those developments. The first development consists in a methodology for testing formal reconstructions of scientific theories, which involves checking both whether translations of paradigmatically successful applications into models satisfy the formalisation of the laws, and also whether unsuccessful applications do not. I show how Reconstructor can help carry this out, since it allows the end-user to specify a formal language, input axioms and models formulated in that language, and then ask if the models satisfy the axioms. The second innovation is the introduction of incomplete models (for which the denotation of some terms is missing) into scientific metatheory, in order to represent cases of missing information. I specify the paracomplete semantics built into Reconstructor to deal with sentences where denotation failures occur. The third development consists in a new way of explicating the structuralist notion of a determination method, by equating them with algorithms. This allows determination methods to be loaded into Reconstructor and then executed within a model to find out the value of a previously non-denoting term (i.e. it allows the formal reconstruction to make predictions). This, in turn, can help test the reconstruction in a different way. Finally, I conclude with some suggestions about additional uses the program may have.
This article elaborates on McShea and Brandon’s idea that drift is unlike the rest of the evoluti... more This article elaborates on McShea and Brandon’s idea that drift is unlike the rest of the evolutionary factors because it is constitutive rather than imposed on the evolutionary process. I show that the way they spelled out this idea renders it inadequate and is the reason why it received some (good) objections. I propose a different way in which their point could be understood, that rests on two general distinctions. The first is a distinction between the underlying mathematical apparatus used to formulate a theory and a concept proposed by that theory. With the aid of a formal reconstruction of a population genetic model, I show that drift belongs to the first category. That is, that drift is constitutive of population genetics in the same sense that multiplication is constitutive in classical mechanics, or that circle is constitutive in Ptolemaic astronomy. The second distinction is between eliminating a concept from a theory and setting its value to zero. I will show that even though drift can be set to zero just like the rest of the evolutionary factors (as others have noted in their criticism of McShea and Brandon), eliminating drift is much harder than eliminating those other factors, since it would require changing the entire mathematical apparatus of standard population genetic theory. I conclude by drawing some other implications from the proposed formal reconstruction.
In this article, I examine the issue of the alleged circularity in the determination of homologie... more In this article, I examine the issue of the alleged circularity in the determination of homologies within cladistic analysis. More specifically, I focus on the claims made by the proponents of the dynamic homology approach, regarding the distinction (sometimes made in the literature) between primary and secondary homology. This distinction is sometimes invoked to dissolve the circularity issue, by upholding that characters in a cladistic data matrix have to be only primarily homologous, and thus can be determined independently of phylogenetic hypotheses, by using the classical Owenian criteria (for morphological characters) or via multiple sequence alignment (for sequence data). However, since in the dynamic approach, sequence data can be analyzed without being pre-aligned, proponents have claimed that the distinction between primary and secondary homology has no place within cladistics. I will argue that this is not the case, since cladistic practice within the dynamic framework does presuppose primary homology statements at a higher level.
Life and Evolution. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, 2020
The systemic approach to function proposes to ground every use of functional language in biology ... more The systemic approach to function proposes to ground every use of functional language in biology in a systemic analysis. A systemic analysis is a kind of explanation or procedure that parts from a capacity of a system and shows how this capacity is exercised by the system by decomposing it into other sub-capacities that are implemented in the (parts of the) system. Our goal in this work is to examine the adequacy of this proposal. We provide a formal reconstruction of systemic analysis based on the structuralist metatheory. This will help us clarify its structure and explicate its key concepts, which will be useful for a fine-grained conceptual discussion in the two sections following it. After this, we examine the question of whether systemic analysis can account for every use of functional language in biology. We argue that, in order to be biologically significant (to avoid the charges of “promiscuity” frequently raised against it), systemic analysis as a whole requires that there exist some criteria for distinguishing biological functions that are independent from it. In order to better discuss the relationship between systemic analysis and functional explanation, we focus on the issue of the explanandum of functional systemic explanations. We argue that in systemic analyses that have biological functions as their top-level capacities, these functions explain the structure of the traits that exercise them, as is usual in functional explanations. We show that this fact has not been appreciated for two reasons. Firstly, because the order of determination is reversed from the usual cases, in the paradigmatic examples that systemic proponents had in mind (i.e. in the neurosciences, one typically first has access to the function and then seeks the traits that implement it) and, secondly, because the proponents refer to the top-level capacity as the “explanandum capacity” (since the components and sub-capacities also explain how it is exercised).
En un libro reciente McShea y Brandon defienden que la diversidad y la complejidad de la vida se ... more En un libro reciente McShea y Brandon defienden que la diversidad y la complejidad de la vida se explican, principalmente, por la acción de un principio que llaman "la ley evolu-tiva de fuerzas cero" o "ZFEL". Tal principio actuaría de un modo implícito por detrás de muchas explicaciones de la biología, pero nunca habría sido explicitado. Asumiendo que esta idea es interesante, y que los autores en cuestión tienen razón, discutiremos el modo metateórico en que presentan dicho principio, como siendo parte de la teoría de la proba-bilidad. Esto permite a los autores afirmar que la teoría de la probabilidad brindaría la base reductiva para toda la biología evolutiva (dado que consideran que otros principios, como el de selección natural, también serían parte de la teoría de la probabilidad). Defenderemos que, efectivamente, ZFEL no es propio de la biología únicamente, pero no por formar parte de la teoría de la probabilidad, sino por tratarse de una versión específica del principio de causa común. Palabras clave: ley evolutiva de fuerzas cero, complejidad, diversidad, teoría de la proba-bilidad, principio de causa común.
The meta-theoretical status of ZFEL
Abstract
In a recent book, McShea and Brandon argue that the observed diversity and complexity of life are explainable by a principle they call the “zero-force evolutionary law” or “ZFEL”. Although this principle would be implicit in many explanations given by biologists, it would have never been made explicit. Assuming that this idea is interesting, and that the authors are right, we will discuss the metatheoretical way in which they present said principle, as being a part of probability theory. This allows the authors to claim that probability theory provides the reductive basis for all evolutionary biology (given that they consider other principles, such as the principle of natural selection, as part of probability theory as well). We will defend, in accordance with them, that ZFEL is not a solely biological principle, but not because it is a part of probability theory, but rather because it is a specific version of the principle of common cause.
Keywords: zero-force evolutionary law, complexity, diversity, probability theory, principle of common cause
The propensity account of fitness intends to solve the classical tautologicity issue by identifyi... more The propensity account of fitness intends to solve the classical tautologicity issue by identifying fitness with a disposition, the ability to survive and reproduce. As proponents recognized early on, this account requires operational independence from actual reproductive success to avoid circularity and vacuousness charges. They suggested that operational independence is achieved by measuring fitness values through optimality models. Our goal in this article is to develop this suggestion. We show that one plausible procedure by which these independent operationalizations could be thought to take place, and which is in accordance with what is said in the optimality literature, is unsound. We provide two independent lines of reasoning to show this. We then provide a sketch of a more adequate account of the role of optimality models in evolutionary contexts and draw some consequences.
An interesting metatheoretical controversy took place during the 1980’s and 1990’s between patter... more An interesting metatheoretical controversy took place during the 1980’s and 1990’s between pattern and phylogenetic cladists. What was always at stake in the discussion was not how work in systematics should be carried out, but rather how this practice should be metatheoretically interpreted. In this article, we criticize Pearson’s account of the metatheoretical factors at play in this discussion. Following him, we focus on the issue of circularity, and on the role that phylogenetic hypotheses play in the determination of “primary homologies”. Pearson argues that the recognition of primary homologies cannot be achieved without recourse to previous phylogenetic knowledge, and that to claim otherwise is to state that primary homologies are observable. To show why that view would be inadequate, he appeals to Hanson's views about theory-laden observation, alongside with a specific case study, which allegedly illustrates the more complex relation between observation and theory. We will argue that the pattern cladists’ point (at least regarding the issue of homology) is better addressed by taking a quite different approach: instead of thinking in terms of observability, the topic can be tackled by paying attention to the way in which concepts are determined. We will take the notion of T-theoricity from metatheoretical structuralism and show that, once the issue is discussed with the appropriate metatheoretical framework, the alleged counterexample brought up by Pearson is not problematic at all for pattern cladism. Keywords: cladistics, pattern cladistics, homology, T-theoricity, metatheoretical structuralism, evolutionary theory.
Es una opinión extendida que la teoría de la selección natural, tal como fue formulada originalme... more Es una opinión extendida que la teoría de la selección natural, tal como fue formulada originalmente por Darwin de manera “cualitativa”, ha sido reemplazada por una versión cuantitativa superior, brindada por la genética de poblaciones. En este artículo se discute contra esa tesis, sosteniendo en cambio que ambas teorías son complementarias, no sucesivas. Para ello, se introduce una línea de argumentación novedosa, que toma su inspiración en la crítica al “inductivismo estrecho” de Hempel. Se sostiene que los genetistas de poblaciones serían incapaces de aplicar exitosamente su teoría sin hipótesis “ecológicas” preconcebidas, provenientes de la teoría darwiniana, que permitan particionar a la población en rasgos selectivamente relevantes. Se enfatiza además que la falla en notar este punto se debe a una mala comprensión de la estructura de la teoría darwiniana y de su ley o principio fundamental. A la luz de una mejor reconstrucción de dicho principio, se reexamina en mayor detalle la relación existente entre ambas teorías.
El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar las relaciones entre los modelos de optimalidad ... more El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar las relaciones entre los modelos de optimalidad y la selección natural. Defenderemos que esas relaciones pueden dividirse en dos tipos, en tanto hay dos tipos de explicaciones seleccionistas, que llamaremos " históricas " y " ahistóricas ". Las explicaciones históricas revelan como una población dada adquiere un rasgo que es adaptativo en ese ambiente e involucran muchas generaciones, variación, etc. Las explicaciones ahistóricas, explican por qué, en determinado momento, ciertos tipos de organismos tienen un mayor éxito reproductivo que otros. Mostraremos que los modelos de optimalidad pueden jugar un rol en la determinación del explanandum de las explicaciones histórica seleccionistas, esto es, que ayudan a reconocer qué rasgos son adaptativos. Por otra parte, mostramos que los modelos de optimalidad nos permiten determinar a veces la parte del explanans de las explicaciones ahistóricas (particularmente, el concepto de fitness). Palabras clave: optimalidad-selección natural-fitness-teoría del forrajeo óptimo Abstract The goal of this paper is to analyze the relations between optimality models and natural selection. We contend that these relationships can be divided into two kinds, as there are two kinds of natural selection explanations, which we call " historical " and " ahistorical ". Historical explanations reveal how a given population acquires a trait which is adaptive in its environment, and involves many generations, variations, etc. Ahistorical ones, explain why, at a given moment, certain kinds of organisms have a greater reproductive success than others. We show that optimality models can play a role in determining the explanandum of historical selectionist explanations, that is, they help us to recognize which traits are adaptive. And, on the other hand, that optimality models sometimes allow us to determine part of the explanans of ahistorical explanations (particularly, the concept of fitness).
The adequacy of Elliott Sober's analogy between classical mechanics and evolutionary theory—accor... more The adequacy of Elliott Sober's analogy between classical mechanics and evolutionary theory—according to which both theories explain via a zero-force law and a set of forces that alter the zero-force state—has been criticized from various points of view. I focus here on McShea and Brandon's claim that drift shouldn't be considered a force because it is not directional. I argue that there are a number of different theses that could be meant by this, and show that one of those theses—the idea that drift cannot bias populations to be taken somewhere in the evolutionary space from one generation to the next—is actually false. Not only has this thesis been implicitly assumed in the discussion of the force analogy thus far, but it is also commonly found in a wider range of philosophical and biological texts. I argue that correcting this view, and the usual images associated with it, will thereby bring heuristic benefits that impact the force analogy discussion, but that also go beyond it.
Principia: an international journal of epistemology, 2020
A given explanatory theory T falls into circular reasoning if the only way to determine its expla... more A given explanatory theory T falls into circular reasoning if the only way to determine its explanandum is through the application of T. To find an (often previous) underlying theory T′ that determines T′s explanandum helps us save T from this accusation of circularity. We follow the structuralist view of theories in presenting and dealing with this issue, by applying it to particular theories. More specifically, we focus on the relationship between the Darwinian theory of common ancestry and the determination of homologies.
In this paper, we present a way to translate the metainferences of a mixed metainferential system... more In this paper, we present a way to translate the metainferences of a mixed metainferential system into formulae of an extended-language system, called its associated σ-system. To do this, the σ-system will contain new operators (one for each satisfaction standard), called the σ operators, which represent the notions of "belonging to a (given) satisfaction standard". We first prove, in a model-theoretic way, that these translations preserve (in)validity. That is, that a metainference is valid in the base system if and only if its translation is a tautology of its corresponding σ-system. We then use these results to obtain other key advantages. Most interestingly, we provide a recipe for building unlabeled sequent calculi for σ-systems. We then exemplify this with a σ-system useful for logics of the ST family, and prove soundness and completeness for it, which indirectly gives us a calculus for the metainferences of all those mixed systems. Finally, we respond to some possible objections and show how our σ-framework can shed light on the "obeying" discussion within mixed metainferential contexts.
La memética constituye un enfoque sobre la evolución cultural que se ha encontrado en el foco de ... more La memética constituye un enfoque sobre la evolución cultural que se ha encontrado en el foco de la discusión y recolectado críticas de diverso tipo en las últimas décadas. El propósito de nuestro trabajo consiste en indagar si, más allá de las críticas y defensas existentes, puede considerarse que existe actualmente algún programa de investigación que pueda caracterizarse adecuadamente como memético. Nos centraremos, específicamente, en el ámbito del estudio de la evolución cultural de los cantos de aves, pues allí algunos autores han utilizado la palabra «meme» para referirse a los ítems culturales bajo estudio. Sin embargo, no todos utilizan la palabra, pues, probablemente por su carácter controversial, ha caído en desuso. Eso implica que para cumplir con el objetivo de nuestro trabajo no pueda apelarse a análisis bibliométricos. Por este motivo elucidaremos los diferentes sentidos en los que puede caracterizarse a la memética. Nuestro objetivo es defender que en el área de cantos de aves se pueden encontrar investigaciones que responden a la perspectiva memética en todos los sentidos señalados. Texto del resumen en castellano o en el idioma que está redactado.
Principia an International Journal of Epistemology, 2020
A given explanatory theory T falls into circular reasoning if the only way to determine its expla... more A given explanatory theory T falls into circular reasoning if the only way to determine its explanandum is through the application of T. To find an (often previous) underlying theory T ′ that determines T ′ s explanandum helps us save T from this accusation of circular-ity. We follow the structuralist view of theories in presenting and dealing with this issue, by applying it to particular theories. More specifically, we focus on the relationship between the Darwinian theory of common ancestry and the determination of homologies.
Resumen En el presente trabajo se analiza la controversia existente en el marco de la sistemática... more Resumen En el presente trabajo se analiza la controversia existente en el marco de la sistemática biológica en torno al estatus de la cladística. La utilización del método de parsimonia para la reconstrucción filogenética ha sido defendida apelando a un principio metodológico de simplicidad, así como a principios fácticos externos a la propia sistemática. Se propone aquí un nuevo tipo de enfoque, que consiste en considerarla una teoría fáctica, siendo su aplicación justificada por su éxito empírico. Para defender este punto se brindará una reconstrucción formal estructuralista de la cladística, que ayudará a clarificar cuáles son sus afirmaciones fácticas centrales. A su vez, se muestra cómo estos principios fácticos han sido utilizados para contrastar a tal teoría utilizando filogenias experimentales. Palabras clave: cladística-estructuralismo metateórico-parsimonia.
El objetivo de este artículo es analizar qué quiere decir capturar una teoría (se utilizará la ar... more El objetivo de este artículo es analizar qué quiere decir capturar una teoría (se utilizará la aritmética como ejemplo paradigmático) por medio de un sistema axiomático formal. Se considerarán para ello dos enfoques, que pueden denominarse “semántico” y “sintáctico”, tanto en términos de sus ventajas como de sus limitaciones. El enfoque semántico (presupuesto por Barrio y Da Ré en este volumen y expuesto en la primera sección), entiende la expresabilidad como una restricción de la clase de los modelos; se muestra que esta concepción lleva a tres clases distintas de limitaciones expresivas. En la segunda sección se examinan -y finalmente rechazan- algunos posibles caminos de solución a estos problemas. En la última sección se ofrecen objeciones a las alternativas restantes y en base a ellas se elabora el enfoque sintáctico que liga la noción de captura a la de prueba de las oraciones relevantes. También se argumenta que desde este marco pueden evitarse algunas de las limitaciones del enfoque semántico.
In this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language... more In this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language involves fully specifying its inferential characteristics within the logic. To do this, we examine a recent proposal by Berto (2014) for a paraconsistent rejection, which — according to him — avoids paradox, even when introduced into a language that contains self-reference and a transparent truth predicate. We will show that this proposal is inadequate because it is too incomplete. We argue that the reason it avoids trouble is that the inferential characteristics of the new operator are left (mostly) unspecified, exporting the task of specifying them to metaphysicians. Additionally, we show that when completing this proposal with some plausible rules for the rejection operator, paradoxes do arise. Finally, we draw some more general implications from the study of this example.
In this article, I develop three conceptual innovations within the area of formal metatheory, and... more In this article, I develop three conceptual innovations within the area of formal metatheory, and present a computer program, called Reconstructor, that implements those developments. The first development consists in a methodology for testing formal reconstructions of scientific theories, which involves checking both whether translations of paradigmatically successful applications into models satisfy the formalisation of the laws, and also whether unsuccessful applications do not. I show how Reconstructor can help carry this out, since it allows the end-user to specify a formal language, input axioms and models formulated in that language, and then ask if the models satisfy the axioms. The second innovation is the introduction of incomplete models (for which the denotation of some terms is missing) into scientific metatheory, in order to represent cases of missing information. I specify the paracomplete semantics built into Reconstructor to deal with sentences where denotation failures occur. The third development consists in a new way of explicating the structuralist notion of a determination method, by equating them with algorithms. This allows determination methods to be loaded into Reconstructor and then executed within a model to find out the value of a previously non-denoting term (i.e. it allows the formal reconstruction to make predictions). This, in turn, can help test the reconstruction in a different way. Finally, I conclude with some suggestions about additional uses the program may have.
This article elaborates on McShea and Brandon’s idea that drift is unlike the rest of the evoluti... more This article elaborates on McShea and Brandon’s idea that drift is unlike the rest of the evolutionary factors because it is constitutive rather than imposed on the evolutionary process. I show that the way they spelled out this idea renders it inadequate and is the reason why it received some (good) objections. I propose a different way in which their point could be understood, that rests on two general distinctions. The first is a distinction between the underlying mathematical apparatus used to formulate a theory and a concept proposed by that theory. With the aid of a formal reconstruction of a population genetic model, I show that drift belongs to the first category. That is, that drift is constitutive of population genetics in the same sense that multiplication is constitutive in classical mechanics, or that circle is constitutive in Ptolemaic astronomy. The second distinction is between eliminating a concept from a theory and setting its value to zero. I will show that even though drift can be set to zero just like the rest of the evolutionary factors (as others have noted in their criticism of McShea and Brandon), eliminating drift is much harder than eliminating those other factors, since it would require changing the entire mathematical apparatus of standard population genetic theory. I conclude by drawing some other implications from the proposed formal reconstruction.
In this article, I examine the issue of the alleged circularity in the determination of homologie... more In this article, I examine the issue of the alleged circularity in the determination of homologies within cladistic analysis. More specifically, I focus on the claims made by the proponents of the dynamic homology approach, regarding the distinction (sometimes made in the literature) between primary and secondary homology. This distinction is sometimes invoked to dissolve the circularity issue, by upholding that characters in a cladistic data matrix have to be only primarily homologous, and thus can be determined independently of phylogenetic hypotheses, by using the classical Owenian criteria (for morphological characters) or via multiple sequence alignment (for sequence data). However, since in the dynamic approach, sequence data can be analyzed without being pre-aligned, proponents have claimed that the distinction between primary and secondary homology has no place within cladistics. I will argue that this is not the case, since cladistic practice within the dynamic framework does presuppose primary homology statements at a higher level.
Life and Evolution. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, 2020
The systemic approach to function proposes to ground every use of functional language in biology ... more The systemic approach to function proposes to ground every use of functional language in biology in a systemic analysis. A systemic analysis is a kind of explanation or procedure that parts from a capacity of a system and shows how this capacity is exercised by the system by decomposing it into other sub-capacities that are implemented in the (parts of the) system. Our goal in this work is to examine the adequacy of this proposal. We provide a formal reconstruction of systemic analysis based on the structuralist metatheory. This will help us clarify its structure and explicate its key concepts, which will be useful for a fine-grained conceptual discussion in the two sections following it. After this, we examine the question of whether systemic analysis can account for every use of functional language in biology. We argue that, in order to be biologically significant (to avoid the charges of “promiscuity” frequently raised against it), systemic analysis as a whole requires that there exist some criteria for distinguishing biological functions that are independent from it. In order to better discuss the relationship between systemic analysis and functional explanation, we focus on the issue of the explanandum of functional systemic explanations. We argue that in systemic analyses that have biological functions as their top-level capacities, these functions explain the structure of the traits that exercise them, as is usual in functional explanations. We show that this fact has not been appreciated for two reasons. Firstly, because the order of determination is reversed from the usual cases, in the paradigmatic examples that systemic proponents had in mind (i.e. in the neurosciences, one typically first has access to the function and then seeks the traits that implement it) and, secondly, because the proponents refer to the top-level capacity as the “explanandum capacity” (since the components and sub-capacities also explain how it is exercised).
En un libro reciente McShea y Brandon defienden que la diversidad y la complejidad de la vida se ... more En un libro reciente McShea y Brandon defienden que la diversidad y la complejidad de la vida se explican, principalmente, por la acción de un principio que llaman "la ley evolu-tiva de fuerzas cero" o "ZFEL". Tal principio actuaría de un modo implícito por detrás de muchas explicaciones de la biología, pero nunca habría sido explicitado. Asumiendo que esta idea es interesante, y que los autores en cuestión tienen razón, discutiremos el modo metateórico en que presentan dicho principio, como siendo parte de la teoría de la proba-bilidad. Esto permite a los autores afirmar que la teoría de la probabilidad brindaría la base reductiva para toda la biología evolutiva (dado que consideran que otros principios, como el de selección natural, también serían parte de la teoría de la probabilidad). Defenderemos que, efectivamente, ZFEL no es propio de la biología únicamente, pero no por formar parte de la teoría de la probabilidad, sino por tratarse de una versión específica del principio de causa común. Palabras clave: ley evolutiva de fuerzas cero, complejidad, diversidad, teoría de la proba-bilidad, principio de causa común.
The meta-theoretical status of ZFEL
Abstract
In a recent book, McShea and Brandon argue that the observed diversity and complexity of life are explainable by a principle they call the “zero-force evolutionary law” or “ZFEL”. Although this principle would be implicit in many explanations given by biologists, it would have never been made explicit. Assuming that this idea is interesting, and that the authors are right, we will discuss the metatheoretical way in which they present said principle, as being a part of probability theory. This allows the authors to claim that probability theory provides the reductive basis for all evolutionary biology (given that they consider other principles, such as the principle of natural selection, as part of probability theory as well). We will defend, in accordance with them, that ZFEL is not a solely biological principle, but not because it is a part of probability theory, but rather because it is a specific version of the principle of common cause.
Keywords: zero-force evolutionary law, complexity, diversity, probability theory, principle of common cause
The propensity account of fitness intends to solve the classical tautologicity issue by identifyi... more The propensity account of fitness intends to solve the classical tautologicity issue by identifying fitness with a disposition, the ability to survive and reproduce. As proponents recognized early on, this account requires operational independence from actual reproductive success to avoid circularity and vacuousness charges. They suggested that operational independence is achieved by measuring fitness values through optimality models. Our goal in this article is to develop this suggestion. We show that one plausible procedure by which these independent operationalizations could be thought to take place, and which is in accordance with what is said in the optimality literature, is unsound. We provide two independent lines of reasoning to show this. We then provide a sketch of a more adequate account of the role of optimality models in evolutionary contexts and draw some consequences.
An interesting metatheoretical controversy took place during the 1980’s and 1990’s between patter... more An interesting metatheoretical controversy took place during the 1980’s and 1990’s between pattern and phylogenetic cladists. What was always at stake in the discussion was not how work in systematics should be carried out, but rather how this practice should be metatheoretically interpreted. In this article, we criticize Pearson’s account of the metatheoretical factors at play in this discussion. Following him, we focus on the issue of circularity, and on the role that phylogenetic hypotheses play in the determination of “primary homologies”. Pearson argues that the recognition of primary homologies cannot be achieved without recourse to previous phylogenetic knowledge, and that to claim otherwise is to state that primary homologies are observable. To show why that view would be inadequate, he appeals to Hanson's views about theory-laden observation, alongside with a specific case study, which allegedly illustrates the more complex relation between observation and theory. We will argue that the pattern cladists’ point (at least regarding the issue of homology) is better addressed by taking a quite different approach: instead of thinking in terms of observability, the topic can be tackled by paying attention to the way in which concepts are determined. We will take the notion of T-theoricity from metatheoretical structuralism and show that, once the issue is discussed with the appropriate metatheoretical framework, the alleged counterexample brought up by Pearson is not problematic at all for pattern cladism. Keywords: cladistics, pattern cladistics, homology, T-theoricity, metatheoretical structuralism, evolutionary theory.
Es una opinión extendida que la teoría de la selección natural, tal como fue formulada originalme... more Es una opinión extendida que la teoría de la selección natural, tal como fue formulada originalmente por Darwin de manera “cualitativa”, ha sido reemplazada por una versión cuantitativa superior, brindada por la genética de poblaciones. En este artículo se discute contra esa tesis, sosteniendo en cambio que ambas teorías son complementarias, no sucesivas. Para ello, se introduce una línea de argumentación novedosa, que toma su inspiración en la crítica al “inductivismo estrecho” de Hempel. Se sostiene que los genetistas de poblaciones serían incapaces de aplicar exitosamente su teoría sin hipótesis “ecológicas” preconcebidas, provenientes de la teoría darwiniana, que permitan particionar a la población en rasgos selectivamente relevantes. Se enfatiza además que la falla en notar este punto se debe a una mala comprensión de la estructura de la teoría darwiniana y de su ley o principio fundamental. A la luz de una mejor reconstrucción de dicho principio, se reexamina en mayor detalle la relación existente entre ambas teorías.
El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar las relaciones entre los modelos de optimalidad ... more El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar las relaciones entre los modelos de optimalidad y la selección natural. Defenderemos que esas relaciones pueden dividirse en dos tipos, en tanto hay dos tipos de explicaciones seleccionistas, que llamaremos " históricas " y " ahistóricas ". Las explicaciones históricas revelan como una población dada adquiere un rasgo que es adaptativo en ese ambiente e involucran muchas generaciones, variación, etc. Las explicaciones ahistóricas, explican por qué, en determinado momento, ciertos tipos de organismos tienen un mayor éxito reproductivo que otros. Mostraremos que los modelos de optimalidad pueden jugar un rol en la determinación del explanandum de las explicaciones histórica seleccionistas, esto es, que ayudan a reconocer qué rasgos son adaptativos. Por otra parte, mostramos que los modelos de optimalidad nos permiten determinar a veces la parte del explanans de las explicaciones ahistóricas (particularmente, el concepto de fitness). Palabras clave: optimalidad-selección natural-fitness-teoría del forrajeo óptimo Abstract The goal of this paper is to analyze the relations between optimality models and natural selection. We contend that these relationships can be divided into two kinds, as there are two kinds of natural selection explanations, which we call " historical " and " ahistorical ". Historical explanations reveal how a given population acquires a trait which is adaptive in its environment, and involves many generations, variations, etc. Ahistorical ones, explain why, at a given moment, certain kinds of organisms have a greater reproductive success than others. We show that optimality models can play a role in determining the explanandum of historical selectionist explanations, that is, they help us to recognize which traits are adaptive. And, on the other hand, that optimality models sometimes allow us to determine part of the explanans of ahistorical explanations (particularly, the concept of fitness).
The adequacy of Elliott Sober's analogy between classical mechanics and evolutionary theory—accor... more The adequacy of Elliott Sober's analogy between classical mechanics and evolutionary theory—according to which both theories explain via a zero-force law and a set of forces that alter the zero-force state—has been criticized from various points of view. I focus here on McShea and Brandon's claim that drift shouldn't be considered a force because it is not directional. I argue that there are a number of different theses that could be meant by this, and show that one of those theses—the idea that drift cannot bias populations to be taken somewhere in the evolutionary space from one generation to the next—is actually false. Not only has this thesis been implicitly assumed in the discussion of the force analogy thus far, but it is also commonly found in a wider range of philosophical and biological texts. I argue that correcting this view, and the usual images associated with it, will thereby bring heuristic benefits that impact the force analogy discussion, but that also go beyond it.
In this article, we provide three generators of propositional formulae for arbitrary languages, w... more In this article, we provide three generators of propositional formulae for arbitrary languages, which uniformly sample three different formulae spaces. They take the same three parameters as input, namely, a desired depth, a set of atomics and a set of logical constants (with specified arities). The first generator returns formulae of exactly the given depth, using all or some of the propositional letters. The second does the same but samples up-to the given depth. The third generator outputs formulae with exactly the desired depth and all the atomics in the set. To make the generators uniform (i.e. to make them return every formula in their space with the same probability), we will prove various cardinality results about those spaces.
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Papers by Ariel J Roffé
The meta-theoretical status of ZFEL
Abstract
In a recent book, McShea and Brandon argue that the observed diversity and complexity of life are explainable by a principle they call the “zero-force evolutionary law” or “ZFEL”. Although this principle would be implicit in many explanations given by biologists, it would have never been made explicit. Assuming that this idea is interesting, and that the authors are right, we will discuss the metatheoretical way in which they present said principle, as being a part of probability theory. This allows the authors to claim that probability theory provides the reductive basis for all evolutionary biology (given that they consider other principles, such as the principle of natural selection, as part of probability theory as well). We will defend, in accordance with them, that ZFEL is not a solely biological principle, but not because it is a part of probability theory, but rather because it is a specific version of the principle of common cause.
Keywords: zero-force evolutionary law, complexity, diversity, probability theory, principle of common cause
Keywords: cladistics, pattern cladistics, homology, T-theoricity, metatheoretical structuralism, evolutionary theory.
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to analyze the relations between optimality models and natural selection. We contend that these relationships can be divided into two kinds, as there are two kinds of natural selection explanations, which we call " historical " and " ahistorical ". Historical explanations reveal how a given population acquires a trait which is adaptive in its environment, and involves many generations, variations, etc. Ahistorical ones, explain why, at a given moment, certain kinds of organisms have a greater reproductive success than others. We show that optimality models can play a role in determining the explanandum of historical selectionist explanations, that is, they help us to recognize which traits are adaptive. And, on the other hand, that optimality models sometimes allow us to determine part of the explanans of ahistorical explanations (particularly, the concept of fitness).
Book Reviews by Ariel J Roffé
The meta-theoretical status of ZFEL
Abstract
In a recent book, McShea and Brandon argue that the observed diversity and complexity of life are explainable by a principle they call the “zero-force evolutionary law” or “ZFEL”. Although this principle would be implicit in many explanations given by biologists, it would have never been made explicit. Assuming that this idea is interesting, and that the authors are right, we will discuss the metatheoretical way in which they present said principle, as being a part of probability theory. This allows the authors to claim that probability theory provides the reductive basis for all evolutionary biology (given that they consider other principles, such as the principle of natural selection, as part of probability theory as well). We will defend, in accordance with them, that ZFEL is not a solely biological principle, but not because it is a part of probability theory, but rather because it is a specific version of the principle of common cause.
Keywords: zero-force evolutionary law, complexity, diversity, probability theory, principle of common cause
Keywords: cladistics, pattern cladistics, homology, T-theoricity, metatheoretical structuralism, evolutionary theory.
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to analyze the relations between optimality models and natural selection. We contend that these relationships can be divided into two kinds, as there are two kinds of natural selection explanations, which we call " historical " and " ahistorical ". Historical explanations reveal how a given population acquires a trait which is adaptive in its environment, and involves many generations, variations, etc. Ahistorical ones, explain why, at a given moment, certain kinds of organisms have a greater reproductive success than others. We show that optimality models can play a role in determining the explanandum of historical selectionist explanations, that is, they help us to recognize which traits are adaptive. And, on the other hand, that optimality models sometimes allow us to determine part of the explanans of ahistorical explanations (particularly, the concept of fitness).