In this article we present two ontological problems for the Integrated Information Theory of Cons... more In this article we present two ontological problems for the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness 4.0: what we call the (i) the intrinsicality 2.0 problem, and (ii) the engineering problem. These problems entail that truly existing, conscious entities can depend on, and be engineered from, entities that do not objectively exist, which is problematic: if something does not exist in objective reality (i.e., in itself, independently of another entity’s consciousness), then it seems that it cannot be part of the material basis and determinants of other entities that do exist on their own. We argue that the core origin of these problems lies in IIT’s equation between true existence and phenomenal existence (consciousness), and the corresponding ontological exclusion of non-conscious physical entities (i.e., extrinsic entities) from objective reality. In short, these two problems seem to show that IIT should reconsider the ontological status of these extrinsic entities, because they need to exist objectively to account for the ontological implications of the scenarios we present here, which are permitted by the operational framework of the theory.
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories ... more Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory’s most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just “operational”. However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT’s idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT’s idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT’s realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one’s own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues.
The deep influence of affectivity on learning is now widely acknowledged (Hargreaves et al., 2010... more The deep influence of affectivity on learning is now widely acknowledged (Hargreaves et al., 2010; Keefer et al., 2018; Sánchez-Álvarez et al., 2020; Shafait et al., 2021). For instance, it has been shown that affect influences key learning-relevant processes such as motivation, perception, behavior and critical thinking (Izard, 2002; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Evidence also shows that emotion and mood strongly influence attention, which in turn drives learning and memory (Elbertson et al., 2010; Elias et al., 1997). Intersubjective phenomena such as degree of affection and respect between child and teacher also affects the child’s learning processes, academic outcomes and brain development (Kusché & Greenberg, 2006; A. M. Ryan & Patrick, 2001). However, the relevant literature is not paying attention to increasing evidence showing that affective phenomena are rooted in interoceptive and homeostatic self and co-regulatory processes within and between people’s living bodies (Barrett, 2017; Carvalho & Damasio, 2021; Craig, 2015, 2018; Fotopoulou et al., 2022; Fotopoulou & Tsakiris, 2017; A. K. Seth & Friston, 2016). In this theoretical chapter, we explore this connection and its importance for learning. We argue that since 1) affective experience plays a fundamental role in learning; and 2) affective experience is rooted in the homeostatic self/co-regulation of living bodies; therefore, 3) the homeostatic self/co- regulation of living bodies plays a fundamental role in learning. In other words, there is an intra and interpersonal somatic dimension of learning that demands explicit consideration in educational contexts. In this way, we aim to contribute to an understanding of learning and education that moves away from an individualistic, brain-centered information- processing conception, towards one centered on sentient, interdependent living bodies.
There is no doubt that the knowledge developed in mindfulness from the scientific perspective has... more There is no doubt that the knowledge developed in mindfulness from the scientific perspective has provided important advances in both basic and clinical sciences. Nevertheless, the traditional scientific perspective omits its fundamental nature: mindfulness as an experiential practice. The main goal of this chapter, then, is to present the enactive approach and its advantages in expanding the contemporary scientific proposal through the reintroduction of the original phenomenological nature of mindfulness.
I welcome with great enthusiasm Meling and Scheidegger’s (2023; henceforth “M&S”) timely contribu... more I welcome with great enthusiasm Meling and Scheidegger’s (2023; henceforth “M&S”) timely contribution to advance an enactive approach to psychedelic therapy, especially to the complex causality involved. Their two main research questions concerned: (i) the causal interaction between the psychedelic molecule and brain activity; and (ii) the causal interaction between brain activity and the psychedelic experience. While I largely agree with and celebrate much of what is proposed by M&S, especially their employment of key enactive concepts to advance our understanding of the first research question, in the following, I will present some worries regarding their answers to the second. Although I agree that there is probably a two-way reciprocal relationship between neural activity and experience, I have several points of contention regarding M&S’s proposal. My hope is to stimulate discussion on M&S’s important contribution, and to help advance a much-needed enactive science of psychedelics.
In a recent remarkable article, Froese (2023) presents his Irruption Theory to explain how motiva... more In a recent remarkable article, Froese (2023) presents his Irruption Theory to explain how motivations can make a behavioral difference in motivated activity. In this opinion article, we review the main tenets of Froese’s theory, and highlight its difficulty in overcoming the randomness challenge it supposedly solves, that is, the issue of how adaptive behavior can arise in the face of material underdetermination. To advance our understanding of motivated behavior in line with Froese’s approach, we recommend that future work should endorse a multilevel pluralistic approach to causation and explanation in which motivations could genuinely play an irreducible role. Additionally, in line with the life-mind continuity thesis, we suggest that the best place to look for the interplay between motivations and nonmotivational physical, biological, and dynamical factors, may be at the level of the continuous feeling of being an embodied, living organism.
Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theo... more Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on the enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others’ emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich the knowledge of the empathic experience of pain using an experimental phenomenological method. Materials and methods: Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results: Experiential access to the other person’s painful experience involves four main themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations in coordination with the sportsperson’s bodily actions. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. The temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant’s own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of an embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory of non-interactive social experience.
Humana.Mente Journal of philosophical studies, 2023
In this article, we address the problem of the potential crisis in people’s life’s meaning due to... more In this article, we address the problem of the potential crisis in people’s life’s meaning due to massive automation-driven technological unemployment. Assuming that the problem of (re)distribution of economic resources to the whole of society in such a scenario will be solved (e.g. through provision of a Universal Basic Income), the question arises concerning the meaning of people’s lives in a world in which almost everyone does not have to (or even could not) work in order to live. Here, we side with many current proposals that paid work is not the only possible source of meaning and hence, that a meaningful life could indeed be led in a post-work society. We especially focus on one of the most developed accounts, Danaher’s Virtual Utopia (Danaher, 2016, 2019, 2022). According to him, living immersed in playful virtual worlds where new, expanded and personalized possibilities of personal and collective experiences and actions, could not only be perfectly meaningful lives, but furthermore, “be the utopia we are looking for” (Danaher, 2019, p. 270). However, our analysis will suggest that although it is a very well thought and carefully articulated position, it suffers from various important problems. Our criticism will be based on an alternative framework to think about life’s meaning and the conditions for leading a good life in general. This alternative is based on the philosophy of buen vivir (“good living”). This notion has its roots in common aspects of various Latin American indigenous cultures regarding a community-centered way of life where humans, society and nature are taken to be deeply interconnected and interdependent, and where the notions of respect, harmony and balance are at the core of this interrelationship (Gudynas, 2011; Acosta, 2008; Beling et al., 2021). Buen vivir has many facets, but we will focus on three: the importance of healthy human communities, the human-nature relationship, and the intrinsic value of nature. Based on these, we argue that the Virtual Utopia is not a good candidate for human’s post-work utopia because i) it unnecessarily augments the environmental damage that is already involved in massive labor automation; ii) it entails an unnecessary and detrimental dependence on technology for human relationships; and iii) increases the severance of the link between humanity and nature. We conclude that the buen vivir approach is a promising candidate for an alternative utopian project, but one that needs further construction.
In consciousness studies there is a growing tendency to consider experience as (i) fundamentally ... more In consciousness studies there is a growing tendency to consider experience as (i) fundamentally affective and (ii) deeply interlinked with interoceptive and homeostatic bodily processes. However, this view still needs further development to be part of any rigorous theory of consciousness. To advance in this direction, we ask: 1) is there any affective type that is always present in consciousness? 2) is it related to interoception and homeostasis? and, 3) what are its properties? Here we analyze and compare Jim Russell's core affect and Thomas Fuchs' concept of vitality, and propose a more encompassing notion that subsumes both: Continuous Organismic Sentience. It provides affirmative answers to questions 1 and 2, and, regarding question 3, a preliminary list of thirteen properties divided into ontological, phenomenological and functional categories. This is the first of a series of studies that will systematically address different notions of a fundamental, homeostatically-rooted affective type, to achieve a rigorous, unified concept for consciousness science.
In this paper I argue that the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness has an underlying e... more In this paper I argue that the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness has an underlying emergentist metaphysics, specifically of a kind that has received minimal attention and we may call functionalist emergentism. I will try to show that in this scientific theory conscious experience is a functional-role property possessed by the whole system, not by their parts, which is dependent on, but also (purportedly) causally powerful over and above, the properties of the parts. However, I will argue that depicting conscious experience as a functional-role emergent property threatens the whole coherence of the theory because, by definition, functional-realizers do all the causal work associated with the instantiation of any functional-role property on any occasion. Hence, to preserve the causal power of consciousness, which, as we will see, is one of the fundamental building blocks of the theory, linked to the assertion of the very existence of consciousness, phenomenal properties should be rethought as realizers of the relevant informationally integrated causal-roles.. Finally, I would like to thank ANID-Chile (ex CONICYT) for a three-year doctoral scholarship that allowed me to do much of the research presented in the present article.
En este artículo abordo críticamente la aseveración de David Papineau según la cual la evidencia ... more En este artículo abordo críticamente la aseveración de David Papineau según la cual la evidencia fisiológica acumulada es suficiente para adoptar razonablemente el Principio del Cierre Causal de lo Físico y la vía negativa, viz. entender físico como no-mental, como solución al dilema de Hempel. Comenzaremos restando fuerza a tal afirmación revisando el trabajo de W. Penfield y J. Eccles, dos importantes neurocientíficos y declarados dualistas. No obstante, luego nos centraremos en el trabajo de B. Libet en el que se demostraría que los movimientos voluntarios están realmente determinados por causas enteramente (neuro)fisiológicas, lo cual constituiría una pieza fundamental de evidencia a favor de Papineau. Nuestro análisis mostrará que no se siguen tales conclusiones. Esto tendrá consecuencias negativas para el Principio del Cierre Causal de lo Físico y revelará una grave tensión al interior del Argumento Causal para el Fisicalismo del cual el mencionado principio es premisa clave.
In this article, I critically address David Papineau's assertion that accumulated physiological evidence is sufficient to reasonably adopt the principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical and the via negativa, viz. to understand 'physical' as 'non-mental', as a solution to Hempel's dilemma. We will start lowering the strength of his view by reviewing the work of W. Penfield and J. Eccles, two important neurophysiologists and declared dualists. However, we will then focus on the work of B. Libet in which it is purportedly shown that voluntary movements are really determined by entirely (neuro)physiological causes, which would constitute a fundamental piece of evidence in favour of Papineau. Our analysis will reveal that such conclusions do not follow. This will have negative consequences for the Causal Closure principle and will reveal a serious tension within the Causal Argument for Physicalism of which the aforementioned principle is a key premise.
Our current scientifically informed worldview is fractured. We have great
understanding about ple... more Our current scientifically informed worldview is fractured. We have great understanding about plenty of natural phenomena but we do not know how to integrate them with the phenomenon we know most intimately, consciousness. This is what I call in chapter 1 the ‘worldview problem’ of consciousness, at whose heart lays the challenge to incorporate experience within the net of causality without reducing it. In other words, our main problem will be to show how consciousness could be both irreducible and causally efficacious with respect to its underlying neurobiological processes, against the background of a general perspective in which the case of consciousness could be understood. To this end, in chapter 2 I will develop an emergentist framework that could help us see how the natural world could, at least as a coherent and empirically possible alternative, be constituted by increasingly higher levels of irreducible properties and powers. A concrete result of this chapter will be a detailed characterization of what requirements a system would need to meet in order to qualify as emergent and reasons to think that the existence of emergent phenomena could be much more plausible than frequently thought. Finally, in chapter 3 we will show how one of our best scientific theories of consciousness, the Integrated Information Theory, precisely suggest that consciousness should be understood as an emergent property endowing their bearers with integral unity over and above their parts, unity that furthermore would come with irreducible phenomenal powers of causal self-determination.
El propósito central de este escrito es abordar el problema de la causación
psico-física de las p... more El propósito central de este escrito es abordar el problema de la causación psico-física de las propiedades conscientes (fenoménicas, experienciales, cualitativas o simplemente qualia) de nuestros estados mentales dentro del contexto del fisicalismo, la doctrina metafísica de acuerdo a la cuál, puesto en términos simples, ‘todo depende de y esta determinado por, lo físico’1. Para ello se discutirán dos principales argumentos fisicalistas, el argumento causal y el argumento de superveniencia que, tomados conjuntamente nos fuerzan hacia el enfrentamiento de un dilema: o reducimos físicamente el aspecto consciente de nuestra mentalidad para poder atribuirle eficacia causal sobre nuestra conducta, o bien, si resistimos tal reducción, debemos aceptar su impotencia causal y abrazar el epifenomenalismo de la mente consciente. Mi diagnóstico es que tal dilema, ‘reducción o epifenomenalismo’, está principalmente forzado por la aceptación de un principio esencial compartido por todo fisicalista y presente en ambos argumentos: el principio de cierre causal del dominio físico (CCF). La perspectiva que se adoptará en este trabajo es que, en consideración de ciertas motivaciones relevantes para negar tanto la reducción física de qualia, como el epifenomenalismo, (es decir, aceptando ‘no-reduccionismo’ y ‘no-epifenomenalismo’) lo natural se vuelve indagar en que medida existen buenas bases para sostener CCF. La mayor parte del escrito estará centrado en demostrar que se carecen de dichas bases y que por el contrario, hay buenos motivos para su negación. Consecuencia de esto, las presiones fisicalistas para el mencionado dilema se desvanecen, no existiendo ya al menos este tipo de obstáculo para sostener una teoría no-reduccionista de qualia que a la vez de cuenta de su eficacia causal. Al complementar esto con el esbozo de una teoría no-reductiva y a la vez naturalista de la consciencia, su relación con la actividad cerebral y la manera en que podría ejercer su influencia causal, se intentará defender la tesis central del trabajo: las propiedades mentales conscientes son causalmente eficaces en la conducta, en tanto mentales.
La Política Nacional de Inteligencia Artificial del Gobierno de Chile trata, entre otros temas, ... more La Política Nacional de Inteligencia Artificial del Gobierno de Chile trata, entre otros temas, los impactos que estas tecnologías probablemente tendrán en el ámbito laboral. Su postura es tecno-optimista al enfatizar que se crearán nuevos puestos de trabajo y aumentará la productividad del país, desestimando la posibilidad de que el desarrollotecnológico traiga graves alzas en el desempleo. El presente artículo argumenta contra esta postura tecno-optimista. Sostendremos, primero (sección 2), que el enfoque chileno está basado en una premisa implausible, a saber, que la presente revolución industrial es similar a las anteriores. Mostraremos cinco dimensiones fundamentales que la diferencian: velocidad, transversalidad, ubicuidad, relativa-inmaterialidad, e impredecibilidad. Luego (sección 3), presentaremos diversa evidencia científica que indica que un futuro de alto desempleo en Chile por automatización es un escenario posible que amerita una postura cautelar. Con esto, esperamos informar a la institucionalidad pertinente, para que se puedan diseñar políticas orientadas a minimizar las potenciales consecuencias negativas de estas tecnologías en el ámbito laboral.
En este borrador se investiga el antiguo concepto de ‘cuidado de sí’ (epimeleia heautou) tal como... more En este borrador se investiga el antiguo concepto de ‘cuidado de sí’ (epimeleia heautou) tal como es retratado por Foucault en sus últimas obras, contrastándolo con la noción actual de ‘autocuidado’, a fin de dilucidar en qué medida y forma el primero estaría presente en nuestros días. Se argumentará que el autocuidado carece de la dimensión espiritual que el cuidado de sí poseía, y se esbozarán vías posibles para suplir esta carencia tomando como ejemplo la práctica de conciencia plena (mindfulness).
The present article focuses on the ancient concept of ‘care of the self’ (epimeleia heautou) as it is portrayed by Foucault in his later works. This is contrasted with the current notion of ‘self-care’, in order to elucidate to what extent and in which form the former would be present in our days. It will be argued that self-care lacks the spiritual dimension that the ‘care of the self’ possessed, while possible ways to overcome this deficiency are outlined, taking as an example the practice of mindfulness.
In this article we present two ontological problems for the Integrated Information Theory of Cons... more In this article we present two ontological problems for the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness 4.0: what we call the (i) the intrinsicality 2.0 problem, and (ii) the engineering problem. These problems entail that truly existing, conscious entities can depend on, and be engineered from, entities that do not objectively exist, which is problematic: if something does not exist in objective reality (i.e., in itself, independently of another entity’s consciousness), then it seems that it cannot be part of the material basis and determinants of other entities that do exist on their own. We argue that the core origin of these problems lies in IIT’s equation between true existence and phenomenal existence (consciousness), and the corresponding ontological exclusion of non-conscious physical entities (i.e., extrinsic entities) from objective reality. In short, these two problems seem to show that IIT should reconsider the ontological status of these extrinsic entities, because they need to exist objectively to account for the ontological implications of the scenarios we present here, which are permitted by the operational framework of the theory.
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories ... more Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory’s most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just “operational”. However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT’s idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT’s idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT’s realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one’s own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues.
The deep influence of affectivity on learning is now widely acknowledged (Hargreaves et al., 2010... more The deep influence of affectivity on learning is now widely acknowledged (Hargreaves et al., 2010; Keefer et al., 2018; Sánchez-Álvarez et al., 2020; Shafait et al., 2021). For instance, it has been shown that affect influences key learning-relevant processes such as motivation, perception, behavior and critical thinking (Izard, 2002; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Evidence also shows that emotion and mood strongly influence attention, which in turn drives learning and memory (Elbertson et al., 2010; Elias et al., 1997). Intersubjective phenomena such as degree of affection and respect between child and teacher also affects the child’s learning processes, academic outcomes and brain development (Kusché & Greenberg, 2006; A. M. Ryan & Patrick, 2001). However, the relevant literature is not paying attention to increasing evidence showing that affective phenomena are rooted in interoceptive and homeostatic self and co-regulatory processes within and between people’s living bodies (Barrett, 2017; Carvalho & Damasio, 2021; Craig, 2015, 2018; Fotopoulou et al., 2022; Fotopoulou & Tsakiris, 2017; A. K. Seth & Friston, 2016). In this theoretical chapter, we explore this connection and its importance for learning. We argue that since 1) affective experience plays a fundamental role in learning; and 2) affective experience is rooted in the homeostatic self/co-regulation of living bodies; therefore, 3) the homeostatic self/co- regulation of living bodies plays a fundamental role in learning. In other words, there is an intra and interpersonal somatic dimension of learning that demands explicit consideration in educational contexts. In this way, we aim to contribute to an understanding of learning and education that moves away from an individualistic, brain-centered information- processing conception, towards one centered on sentient, interdependent living bodies.
There is no doubt that the knowledge developed in mindfulness from the scientific perspective has... more There is no doubt that the knowledge developed in mindfulness from the scientific perspective has provided important advances in both basic and clinical sciences. Nevertheless, the traditional scientific perspective omits its fundamental nature: mindfulness as an experiential practice. The main goal of this chapter, then, is to present the enactive approach and its advantages in expanding the contemporary scientific proposal through the reintroduction of the original phenomenological nature of mindfulness.
I welcome with great enthusiasm Meling and Scheidegger’s (2023; henceforth “M&S”) timely contribu... more I welcome with great enthusiasm Meling and Scheidegger’s (2023; henceforth “M&S”) timely contribution to advance an enactive approach to psychedelic therapy, especially to the complex causality involved. Their two main research questions concerned: (i) the causal interaction between the psychedelic molecule and brain activity; and (ii) the causal interaction between brain activity and the psychedelic experience. While I largely agree with and celebrate much of what is proposed by M&S, especially their employment of key enactive concepts to advance our understanding of the first research question, in the following, I will present some worries regarding their answers to the second. Although I agree that there is probably a two-way reciprocal relationship between neural activity and experience, I have several points of contention regarding M&S’s proposal. My hope is to stimulate discussion on M&S’s important contribution, and to help advance a much-needed enactive science of psychedelics.
In a recent remarkable article, Froese (2023) presents his Irruption Theory to explain how motiva... more In a recent remarkable article, Froese (2023) presents his Irruption Theory to explain how motivations can make a behavioral difference in motivated activity. In this opinion article, we review the main tenets of Froese’s theory, and highlight its difficulty in overcoming the randomness challenge it supposedly solves, that is, the issue of how adaptive behavior can arise in the face of material underdetermination. To advance our understanding of motivated behavior in line with Froese’s approach, we recommend that future work should endorse a multilevel pluralistic approach to causation and explanation in which motivations could genuinely play an irreducible role. Additionally, in line with the life-mind continuity thesis, we suggest that the best place to look for the interplay between motivations and nonmotivational physical, biological, and dynamical factors, may be at the level of the continuous feeling of being an embodied, living organism.
Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theo... more Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on the enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others’ emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich the knowledge of the empathic experience of pain using an experimental phenomenological method. Materials and methods: Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results: Experiential access to the other person’s painful experience involves four main themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations in coordination with the sportsperson’s bodily actions. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. The temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant’s own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of an embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory of non-interactive social experience.
Humana.Mente Journal of philosophical studies, 2023
In this article, we address the problem of the potential crisis in people’s life’s meaning due to... more In this article, we address the problem of the potential crisis in people’s life’s meaning due to massive automation-driven technological unemployment. Assuming that the problem of (re)distribution of economic resources to the whole of society in such a scenario will be solved (e.g. through provision of a Universal Basic Income), the question arises concerning the meaning of people’s lives in a world in which almost everyone does not have to (or even could not) work in order to live. Here, we side with many current proposals that paid work is not the only possible source of meaning and hence, that a meaningful life could indeed be led in a post-work society. We especially focus on one of the most developed accounts, Danaher’s Virtual Utopia (Danaher, 2016, 2019, 2022). According to him, living immersed in playful virtual worlds where new, expanded and personalized possibilities of personal and collective experiences and actions, could not only be perfectly meaningful lives, but furthermore, “be the utopia we are looking for” (Danaher, 2019, p. 270). However, our analysis will suggest that although it is a very well thought and carefully articulated position, it suffers from various important problems. Our criticism will be based on an alternative framework to think about life’s meaning and the conditions for leading a good life in general. This alternative is based on the philosophy of buen vivir (“good living”). This notion has its roots in common aspects of various Latin American indigenous cultures regarding a community-centered way of life where humans, society and nature are taken to be deeply interconnected and interdependent, and where the notions of respect, harmony and balance are at the core of this interrelationship (Gudynas, 2011; Acosta, 2008; Beling et al., 2021). Buen vivir has many facets, but we will focus on three: the importance of healthy human communities, the human-nature relationship, and the intrinsic value of nature. Based on these, we argue that the Virtual Utopia is not a good candidate for human’s post-work utopia because i) it unnecessarily augments the environmental damage that is already involved in massive labor automation; ii) it entails an unnecessary and detrimental dependence on technology for human relationships; and iii) increases the severance of the link between humanity and nature. We conclude that the buen vivir approach is a promising candidate for an alternative utopian project, but one that needs further construction.
In consciousness studies there is a growing tendency to consider experience as (i) fundamentally ... more In consciousness studies there is a growing tendency to consider experience as (i) fundamentally affective and (ii) deeply interlinked with interoceptive and homeostatic bodily processes. However, this view still needs further development to be part of any rigorous theory of consciousness. To advance in this direction, we ask: 1) is there any affective type that is always present in consciousness? 2) is it related to interoception and homeostasis? and, 3) what are its properties? Here we analyze and compare Jim Russell's core affect and Thomas Fuchs' concept of vitality, and propose a more encompassing notion that subsumes both: Continuous Organismic Sentience. It provides affirmative answers to questions 1 and 2, and, regarding question 3, a preliminary list of thirteen properties divided into ontological, phenomenological and functional categories. This is the first of a series of studies that will systematically address different notions of a fundamental, homeostatically-rooted affective type, to achieve a rigorous, unified concept for consciousness science.
In this paper I argue that the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness has an underlying e... more In this paper I argue that the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness has an underlying emergentist metaphysics, specifically of a kind that has received minimal attention and we may call functionalist emergentism. I will try to show that in this scientific theory conscious experience is a functional-role property possessed by the whole system, not by their parts, which is dependent on, but also (purportedly) causally powerful over and above, the properties of the parts. However, I will argue that depicting conscious experience as a functional-role emergent property threatens the whole coherence of the theory because, by definition, functional-realizers do all the causal work associated with the instantiation of any functional-role property on any occasion. Hence, to preserve the causal power of consciousness, which, as we will see, is one of the fundamental building blocks of the theory, linked to the assertion of the very existence of consciousness, phenomenal properties should be rethought as realizers of the relevant informationally integrated causal-roles.. Finally, I would like to thank ANID-Chile (ex CONICYT) for a three-year doctoral scholarship that allowed me to do much of the research presented in the present article.
En este artículo abordo críticamente la aseveración de David Papineau según la cual la evidencia ... more En este artículo abordo críticamente la aseveración de David Papineau según la cual la evidencia fisiológica acumulada es suficiente para adoptar razonablemente el Principio del Cierre Causal de lo Físico y la vía negativa, viz. entender físico como no-mental, como solución al dilema de Hempel. Comenzaremos restando fuerza a tal afirmación revisando el trabajo de W. Penfield y J. Eccles, dos importantes neurocientíficos y declarados dualistas. No obstante, luego nos centraremos en el trabajo de B. Libet en el que se demostraría que los movimientos voluntarios están realmente determinados por causas enteramente (neuro)fisiológicas, lo cual constituiría una pieza fundamental de evidencia a favor de Papineau. Nuestro análisis mostrará que no se siguen tales conclusiones. Esto tendrá consecuencias negativas para el Principio del Cierre Causal de lo Físico y revelará una grave tensión al interior del Argumento Causal para el Fisicalismo del cual el mencionado principio es premisa clave.
In this article, I critically address David Papineau's assertion that accumulated physiological evidence is sufficient to reasonably adopt the principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical and the via negativa, viz. to understand 'physical' as 'non-mental', as a solution to Hempel's dilemma. We will start lowering the strength of his view by reviewing the work of W. Penfield and J. Eccles, two important neurophysiologists and declared dualists. However, we will then focus on the work of B. Libet in which it is purportedly shown that voluntary movements are really determined by entirely (neuro)physiological causes, which would constitute a fundamental piece of evidence in favour of Papineau. Our analysis will reveal that such conclusions do not follow. This will have negative consequences for the Causal Closure principle and will reveal a serious tension within the Causal Argument for Physicalism of which the aforementioned principle is a key premise.
Our current scientifically informed worldview is fractured. We have great
understanding about ple... more Our current scientifically informed worldview is fractured. We have great understanding about plenty of natural phenomena but we do not know how to integrate them with the phenomenon we know most intimately, consciousness. This is what I call in chapter 1 the ‘worldview problem’ of consciousness, at whose heart lays the challenge to incorporate experience within the net of causality without reducing it. In other words, our main problem will be to show how consciousness could be both irreducible and causally efficacious with respect to its underlying neurobiological processes, against the background of a general perspective in which the case of consciousness could be understood. To this end, in chapter 2 I will develop an emergentist framework that could help us see how the natural world could, at least as a coherent and empirically possible alternative, be constituted by increasingly higher levels of irreducible properties and powers. A concrete result of this chapter will be a detailed characterization of what requirements a system would need to meet in order to qualify as emergent and reasons to think that the existence of emergent phenomena could be much more plausible than frequently thought. Finally, in chapter 3 we will show how one of our best scientific theories of consciousness, the Integrated Information Theory, precisely suggest that consciousness should be understood as an emergent property endowing their bearers with integral unity over and above their parts, unity that furthermore would come with irreducible phenomenal powers of causal self-determination.
El propósito central de este escrito es abordar el problema de la causación
psico-física de las p... more El propósito central de este escrito es abordar el problema de la causación psico-física de las propiedades conscientes (fenoménicas, experienciales, cualitativas o simplemente qualia) de nuestros estados mentales dentro del contexto del fisicalismo, la doctrina metafísica de acuerdo a la cuál, puesto en términos simples, ‘todo depende de y esta determinado por, lo físico’1. Para ello se discutirán dos principales argumentos fisicalistas, el argumento causal y el argumento de superveniencia que, tomados conjuntamente nos fuerzan hacia el enfrentamiento de un dilema: o reducimos físicamente el aspecto consciente de nuestra mentalidad para poder atribuirle eficacia causal sobre nuestra conducta, o bien, si resistimos tal reducción, debemos aceptar su impotencia causal y abrazar el epifenomenalismo de la mente consciente. Mi diagnóstico es que tal dilema, ‘reducción o epifenomenalismo’, está principalmente forzado por la aceptación de un principio esencial compartido por todo fisicalista y presente en ambos argumentos: el principio de cierre causal del dominio físico (CCF). La perspectiva que se adoptará en este trabajo es que, en consideración de ciertas motivaciones relevantes para negar tanto la reducción física de qualia, como el epifenomenalismo, (es decir, aceptando ‘no-reduccionismo’ y ‘no-epifenomenalismo’) lo natural se vuelve indagar en que medida existen buenas bases para sostener CCF. La mayor parte del escrito estará centrado en demostrar que se carecen de dichas bases y que por el contrario, hay buenos motivos para su negación. Consecuencia de esto, las presiones fisicalistas para el mencionado dilema se desvanecen, no existiendo ya al menos este tipo de obstáculo para sostener una teoría no-reduccionista de qualia que a la vez de cuenta de su eficacia causal. Al complementar esto con el esbozo de una teoría no-reductiva y a la vez naturalista de la consciencia, su relación con la actividad cerebral y la manera en que podría ejercer su influencia causal, se intentará defender la tesis central del trabajo: las propiedades mentales conscientes son causalmente eficaces en la conducta, en tanto mentales.
La Política Nacional de Inteligencia Artificial del Gobierno de Chile trata, entre otros temas, ... more La Política Nacional de Inteligencia Artificial del Gobierno de Chile trata, entre otros temas, los impactos que estas tecnologías probablemente tendrán en el ámbito laboral. Su postura es tecno-optimista al enfatizar que se crearán nuevos puestos de trabajo y aumentará la productividad del país, desestimando la posibilidad de que el desarrollotecnológico traiga graves alzas en el desempleo. El presente artículo argumenta contra esta postura tecno-optimista. Sostendremos, primero (sección 2), que el enfoque chileno está basado en una premisa implausible, a saber, que la presente revolución industrial es similar a las anteriores. Mostraremos cinco dimensiones fundamentales que la diferencian: velocidad, transversalidad, ubicuidad, relativa-inmaterialidad, e impredecibilidad. Luego (sección 3), presentaremos diversa evidencia científica que indica que un futuro de alto desempleo en Chile por automatización es un escenario posible que amerita una postura cautelar. Con esto, esperamos informar a la institucionalidad pertinente, para que se puedan diseñar políticas orientadas a minimizar las potenciales consecuencias negativas de estas tecnologías en el ámbito laboral.
En este borrador se investiga el antiguo concepto de ‘cuidado de sí’ (epimeleia heautou) tal como... more En este borrador se investiga el antiguo concepto de ‘cuidado de sí’ (epimeleia heautou) tal como es retratado por Foucault en sus últimas obras, contrastándolo con la noción actual de ‘autocuidado’, a fin de dilucidar en qué medida y forma el primero estaría presente en nuestros días. Se argumentará que el autocuidado carece de la dimensión espiritual que el cuidado de sí poseía, y se esbozarán vías posibles para suplir esta carencia tomando como ejemplo la práctica de conciencia plena (mindfulness).
The present article focuses on the ancient concept of ‘care of the self’ (epimeleia heautou) as it is portrayed by Foucault in his later works. This is contrasted with the current notion of ‘self-care’, in order to elucidate to what extent and in which form the former would be present in our days. It will be argued that self-care lacks the spiritual dimension that the ‘care of the self’ possessed, while possible ways to overcome this deficiency are outlined, taking as an example the practice of mindfulness.
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Papers by Ignacio Cea
Objective: This study aims to enrich the knowledge of the empathic experience of pain using an experimental phenomenological method.
Materials and methods: Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories.
Results: Experiential access to the other person’s painful experience involves four main themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations in coordination with the sportsperson’s bodily actions. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. The temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant’s own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them.
Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of an embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory of non-interactive social experience.
In this article, I critically address David Papineau's assertion that accumulated physiological evidence is sufficient to reasonably adopt the principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical and the via negativa, viz. to understand 'physical' as 'non-mental', as a solution to Hempel's dilemma. We will start lowering the strength of his view by reviewing the work of W. Penfield and J. Eccles, two important neurophysiologists and declared dualists. However, we will then focus on the work of B. Libet in which it is purportedly shown that voluntary movements are really determined by entirely (neuro)physiological causes, which would constitute a fundamental piece of evidence in favour of Papineau. Our analysis will reveal that such conclusions do not follow. This will have negative consequences for the Causal Closure principle and will reveal a serious tension within the Causal Argument for Physicalism of which the aforementioned principle is a key premise.
Thesis Chapters by Ignacio Cea
understanding about plenty of natural phenomena but we do not know how to integrate them with the phenomenon we know most intimately, consciousness. This is what I call in chapter 1 the ‘worldview problem’ of consciousness, at whose heart lays the challenge to incorporate experience within the net of causality without reducing it. In other words, our main problem will be to show how consciousness could be both irreducible and causally efficacious with respect to its underlying neurobiological processes, against the background of a general
perspective in which the case of consciousness could be understood. To this end, in chapter 2 I will develop an emergentist framework that could help us see how the natural world could, at least as a coherent and empirically possible alternative, be constituted by increasingly higher levels of irreducible properties and powers. A concrete result of this chapter will be a detailed characterization of what requirements a system would need to meet in order to qualify as emergent and reasons to think that the existence of emergent phenomena could be much more plausible than frequently thought. Finally, in chapter 3 we will show how one of our best scientific theories of consciousness, the Integrated Information Theory, precisely suggest that consciousness should be understood as an emergent property endowing their bearers with integral unity over and
above their parts, unity that furthermore would come with irreducible
phenomenal powers of causal self-determination.
psico-física de las propiedades conscientes (fenoménicas, experienciales, cualitativas o simplemente qualia) de nuestros estados mentales dentro del contexto del fisicalismo, la doctrina metafísica de acuerdo a la cuál, puesto en términos simples, ‘todo depende de y esta determinado por, lo físico’1. Para ello se discutirán dos principales argumentos fisicalistas, el argumento causal y el argumento de superveniencia que, tomados conjuntamente nos fuerzan hacia el enfrentamiento de un dilema: o reducimos físicamente el aspecto consciente de nuestra mentalidad para
poder atribuirle eficacia causal sobre nuestra conducta, o bien, si resistimos tal reducción, debemos aceptar su impotencia causal y abrazar el epifenomenalismo de la mente consciente. Mi diagnóstico es que tal dilema, ‘reducción o epifenomenalismo’, está principalmente forzado por la aceptación de un principio esencial compartido por todo fisicalista y presente en ambos argumentos: el principio de cierre causal del
dominio físico (CCF). La perspectiva que se adoptará en este trabajo es que, en consideración de ciertas motivaciones relevantes para negar tanto la reducción física de qualia, como el epifenomenalismo, (es decir, aceptando ‘no-reduccionismo’ y ‘no-epifenomenalismo’) lo natural se vuelve indagar en que medida existen buenas bases para sostener CCF. La mayor parte del escrito estará centrado en demostrar que se carecen de dichas bases y que por el contrario, hay buenos motivos para su negación. Consecuencia de esto, las presiones fisicalistas para el mencionado dilema
se desvanecen, no existiendo ya al menos este tipo de obstáculo para sostener una teoría no-reduccionista de qualia que a la vez de cuenta de su eficacia causal. Al complementar esto con el esbozo de una teoría no-reductiva y a la vez naturalista de la consciencia, su relación con la actividad cerebral y la manera en que podría ejercer su influencia causal, se intentará defender la tesis central del trabajo: las propiedades mentales conscientes son causalmente eficaces en la conducta, en tanto mentales.
Drafts by Ignacio Cea
The present article focuses on the ancient concept of ‘care of the self’ (epimeleia heautou) as it is portrayed by Foucault in his later works. This is contrasted with the current notion of ‘self-care’, in order to elucidate to what extent and in which form the former would be present in our days. It will be argued that self-care lacks the spiritual dimension that the ‘care of the self’ possessed, while possible ways to overcome this deficiency are outlined, taking as an example the practice of mindfulness.
Objective: This study aims to enrich the knowledge of the empathic experience of pain using an experimental phenomenological method.
Materials and methods: Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories.
Results: Experiential access to the other person’s painful experience involves four main themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations in coordination with the sportsperson’s bodily actions. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. The temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant’s own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them.
Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of an embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory of non-interactive social experience.
In this article, I critically address David Papineau's assertion that accumulated physiological evidence is sufficient to reasonably adopt the principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical and the via negativa, viz. to understand 'physical' as 'non-mental', as a solution to Hempel's dilemma. We will start lowering the strength of his view by reviewing the work of W. Penfield and J. Eccles, two important neurophysiologists and declared dualists. However, we will then focus on the work of B. Libet in which it is purportedly shown that voluntary movements are really determined by entirely (neuro)physiological causes, which would constitute a fundamental piece of evidence in favour of Papineau. Our analysis will reveal that such conclusions do not follow. This will have negative consequences for the Causal Closure principle and will reveal a serious tension within the Causal Argument for Physicalism of which the aforementioned principle is a key premise.
understanding about plenty of natural phenomena but we do not know how to integrate them with the phenomenon we know most intimately, consciousness. This is what I call in chapter 1 the ‘worldview problem’ of consciousness, at whose heart lays the challenge to incorporate experience within the net of causality without reducing it. In other words, our main problem will be to show how consciousness could be both irreducible and causally efficacious with respect to its underlying neurobiological processes, against the background of a general
perspective in which the case of consciousness could be understood. To this end, in chapter 2 I will develop an emergentist framework that could help us see how the natural world could, at least as a coherent and empirically possible alternative, be constituted by increasingly higher levels of irreducible properties and powers. A concrete result of this chapter will be a detailed characterization of what requirements a system would need to meet in order to qualify as emergent and reasons to think that the existence of emergent phenomena could be much more plausible than frequently thought. Finally, in chapter 3 we will show how one of our best scientific theories of consciousness, the Integrated Information Theory, precisely suggest that consciousness should be understood as an emergent property endowing their bearers with integral unity over and
above their parts, unity that furthermore would come with irreducible
phenomenal powers of causal self-determination.
psico-física de las propiedades conscientes (fenoménicas, experienciales, cualitativas o simplemente qualia) de nuestros estados mentales dentro del contexto del fisicalismo, la doctrina metafísica de acuerdo a la cuál, puesto en términos simples, ‘todo depende de y esta determinado por, lo físico’1. Para ello se discutirán dos principales argumentos fisicalistas, el argumento causal y el argumento de superveniencia que, tomados conjuntamente nos fuerzan hacia el enfrentamiento de un dilema: o reducimos físicamente el aspecto consciente de nuestra mentalidad para
poder atribuirle eficacia causal sobre nuestra conducta, o bien, si resistimos tal reducción, debemos aceptar su impotencia causal y abrazar el epifenomenalismo de la mente consciente. Mi diagnóstico es que tal dilema, ‘reducción o epifenomenalismo’, está principalmente forzado por la aceptación de un principio esencial compartido por todo fisicalista y presente en ambos argumentos: el principio de cierre causal del
dominio físico (CCF). La perspectiva que se adoptará en este trabajo es que, en consideración de ciertas motivaciones relevantes para negar tanto la reducción física de qualia, como el epifenomenalismo, (es decir, aceptando ‘no-reduccionismo’ y ‘no-epifenomenalismo’) lo natural se vuelve indagar en que medida existen buenas bases para sostener CCF. La mayor parte del escrito estará centrado en demostrar que se carecen de dichas bases y que por el contrario, hay buenos motivos para su negación. Consecuencia de esto, las presiones fisicalistas para el mencionado dilema
se desvanecen, no existiendo ya al menos este tipo de obstáculo para sostener una teoría no-reduccionista de qualia que a la vez de cuenta de su eficacia causal. Al complementar esto con el esbozo de una teoría no-reductiva y a la vez naturalista de la consciencia, su relación con la actividad cerebral y la manera en que podría ejercer su influencia causal, se intentará defender la tesis central del trabajo: las propiedades mentales conscientes son causalmente eficaces en la conducta, en tanto mentales.
The present article focuses on the ancient concept of ‘care of the self’ (epimeleia heautou) as it is portrayed by Foucault in his later works. This is contrasted with the current notion of ‘self-care’, in order to elucidate to what extent and in which form the former would be present in our days. It will be argued that self-care lacks the spiritual dimension that the ‘care of the self’ possessed, while possible ways to overcome this deficiency are outlined, taking as an example the practice of mindfulness.