My research is on the following: action theory, embodied cognition (extended cognition), theory of mind, theory of knowledge, information theory and philosophy, and philosophy of language (naturalized semantics and direct reference theory).
In "Beat the (Backward) Clock," we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu's Backward Clock ... more In "Beat the (Backward) Clock," we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu's Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick's or Fred Dretske's Theories of Knowledge. Williams' reply to our paper, "There's Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke," is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counterexamples to... more Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counterexamples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge. 1 Here we respond to his two recent claims that we have made mistakes in our reply. We deny both of his claims.
In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams ... more In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counterexample to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1978
Rote, repetitive Type 1 Rehearsal is defined as the continuous maintenance of information in memo... more Rote, repetitive Type 1 Rehearsal is defined as the continuous maintenance of information in memory using the minimum cognitive capacity necessary for maintenance. This definition is operationalized in an incidental paradigm where pairs of words are overtly rehearsed 1, 5, or 10 times (maintained for 1.33 to 13.33 seconds). An analysis of the types of errors made on a forced-choice recognition test supported the hypothesis that acoustic-phonemic components of the memory trace, as opposed to semantic and contextual components , are added or strengthened by this rehearsal process. Furthermore, it was observed that co rehearsed words did not effectively cue one another's recall. These results are discussed in relation to the usefulness of the distinction between Type I and Type II rehearsal. The terms Type I and Type II rehearsal were proposed by Craik and Lockhart (1972) to refer to two theoretically distinct kinds of processing. Type II rehearsal results in deep (semantic) analysis or mnemonic elaboration and is beneficial for long-term performance. Type I rehearsal was characterized as a rote repetition of analyses that have already been completed. This process was supposed to maintain information for immediate performance at a given level of analysis (within a levelof-analysis framework), but not to enhance long-term performance. A similar dichotomy was proposed by Woodward, Bjork, and Jongeward (1973). This article is primarily concerned with the definition of Type I rehearsal, and with the effects of Type I rehearsal on the memory code as measured, primarily, with a recognition procedure. Research on Type I rehearsal has been hampered and roundly criticized (e.g., Nelson, 1977) for lack of an operational definition.
Wayward causal chains present an obstacle for causal theories of intentional action-as is well kn... more Wayward causal chains present an obstacle for causal theories of intentional action-as is well known. It is not enough that the intention to A cause one's A-ing, it must cause it non-deviantly in order to be intentional A-ing. For without excludin.g deviant causal pathways, many cases which should not be counted as intentional actions would slip through the net and become classified as intentional. S intends to drop the precious vase, but his intention so unnerves him that it causes him to shake, thereby causing him to drop and break the vase. Even if S had changed his mind (which he did not) and ceased to intend to drop the vase, he could not have avoided dropping it. Although the intention to drop the vase is a key player in the etiology of S's vase-breaking, we are not inclined to count it as intentional breaking. Recently, Myles Brand [5] has catalogued two varieties of deviance (waywardness) in causal chains which might prevent an action's being intentional, even if caused by
As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre ... more As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre o agente cognitivo e seu ambiente. Os estados cognitivos de um agente epistêmico fazem o rastreamento da verdade das proposições que são objeto de conhecimento ao embasarem a crença em indicadores confiáveis da verdade (evidência, razões, ou métodos de formação de crença). A novidade nessa abordagem é que se dá pouca ênfase no tipo de justificação epistêmica voltada ao fornecimento de procedimentos de decisão doxástica ou regras de responsabilidade epistêmica. Este artigo oferece um pouco da história das teorias de rastreamento e, então, defende-as contra muitas objeções que se pretendem (equivocadamente) refutadoras dessas teorias. PALAVRAS – CHAVE – Teorias de rastreamento. Nozick. Dretske. Conhecimento. ABSTRACT Tracking theories of knowledge maintain that knowledge is a real relation between cognitive agent and environment. Cognitive states of a knower track the truth of known propos...
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2018
In what kinds of physical systems can cognition be realized? There are currently competing answer... more In what kinds of physical systems can cognition be realized? There are currently competing answers among scientists and theorists of cognition. There are many plant scientists who maintain that cognition can be realized in plants. There are biological scientists who maintain that cognition is materially realized in bacteria. In this paper, I will present the basis for such claims and evaluate them and discuss the future for theories of the metaphysical basis of cognition in the cognitive sciences.
This paper considers the main reasons Zalabardo rejects Nozick’s tracking theo- ry of knowledge. ... more This paper considers the main reasons Zalabardo rejects Nozick’s tracking theo- ry of knowledge. It also considers Zalabardo’s preferred replacement theory—a prob- abilistic tracking account. I suggest that the reasons given for rejecting Nozick’s account do not withstand scrutiny and that the replacement account has problems of its own. So, in the end, this paper defends Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge.
Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4? Clark's Answer: Because it was coupled to the ... more Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4? Clark's Answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician. That about sums up what is wrong with Clark's extended mind hypothesis. Clark apparently thinks that the nature of the processes internal to a pencil, Rolodex, computer, cell phone, piece of string, or whatever, has nothing to do with whether that thing carries out cognitive processing. 1 Rather, what matters is how the thing interacts with a cognitive agent; the thing has to be coupled to a cognitive agent in a particular kind of way. Clark (20??) gives three conditions that constitute a rough or partial specification of the kind of coupling required. 1. The resource has to be reliably available and typically invoked. 2. Any information retrieved from/with the resource must be more-or-less automatically endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny (unlike the opinions of other people, for example). It should be deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological memory. 3. Information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required. (cf. Clark, (20??), pp. 6-7). 1 Clark does shy away from this from time to time, but more on this below. Granted condition three doesn't fit the use of a pencil very well, since the mathematician is not really extracting information from the pencil, but blame Clark for that. After all, he likes the idea that the use of pencil and paper in computing sums constitutes part of an agent's cognitive processing, hence it's up to him to make his story work there. 2 When Clark makes an object cognitive when it is connected to a cognitive agent, he is committing an instance of a "coupling-constitution fallacy." This is the most common mistake that extended mind theorists make. 3 The fallacious pattern is to draw attention to cases, real or imagined, in which some object or process is coupled in some fashion to some cognitive agent. From this, slide to the conclusion that the object or process constitutes part of the agent's cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing. If you are coupled to your pocket notebook in the sense of always having it readily available, use it a lot, trust it implicitly, and so forth, then Clark infers that the pocket notebook constitutes a part of your memory store. If you are coupled to a rock in the sense of always having it readily available, use it a lot, trust it implicitly, and so forth, Clark infers that the rock constitutes a part of your memory store. Yet coupling relations are distinct from constitutive relations, and the fact that object or process X is coupled to object or process Y does not entail that X is part of Y. The neurons leading into a neuromuscular junction are coupled to the muscles they innervate, but the neurons are not a part of the muscles they innervate. The release of neurotransmitters at the neuromuscular junction is coupled to the
In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where h... more In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information.
What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten y... more What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new ‘modal’ version of this causal powers argument. I argue that Fodor's argument (in old or new dress) is a non sequitur. It neither establishes the existence of narrow content nor the need for a content other than broad content to explain intentional behavior.
In this commentary to Serrano et al. (2013), I applaud this foundation article for being a breath... more In this commentary to Serrano et al. (2013), I applaud this foundation article for being a breath of fresh air because it addresses the question “What is cognition?” Too often in the cognitive sciences, we leave that question unanswered or worse, unasked. I come not to criticize but to offer a helpful suggestion aimed a pulling together some of the separate strands weaved throughout this article.
In the etiology of teleological functions, what role can be played by accidental occurrences? Dou... more In the etiology of teleological functions, what role can be played by accidental occurrences? Douglas Ehring's essay “Accidental Functions” constructs a theory of ideological functions which makes it possible for objects to have functions even when their causal origins are due entirely to accident—be they natural functions (the function of the heart) or artifact functions (the function of a watch). Ehring constructs this view on the basis of a set of putative counterexamples aimed largely at the theories of Enc and Adams. Both of these theories block the attribution of ideological function to structures with entirely accidental causal histories—accidental in originandin the way their effects are causally sustained.
In "Beat the (Backward) Clock," we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu's Backward Clock ... more In "Beat the (Backward) Clock," we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu's Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick's or Fred Dretske's Theories of Knowledge. Williams' reply to our paper, "There's Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke," is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counterexamples to... more Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counterexamples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge. 1 Here we respond to his two recent claims that we have made mistakes in our reply. We deny both of his claims.
In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams ... more In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counterexample to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1978
Rote, repetitive Type 1 Rehearsal is defined as the continuous maintenance of information in memo... more Rote, repetitive Type 1 Rehearsal is defined as the continuous maintenance of information in memory using the minimum cognitive capacity necessary for maintenance. This definition is operationalized in an incidental paradigm where pairs of words are overtly rehearsed 1, 5, or 10 times (maintained for 1.33 to 13.33 seconds). An analysis of the types of errors made on a forced-choice recognition test supported the hypothesis that acoustic-phonemic components of the memory trace, as opposed to semantic and contextual components , are added or strengthened by this rehearsal process. Furthermore, it was observed that co rehearsed words did not effectively cue one another's recall. These results are discussed in relation to the usefulness of the distinction between Type I and Type II rehearsal. The terms Type I and Type II rehearsal were proposed by Craik and Lockhart (1972) to refer to two theoretically distinct kinds of processing. Type II rehearsal results in deep (semantic) analysis or mnemonic elaboration and is beneficial for long-term performance. Type I rehearsal was characterized as a rote repetition of analyses that have already been completed. This process was supposed to maintain information for immediate performance at a given level of analysis (within a levelof-analysis framework), but not to enhance long-term performance. A similar dichotomy was proposed by Woodward, Bjork, and Jongeward (1973). This article is primarily concerned with the definition of Type I rehearsal, and with the effects of Type I rehearsal on the memory code as measured, primarily, with a recognition procedure. Research on Type I rehearsal has been hampered and roundly criticized (e.g., Nelson, 1977) for lack of an operational definition.
Wayward causal chains present an obstacle for causal theories of intentional action-as is well kn... more Wayward causal chains present an obstacle for causal theories of intentional action-as is well known. It is not enough that the intention to A cause one's A-ing, it must cause it non-deviantly in order to be intentional A-ing. For without excludin.g deviant causal pathways, many cases which should not be counted as intentional actions would slip through the net and become classified as intentional. S intends to drop the precious vase, but his intention so unnerves him that it causes him to shake, thereby causing him to drop and break the vase. Even if S had changed his mind (which he did not) and ceased to intend to drop the vase, he could not have avoided dropping it. Although the intention to drop the vase is a key player in the etiology of S's vase-breaking, we are not inclined to count it as intentional breaking. Recently, Myles Brand [5] has catalogued two varieties of deviance (waywardness) in causal chains which might prevent an action's being intentional, even if caused by
As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre ... more As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre o agente cognitivo e seu ambiente. Os estados cognitivos de um agente epistêmico fazem o rastreamento da verdade das proposições que são objeto de conhecimento ao embasarem a crença em indicadores confiáveis da verdade (evidência, razões, ou métodos de formação de crença). A novidade nessa abordagem é que se dá pouca ênfase no tipo de justificação epistêmica voltada ao fornecimento de procedimentos de decisão doxástica ou regras de responsabilidade epistêmica. Este artigo oferece um pouco da história das teorias de rastreamento e, então, defende-as contra muitas objeções que se pretendem (equivocadamente) refutadoras dessas teorias. PALAVRAS – CHAVE – Teorias de rastreamento. Nozick. Dretske. Conhecimento. ABSTRACT Tracking theories of knowledge maintain that knowledge is a real relation between cognitive agent and environment. Cognitive states of a knower track the truth of known propos...
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2018
In what kinds of physical systems can cognition be realized? There are currently competing answer... more In what kinds of physical systems can cognition be realized? There are currently competing answers among scientists and theorists of cognition. There are many plant scientists who maintain that cognition can be realized in plants. There are biological scientists who maintain that cognition is materially realized in bacteria. In this paper, I will present the basis for such claims and evaluate them and discuss the future for theories of the metaphysical basis of cognition in the cognitive sciences.
This paper considers the main reasons Zalabardo rejects Nozick’s tracking theo- ry of knowledge. ... more This paper considers the main reasons Zalabardo rejects Nozick’s tracking theo- ry of knowledge. It also considers Zalabardo’s preferred replacement theory—a prob- abilistic tracking account. I suggest that the reasons given for rejecting Nozick’s account do not withstand scrutiny and that the replacement account has problems of its own. So, in the end, this paper defends Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge.
Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4? Clark's Answer: Because it was coupled to the ... more Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4? Clark's Answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician. That about sums up what is wrong with Clark's extended mind hypothesis. Clark apparently thinks that the nature of the processes internal to a pencil, Rolodex, computer, cell phone, piece of string, or whatever, has nothing to do with whether that thing carries out cognitive processing. 1 Rather, what matters is how the thing interacts with a cognitive agent; the thing has to be coupled to a cognitive agent in a particular kind of way. Clark (20??) gives three conditions that constitute a rough or partial specification of the kind of coupling required. 1. The resource has to be reliably available and typically invoked. 2. Any information retrieved from/with the resource must be more-or-less automatically endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny (unlike the opinions of other people, for example). It should be deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological memory. 3. Information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required. (cf. Clark, (20??), pp. 6-7). 1 Clark does shy away from this from time to time, but more on this below. Granted condition three doesn't fit the use of a pencil very well, since the mathematician is not really extracting information from the pencil, but blame Clark for that. After all, he likes the idea that the use of pencil and paper in computing sums constitutes part of an agent's cognitive processing, hence it's up to him to make his story work there. 2 When Clark makes an object cognitive when it is connected to a cognitive agent, he is committing an instance of a "coupling-constitution fallacy." This is the most common mistake that extended mind theorists make. 3 The fallacious pattern is to draw attention to cases, real or imagined, in which some object or process is coupled in some fashion to some cognitive agent. From this, slide to the conclusion that the object or process constitutes part of the agent's cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing. If you are coupled to your pocket notebook in the sense of always having it readily available, use it a lot, trust it implicitly, and so forth, then Clark infers that the pocket notebook constitutes a part of your memory store. If you are coupled to a rock in the sense of always having it readily available, use it a lot, trust it implicitly, and so forth, Clark infers that the rock constitutes a part of your memory store. Yet coupling relations are distinct from constitutive relations, and the fact that object or process X is coupled to object or process Y does not entail that X is part of Y. The neurons leading into a neuromuscular junction are coupled to the muscles they innervate, but the neurons are not a part of the muscles they innervate. The release of neurotransmitters at the neuromuscular junction is coupled to the
In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where h... more In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information.
What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten y... more What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new ‘modal’ version of this causal powers argument. I argue that Fodor's argument (in old or new dress) is a non sequitur. It neither establishes the existence of narrow content nor the need for a content other than broad content to explain intentional behavior.
In this commentary to Serrano et al. (2013), I applaud this foundation article for being a breath... more In this commentary to Serrano et al. (2013), I applaud this foundation article for being a breath of fresh air because it addresses the question “What is cognition?” Too often in the cognitive sciences, we leave that question unanswered or worse, unasked. I come not to criticize but to offer a helpful suggestion aimed a pulling together some of the separate strands weaved throughout this article.
In the etiology of teleological functions, what role can be played by accidental occurrences? Dou... more In the etiology of teleological functions, what role can be played by accidental occurrences? Douglas Ehring's essay “Accidental Functions” constructs a theory of ideological functions which makes it possible for objects to have functions even when their causal origins are due entirely to accident—be they natural functions (the function of the heart) or artifact functions (the function of a watch). Ehring constructs this view on the basis of a set of putative counterexamples aimed largely at the theories of Enc and Adams. Both of these theories block the attribution of ideological function to structures with entirely accidental causal histories—accidental in originandin the way their effects are causally sustained.
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Papers by Fred Adams