Religion, Society and Culture

Statistically speaking, American Evangelical Christians are uniquely attracted to apocalyptic conspiracy theories when it comes to the topic of climate change. Since Evangelicals constitute a powerful voting/lobbying/shopping bloc, it is worth asking why this might be the case and what (if anything) can be done about it. To this end, my study considers the relevance of two major cultural tributaries to American Evangelical pop apocalyptic culture. In the first section I consider biblical apocalyptic culture and argue that the characteristic apocalyptic promise to disclose hidden divine plans to a misunderstood but soon-to-be-vindicated elect group naturally entails conspiracy-theory thinking. I argue further that apocalyptic imagination and conspiracy-theory thinking are powerful tools for the definition of identity and community. In the second section I turn my attention to the kind of Evangelical pop apocalyptic culture that helped push climate science denial into the Christian mainstream. I argue that in pop apocalyptic productions like the influential tracts and comics of Jack T. Chick, the image of the elect as the persecuted and powerful bearers of special knowledge found a new lease on life, and continues to fascinate millions with the attractive offer of somebody special to be and somewhere special to belong. I conclude that apocalyptic questions of crisis and conspiracy have a sociological function, as means to the end of defining social identity. Understanding this concrete function of conspiracy-theory thinking in Christian apocalyptic imagination can help in assessing and addressing the troubling phenomenon of Evangelical climate denial.

In our ostensibly secular age, discussing the real‐world contexts and impacts of religious traditions in the classroom can be difficult. Religious traditions may appear at different times to different students as too irrelevant, too personal, or too inflammatory to allow them to engage openly with the materials, the issues, and each other. In this “Design & Analysis” article Aaron Ricker describes an attempt to address this awkward pedagogical situation with an experiment in role‐play enacted on the model of a mock conference. This description is followed by four short responses by authors who have experimented with this form of pedagogy themselves. In “Conplay,” students dramatize the wildly varying and often conflict- ing approaches to biblical tradition they have been reading about and discussing in class. They bring the believers, doubters, artists, and critics they have been studying into the room, to interact face‐to‐face with each other and the class. In Ricker's experience, this playful and collaborative event involves just the right amount of risk to allow high levels of engagement and retention, and it allows a wide range of voices to be heard in an immediate and very human reg- ister. Ricker finds Conplay to be very effective, and well worth any perceived risks when it comes to inviting students to take the reins.

This article considers imperial Roman and German forms of liberal elite consensus on “proper religious diversity” to set the stage for an examination of the contemporary form of liberal consensus discernible in a recent public talk given by Charles Taylor and Rowan Williams. In each case, attention is drawn to the ways in which “proper religious diversity” is defined to serve ideological and theological agendas. Romanitas, Germanentum, and the Taylor–Williams consensus are cannibalistic theological systems: each uses a public stance of reasonable openmindedness regarding “proper religious diversity” to build and police a theological position that arrogates the perceived value of selected “religious” traditions by re-making them in its own image. Imperial Romanitas and Germanentum served in this way to absorb a diversity of traditions deemed palatable and digestible into overarching theological visions which were convenient to those in power. When Taylor and Williams use the platform...

Statistically speaking, American Evangelical Christians are uniquely attracted to apocalyptic conspiracy theories when it comes to the topic of climate change. Since Evangelicals constitute a powerful voting/lobbying/shopping bloc, it is worth asking why this might be the case and what (if anything) can be done about it. To this end, my study considers the relevance of two major cultural tributaries to American Evangelical pop apocalyptic culture. In the first section I consider biblical apocalyptic culture and argue that the characteristic apocalyptic promise to disclose hidden divine plans to a misunderstood but soon-tobe- vindicated elect group naturally entails conspiracy-theory thinking. I argue further that apocalyptic imagination and conspiracy-theory thinking are powerful tools for the definition of identity and community. In the second section I turn my attention to the kind of Evangelical pop apocalyptic culture that helped push climate science denial into the Christian ma...

The claim that superhero comics culture is a modern religious and/ or mythopoeic expression has been repeated so often by academic observers of pop culture over the years, it has assumed the dimensions of a modern myth in its own right. Critically evaluating this claim that superhero comics culture is in effect a modern religious or mythopoeic expression can, though, feel at times like reading comics produced by M.C. Escher, since superhero comics "mythology" so often includes elaborate homage to (and exuberant plagiarism of) real-world religions and myths, including the religions and myths held sacred by the heroes themselves. To complete the picture of confusion, one needs only to note the fact that "religion" and "myth" are both notoriously difficult to define, and the related fact that taking any given set of phenomena seriously as "religious data" effectively makes it religious data for the practical purposes of human cultures and their s...