Although debate is a richly structured and prevalent form of discourse, it has received little sc... more Although debate is a richly structured and prevalent form of discourse, it has received little scholarly attention. Logicians have focused on the structure of individual arguments-how they divide into premises and conclusions, which in turn divide into various constituents. In contrast, I focus on the structure of sets of arguments, showing how arguments are themselves constituents in high-level dialectical structures. I represent debates and positions by graphs whose vertices correspond to arguments and whose edges correspond to two inter-argument relations: "dispute" and "support," respectively. On this basis I develop a theory of the structure of debate.
In this chapter the basic idea of the book is presented in an intuitive way, using the metaphor o... more In this chapter the basic idea of the book is presented in an intuitive way, using the metaphor of a world-model that experience “moves through.” This metaphor illuminates an explanatory dimension of phenomenology, whereby what we actually experience is informed by what expect to be the case in a given part of the world. Qualifications and simplifying assumptions are stated, and the project is related to existing efforts to formalize phenomenological structures.
Forthcoming in G. Stanghellini et al. (eds.): Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology... more Forthcoming in G. Stanghellini et al. (eds.): Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford University Press, 2016No abstract availabl
While the cognitivist school of thought holds that the mind is analogous to a computer, performin... more While the cognitivist school of thought holds that the mind is analogous to a computer, performing logical operations over internal representations, the tradition of ecological psychology contends that organisms can directly "resonate" to information for action and perception without the need for a representational intermediary. The concept of resonance has played an important role in ecological psychology, but it remains a metaphor. Supplying a mechanistic account of resonance requires a non-representational account of central nervous system (CNS) dynamics. We present a series of simple models in which a reservoir network with homeostatic nodes is used to control a simple agent embedded in an environment. This network spontaneously produces behaviors that are adaptive in each context, including (1) visually tracking a moving object, (2) substantially above-chance performance in the arcade game Pong, (2) and avoiding walls while controlling a mobile agent. These results ma...
Lopes (2021) has argued against my use of neural networks and dynamical systems theory in neuroph... more Lopes (2021) has argued against my use of neural networks and dynamical systems theory in neurophenomenology. Responding to his argument provides an opportunity to articulate a pluralist approach to neurophenomenology, according to which multiple theoretical frameworks—symbolic, dynamical systems, connectionist, etc.—can be used to study consciousness and its relationship to neural activity. Each type of analysis is best suited to specific phenomena, but they are mutually compatible and can inform and constrain one another in non-trivial ways. I use historical and conceptual arguments to elaborate on this type of pluralism as it applies to cognitive science, phenomenology, and neurophenomenology.
Although debate is a richly structured and prevalent form of discourse, it has received little sc... more Although debate is a richly structured and prevalent form of discourse, it has received little scholarly attention. Logicians have focused on the structure of individual arguments-how they divide into premises and conclusions, which in turn divide into various constituents. In contrast, I focus on the structure of sets of arguments, showing how arguments are themselves constituents in high-level dialectical structures. I represent debates and positions by graphs whose vertices correspond to arguments and whose edges correspond to two inter-argument relations: "dispute" and "support," respectively. On this basis I develop a theory of the structure of debate.
In this chapter the basic idea of the book is presented in an intuitive way, using the metaphor o... more In this chapter the basic idea of the book is presented in an intuitive way, using the metaphor of a world-model that experience “moves through.” This metaphor illuminates an explanatory dimension of phenomenology, whereby what we actually experience is informed by what expect to be the case in a given part of the world. Qualifications and simplifying assumptions are stated, and the project is related to existing efforts to formalize phenomenological structures.
Forthcoming in G. Stanghellini et al. (eds.): Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology... more Forthcoming in G. Stanghellini et al. (eds.): Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford University Press, 2016No abstract availabl
While the cognitivist school of thought holds that the mind is analogous to a computer, performin... more While the cognitivist school of thought holds that the mind is analogous to a computer, performing logical operations over internal representations, the tradition of ecological psychology contends that organisms can directly "resonate" to information for action and perception without the need for a representational intermediary. The concept of resonance has played an important role in ecological psychology, but it remains a metaphor. Supplying a mechanistic account of resonance requires a non-representational account of central nervous system (CNS) dynamics. We present a series of simple models in which a reservoir network with homeostatic nodes is used to control a simple agent embedded in an environment. This network spontaneously produces behaviors that are adaptive in each context, including (1) visually tracking a moving object, (2) substantially above-chance performance in the arcade game Pong, (2) and avoiding walls while controlling a mobile agent. These results ma...
Lopes (2021) has argued against my use of neural networks and dynamical systems theory in neuroph... more Lopes (2021) has argued against my use of neural networks and dynamical systems theory in neurophenomenology. Responding to his argument provides an opportunity to articulate a pluralist approach to neurophenomenology, according to which multiple theoretical frameworks—symbolic, dynamical systems, connectionist, etc.—can be used to study consciousness and its relationship to neural activity. Each type of analysis is best suited to specific phenomena, but they are mutually compatible and can inform and constrain one another in non-trivial ways. I use historical and conceptual arguments to elaborate on this type of pluralism as it applies to cognitive science, phenomenology, and neurophenomenology.
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