Heidi Maibom investigates the phenomenon of practical necessity against the background of the phe... more Heidi Maibom investigates the phenomenon of practical necessity against the background of the phenomenon of shame in order to establish the centrality of taking the third-person perspective on oneself and one’s actions to practical necessity. She illustrates the importance of shame in our lives with others using a population in which emotional connection appears to be absent: psychopaths. Psychopaths lack the ability to view themselves as others see them. This ability is also central to responsibility. The literature on autobiographical memory shows that this third-person perspective is associated with understanding our actions in terms of their larger meaning or significance. Maibom points out that this is exactly what is central to practical necessity. She argues that it is a mistake to think of practical necessity as being some peculiar force that we feel merely concerns ourselves. If we were alone in the world, it is unlikely that we would feel either the pull of practical necessity or shame. The necessity that is felt is connected to our social identities, our identity as one being among others. Personal practical necessities thus have to be interpreted as social practical necessities. Maibom’s chapter contributes to a better understanding of practical necessity and its connection to identity, morality, and responsibility.
In this paper, I evaluate one of the most prominent accounts of how emotion regulation features i... more In this paper, I evaluate one of the most prominent accounts of how emotion regulation features in empathy. According to this account, by Nancy Eisenberg and colleagues, empathy develops into either personal distress or sympathy depending on the ability to regulate one’s empathic distress. I argue that recent evidence suggests (1) that empathic distress and sympathy co-occur throughout the empathic episode, (2) that a certain degree of empathic distress may be necessary for prosocial motivation, as high emotion regulation leads to loss of this motivation, and (3) that emotion regulation is not an unmitigated good since much of it is achieved by dehumanizing the sufferer or minimizing her pain. A fertile ground for further research, I suggest, is the role of up-regulation of sympathy.
... If Blair is serious, then, ... consists in parents training their children's emotion... more ... If Blair is serious, then, ... consists in parents training their children's emotions in three ways:(i) power assertion,(ii) love with-drawal, and (iii) empathy induction. ... When planning a course of action, considering the moral aspect of it adds a cognitive load; it is an extra factor that must ...
Some philosophers argue that the state and its citizens stand in a morally privileged position vi... more Some philosophers argue that the state and its citizens stand in a morally privileged position vis-à-vis one another, but not towards other states or citizens. However, many of those people, particularly philosophical liberals, also hold that morally insignificant differences, such as place of birth, sex or ethnicity, should not affect rights, liberties and life prospects. On the face of it, these two sets of ideas appear incompatible and point to a conflict in some liberal thought. Liberal philosophers, like John Rawls, have attempted to reconcile these conflicting ideas. His attempt has attracted a great deal of criticism, especially from those liberals attracted to a more cosmopolitan point of view. In this article, we use Aristotelian virtue ethics as the basis upon which to reconcile liberalism and patriotism. We argue that the state should be understood as an agent that stands in a special relationship to its citizens (of philia). The state's virtue depends, in part, on it...
I question whether psychological effects that an agent is unaware of can express her values and, ... more I question whether psychological effects that an agent is unaware of can express her values and, if they can, whether this allows us to hold her responsible in the range of cases that we would like to.
Many spectacular claims about psychopaths are circulated. This contribution aims at providing the... more Many spectacular claims about psychopaths are circulated. This contribution aims at providing the reader with the more complex reality of the phenomenon (or phenomena), and to point to issues of particular interest to philosophers working in moral psychology and moral theory. I first discuss the current evidence regarding psychopaths’ deficient empathy and decision-making skills. I then explore what difference it makes to our thinking whether we regard their deficit dimensionally (as involving abilities that are on or off) and whether we focus on primary or secondary psychopathy. My conclusion is that most grand claims about psychopathy settling long-standing debates in moral philosophy and psychology are overblown, but there is much to be learnt from this disorder when it comes to formulating modern theories of moral psychology.
Heidi Maibom investigates the phenomenon of practical necessity against the background of the phe... more Heidi Maibom investigates the phenomenon of practical necessity against the background of the phenomenon of shame in order to establish the centrality of taking the third-person perspective on oneself and one’s actions to practical necessity. She illustrates the importance of shame in our lives with others using a population in which emotional connection appears to be absent: psychopaths. Psychopaths lack the ability to view themselves as others see them. This ability is also central to responsibility. The literature on autobiographical memory shows that this third-person perspective is associated with understanding our actions in terms of their larger meaning or significance. Maibom points out that this is exactly what is central to practical necessity. She argues that it is a mistake to think of practical necessity as being some peculiar force that we feel merely concerns ourselves. If we were alone in the world, it is unlikely that we would feel either the pull of practical necessity or shame. The necessity that is felt is connected to our social identities, our identity as one being among others. Personal practical necessities thus have to be interpreted as social practical necessities. Maibom’s chapter contributes to a better understanding of practical necessity and its connection to identity, morality, and responsibility.
In this paper, I evaluate one of the most prominent accounts of how emotion regulation features i... more In this paper, I evaluate one of the most prominent accounts of how emotion regulation features in empathy. According to this account, by Nancy Eisenberg and colleagues, empathy develops into either personal distress or sympathy depending on the ability to regulate one’s empathic distress. I argue that recent evidence suggests (1) that empathic distress and sympathy co-occur throughout the empathic episode, (2) that a certain degree of empathic distress may be necessary for prosocial motivation, as high emotion regulation leads to loss of this motivation, and (3) that emotion regulation is not an unmitigated good since much of it is achieved by dehumanizing the sufferer or minimizing her pain. A fertile ground for further research, I suggest, is the role of up-regulation of sympathy.
... If Blair is serious, then, ... consists in parents training their children's emotion... more ... If Blair is serious, then, ... consists in parents training their children's emotions in three ways:(i) power assertion,(ii) love with-drawal, and (iii) empathy induction. ... When planning a course of action, considering the moral aspect of it adds a cognitive load; it is an extra factor that must ...
Some philosophers argue that the state and its citizens stand in a morally privileged position vi... more Some philosophers argue that the state and its citizens stand in a morally privileged position vis-à-vis one another, but not towards other states or citizens. However, many of those people, particularly philosophical liberals, also hold that morally insignificant differences, such as place of birth, sex or ethnicity, should not affect rights, liberties and life prospects. On the face of it, these two sets of ideas appear incompatible and point to a conflict in some liberal thought. Liberal philosophers, like John Rawls, have attempted to reconcile these conflicting ideas. His attempt has attracted a great deal of criticism, especially from those liberals attracted to a more cosmopolitan point of view. In this article, we use Aristotelian virtue ethics as the basis upon which to reconcile liberalism and patriotism. We argue that the state should be understood as an agent that stands in a special relationship to its citizens (of philia). The state's virtue depends, in part, on it...
I question whether psychological effects that an agent is unaware of can express her values and, ... more I question whether psychological effects that an agent is unaware of can express her values and, if they can, whether this allows us to hold her responsible in the range of cases that we would like to.
Many spectacular claims about psychopaths are circulated. This contribution aims at providing the... more Many spectacular claims about psychopaths are circulated. This contribution aims at providing the reader with the more complex reality of the phenomenon (or phenomena), and to point to issues of particular interest to philosophers working in moral psychology and moral theory. I first discuss the current evidence regarding psychopaths’ deficient empathy and decision-making skills. I then explore what difference it makes to our thinking whether we regard their deficit dimensionally (as involving abilities that are on or off) and whether we focus on primary or secondary psychopathy. My conclusion is that most grand claims about psychopathy settling long-standing debates in moral philosophy and psychology are overblown, but there is much to be learnt from this disorder when it comes to formulating modern theories of moral psychology.
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