Visual Attention & Scene Perception by Ronald A Rensink
Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness, Aug 2015
It is suggested that the relationship between visual attention and conscious visual experience ca... more It is suggested that the relationship between visual attention and conscious visual experience can be simplified by distinguishing different aspects of both visual attention and visual experience. A set of principles is first proposed for any possible taxonomy of the processes involved in visual attention. A particular taxonomy is then put forward that describes five such processes, each with a distinct function and characteristic mode of operation. Based on these, three separate kinds—or possibly grades—of conscious visual experience can be distinguished, each associated with a particular combination of attentional processes.
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Our visual experience of the world is one of diverse objects and events, each with particular col... more Our visual experience of the world is one of diverse objects and events, each with particular colors, shapes, and motions. This experience is so coherent, so immediate, and so effortless that it seems to result from a single system that lets us experience everything in our field of view. But however appealing, this belief is mistaken: there are severe limits on what can be visually experienced. Performance is evidently affected by a factor within the observer which enables certain kinds of perception to occur, but is limited in some way. This factor is generally referred to as attention. This article surveys several of the major issues in our understanding of attention, and how it relates to perception. Among other things, it organizes the known body of research results into five main classes, each corresponding to a particular type of attentional mechanism.
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This article discusses several key issues concerning the study of attention and its relation to v... more This article discusses several key issues concerning the study of attention and its relation to visual perception, with an emphasis on behavioral and experiential aspects. It begins with an overview of several classical works carried out in the latter half of the 20th century, such as the development of early filter and spotlight models of attention. This is followed by a survey of subsequent research that extended or modified these results in significant ways. It covers current work on various forms of induced blindness and on the capabilities of nonattentional processes. It also includes proposals about how a "just-in-time" allocation of attention can create the impression that we see our surroundings in coherent detail everywhere, as well as how the failure of such allocation can result in various perceptual deficits. The final section examines issues that have received little consideration to date, but may be important for new lines of research in the near future. These include the prospects for a better characterization of attention, the possibility of more systematic explanations, factors that may significantly modulate attentional operation, and the possibility of several kinds of visual attention and visual experience.
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It is argued that change perception can provide a powerful way to explore various aspects of visi... more It is argued that change perception can provide a powerful way to explore various aspects of vision, such as visual attention and the accumulation of information across saccades. Several studies of change perception are discussed, and their results consolidated with existing knowledge to cast new light on our understanding of the visual system.
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In Encyclopedia of Consciousness, Vol 1. W. Banks (ed). New York: Elsevier. pp. 47-59. , 2009
As observers, we generally have a strong impression of seeing everything in front of us at any mo... more As observers, we generally have a strong impression of seeing everything in front of us at any moment. But compelling as it is, this impression is false – there are severe limits to what we can consciously experience in everyday life. Much of the evidence for this claim has come from two phenomena: change blindness (CB) and inattentional blindness (IB). CB refers to the failure of an observer to visually experience changes that are easily seen once noticed. This can happen even if the changes are large, constantly repeat, and the observer has been informed that they will occur. A related phenomenon is IB – the failure to visually experience an object or event when attention is directed elsewhere. For example, observers may fail to notice an unexpected object that enters their visual field, even if this object is large, appears for several seconds, and has important consequences for the selection of action. Both phenomena involve a striking failure to report an object or event that is easily seen once noticed. As such, both are highly counterintuitive, not only in the subjective sense that observers have difficulty believing they could fail so badly at seeing but also in the objective sense that these findings challenge many existing ideas about how we see. But as counterintuitive as these phenomena are, progress has been made in understanding them. Indeed, doing so has allowed us to better understand the limitations of human perception in everyday life and to gain new insights into how our visual systems create the picture of the world that we experience each moment our eyes are open.
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Inattentional Blindness (IB) is the failure to see the presence of an item when it is not attende... more Inattentional Blindness (IB) is the failure to see the presence of an item when it is not attended. Previous studies (e.g., Neisser & Becklen, 1975; Mack & Rock, 1998) relied on having the observer attend to one part of a visual display and then presenting an unexpected—and thus unattended—part that the observer is subsequently queried about. But the need for an unexpected stimulus creates problems. For example, the test stimulus is unexpected only the first time it appears, making extensive exploration of IB difficult. And at the theoretical level, it leaves open the possibility that IB is not really a failure to see the stimulus, but rather is a failure to remember it long enough to be queried about it (Wolfe, 1999).
To address these concerns, a “locked onset” technique was developed in which a test stimulus appeared the moment the observer attended to some other part of the display. In each trial, observers viewed a set of items that briefly appeared and then made a sudden change; a test stimulus then appeared in the center of this display on half the trials. Observers were asked to report whether the monitored items did or did not change uniformly, and whether the test stimulus appeared. The onset of this stimulus was locked to the moment the monitored changes occurred, so that attention could not be easily given to it. Detection rates therefore indicate whether or not observers are blind to an unattended stimulus even when it is expected.
Results showed blindness rates comparable to those reported in previous studies, even when there were 192 trials per observer, and test stimuli were displayed for 400 ms. Since observers were prepared to respond to the test stimulus, this shows that IB is due to a failure to see rather than a failure to remember. These results also suggest that the locked onset technique may form a simple and practical basis for the exploration of IB.
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Encyclopedia of Perception. (E. Bruce Goldstein, ed.) , 2009
Change detection is the noticing of change in the world around us. For example, when driving in t... more Change detection is the noticing of change in the world around us. For example, when driving in traffic, the vehicles around us constantly change their position, and sometimes their speed and direction as well. In order to avoid collisions, we must notice any such changes and respond to them. More generally, the ability to detect change is important for coping with everyday life; humans (and most animals) are consequently very good at it. However, our knowledge of how changes are detected remains incomplete. The progress that has recently been made owes its existence to two related developments: (i) a realization of some of the confusions and assumptions built into our previous ideas about change, and (ii) new methodologies that allow it to be more effectively isolated and studied.
An important step is to clarify the meaning of the terms themselves. As used here, "change detection" is restricted to the noticing of a change (i.e., the observer seeing that a change exists) via the use of vision. This can include the related abilities of identifying the change (i.e., seeing what it is), as well as localizing it (i.e., seeing where it is), although these abilities likely involve somewhat different mechanisms.
An adequate understanding of change detection has been difficult to achieve. Part of this is due to the nature of change itself. Although the concept of change appears simple, attempts to formalize it have shown otherwise. For example, change requires that some aspect of an object remain constant while another aspect does not, a situation that has not been completely resolved by present-day philosophers. Furthermore, our intuitions about change detection are often highly inaccurate. For example, we generally believe that we could easily detect any change in front of us provided that its size is sufficiently large. But we can be amazingly "blind" to such changes, failing to detect them even when they are large, repeatedly made, and are expected. Such change blindness is a phenomenon strikingly at odds with our intuitions about how change detection should work. However, such counterintuitive results have taught us much about what change detection is and how it works.
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Visual Attention & Scene Perception by Ronald A Rensink
To address these concerns, a “locked onset” technique was developed in which a test stimulus appeared the moment the observer attended to some other part of the display. In each trial, observers viewed a set of items that briefly appeared and then made a sudden change; a test stimulus then appeared in the center of this display on half the trials. Observers were asked to report whether the monitored items did or did not change uniformly, and whether the test stimulus appeared. The onset of this stimulus was locked to the moment the monitored changes occurred, so that attention could not be easily given to it. Detection rates therefore indicate whether or not observers are blind to an unattended stimulus even when it is expected.
Results showed blindness rates comparable to those reported in previous studies, even when there were 192 trials per observer, and test stimuli were displayed for 400 ms. Since observers were prepared to respond to the test stimulus, this shows that IB is due to a failure to see rather than a failure to remember. These results also suggest that the locked onset technique may form a simple and practical basis for the exploration of IB.
An important step is to clarify the meaning of the terms themselves. As used here, "change detection" is restricted to the noticing of a change (i.e., the observer seeing that a change exists) via the use of vision. This can include the related abilities of identifying the change (i.e., seeing what it is), as well as localizing it (i.e., seeing where it is), although these abilities likely involve somewhat different mechanisms.
An adequate understanding of change detection has been difficult to achieve. Part of this is due to the nature of change itself. Although the concept of change appears simple, attempts to formalize it have shown otherwise. For example, change requires that some aspect of an object remain constant while another aspect does not, a situation that has not been completely resolved by present-day philosophers. Furthermore, our intuitions about change detection are often highly inaccurate. For example, we generally believe that we could easily detect any change in front of us provided that its size is sufficiently large. But we can be amazingly "blind" to such changes, failing to detect them even when they are large, repeatedly made, and are expected. Such change blindness is a phenomenon strikingly at odds with our intuitions about how change detection should work. However, such counterintuitive results have taught us much about what change detection is and how it works.
To address these concerns, a “locked onset” technique was developed in which a test stimulus appeared the moment the observer attended to some other part of the display. In each trial, observers viewed a set of items that briefly appeared and then made a sudden change; a test stimulus then appeared in the center of this display on half the trials. Observers were asked to report whether the monitored items did or did not change uniformly, and whether the test stimulus appeared. The onset of this stimulus was locked to the moment the monitored changes occurred, so that attention could not be easily given to it. Detection rates therefore indicate whether or not observers are blind to an unattended stimulus even when it is expected.
Results showed blindness rates comparable to those reported in previous studies, even when there were 192 trials per observer, and test stimuli were displayed for 400 ms. Since observers were prepared to respond to the test stimulus, this shows that IB is due to a failure to see rather than a failure to remember. These results also suggest that the locked onset technique may form a simple and practical basis for the exploration of IB.
An important step is to clarify the meaning of the terms themselves. As used here, "change detection" is restricted to the noticing of a change (i.e., the observer seeing that a change exists) via the use of vision. This can include the related abilities of identifying the change (i.e., seeing what it is), as well as localizing it (i.e., seeing where it is), although these abilities likely involve somewhat different mechanisms.
An adequate understanding of change detection has been difficult to achieve. Part of this is due to the nature of change itself. Although the concept of change appears simple, attempts to formalize it have shown otherwise. For example, change requires that some aspect of an object remain constant while another aspect does not, a situation that has not been completely resolved by present-day philosophers. Furthermore, our intuitions about change detection are often highly inaccurate. For example, we generally believe that we could easily detect any change in front of us provided that its size is sufficiently large. But we can be amazingly "blind" to such changes, failing to detect them even when they are large, repeatedly made, and are expected. Such change blindness is a phenomenon strikingly at odds with our intuitions about how change detection should work. However, such counterintuitive results have taught us much about what change detection is and how it works.
size. All were able to support the perception of correlation. Indeed, despite the strikingly different appearances of the associated stimuli, all gave rise to performance that was much the same: just noticeable difference was a linear function of distance from complete correlation, and estimated correlation a logarithmic function of this distance. Performance differed only in regards to the level of noise in the feature, with these values compatible with estimates of channel capacity encountered in classic experiments on absolute perceptual magnitudes. These results suggest that quantitative information can be conveyed by visual features that are abstracted at relatively low levels of visual processing, with little representation of the original sensory property. It is proposed that this is achieved via an abstract parameter space in which the values in each perceptual dimension are normalized to have the same means and variances, with perceived correlation based on the shape of the joint probability density function of the resultant elements.
In this chapter, we start with the view that any system for processing information is incomplete unless the human observer—the person supposed to explore, analyze, and ultimately use the information—is taken into account. We do not pretend that this is a new insight. There is a considerable body of work on improving the effectiveness of systems to convey quantitative information visually. To date, however, this has been a fairly empirical tradition. In contrast, we suggest here that oncology informatics could be substantially improved by drawing on basic research in visual perception to offer a better understanding of how best to present data and images. To this end, we begin with an introduction to the functional properties of the human visual system. We follow this with a general discussion of how knowledge of vision science can be applied to the field of visualization, which is concerned with developing effective ways of conveying information visually. Then, to illustrate how this approach can be applied to the design of improved informatics systems, we discuss in detail two specific examples: the effective display of quantitative data, and the effective display of medical images.
visualizations has great value for research (e. g., to avoid confounds), for design (e. g., to best determine the capabilities of an audience), for teaching (e. g., to assess the level of new students), and for recruiting (e. g., to assess the level of interviewees). This paper proposes a method for assessing VL based on Item Response Theory. It describes the design and evaluation of two VL tests for line graphs, and presents the extension of the method to bar charts and scatterplots. Finally, it discusses the reimplementation of these tests for fast, effective, and scalable web-based use.
has been given to developing the machine component—for example, machine learning or the human-computer interface. However, it is also essential to develop the abilities of the analysts themselves, especially at the beginning of their careers.
The use of visual displays has a long history. Drawings were used tens of thousand of years ago, likely for teaching. With the advent of writing, text became the dominant means of transmitting information, and reduced the involvement of visual perception to that of recognizing characters or words. But the use of drawings never completely disappeared. And displays such as maps were discovered to be a highly effective way of describing the two-dimensional surface of the Earth. More generally, it has been found that when a visual display draws on the appropriate mechanisms of visual perception, it can present information in a way that allows a viewer to understand it far more quickly, accurately, and memorably than if presented by text alone. It has also been found that successful design techniques sometimes point to previously unknown mechanisms.
When used to convey more abstract information by more metaphoric means, visual displays cross over into the domain of fine art. The two domains have a great deal of overlap, drawing on many of the same perceptual mechanisms. They are also very compatible—an effective visual display can have great esthetic appeal. However, the focus of visual display design is on the communication of relatively concrete information, with emphasis on speed and accuracy. As such, different principles are often involved, principles that depend on the nature of the task and on the tradition in which they were developed.
(For paper, go to http://authors.elsevier.com/a/1SHZj2Hx2Q8yv)
We propose here a framework outlining how knowledge about magic can be used to help us understand the human mind. Various approaches—both old and new—are surveyed, in terms of four different levels. The first focuses on the methods in magic, using these to suggest new approaches to existing issues in psychology. The second focuses on the effects that magic can produce, such as the sense of wonder induced by seeing an apparently impossible event. Third is the consideration of magic tricks—methods and effects together—as phenomena of scientific interest in their own right. Finally, there is the organization of knowledge about magic into an informative whole, including the possibility of a science centered around the experience of wonder.
But in addition to this, we also suggested that it might be time to consider developing an outright science of magic—a distinct area of study concerned with the experience of wonder that results from encountering an apparently impossible event . To this end, we proposed a framework as to how this might be achieved (Rensink & Kuhn, 2015). A science can be viewed as a systematic method of investigation involving three sets of issues: (i) the entities considered relevant, (ii) the kinds of questions that can be asked about them, and (iii) the kinds of answers that are legitimate (T Kuhn, 1970). In the case of magic, we suggested that this could be done at three different levels, each focusing on a distinct set of issues concerned with the nature of magic itself: (i) the nature of magical experience, (ii) how individual magic tricks create this experience, and (iii) organizing knowledge of the set of known tricks in a more comprehensive way (Rensink & Kuhn, 2015). Our framework also included a base level focused on how the methods of magic could be used as tools to investigate issues in existing fields of study.
Lamont & colleagues (Lamont, 2010; Lamont, Henderson, & Smith, 2010) raised a number of concerns about the possibility of such a science, which we have addressed (Rensink & Kuhn, 2015). More recently, Lamont (2015) raised a new objection, arguing that although base-level work (i.e., applications of magic methods) might be useful, there is too little structure in magic tricks for them to be studied in a systematic way at the other levels, ruling out a science of magic. However, we argue here that although this concern raises some interesting challenges for this science, it does not negate the possibility that it could exist, and could contribute to the study of the mind.
that humans are very good at resuming a search after it
has been momentarily interrupted. This is shown by exceptionally
rapid response time to a display that reappears
after a brief interruption, even when an entirely different
visual display is seen during the interruption and two
different visual searches are performed simultaneously.
This rapid resumption depends on the stability of the visual
scene and is not due to display or response anticipations.
These results are consistent with the existence of an iterative
hypothesis-testing mechanism that compares information
stored in short-term memory (the perceptual hypothesis)
with information about the display (the sensory pattern).
In this view, rapid resumption occurs because a hypothesis
based on a previous glance of the scene can be tested very
rapidly in a subsequent glance, given that the initial hypothesis-
generation step has already been performed.
As the display time in each alternation cycle is increased, search slopes become proportional to display time, with the proportionality constant a direct estimate of attentional capacity (Rensink, 2000, Visual Cognition 7, 345-376). Two display times were examined here: 80 ms and 800 ms. For orientation changes, slopes for the two conditions differed significantly, with the long-display slope corresponding to a capacity of 5.3 items. However, for contrast polarity, slopes did not differ, indicating a capacity of at least 10. It is suggested that visual attention still has a capacity of 4-5 units, but that items of similar polarity are grouped such that they effectively form a single unit. Such grouping was also found for size and color.
associated with an absence of any sense of agency, and convey thought rather than respond to sensory stimulation. The question examined here is whether ideomotor actions can express thoughts that are unconscious. We investigated this via the use of implicit long-term semantic memory, which is not available to conscious recall. We compared accuracy of answers to yes/no questions, using both conscious report and ideomotor response (Ouija board response). Results show that when participants believed they knew the answer, accuracies in the two response modalities
did not differ, but when they did not believe they knew it, accuracy was at chance for conscious report but was significantly higher for Ouija response. These results demonstrate that implicit semantic memory can be expressed through ideomotor actions. They also demonstrate that ideomotor actions can provide a powerful new methodology for studying implicit processes in cognition.