Historian of modern Latin America. Tweets @MorrisInMexico. Researches revolutions, state formation, violence, and indigenous politics in Mexico. First book out now! https://uapress.arizona.edu/book/soldiers-saints-and-shamans
José de Jesús Chávez Cervantes and Maximino Muñoz de la Cruz (eds.), 'Derechos de los pueblos originarios y comunidades indígenas: Perspectivas contemporáneas', 2023
El trazo que separa la frontera entre Nayarit y Jalisco, y las comunidades indígenas y mestizas p... more El trazo que separa la frontera entre Nayarit y Jalisco, y las comunidades indígenas y mestizas por cada lado de esta frontera, ha sido históricamente ambiguo. La historia de esta ambigüedad es, sobre todo, la suma de historias contadas según motivaciones, vivencias y reclamos en disputa desde larga data, atravesadas por relaciones de desigualdad estructural. Por un lado, Jalisco reticente de la separación de Tepic pero cómplice del modo en que funcionarios de gobierno, sean presidentes y autoridades municipales, militares, agrónomos y profesores se fueron apropiando de tierras, bosques y aguas de las comunidades, que a pesar de ser respaldados por las autoridades de Tepic respondía a una política promovida desde el centro del país que acató. Por el otro, Jalisco retóricamente promueve el discurso nacionalista sobre la defensa de los pueblos y las culturas indígenas, pero reitera su “ser primitivo” y la necesidad de ser integrados a la “civilización”, revelando actitudes netamente racistas. Este discurso en la esfera pública tendió a promover y revivir la vieja idea de la “civilización” contra la “barbarie”, y con ello, la división entre “indígenas” contra “mestizos”, pero como mostramos aquí, no tiene realmente sustento en los hechos.
The state of Durango has long been a centre of Mexican heroin production and an important node in... more The state of Durango has long been a centre of Mexican heroin production and an important node in transnational drug trafficking networks. As early as 1944, it was the site of one of the biggest drug busts in Mexican history, when an opium poppy plantation the size of 325 football pitches, irrigated by a purpose-built aqueduct, was discovered in the state’s northern mountains. By the mid 1970s, a combination of kinship ties and concrete connected these poppy fields directly with the US drug market hub of Chicago, Illinois, along a route known as the ‘heroin highway’, which helped Mexico become the supplier of 90 per cent of US heroin. But how did a poor, underpopulated and overwhelmingly rural state become a major player in the billion-dollar US–Mexican drug trade? This article shows that in Durango, the rise of heroin production and trafficking were integral aspects of local processes of social, political and economic modernization. Stimulated by the Mexican and US governments’ promotion of infrastructural improvements and mass migration, and protected by representatives of Mexico’s post-revolutionary political system, the drug trade in turn fuelled further ‘licit’ economic development, making it part of the very foundation of Mexico as we know it today.
Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 2022
Despite the well-documented human costs of the war on drugs, and the growing evidence of the envi... more Despite the well-documented human costs of the war on drugs, and the growing evidence of the environmental impacts of illicit economies, the militarized repression of the illicit drug trade remains a central hemispheric security and cooperation strategy in Northern and Central American countries. Through a multidisciplinary dialogue that combines history, sociology, anthropology, economics, and political science, this Special Issue critically interrogates why despite these failures the war on drug endures. Together, the contributors challenge explanations focused on state absence, weakening of the state, and ungoverned spaces and instead propose a research agenda that sheds light on the long-lasting, structural effects of the capitalistic integration of the region within the economy of illicit drugs. In particular, the Special Issue contributes to three existing and interconnected debates: First: the role of drug economies and illicitness on state formation, social inequalities, and development in Mexico and Central America. Second: the impact of illicit economies on local populations, and the connections between the licit and the illicit, margins and centers, and political orders and violence. Third: the variety of stakeholders that benefit from the war on drugs and that link the United States, Mexico, and Central America in licit and illicit fashions.
La rebelión cristera de 1926 a 1930 fue el conflicto civil más importante del México posrevolucio... more La rebelión cristera de 1926 a 1930 fue el conflicto civil más importante del México posrevolucionario. La mayoría de los rebeldes se levantaron para defender a la Iglesia Católica contra el régimen anticlerical del gobierno revolucionario, pero muchos miembros del pueblo indígena wixárika (o huicholes), famosos por practicar una religión propia muy lejos del catolicismo ortodoxo, también se incorporaron a la rebelión. En el presente texto, se plantea que los huicholes apoyaron a los rebeldes no por cuestiones religiosas, sino en respuesta a los esfuerzos recientes del estado revolucionario para establecerse en su patria chica. Esto en el contexto de conflictos territoriales ya antiguos, además de rivalidades recién nacidas en la violencia de la revolución. Comprender esta historia permite conocer mejor las contradicciones de la revolución mexicana y la rebelión cristera, y nos lleva lejos de la visión romántica de los pueblos originarios como “incorruptibles” por la política corriente o siempre ubicados del lado de los movimientos “progresistas” en América Latina.
Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 2019
For decades, farmers in the most marginalised regions of Mexico have depended for survival on the... more For decades, farmers in the most marginalised regions of Mexico have depended for survival on the illicit cultivation of opium poppy for the US heroin market. In 2017 they could earn up to 20,000 pesos ($950–$1,050 dollars) per kilo of opium, which channelled around 19 billion pesos ($1 billion dollars) into the country’s poorest communities, sustaining regional economies, religious ceremonies, and intra-community relations while stemming out-migration to Mexican cities and the US. With the recent upsurge in fentanyl use in the US, however, the demand for Mexican heroin has fallen sharply, meaning that farmers are now being paid around 6000 to 8000 pesos ($315–415 dollars) per kilo of raw opium. Thus the total money being paid to opium producing villages has dropped to an unprecedented low of 7 billion pesos ($370 million dollars). Drawing on fieldwork conducted in two poppy-producing regions of Mexico – one in the State of Nayarit, one in the State of Guerrero – this article shows that today, farmers cannot make a profit from opium once fertilizers and other capital inputs have been taken into account; village economies are starting to dry up; and out-migration is on the up. But this economic emergency opens the possibility of wrestling Mexico’s opium-growing regions from the control of Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). This article concludes by addressing several possible solutions to what we term ‘the Mexican Opium Crisis’ – including crop substitution or opium legalization for medicinal use – and evaluates how realistic they are in the Mexican context.
Desde el siglo xvi, hasta la época de la revolución, existían fuertes vínculos del "costumbre" en... more Desde el siglo xvi, hasta la época de la revolución, existían fuertes vínculos del "costumbre" entre las comunidades coras de la Sierra del Nayar. Estos enlaces rituales formaban la base de una visión de la identidad cora más amplia que la del grupo de parentesco o de la comunidad, que a su vez que hicieron posible la frecuente cooperación política y militar entre todas, en busca de fines comunes, como la preservación de la autonomía cultural y territorial. Pero durante la primera mitad del siglo xx, la llegada al poder local de caciques carrancistas, la política indigenista, agrarista y colonizadora del Estado mexicano y el crecimiento de la población regional mestiza asociado con esas políticas, promovieron la división de cada comunidad cora en facciones, y el desarrollo de conflictos territoriales entre las comunidades. Así se deterioraron los intercambios rituales coras y se fragmentó la idea de la territorialidad cora más allá de los territorios comunales.
Between the sixteenth century and the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution, strong ritual bonds existed between the Cora communities of the Sierra del Nayar, which facilitated their working together politically and militarily in the name of shared goals, such as the preservation of their cultural and territorial autonomy. However, during the first half of the twentieth century, the rise to power of local Carrancista warlords, the Mexican state's promotion of divisive indigenist, agrarian and pro-colonisation policies, and the growth of the regional mestizo population, spurred the emergence of factional conflicts within each of the Cora communities, and of wider territorial conflicts between them. These developments led to widespread violence and the decline of inter-communal Cora ritual practices, which in turn shattered Cora conceptions of an ethnic Cora homeland that existed beyond that of the community.
Why do peasants cultivate opium poppies? And how do they survive the dangers of participation in ... more Why do peasants cultivate opium poppies? And how do they survive the dangers of participation in the drug trade? In this article I argue that opium producers in Mexico share important cultural, political and economic affinities with the so-called 'serrano' peasants whom Alan Knight has identified as key players in the Mexican Revolution of 1910-20. Building on this comparison, I identify three strategies - 'legalism,' 'weapons of the weak,' and the threat or use of violence - that poppy farmers use to defend themselves from the exploitation or aggression of the police, the army, and cartel gunmen alike. I then explore how poppy farmers have historically employed these strategies in practice, as well as the factors that determine when and where they are used.
Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 2019
For decades, farmers in the most marginalised regions of Mexico have depended for survival on the... more For decades, farmers in the most marginalised regions of Mexico have depended for survival on the illicit cultivation of opium poppy for the US heroin market. In 2017 they could earn up to 20,000 pesos ($950–$1,050 dollars) per kilo of opium, which channelled around 19 billion pesos ($1 billion dollars) into the country’s poorest communities, sustaining regional economies, religious ceremonies, and intra-community relations while stemming out-migration to Mexican cities and the US. With the recent upsurge in fentanyl use in the US, however, the demand for Mexican heroin has fallen sharply, meaning that farmers are now being paid around 6000 to 8000 pesos ($315–415 dollars) per kilo of raw opium. Thus the total money being paid to opium producing villages has dropped to an unprecedented low of 7 billion pesos ($370 million dollars). Drawing on fieldwork conducted in two poppy-producing regions of Mexico – one in the State of Nayarit, one in the State of Guerrero – this article shows that today, farmers cannot make a profit from opium once fertilizers and other capital inputs have been taken into account; village economies are starting to dry up; and out-migration is on the up. But this economic emergency opens the possibility of wrestling Mexico’s opium-growing regions from the control of Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). This article concludes by addressing several possible solutions to what we term ‘the Mexican Opium Crisis’ – including crop substitution or opium legalization for medicinal use – and evaluates how realistic they are in the Mexican context.
Mexico’s Cora Indians have played an outsized role in national history, thanks to their skilful u... more Mexico’s Cora Indians have played an outsized role in national history, thanks to their skilful use of guerrilla tactics and success in forging strategic alliances with outside forces in defence of their cultural, territorial and political autonomy. Cora participation in elite struggles between Liberals and Conservatives (1850-73), and subsequently in the Mexican Revolution (1910-20), helped to shape the way that both conflicts played out in Western Mexico. Such participation also allowed Cora communities to keep hold of traditional landholdings in the face of political and economic reform, while sowing the seeds for the foundation of the Mexican state of Nayarit.
Manuel Lozada es bien conocido en su natal estado de Nayarit, donde se le atribuye el triunfo de ... more Manuel Lozada es bien conocido en su natal estado de Nayarit, donde se le atribuye el triunfo de la independización de Jalisco, del cual fue una vez el Séptimo Cantón. Su movimiento ha sido aclamado por algunos como el precursor del movimiento agrarista, que formó parte importante en los eventos de la Revolución Mexicana, en el periodo de 1910-1940, y en la sierra alta que una vez merodeara, incluso ha sido impregnado con cualidades sobrenaturales por los indios cora y huichol. Pero la mayoría de esos mexicanos que han escuchado su nombre (y estos son pocos, ya que languidece en la obscuridad fuera de Nayarit y Jalisco), Lozada era un bandido, un reaccionario, un traidor y, sobre todo, un salvaje cruel y sanguinario, un Indio que intentó iniciar con una guerra de castas que hubiera terminado como un ‘mexicano’ que gobernara la parte occidental del
país. Esta traición anti-Lozada, o ‘leyenda negra’, nació en la letra contemporánea,
fue fortalecida después de su derrota final y muerte en manos del Ejército Federal,
y ha persistido hasta este día. Pero cómo, y por qué? Y si ésta es leyenda, que fue la realidad del movimiento encabezado por Lozada durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX?
Attempts to use schools to assimilate the Huichols into the revolutionary nation-state prompted t... more Attempts to use schools to assimilate the Huichols into the revolutionary nation-state prompted the development of divergent partnerships and conflicts in their patria chica, involving rival Huichol communities and factions, local mestizos, government officials and Cristero rebels. The provocations of teachers, the cupidity of mestizo caciques, rebel violence, and Huichol commitment to preserving communal autonomy, undermined alliances between Huichol leaders and federal officials, and led to the ultimate failure of the government's project. If anything, the short-lived revolutionary education programme equipped a new generation of Huichol leaders with tools to better resist external assimilatory pressures into the 1940s and beyond.
Exploring the cross-over between the 'traditional' music of the Cora, Huichol and Tepehuano India... more Exploring the cross-over between the 'traditional' music of the Cora, Huichol and Tepehuano Indians and the narco-corridos so prevalent across Mexico today.
The Mayangna Indians of Nicaragua and their fight to defend their homeland from loggers and cattl... more The Mayangna Indians of Nicaragua and their fight to defend their homeland from loggers and cattle-ranchers.
The predominant Mayangna narrative of the Nicaraguan Civil War holds that the Miskitu 'tricked' t... more The predominant Mayangna narrative of the Nicaraguan Civil War holds that the Miskitu 'tricked' them into joining the conflict. However, I argue here that the Mayangna leadership and the Sandinista government were also responsible, as Sandinista denial of the importance of ethnic difference in Nicaragua allowed Miskitu nationalists, using the language of the religion, to co-opt Mayangna leaders, while subsequent Sandinista violence turned Mayangna civilians against the Revolution. Accusations of 'trickery' stem from later Mayangna disillusion with the war and from problems with the autonomous political system set up in its wake, which encourages the Mayangna to underplay the role of their own leaders and the Sandinista government in embroiling them in the conflict. This one-sided narrative, however, increasingly defines Mayangna interpretations of their very identity as a people.
El presente texto es un primer borrador la traducción española de capítulo dos del libro titulado... more El presente texto es un primer borrador la traducción española de capítulo dos del libro titulado, en inglés, 'Soldiers, Saints and Shamans: Indigenous Communities and the Revolutionary State in Mexico's Gran Nayar, 1910-40,' publicado por University of Arizona Press en 2020
El presente artículo trata de explicar la movilización de un número significativo de indígenas ma... more El presente artículo trata de explicar la movilización de un número significativo de indígenas mayangnas en contra del gobierno sandinista. Se sugiere que no obstante del compromiso sandinista para mejorar las condiciones de los grupos étnicos de la Costa Atlántica, su incapacidad para comprender las relaciones de poder desiguales entre estos mismos grupos indujo al pueblo mayangna hacia el creciente conflicto entre los sandinistas y miskitos. Los violentos excesos de los sandinistas presionaron a los mayangnas a fortalecer su alianza con los miskitos a pesar de la tradicional enemistad entre ellos. Con el tiempo los sandinistas pudieron persuadir a los mayangnas a desmovilizarse, pero sólo mediante la modificación de algunos aspectos de su propia ideología nacionalista.
El boom del fentanilo en Estados Unidos y la crisis del opio en México ¿Oportunidades en medio de la violencia?, 2019
Este reporte estudia los efectos que el incremento en el uso del fentanilo en Estados Unidos tien... more Este reporte estudia los efectos que el incremento en el uso del fentanilo en Estados Unidos tiene en áreas productoras de opio en México. Al usar los datos cuantitativos disponibles sobre la producción mexicana de opio e investigación de campo cualitativa de las comunidades productoras de opio en Nayarit y Guerrero, este documento muestra hasta qué punto ciertos pueblos en el Triángulo Dorado, y también en Guerrero, Nayarit y Oaxaca, dependen de la producción de opio para sobrevivir
"No More Opium For the Masses": The socio-political effects of U.S. Fentanyl Boom on the Opium & Heroin economy in Mexico., 2019
This report analyzes the socio-political effects of U.S. fentanyl use on the opium and heroin eco... more This report analyzes the socio-political effects of U.S. fentanyl use on the opium and heroin economy in Mexico.
Drawing on fieldwork conducted in two poppy-producing regions of Mexico – one in the State of Nayarit, one in the State of Guerrero – this report shows that the dramatic upswing in fentanyl use in the United States is generating a parallel and rapid collapse in the price offered for raw opium in rural Mexico.
José de Jesús Chávez Cervantes and Maximino Muñoz de la Cruz (eds.), 'Derechos de los pueblos originarios y comunidades indígenas: Perspectivas contemporáneas', 2023
El trazo que separa la frontera entre Nayarit y Jalisco, y las comunidades indígenas y mestizas p... more El trazo que separa la frontera entre Nayarit y Jalisco, y las comunidades indígenas y mestizas por cada lado de esta frontera, ha sido históricamente ambiguo. La historia de esta ambigüedad es, sobre todo, la suma de historias contadas según motivaciones, vivencias y reclamos en disputa desde larga data, atravesadas por relaciones de desigualdad estructural. Por un lado, Jalisco reticente de la separación de Tepic pero cómplice del modo en que funcionarios de gobierno, sean presidentes y autoridades municipales, militares, agrónomos y profesores se fueron apropiando de tierras, bosques y aguas de las comunidades, que a pesar de ser respaldados por las autoridades de Tepic respondía a una política promovida desde el centro del país que acató. Por el otro, Jalisco retóricamente promueve el discurso nacionalista sobre la defensa de los pueblos y las culturas indígenas, pero reitera su “ser primitivo” y la necesidad de ser integrados a la “civilización”, revelando actitudes netamente racistas. Este discurso en la esfera pública tendió a promover y revivir la vieja idea de la “civilización” contra la “barbarie”, y con ello, la división entre “indígenas” contra “mestizos”, pero como mostramos aquí, no tiene realmente sustento en los hechos.
The state of Durango has long been a centre of Mexican heroin production and an important node in... more The state of Durango has long been a centre of Mexican heroin production and an important node in transnational drug trafficking networks. As early as 1944, it was the site of one of the biggest drug busts in Mexican history, when an opium poppy plantation the size of 325 football pitches, irrigated by a purpose-built aqueduct, was discovered in the state’s northern mountains. By the mid 1970s, a combination of kinship ties and concrete connected these poppy fields directly with the US drug market hub of Chicago, Illinois, along a route known as the ‘heroin highway’, which helped Mexico become the supplier of 90 per cent of US heroin. But how did a poor, underpopulated and overwhelmingly rural state become a major player in the billion-dollar US–Mexican drug trade? This article shows that in Durango, the rise of heroin production and trafficking were integral aspects of local processes of social, political and economic modernization. Stimulated by the Mexican and US governments’ promotion of infrastructural improvements and mass migration, and protected by representatives of Mexico’s post-revolutionary political system, the drug trade in turn fuelled further ‘licit’ economic development, making it part of the very foundation of Mexico as we know it today.
Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 2022
Despite the well-documented human costs of the war on drugs, and the growing evidence of the envi... more Despite the well-documented human costs of the war on drugs, and the growing evidence of the environmental impacts of illicit economies, the militarized repression of the illicit drug trade remains a central hemispheric security and cooperation strategy in Northern and Central American countries. Through a multidisciplinary dialogue that combines history, sociology, anthropology, economics, and political science, this Special Issue critically interrogates why despite these failures the war on drug endures. Together, the contributors challenge explanations focused on state absence, weakening of the state, and ungoverned spaces and instead propose a research agenda that sheds light on the long-lasting, structural effects of the capitalistic integration of the region within the economy of illicit drugs. In particular, the Special Issue contributes to three existing and interconnected debates: First: the role of drug economies and illicitness on state formation, social inequalities, and development in Mexico and Central America. Second: the impact of illicit economies on local populations, and the connections between the licit and the illicit, margins and centers, and political orders and violence. Third: the variety of stakeholders that benefit from the war on drugs and that link the United States, Mexico, and Central America in licit and illicit fashions.
La rebelión cristera de 1926 a 1930 fue el conflicto civil más importante del México posrevolucio... more La rebelión cristera de 1926 a 1930 fue el conflicto civil más importante del México posrevolucionario. La mayoría de los rebeldes se levantaron para defender a la Iglesia Católica contra el régimen anticlerical del gobierno revolucionario, pero muchos miembros del pueblo indígena wixárika (o huicholes), famosos por practicar una religión propia muy lejos del catolicismo ortodoxo, también se incorporaron a la rebelión. En el presente texto, se plantea que los huicholes apoyaron a los rebeldes no por cuestiones religiosas, sino en respuesta a los esfuerzos recientes del estado revolucionario para establecerse en su patria chica. Esto en el contexto de conflictos territoriales ya antiguos, además de rivalidades recién nacidas en la violencia de la revolución. Comprender esta historia permite conocer mejor las contradicciones de la revolución mexicana y la rebelión cristera, y nos lleva lejos de la visión romántica de los pueblos originarios como “incorruptibles” por la política corriente o siempre ubicados del lado de los movimientos “progresistas” en América Latina.
Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 2019
For decades, farmers in the most marginalised regions of Mexico have depended for survival on the... more For decades, farmers in the most marginalised regions of Mexico have depended for survival on the illicit cultivation of opium poppy for the US heroin market. In 2017 they could earn up to 20,000 pesos ($950–$1,050 dollars) per kilo of opium, which channelled around 19 billion pesos ($1 billion dollars) into the country’s poorest communities, sustaining regional economies, religious ceremonies, and intra-community relations while stemming out-migration to Mexican cities and the US. With the recent upsurge in fentanyl use in the US, however, the demand for Mexican heroin has fallen sharply, meaning that farmers are now being paid around 6000 to 8000 pesos ($315–415 dollars) per kilo of raw opium. Thus the total money being paid to opium producing villages has dropped to an unprecedented low of 7 billion pesos ($370 million dollars). Drawing on fieldwork conducted in two poppy-producing regions of Mexico – one in the State of Nayarit, one in the State of Guerrero – this article shows that today, farmers cannot make a profit from opium once fertilizers and other capital inputs have been taken into account; village economies are starting to dry up; and out-migration is on the up. But this economic emergency opens the possibility of wrestling Mexico’s opium-growing regions from the control of Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). This article concludes by addressing several possible solutions to what we term ‘the Mexican Opium Crisis’ – including crop substitution or opium legalization for medicinal use – and evaluates how realistic they are in the Mexican context.
Desde el siglo xvi, hasta la época de la revolución, existían fuertes vínculos del "costumbre" en... more Desde el siglo xvi, hasta la época de la revolución, existían fuertes vínculos del "costumbre" entre las comunidades coras de la Sierra del Nayar. Estos enlaces rituales formaban la base de una visión de la identidad cora más amplia que la del grupo de parentesco o de la comunidad, que a su vez que hicieron posible la frecuente cooperación política y militar entre todas, en busca de fines comunes, como la preservación de la autonomía cultural y territorial. Pero durante la primera mitad del siglo xx, la llegada al poder local de caciques carrancistas, la política indigenista, agrarista y colonizadora del Estado mexicano y el crecimiento de la población regional mestiza asociado con esas políticas, promovieron la división de cada comunidad cora en facciones, y el desarrollo de conflictos territoriales entre las comunidades. Así se deterioraron los intercambios rituales coras y se fragmentó la idea de la territorialidad cora más allá de los territorios comunales.
Between the sixteenth century and the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution, strong ritual bonds existed between the Cora communities of the Sierra del Nayar, which facilitated their working together politically and militarily in the name of shared goals, such as the preservation of their cultural and territorial autonomy. However, during the first half of the twentieth century, the rise to power of local Carrancista warlords, the Mexican state's promotion of divisive indigenist, agrarian and pro-colonisation policies, and the growth of the regional mestizo population, spurred the emergence of factional conflicts within each of the Cora communities, and of wider territorial conflicts between them. These developments led to widespread violence and the decline of inter-communal Cora ritual practices, which in turn shattered Cora conceptions of an ethnic Cora homeland that existed beyond that of the community.
Why do peasants cultivate opium poppies? And how do they survive the dangers of participation in ... more Why do peasants cultivate opium poppies? And how do they survive the dangers of participation in the drug trade? In this article I argue that opium producers in Mexico share important cultural, political and economic affinities with the so-called 'serrano' peasants whom Alan Knight has identified as key players in the Mexican Revolution of 1910-20. Building on this comparison, I identify three strategies - 'legalism,' 'weapons of the weak,' and the threat or use of violence - that poppy farmers use to defend themselves from the exploitation or aggression of the police, the army, and cartel gunmen alike. I then explore how poppy farmers have historically employed these strategies in practice, as well as the factors that determine when and where they are used.
Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 2019
For decades, farmers in the most marginalised regions of Mexico have depended for survival on the... more For decades, farmers in the most marginalised regions of Mexico have depended for survival on the illicit cultivation of opium poppy for the US heroin market. In 2017 they could earn up to 20,000 pesos ($950–$1,050 dollars) per kilo of opium, which channelled around 19 billion pesos ($1 billion dollars) into the country’s poorest communities, sustaining regional economies, religious ceremonies, and intra-community relations while stemming out-migration to Mexican cities and the US. With the recent upsurge in fentanyl use in the US, however, the demand for Mexican heroin has fallen sharply, meaning that farmers are now being paid around 6000 to 8000 pesos ($315–415 dollars) per kilo of raw opium. Thus the total money being paid to opium producing villages has dropped to an unprecedented low of 7 billion pesos ($370 million dollars). Drawing on fieldwork conducted in two poppy-producing regions of Mexico – one in the State of Nayarit, one in the State of Guerrero – this article shows that today, farmers cannot make a profit from opium once fertilizers and other capital inputs have been taken into account; village economies are starting to dry up; and out-migration is on the up. But this economic emergency opens the possibility of wrestling Mexico’s opium-growing regions from the control of Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). This article concludes by addressing several possible solutions to what we term ‘the Mexican Opium Crisis’ – including crop substitution or opium legalization for medicinal use – and evaluates how realistic they are in the Mexican context.
Mexico’s Cora Indians have played an outsized role in national history, thanks to their skilful u... more Mexico’s Cora Indians have played an outsized role in national history, thanks to their skilful use of guerrilla tactics and success in forging strategic alliances with outside forces in defence of their cultural, territorial and political autonomy. Cora participation in elite struggles between Liberals and Conservatives (1850-73), and subsequently in the Mexican Revolution (1910-20), helped to shape the way that both conflicts played out in Western Mexico. Such participation also allowed Cora communities to keep hold of traditional landholdings in the face of political and economic reform, while sowing the seeds for the foundation of the Mexican state of Nayarit.
Manuel Lozada es bien conocido en su natal estado de Nayarit, donde se le atribuye el triunfo de ... more Manuel Lozada es bien conocido en su natal estado de Nayarit, donde se le atribuye el triunfo de la independización de Jalisco, del cual fue una vez el Séptimo Cantón. Su movimiento ha sido aclamado por algunos como el precursor del movimiento agrarista, que formó parte importante en los eventos de la Revolución Mexicana, en el periodo de 1910-1940, y en la sierra alta que una vez merodeara, incluso ha sido impregnado con cualidades sobrenaturales por los indios cora y huichol. Pero la mayoría de esos mexicanos que han escuchado su nombre (y estos son pocos, ya que languidece en la obscuridad fuera de Nayarit y Jalisco), Lozada era un bandido, un reaccionario, un traidor y, sobre todo, un salvaje cruel y sanguinario, un Indio que intentó iniciar con una guerra de castas que hubiera terminado como un ‘mexicano’ que gobernara la parte occidental del
país. Esta traición anti-Lozada, o ‘leyenda negra’, nació en la letra contemporánea,
fue fortalecida después de su derrota final y muerte en manos del Ejército Federal,
y ha persistido hasta este día. Pero cómo, y por qué? Y si ésta es leyenda, que fue la realidad del movimiento encabezado por Lozada durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX?
Attempts to use schools to assimilate the Huichols into the revolutionary nation-state prompted t... more Attempts to use schools to assimilate the Huichols into the revolutionary nation-state prompted the development of divergent partnerships and conflicts in their patria chica, involving rival Huichol communities and factions, local mestizos, government officials and Cristero rebels. The provocations of teachers, the cupidity of mestizo caciques, rebel violence, and Huichol commitment to preserving communal autonomy, undermined alliances between Huichol leaders and federal officials, and led to the ultimate failure of the government's project. If anything, the short-lived revolutionary education programme equipped a new generation of Huichol leaders with tools to better resist external assimilatory pressures into the 1940s and beyond.
Exploring the cross-over between the 'traditional' music of the Cora, Huichol and Tepehuano India... more Exploring the cross-over between the 'traditional' music of the Cora, Huichol and Tepehuano Indians and the narco-corridos so prevalent across Mexico today.
The Mayangna Indians of Nicaragua and their fight to defend their homeland from loggers and cattl... more The Mayangna Indians of Nicaragua and their fight to defend their homeland from loggers and cattle-ranchers.
The predominant Mayangna narrative of the Nicaraguan Civil War holds that the Miskitu 'tricked' t... more The predominant Mayangna narrative of the Nicaraguan Civil War holds that the Miskitu 'tricked' them into joining the conflict. However, I argue here that the Mayangna leadership and the Sandinista government were also responsible, as Sandinista denial of the importance of ethnic difference in Nicaragua allowed Miskitu nationalists, using the language of the religion, to co-opt Mayangna leaders, while subsequent Sandinista violence turned Mayangna civilians against the Revolution. Accusations of 'trickery' stem from later Mayangna disillusion with the war and from problems with the autonomous political system set up in its wake, which encourages the Mayangna to underplay the role of their own leaders and the Sandinista government in embroiling them in the conflict. This one-sided narrative, however, increasingly defines Mayangna interpretations of their very identity as a people.
El presente texto es un primer borrador la traducción española de capítulo dos del libro titulado... more El presente texto es un primer borrador la traducción española de capítulo dos del libro titulado, en inglés, 'Soldiers, Saints and Shamans: Indigenous Communities and the Revolutionary State in Mexico's Gran Nayar, 1910-40,' publicado por University of Arizona Press en 2020
El presente artículo trata de explicar la movilización de un número significativo de indígenas ma... more El presente artículo trata de explicar la movilización de un número significativo de indígenas mayangnas en contra del gobierno sandinista. Se sugiere que no obstante del compromiso sandinista para mejorar las condiciones de los grupos étnicos de la Costa Atlántica, su incapacidad para comprender las relaciones de poder desiguales entre estos mismos grupos indujo al pueblo mayangna hacia el creciente conflicto entre los sandinistas y miskitos. Los violentos excesos de los sandinistas presionaron a los mayangnas a fortalecer su alianza con los miskitos a pesar de la tradicional enemistad entre ellos. Con el tiempo los sandinistas pudieron persuadir a los mayangnas a desmovilizarse, pero sólo mediante la modificación de algunos aspectos de su propia ideología nacionalista.
El boom del fentanilo en Estados Unidos y la crisis del opio en México ¿Oportunidades en medio de la violencia?, 2019
Este reporte estudia los efectos que el incremento en el uso del fentanilo en Estados Unidos tien... more Este reporte estudia los efectos que el incremento en el uso del fentanilo en Estados Unidos tiene en áreas productoras de opio en México. Al usar los datos cuantitativos disponibles sobre la producción mexicana de opio e investigación de campo cualitativa de las comunidades productoras de opio en Nayarit y Guerrero, este documento muestra hasta qué punto ciertos pueblos en el Triángulo Dorado, y también en Guerrero, Nayarit y Oaxaca, dependen de la producción de opio para sobrevivir
"No More Opium For the Masses": The socio-political effects of U.S. Fentanyl Boom on the Opium & Heroin economy in Mexico., 2019
This report analyzes the socio-political effects of U.S. fentanyl use on the opium and heroin eco... more This report analyzes the socio-political effects of U.S. fentanyl use on the opium and heroin economy in Mexico.
Drawing on fieldwork conducted in two poppy-producing regions of Mexico – one in the State of Nayarit, one in the State of Guerrero – this report shows that the dramatic upswing in fentanyl use in the United States is generating a parallel and rapid collapse in the price offered for raw opium in rural Mexico.
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Between the sixteenth century and the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution, strong ritual bonds existed between the Cora communities of the Sierra del Nayar, which facilitated their working together politically and militarily in the name of shared goals, such as the preservation of their cultural and territorial autonomy. However, during the first half of the twentieth century, the rise to power of local Carrancista warlords, the Mexican state's promotion of divisive indigenist, agrarian and pro-colonisation policies, and the growth of the regional mestizo population, spurred the emergence of factional conflicts within each of the Cora communities, and of wider territorial conflicts between them. These developments led to widespread violence and the decline of inter-communal Cora ritual practices, which in turn shattered Cora conceptions of an ethnic Cora homeland that existed beyond that of the community.
Keywords: Mexico, Opium, Fentanyl, Crop Substitution, Drug Regulation, Migration, Market Crises
país. Esta traición anti-Lozada, o ‘leyenda negra’, nació en la letra contemporánea,
fue fortalecida después de su derrota final y muerte en manos del Ejército Federal,
y ha persistido hasta este día. Pero cómo, y por qué? Y si ésta es leyenda, que fue la realidad del movimiento encabezado por Lozada durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX?
Drawing on fieldwork conducted in two poppy-producing regions of Mexico – one in the State of Nayarit, one in the State of Guerrero – this report shows that the dramatic upswing in fentanyl use in the United States is generating a parallel and rapid collapse in the price offered for raw opium in rural Mexico.
Between the sixteenth century and the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution, strong ritual bonds existed between the Cora communities of the Sierra del Nayar, which facilitated their working together politically and militarily in the name of shared goals, such as the preservation of their cultural and territorial autonomy. However, during the first half of the twentieth century, the rise to power of local Carrancista warlords, the Mexican state's promotion of divisive indigenist, agrarian and pro-colonisation policies, and the growth of the regional mestizo population, spurred the emergence of factional conflicts within each of the Cora communities, and of wider territorial conflicts between them. These developments led to widespread violence and the decline of inter-communal Cora ritual practices, which in turn shattered Cora conceptions of an ethnic Cora homeland that existed beyond that of the community.
Keywords: Mexico, Opium, Fentanyl, Crop Substitution, Drug Regulation, Migration, Market Crises
país. Esta traición anti-Lozada, o ‘leyenda negra’, nació en la letra contemporánea,
fue fortalecida después de su derrota final y muerte en manos del Ejército Federal,
y ha persistido hasta este día. Pero cómo, y por qué? Y si ésta es leyenda, que fue la realidad del movimiento encabezado por Lozada durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX?
Drawing on fieldwork conducted in two poppy-producing regions of Mexico – one in the State of Nayarit, one in the State of Guerrero – this report shows that the dramatic upswing in fentanyl use in the United States is generating a parallel and rapid collapse in the price offered for raw opium in rural Mexico.