Evento on-line organizado pela equipe do Programa de Residência Multiprofissional em Saúde Mental... more Evento on-line organizado pela equipe do Programa de Residência Multiprofissional em Saúde Mental da Autarquia Municipal de Saúde (AMS) de Apucarana - PR, em 15 de maio de 2021. Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PimfuBbMSkM
Problemata - International Journal of Philosophy, Jul 1, 2024
This paper represents a counterreply to “A rejoinder to Alessio Gava’s ‘Van Fraassen, a inferênci... more This paper represents a counterreply to “A rejoinder to Alessio Gava’s ‘Van Fraassen, a inferência da melhor explicação e a Matrix realista’”, by Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva, released in Problemata (v. 12, n. 2, 2021). The authors originally published an essay in the same journal, “Van Fraassen and inference to the best explanation” (2016), the object of critic - ‘friendly and gentle’ - in a work of mine that also appeared in Problemata, in 2019. In this paper I will show that, even when the subject matter is the inference to the best explanation, realists and antirealists end up debating about the same old topics, that represent the essence of the controversy between the two philosophical stances
Tradução de "Bas van Fraassen’s Philosophy of Science and His Epistemic Voluntarism", de Kathleen... more Tradução de "Bas van Fraassen’s Philosophy of Science and His Epistemic Voluntarism", de Kathleen Okruhlik (2014).
Bas van Fraassen’s anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, his relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen’s empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens’s epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science.
2020 is the year of the fortieth anniversary of Bas van Fraassen’s seminal book The Scientific Im... more 2020 is the year of the fortieth anniversary of Bas van Fraassen’s seminal book The Scientific Image. It is quite surprising, after such a long time, and considering how much the author’s proposal was debated during the last four decades, to find a new review of it on the March issue of Metascience. In “Concluding Unscientific Image”, Hans Halvorson claims that, in the work of the founder of constructive empiricism, not only is there a defense of an anti-realist perspective on science—and, at the same time, a critique of scientific realism—, but also a revolt against the way of doing philosophy that, since Quine, seemed to be hegemonic in analytical philosophy. The present study focuses on Halvorson’s allegations about what maintaining the empirical adequacy of a theory would encompass—and that, according to him, van Fraassen has in mind—and aims at showing that, perhaps, they do not correspond to what van Fraassen actually defends in his book.
Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. S... more Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. Still, the output of a telescope is different from that of a microscope, for in the latter case it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between the observer, the image and the detected entity, while in the former it is - at least in principle. In this paper I argue that this is a weak argument to support the belief in the existence of exoplanets that, according to van Fraassen, comes with accepting a theory that posits these entities. If a constructive empiricist asserts the empirical adequacy of such a theory, she might be relying on typical realist arguments, instead - of the very same ilk as the ones used to defend the veridicality of microscopic images. Perhaps the time has come for van Fraassen to explain his view on telescopes.
Bas van Fraassen's antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously ... more Bas van Fraassen's antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously rests upon a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In order to back his empiricist stance, the Dutch philosopher put forward his own characterization of observability. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the point of constructive empiricism is not lost if the line is drawn in a somewhat different way from how he draws it. This means that other characterizations of observability can support this antirealist stance, provided they allow for a viable distinction between the observable and the unobservable. The aim of this work, however, is not to propose another characterization of observability that fits constructive empiricism, but to put forward a little amendment to van Fraassen's own antirealism, to the effect that it can actually be seen as a coherent position, albeit controversial, since its present consistency might be called into question.
Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen's controversial view on microscopes, accordin... more Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen's controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not "windows on an invisible world", but rather "image generators". Both authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic view about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary to what Kusch maintains, this might not be a neutral way to render scientific evidence. Moreover, a constructive empiricist can support a realist interpretation of microscopic images. In fact, constructive empiricism and van Fraassen's own anti-realism do not necessarily amount to the same thing.
Problemata - International Journal of Philosophy, Jul 16, 2019
In a recent work published in this journal, "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação" (2... more In a recent work published in this journal, "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação" (2016), Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva identify four critical lines proposed by Bas van Fraassen against the form of abductive reasoning known as 'inference to the best explanation' (IBE). The first one, put forward by the Dutch philosopher in his seminal book The Scientific Image (1980), concerns the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva consider that the distinction is of no relevance to the scientific practice. For this reason, they address van Fraassen's allegations against IBE qua justification of the existence of unobservable entities in a couple of pages and prefer focusing on the other lines they identified. The aim of this work is to pour over the analysis that the two authors perform about van Fraassen's mentioned argument and some realists' replies, particularly in the section that Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva devote to this topic. This will allow us to clarify van Fraassen's vision on scientific practice and on the 'immersion in the theoretical world-picture'. The importance and the relevance of the distinction between observables and unobservables will also be reaffirmed.
In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this pos... more In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this position from a quite famous criticism put forward by Rosen (1994), according to which while manifestationalism can be seen as more compatible with the letter of empiricism than other popular stances, such as constructive empiricism, it fails nonetheless to make sense of science. The two authors reckon that Rosen's argument is actually flawed. In their view, manifestationalism could in fact represent a legitimate thesis about the nature of scientific inquiry. In this paper, I will show that Asay and Bordner's criticisms to Rosen are actually off target. Moreover, they rest upon an understanding of what the aim of science is that might serve to their purposes, but that does not seem to be in line with the scientific enterprise. Perhaps constructive empiricism still represents the best compromise so far presented between strict empiricism and the acknowledgment of the rationality of science.
Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particl... more Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particle physics. In a recent paper on this topic, Brigitte Falkenburg (2012) defended that only scientific realism can make sense of it and that realistic beliefs constitute an indispensable methodological principle of research in this discipline. The aim of this work is to show that there exists an anti-realist alternative to this account, along the lines of what Bas van Fraassen showed in his famous book The Scientific Image (1980). Problems and results of astroparticle physics can be understood from an empiricist point of view too, namely that of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, which is a more modest and metaphysics-free alternative to scientific realism. Although constructive empiricism can make sense of science no worse than scientific realism does, van Fraassen's goal is not to demonstrate that his stance is the only viable position, but just that it is not incoherent or proven false by his opponents (see Kusch 2015, 172). In this paper it will be shown that the constructive empiricist stance constitutes a legitimate alternative to scientific realism even when it gets to astroparticle physics and that it does indeed make sense of this new discipline, pace Falkenburg.
In 1985, Alan Musgrave raised a serious objection against the possibility that a constructive emp... more In 1985, Alan Musgrave raised a serious objection against the possibility that a constructive empiricist could coherently draw the distinction – crucial to her – between observables and unobservables. In his brief response, in the same year, Bas van Fraassen claimed that Musgrave’s argument only works within the so-called “syntactic view” of theories, while it loses its force in the context of the “semantic view”. But that was not enough, or so claimed F. A. Muller, who published two articles (2004 and 2005) in order to extend the epistemic policy of constructive empiricism. In order to do so, Muller provided a rigorous characterization of observability, but this could only be accomplished by using modal logic. The outcome was a new (extended) epistemic policy for constructive empiricism, which van Fraassen apparently endorsed (cf. MULLER; VAN FRAASSEN, 2008). As it will be shown in this article, however, Muller’s extended epistemic policy is superfluous. Moreover, and more importantly, Musgrave’s argument seems to be a pseudo-problem.
In his last book (2008), Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, put forward... more In his last book (2008), Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, put forward a table containing a categorization of images. His aim, however, was to discuss the reality of what they represent and not addressing the issue of images per se. One of the consequences is that it remained an open question what 'public hallucinations'-reflections in the water, rainbows and the like-are. In this paper it will be defended that only images in the relevant (representational) sense should be considered as such. For this and other reasons, van Fraassen's diagram should be amended. Moreover, as Physics teaches us, the class of the so-called 'images' that are actually objects is wider than van Fraassen reckons. The set of the observable objects do not contain only concrete things, but goes beyond what 'common sense realism' suggests. In addition to rocks, oceans and bicycles, we can also see rainbows, reflections in the water and the like.
In his famous book "Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows" (2008), Roy Sorensen put forwa... more In his famous book "Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows" (2008), Roy Sorensen put forward a 'blocking theory of shadows', a causal view on these entities according to which a shadow is an absence of light caused by blockage. This approach allows him to solve a quite famous riddle on shadows, 'the Yale puzzle', that was devised by Robert Fogelin in the late 1960s and that Sorensen presents in the form mentioned by Bas van Fraassen (1989). István Aranyosi has recently criticized Sorensen's solution to the Yale puzzle, on the grounds that it does not resist another version of the riddle, that Aranyosi calls 'the Bilkent puzzle'. A new perspective on shadows, the 'Material Exstitution View', that allegedly permits to solve both puzzles, could be adopted as an alternative. In this paper I will show that Sorensen's blockage theory can actually handle both the Yale and the Bilkent puzzle, plus another one that I put forward ('the donut puzzle'), which instead is fatal to Aranyosi's position. As Sorensen puts it, nothing aside from the original blockage of light is needed.
Reliabilism is an epistemological theory about justification, which
defends the possibility that... more Reliabilism is an epistemological theory about justification, which
defends the possibility that a belief be justified merely because of the reliability of its mechanism of production. The claim that, in some cases, true beliefs can be classified as knowledge, despite (apparently) not satisfying the condition of justification in the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief, constitutes, according to Robert Brandom, the Founding Insight of reliabilist epistemologies. Still, as it will be shown in this article, this does not lead to a change in the object of epistemology, from reasons to reliability. Moreover, the fact that true beliefs can, in some cases, be classified as knowledge, despite not satisfying the (classical interpretation of the) condition of justification, is in no conflict with the capacity of providing reasons for having them. As a matter of fact, according to Brandom, it is possible to identify reasons for having a certain belief even when the subject is in no condition to
provide them, as in the case of the reliability of the process that led to it. Changing the focus of justification from the subject to the belief – as the externalists seem to suggest – seems also to confirm Kent Bach’s claim that the apparent conflict between internalism and externalism perhaps has no reason to exist. Still, at first sight, the two competing positions are actually getting closer over the years. In this work, the possibility of an even closer convergence will be discussed.
Microscopes - not only the optic ones - are commonly considered, particularly by scientists and l... more Microscopes - not only the optic ones - are commonly considered, particularly by scientists and laboratory technicians, as devices that allow to widen the scope of our limited sensory system and see entities that would otherwise be unobservable. A notorious exception is Bas van Fraassen’s interpretation. This important and well-known philosopher of science sees these instruments as ‘engines of creation’ (of images), thus rejecting the ‘window onto the unobservable world’ metaphor. In this paper I will present, under the perspective of the realism/anti-realism debate in philosophy of science, the Dutch author’s position and show that, despite being a peculiar and isolated stand, it does not exhibit flaws or contradictions - from a strictly logical point of view, at least. The case of the mesosome, a folded invagination in the plasma membrane of bacteria that is produced by chemical fixation (for electron microscopy), is particularly instructive in this respect.
Observation plays a key role in the empirical science; for this reason, but not only, it is also ... more Observation plays a key role in the empirical science; for this reason, but not only, it is also a crucial topic of discussion in the philosophy of science. As a matter of fact, observability, under different perspectives, spans through the XX and XXI century philosophy of science debate and represents one of the main issues in the realism vs anti-realism dispute. Important contemporary authors, such as Bas van Fraassen, endorse Paul Feyerabend’s thesis that observability is a mere pragmatic concept. According to the famous Austrian philosopher, when we observe, we are on a par with an instrument. It is just a matter of ‘stimulus-response’. In this paper it will be defended that, on the contrary, any attempt of dealing with this issue by the philosophers is legitimate. In this topic, it is philosophy – and not science – that should have the last word.
Observation and observability represent a crucial topic in the philosophy of science, as the huge... more Observation and observability represent a crucial topic in the philosophy of science, as the huge production of papers and books on the subject attests. Philosophy of perception, on the other hand, is a field of study that took root effectively in the last decades. Even then, apparently, the main theories on observation have neglected the issue of determining which is the object of a successful perception. As a consequence, some theses that have recently been proposed are actually paradoxical, despite deriving from renowned and, prima facie, satisfactory and complete theories. This is the situation of van Fraassen’s assertions on the (putative?) observation of images and rainbows (see 2001 and 2008) and of Sorensen’s claims on what one actually sees during a solar eclipse (see 2008). After putting forward a possible characterization of the object of perception, with no need of discussing the issue of intentionality, in this paper it will be shown that devoting adequate attention to this topic, together with acknowledging that observation is an action, in which the subject plays an indeed active role, would make it possible to avoid drawing conclusions that do not seem to be correct, such as the ones just mentioned. Any theory about observation will only be complete and adequate provided the object of perception is taken into account.
According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is i... more According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is its inner (concave) part of the farther, reflective one, and not the always-facing-Earth side of our natural satellite. To make his point clearer, he put forward the famous example of a double eclipse involving the fictional planets Far and Near. From the observer's vantage point, the two planets have the same apparent diameter and overlap. What the agent sees is a dark disk, but believes that what she is seeing is Near, because Far is behind it. Sorensen claims that what she actually sees is planet Far and that the causal theory of perception explains why this is the case. Of course, this position stands against common sense. Sorensen shows that it counters Alvin Goldman's renowned observation criteria too. Nonetheless, he maintains, since Near is causally idle and the agent does see something, the only possible conclusion is that she sees Far, pace Goldman – and common sense. In this paper, I try to demonstrate that Sorensen is wrong and that the correct solution to the eclipse riddle is that the observer sees Near. As a matter of fact, besides meeting common sense and Goldman's observability criteria (along with others), Near can be legitimately be considered the object of a successful perceptual discrimination even in the light of the causal theory of perception .
Constructive Empiricism, the anti-realist position about science proposed by the Dutch philosophe... more Constructive Empiricism, the anti-realist position about science proposed by the Dutch philosopher Bas van Fraassen in 1980, heavily relies upon the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In 2004 and 2005, F. A. Muller provided a rigorous characterization of observability, later endorsed, apparently, by van Fraassen (cf. Muller & van Fraassen 2008). However, an analysis of what it means to observe is needed to secure Muller’s ‘definition’. Van Fraassen always maintained that observation is an empirical matter, but I argue that a philosophical analysis is also needed and that van Fraassen himself relied on philosophical principles to address the issue of observability.
An analysis of the contemporary debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology shows ... more An analysis of the contemporary debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology shows that, nowadays, this branch of philosophy focuses almost entirely on justification, which is, according to the classical definition, the third condition for knowledge. Neither externalism nor internalism seems to be able to deal with it without some concession to the other position, though. In other words, someone might even think that these opposite epistemological positions actually deal with different things, but in fact there is no difference in the subject matter. For this reason, the debate cannot be considered meaningless. On the contrary, it represents just another instance of dialectical interaction between distinct positions, which, we may say, is the very essence of philosophy.
Evento on-line organizado pela equipe do Programa de Residência Multiprofissional em Saúde Mental... more Evento on-line organizado pela equipe do Programa de Residência Multiprofissional em Saúde Mental da Autarquia Municipal de Saúde (AMS) de Apucarana - PR, em 15 de maio de 2021. Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PimfuBbMSkM
Problemata - International Journal of Philosophy, Jul 1, 2024
This paper represents a counterreply to “A rejoinder to Alessio Gava’s ‘Van Fraassen, a inferênci... more This paper represents a counterreply to “A rejoinder to Alessio Gava’s ‘Van Fraassen, a inferência da melhor explicação e a Matrix realista’”, by Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva, released in Problemata (v. 12, n. 2, 2021). The authors originally published an essay in the same journal, “Van Fraassen and inference to the best explanation” (2016), the object of critic - ‘friendly and gentle’ - in a work of mine that also appeared in Problemata, in 2019. In this paper I will show that, even when the subject matter is the inference to the best explanation, realists and antirealists end up debating about the same old topics, that represent the essence of the controversy between the two philosophical stances
Tradução de "Bas van Fraassen’s Philosophy of Science and His Epistemic Voluntarism", de Kathleen... more Tradução de "Bas van Fraassen’s Philosophy of Science and His Epistemic Voluntarism", de Kathleen Okruhlik (2014).
Bas van Fraassen’s anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, his relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen’s empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens’s epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science.
2020 is the year of the fortieth anniversary of Bas van Fraassen’s seminal book The Scientific Im... more 2020 is the year of the fortieth anniversary of Bas van Fraassen’s seminal book The Scientific Image. It is quite surprising, after such a long time, and considering how much the author’s proposal was debated during the last four decades, to find a new review of it on the March issue of Metascience. In “Concluding Unscientific Image”, Hans Halvorson claims that, in the work of the founder of constructive empiricism, not only is there a defense of an anti-realist perspective on science—and, at the same time, a critique of scientific realism—, but also a revolt against the way of doing philosophy that, since Quine, seemed to be hegemonic in analytical philosophy. The present study focuses on Halvorson’s allegations about what maintaining the empirical adequacy of a theory would encompass—and that, according to him, van Fraassen has in mind—and aims at showing that, perhaps, they do not correspond to what van Fraassen actually defends in his book.
Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. S... more Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. Still, the output of a telescope is different from that of a microscope, for in the latter case it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between the observer, the image and the detected entity, while in the former it is - at least in principle. In this paper I argue that this is a weak argument to support the belief in the existence of exoplanets that, according to van Fraassen, comes with accepting a theory that posits these entities. If a constructive empiricist asserts the empirical adequacy of such a theory, she might be relying on typical realist arguments, instead - of the very same ilk as the ones used to defend the veridicality of microscopic images. Perhaps the time has come for van Fraassen to explain his view on telescopes.
Bas van Fraassen's antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously ... more Bas van Fraassen's antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously rests upon a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In order to back his empiricist stance, the Dutch philosopher put forward his own characterization of observability. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the point of constructive empiricism is not lost if the line is drawn in a somewhat different way from how he draws it. This means that other characterizations of observability can support this antirealist stance, provided they allow for a viable distinction between the observable and the unobservable. The aim of this work, however, is not to propose another characterization of observability that fits constructive empiricism, but to put forward a little amendment to van Fraassen's own antirealism, to the effect that it can actually be seen as a coherent position, albeit controversial, since its present consistency might be called into question.
Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen's controversial view on microscopes, accordin... more Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen's controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not "windows on an invisible world", but rather "image generators". Both authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic view about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary to what Kusch maintains, this might not be a neutral way to render scientific evidence. Moreover, a constructive empiricist can support a realist interpretation of microscopic images. In fact, constructive empiricism and van Fraassen's own anti-realism do not necessarily amount to the same thing.
Problemata - International Journal of Philosophy, Jul 16, 2019
In a recent work published in this journal, "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação" (2... more In a recent work published in this journal, "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação" (2016), Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva identify four critical lines proposed by Bas van Fraassen against the form of abductive reasoning known as 'inference to the best explanation' (IBE). The first one, put forward by the Dutch philosopher in his seminal book The Scientific Image (1980), concerns the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva consider that the distinction is of no relevance to the scientific practice. For this reason, they address van Fraassen's allegations against IBE qua justification of the existence of unobservable entities in a couple of pages and prefer focusing on the other lines they identified. The aim of this work is to pour over the analysis that the two authors perform about van Fraassen's mentioned argument and some realists' replies, particularly in the section that Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva devote to this topic. This will allow us to clarify van Fraassen's vision on scientific practice and on the 'immersion in the theoretical world-picture'. The importance and the relevance of the distinction between observables and unobservables will also be reaffirmed.
In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this pos... more In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this position from a quite famous criticism put forward by Rosen (1994), according to which while manifestationalism can be seen as more compatible with the letter of empiricism than other popular stances, such as constructive empiricism, it fails nonetheless to make sense of science. The two authors reckon that Rosen's argument is actually flawed. In their view, manifestationalism could in fact represent a legitimate thesis about the nature of scientific inquiry. In this paper, I will show that Asay and Bordner's criticisms to Rosen are actually off target. Moreover, they rest upon an understanding of what the aim of science is that might serve to their purposes, but that does not seem to be in line with the scientific enterprise. Perhaps constructive empiricism still represents the best compromise so far presented between strict empiricism and the acknowledgment of the rationality of science.
Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particl... more Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particle physics. In a recent paper on this topic, Brigitte Falkenburg (2012) defended that only scientific realism can make sense of it and that realistic beliefs constitute an indispensable methodological principle of research in this discipline. The aim of this work is to show that there exists an anti-realist alternative to this account, along the lines of what Bas van Fraassen showed in his famous book The Scientific Image (1980). Problems and results of astroparticle physics can be understood from an empiricist point of view too, namely that of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, which is a more modest and metaphysics-free alternative to scientific realism. Although constructive empiricism can make sense of science no worse than scientific realism does, van Fraassen's goal is not to demonstrate that his stance is the only viable position, but just that it is not incoherent or proven false by his opponents (see Kusch 2015, 172). In this paper it will be shown that the constructive empiricist stance constitutes a legitimate alternative to scientific realism even when it gets to astroparticle physics and that it does indeed make sense of this new discipline, pace Falkenburg.
In 1985, Alan Musgrave raised a serious objection against the possibility that a constructive emp... more In 1985, Alan Musgrave raised a serious objection against the possibility that a constructive empiricist could coherently draw the distinction – crucial to her – between observables and unobservables. In his brief response, in the same year, Bas van Fraassen claimed that Musgrave’s argument only works within the so-called “syntactic view” of theories, while it loses its force in the context of the “semantic view”. But that was not enough, or so claimed F. A. Muller, who published two articles (2004 and 2005) in order to extend the epistemic policy of constructive empiricism. In order to do so, Muller provided a rigorous characterization of observability, but this could only be accomplished by using modal logic. The outcome was a new (extended) epistemic policy for constructive empiricism, which van Fraassen apparently endorsed (cf. MULLER; VAN FRAASSEN, 2008). As it will be shown in this article, however, Muller’s extended epistemic policy is superfluous. Moreover, and more importantly, Musgrave’s argument seems to be a pseudo-problem.
In his last book (2008), Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, put forward... more In his last book (2008), Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, put forward a table containing a categorization of images. His aim, however, was to discuss the reality of what they represent and not addressing the issue of images per se. One of the consequences is that it remained an open question what 'public hallucinations'-reflections in the water, rainbows and the like-are. In this paper it will be defended that only images in the relevant (representational) sense should be considered as such. For this and other reasons, van Fraassen's diagram should be amended. Moreover, as Physics teaches us, the class of the so-called 'images' that are actually objects is wider than van Fraassen reckons. The set of the observable objects do not contain only concrete things, but goes beyond what 'common sense realism' suggests. In addition to rocks, oceans and bicycles, we can also see rainbows, reflections in the water and the like.
In his famous book "Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows" (2008), Roy Sorensen put forwa... more In his famous book "Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows" (2008), Roy Sorensen put forward a 'blocking theory of shadows', a causal view on these entities according to which a shadow is an absence of light caused by blockage. This approach allows him to solve a quite famous riddle on shadows, 'the Yale puzzle', that was devised by Robert Fogelin in the late 1960s and that Sorensen presents in the form mentioned by Bas van Fraassen (1989). István Aranyosi has recently criticized Sorensen's solution to the Yale puzzle, on the grounds that it does not resist another version of the riddle, that Aranyosi calls 'the Bilkent puzzle'. A new perspective on shadows, the 'Material Exstitution View', that allegedly permits to solve both puzzles, could be adopted as an alternative. In this paper I will show that Sorensen's blockage theory can actually handle both the Yale and the Bilkent puzzle, plus another one that I put forward ('the donut puzzle'), which instead is fatal to Aranyosi's position. As Sorensen puts it, nothing aside from the original blockage of light is needed.
Reliabilism is an epistemological theory about justification, which
defends the possibility that... more Reliabilism is an epistemological theory about justification, which
defends the possibility that a belief be justified merely because of the reliability of its mechanism of production. The claim that, in some cases, true beliefs can be classified as knowledge, despite (apparently) not satisfying the condition of justification in the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief, constitutes, according to Robert Brandom, the Founding Insight of reliabilist epistemologies. Still, as it will be shown in this article, this does not lead to a change in the object of epistemology, from reasons to reliability. Moreover, the fact that true beliefs can, in some cases, be classified as knowledge, despite not satisfying the (classical interpretation of the) condition of justification, is in no conflict with the capacity of providing reasons for having them. As a matter of fact, according to Brandom, it is possible to identify reasons for having a certain belief even when the subject is in no condition to
provide them, as in the case of the reliability of the process that led to it. Changing the focus of justification from the subject to the belief – as the externalists seem to suggest – seems also to confirm Kent Bach’s claim that the apparent conflict between internalism and externalism perhaps has no reason to exist. Still, at first sight, the two competing positions are actually getting closer over the years. In this work, the possibility of an even closer convergence will be discussed.
Microscopes - not only the optic ones - are commonly considered, particularly by scientists and l... more Microscopes - not only the optic ones - are commonly considered, particularly by scientists and laboratory technicians, as devices that allow to widen the scope of our limited sensory system and see entities that would otherwise be unobservable. A notorious exception is Bas van Fraassen’s interpretation. This important and well-known philosopher of science sees these instruments as ‘engines of creation’ (of images), thus rejecting the ‘window onto the unobservable world’ metaphor. In this paper I will present, under the perspective of the realism/anti-realism debate in philosophy of science, the Dutch author’s position and show that, despite being a peculiar and isolated stand, it does not exhibit flaws or contradictions - from a strictly logical point of view, at least. The case of the mesosome, a folded invagination in the plasma membrane of bacteria that is produced by chemical fixation (for electron microscopy), is particularly instructive in this respect.
Observation plays a key role in the empirical science; for this reason, but not only, it is also ... more Observation plays a key role in the empirical science; for this reason, but not only, it is also a crucial topic of discussion in the philosophy of science. As a matter of fact, observability, under different perspectives, spans through the XX and XXI century philosophy of science debate and represents one of the main issues in the realism vs anti-realism dispute. Important contemporary authors, such as Bas van Fraassen, endorse Paul Feyerabend’s thesis that observability is a mere pragmatic concept. According to the famous Austrian philosopher, when we observe, we are on a par with an instrument. It is just a matter of ‘stimulus-response’. In this paper it will be defended that, on the contrary, any attempt of dealing with this issue by the philosophers is legitimate. In this topic, it is philosophy – and not science – that should have the last word.
Observation and observability represent a crucial topic in the philosophy of science, as the huge... more Observation and observability represent a crucial topic in the philosophy of science, as the huge production of papers and books on the subject attests. Philosophy of perception, on the other hand, is a field of study that took root effectively in the last decades. Even then, apparently, the main theories on observation have neglected the issue of determining which is the object of a successful perception. As a consequence, some theses that have recently been proposed are actually paradoxical, despite deriving from renowned and, prima facie, satisfactory and complete theories. This is the situation of van Fraassen’s assertions on the (putative?) observation of images and rainbows (see 2001 and 2008) and of Sorensen’s claims on what one actually sees during a solar eclipse (see 2008). After putting forward a possible characterization of the object of perception, with no need of discussing the issue of intentionality, in this paper it will be shown that devoting adequate attention to this topic, together with acknowledging that observation is an action, in which the subject plays an indeed active role, would make it possible to avoid drawing conclusions that do not seem to be correct, such as the ones just mentioned. Any theory about observation will only be complete and adequate provided the object of perception is taken into account.
According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is i... more According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is its inner (concave) part of the farther, reflective one, and not the always-facing-Earth side of our natural satellite. To make his point clearer, he put forward the famous example of a double eclipse involving the fictional planets Far and Near. From the observer's vantage point, the two planets have the same apparent diameter and overlap. What the agent sees is a dark disk, but believes that what she is seeing is Near, because Far is behind it. Sorensen claims that what she actually sees is planet Far and that the causal theory of perception explains why this is the case. Of course, this position stands against common sense. Sorensen shows that it counters Alvin Goldman's renowned observation criteria too. Nonetheless, he maintains, since Near is causally idle and the agent does see something, the only possible conclusion is that she sees Far, pace Goldman – and common sense. In this paper, I try to demonstrate that Sorensen is wrong and that the correct solution to the eclipse riddle is that the observer sees Near. As a matter of fact, besides meeting common sense and Goldman's observability criteria (along with others), Near can be legitimately be considered the object of a successful perceptual discrimination even in the light of the causal theory of perception .
Constructive Empiricism, the anti-realist position about science proposed by the Dutch philosophe... more Constructive Empiricism, the anti-realist position about science proposed by the Dutch philosopher Bas van Fraassen in 1980, heavily relies upon the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In 2004 and 2005, F. A. Muller provided a rigorous characterization of observability, later endorsed, apparently, by van Fraassen (cf. Muller & van Fraassen 2008). However, an analysis of what it means to observe is needed to secure Muller’s ‘definition’. Van Fraassen always maintained that observation is an empirical matter, but I argue that a philosophical analysis is also needed and that van Fraassen himself relied on philosophical principles to address the issue of observability.
An analysis of the contemporary debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology shows ... more An analysis of the contemporary debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology shows that, nowadays, this branch of philosophy focuses almost entirely on justification, which is, according to the classical definition, the third condition for knowledge. Neither externalism nor internalism seems to be able to deal with it without some concession to the other position, though. In other words, someone might even think that these opposite epistemological positions actually deal with different things, but in fact there is no difference in the subject matter. For this reason, the debate cannot be considered meaningless. On the contrary, it represents just another instance of dialectical interaction between distinct positions, which, we may say, is the very essence of philosophy.
PRELIMINARY NOTE: the following paper is an extended (and amended, following the referees' sugges... more PRELIMINARY NOTE: the following paper is an extended (and amended, following the referees' suggestions) version of the article by the same name, published in the journal Archai in 2014. Due to technical problems, the first version ended up being published at the time, without the enhancements suggested by the reviewers. What follows is then the 'ultimate' version of " Zeno and the impossibility of analogy " .
Problemata - International Journal of Philosophy, 2021
by Marcos Rodrigues da Silva and Debora Minikoski
Resumo: o breve artigo é uma réplica à respost... more by Marcos Rodrigues da Silva and Debora Minikoski
Resumo: o breve artigo é uma réplica à resposta de Alessio Gava ao artigo "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação", publicado em Problemata (v. 7. n. 1, 2016), de autoria de Marcos Rodrigues da Silva e Debora Minikoski.
This is a critical review of the book Variational Approach to Gravity Field Theories-From Newton ... more This is a critical review of the book Variational Approach to Gravity Field Theories-From Newton to Einstein and Beyond (2017), written by the Italian astrophysicist Alberto Vecchiato. In his work, Vecchiato shows that physics, as we know it, can be built up from simple mathematical models that become more complex step by step by gradually introducing new principles. The reader is invited to follow the steps that lead from classical physics to relativity and to understand how this happens and why. Moreover, while presenting the variational approach to gravity field theories in a clear and elegant manner, Vecchiato shows a constant worry in leading the readers in such a way that they understand the relevance of what the author considers to be the most powerful technique and unifying concept of theoretical physics-and how it works. Each chapter is enriched with exercises, of which a step-by-step solution is offered, so that the reader can gain a real insight into the topic presented and follow the reading as fruitfully as possible. The most innovative aspect of the book, however, is not the rigorousness and the clarity of the treatment of the variational approach but rather the point of view that Vecchiato keeps and that the reader is led to endorse too: physics is a human enterprise, prone to error and open to improvement, and not a complete and definite system of truths about our world.
Il professore vittoriese: "Mia moglie è in Brasile, vi racconto l'orda fascista".
Il 52enne ci... more Il professore vittoriese: "Mia moglie è in Brasile, vi racconto l'orda fascista".
Il 52enne ci ha inviato un contributo riguardante i fatti accaduti a Brasilia, e noi abbiamo scelto di pubblicarlo integralmente
Un nostro lettore che abita nella capitale russa, ci ha segnalato un 'caso' mediatico molto inter... more Un nostro lettore che abita nella capitale russa, ci ha segnalato un 'caso' mediatico molto interessante
Alessio Gava: “Sabato andrò a comprarmi una valigia”. Anche se per ora si tratta solo di una prec... more Alessio Gava: “Sabato andrò a comprarmi una valigia”. Anche se per ora si tratta solo di una precauzione, rischia di dover lasciare la Russia
VITTORIO VENETO/MOSCA - Alessio Gava, professore giramondo, vive in Russia. Il 51enne vittoriese ... more VITTORIO VENETO/MOSCA - Alessio Gava, professore giramondo, vive in Russia. Il 51enne vittoriese insegna matematica e fisica presso il liceo linguistico italiano “Italo Calvino” di Mosca. Gli abbiamo chiesto di parlarci dell’aria che si respira nella capitale dopo l’inizio del conflitto tra Russia e Ucraina.
Alessio Gava racconta la sua esperienza
VITTORIO VENETO - "Il Covid? Qui alcuni sostengono che ... more Alessio Gava racconta la sua esperienza
VITTORIO VENETO - "Il Covid? Qui alcuni sostengono che è un'invenzione occidentale". Alessio Gava, professore giramondo, attualmente si trova in Russia. Il 51enne vittoriese, infatti, insegna matematica e fisica presso il liceo linguistico italiano "Italo Calvino" di Mosca. Dopo le esperienze in Marocco e in Brasile, l'insegnante sta iniziando a conoscere anche la cultura e le usanze russe.
OggiTreviso > Vittorio Veneto > Coronavirus: il Brasile il nuovo epicentro dell'epidemia
di Ales... more OggiTreviso > Vittorio Veneto > Coronavirus: il Brasile il nuovo epicentro dell'epidemia
No presente artigo se relata o desenvolvimento de uma atividade de ensino-aprendizagem de matemát... more No presente artigo se relata o desenvolvimento de uma atividade de ensino-aprendizagem de matemática, realizada em um colégio estadual paranaense, na qual utilizou-se o Soroban, o ábaco japonês. O uso desse antigo instrumento, tanto em sua versão manual tradicional quanto naquela tecnológica moderna, permite lidar com a aritmética de forma produtiva, proporcionando maior compreensão dos conceitos matemáticos e maior agilidade na realização de cálculos. O Soroban pode ser considerado uma maneira eficiente e empolgante de o professor realizar intervenções em sala de aula, de modo a envolver os alunos. Na atividade de ensino-aprendizagem aqui descrita, o uso desse instrumento despertou nos discentes grande interesse pelo conteúdo matemático desenvolvido, o que permitiu uma aquisição mais eficaz do mesmo. A utilização do Soroban nos anos escolares iniciais contribui de modo importante para o desenvolvimento da agilidade mental e do raciocínio lógico, pois com o tempo essa prática supre a falta do objeto manual e permite a desenvoltura do cálculo mental.
Employing recreational activities in the teaching field, such as playing educational games in cla... more Employing recreational activities in the teaching field, such as playing educational games in class, is nowadays a common practice. In this paper, an experience that took place in a state college in Paraná, as part of the PIBID program, will be presented. Considerations about the use and the contribution of Maths games in the teaching-learning process, together with a reflection on the importance of these resources and didactic strategies as learning object and reinforcement, will also be proposed.
The present study approaches the use of games in mathematics teaching, in search of a more effect... more The present study approaches the use of games in mathematics teaching, in search of a more effective and consistent learning of concepts of this subject. We will present, in particular, the results of an activity developed with secondary level classes of the "Heitor Cavalcanti de Alencar Furtado" state college (Apucarana, PR). A game devised by one of the authors of this work, called "1º grau ou grau?" was used, which involves two important topics of secondary level mathematics contents: first-degree equations and trigonometry. The objective of the activity was to work on these two concepts in a ludic and collaborative way, but also to verify if this can simultaneously be an efficient and productive manner of carrying out the teaching-learning process of the subject. From the observations made by the teachers who monitored the activity and from the answers the students gave to a survey made afterwards, we conclude that math games are indeed a valuable tool for teachers, enabling them to capture the students' attention and interest and helping them in the acquisition of essential notions of the subject.
In this paper, we will discuss possible uses of the free educational software GeoGebra in solving... more In this paper, we will discuss possible uses of the free educational software GeoGebra in solving math problems. The software’s resources allow doing it in a variety of ways, which makes GeoGebra a complete tool and an important support for math teachers. Data relative to the thirteenth edition of the GeoGebra course promoted by Paraná State University have been scrutinized. Some of the solutions to two specific problems, performed by some of the participants, have been analyzed in details. By doing so, it was possible to appraise GeoGebra’s versatility and usefulness, since it allows undertaking dynamical constructions in various areas of mathematics and provides teachers with a great opportunity to enrich their classes.
The processes of teaching and learning mathematics represent a path notoriously fraught with diff... more The processes of teaching and learning mathematics represent a path notoriously fraught with difficulties. Historically, such a discipline has always been viewed as 'difficult' by students, not only in Brazil. It's a common view that it requires a lot of effort and concentration and that failure is always in the lurch. To reverse this negative image, there is a constant search for alternative methodologies in the daily school life, in order to facilitate these processes. The purpose of this article is to report an experience of activity in the perspective of the Inquiry Teaching, carried out in a class of the sixth year of elementary school, devoted to the teaching of fractions. It will be shown that this teaching perspective aroused the students' interest and participation, providing moments in which they could conduct a mathematical discussion under the coordination of the teacher, a characteristic that distinguishes Inquiry Teaching from directive teaching.
The aim of this work is to present the results of a workshop concerning the use of cell phone, de... more The aim of this work is to present the results of a workshop concerning the use of cell phone, developed by three fellows of the PIBID Math project of the Universidade Estadual do Paraná - campus Apucarana. The workshop involved four sixth grade classes of the Colégio Estadual Antônio dos Três Reis de Oliveira, in Apucarana. The goal of the activity was to integrate technology into the classroom and show the students how they can use their smartphones to favor the understanding of a certain subject. In this specific case, the idea was to learn the multiplication table, but in a pleasant and dynamic way, for a test was due the next week. We will also weave considerations on the importance of playing games and using technology in class. Why don’t we have game-centered subjects in our teacher training colleges?
Resumo: O presente trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar o resultado de uma oficina envolvendo um aplicativo de celular, desenvolvida por três bolsistas do projeto de matemática do PIBID da Universidade Estadual do Paraná - campus Apucarana e realizada com quatro turmas do sexto ano do Colégio Estadual Antônio dos Três Reis de Oliveira, da cidade de Apucarana. O objetivo da atividade foi trazer a tecnologia para dentro da sala de aula e mostrar para os estudantes como podem utilizar seus smartphones para a compreensão de uma determinada matéria. A proposta principal foi a de que os alunos aprendessem a tabuada de multiplicação, estudando de uma forma mais divertida e dinâmica, em vista de uma prova que teriam na semana seguinte. Considerações sobre a importância tanto do lúdico quanto das novas tecnologias em sala de aula também serão tecidas. Por que, em nossas universidades, na formação de educadores/professores, não existem disciplinas centradas no lúdico?
In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this pos... more In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this position from a quite famous criticism put forward by Rosen (1994), according to which while manifestationalism can be seen as more compatible with the letter of empiricism than other popular stances, such as constructive empiricism, it fails nonetheless to make sense of science. The two authors reckon that Rosen's argument is actually flawed. In their view, manifestationalism could in fact represent a legitimate thesis about the nature of scientific inquiry. In this paper, I will show that Asay and Bordner's criticisms to Rosen are actually off target. Moreover, they rest upon an understanding of what the aim of science is that might serve to their purposes, but that does not seem to be in line with the scientific enterprise. Perhaps constructive empiricism still represents the best compromise so far presented between strict empiricism and the acknowledgment of the rationality of science.
Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. S... more Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. Still, the output of a telescope is different from that of a microscope, for in the latter case it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between the observer, the image and the detected entity, while in the former it is - at least in principle. In this paper I argue that this is a weak argument to support the belief in the existence of exoplanets that, according to van Fraassen, comes with accepting a theory that posits these entities. If a constructive empiricist asserts the empirical adequacy of such a theory, she might be relying on typical realist arguments, instead - of the very same ilk as the ones used to defend the veridicality of microscopic images. Perhaps the time has come for van Fraassen to explain his view on telescopes.
O presente artigo aborda possiveis usos do software livre GeoGebra na resolucao de problemas mate... more O presente artigo aborda possiveis usos do software livre GeoGebra na resolucao de problemas matematicos. Os recursos disponiveis no referido software permitem resolver o mesmo problema de varias maneiras, o que torna o GeoGebra uma ferramenta completa e um importante auxilio para os docentes de matematica em sala de aula. Pesquisando dados referentes a decima terceira edicao do curso de GeoGebra promovido pela Universidade Estadual do Parana, foram analisados dois enunciados de problemas e algumas resolucoes dos mesmos, realizadas por cursistas. Ao faze-lo, pode-se constatar a versatilidade e a utilidade do GeoGebra, o qual permite realizar construcoes dinâmicas em varias areas da matematica, fornecendo aos docentes uma grande oportunidade para enriquecer suas aulas.
O problema da justificacao das inferencias indutivas, tambem conhecido como ‘o problema de Hume’,... more O problema da justificacao das inferencias indutivas, tambem conhecido como ‘o problema de Hume’, parece ter perdido forca a partir do seculo passado, depois que varios autores negaram que a ciencia siga o metodo indutivo. Van Fraassen foi alem e recentemente negou que a inducao exista. O objetivo deste trabalho e mostrar como, para propor uma visao da ciencia coerente com essa rejeicao, na reconstrucao do filosofo holandes e o observavel (termo crucial para o empirismo construtivo dele) que antecede logicamente o ato de observar e nao vice-versa, segundo aquela que chamamos de ‘imagem reversa da observacao’.
Resumo: A visão antirrealista acerca da ciência de Bas van Fraassen desempenhou um papel determin... more Resumo: A visão antirrealista acerca da ciência de Bas van Fraassen desempenhou um papel determinante no desenvolvimento da filosofia da ciência recente. Particularmente, seu empirismo construtivo tem sido amplamente discutido e criticado, nas revistas especializadas, e constitui um tópico comumente abordado nos programas das disciplinas de filosofia da ciência. Outros aspectos do empirismo de van Fraassen são menos conhecidos. Entre eles, sua abordagem empirista às leis científicas, sua reavaliação, relativamente recente, do que significa ser um empirista e seu estruturalismo empirista. O presente estudo visa a oferecer uma panorâmica desses diferentes aspectos do empirismo de van Fraassen e mostrar como estão relacionados entre si. Detém-se, ainda, sobre a natureza do voluntarismo epistêmico de van Fraassen e seu nexo com a filosofia da ciência empirista desse autor.
O presente trabalho apresenta o resultado de uma oficina envolvendo um aplicativo de celular, des... more O presente trabalho apresenta o resultado de uma oficina envolvendo um aplicativo de celular, desenvolvida por três bolsistas do Projeto de Matemática do PIBID da Universidade Estadual do Paraná - campus Apucarana e realizada com quatro turmas do 6º ano do Colégio Estadual Antônio dos Três Reis de Oliveira, da cidade de Apucarana. O objetivo da atividade foi trazer a tecnologia para dentro da sala de aula, mostrando para os estudantes como eles podem utilizar seus smartphones para a compreensão de uma determinada matéria. A proposta principal foi a de que os alunos aprendessem a tabuada de multiplicação, estudando de uma forma mais divertida e dinâmica, em vista de uma prova que teriam que realizar na semana seguinte. Considerações sobre a importância tanto do lúdico, quanto das novas tecnologias em sala de aula também serão tecidas. Por que, em nossas universidades, na formação de educadores/professores, não existem disciplinas centradas no lúdico?
RESUMO: A ênfase no papel da observação, uma das características salientes do empirismo, está rea... more RESUMO: A ênfase no papel da observação, uma das características salientes do empirismo, está reafirmada no empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen através da primazia atribuída por esse à distinção entre observável e inobservável. Neste artigo será mostrado que, apesar de sua atualidade em filosofia da ciência, particularmente graças â enfase que van Fraassen lhe atribui, a questão da observação e da observabilidade na verdade é tão antiga quanto a própria filosofia e remete ao desejo, definitório do empirismo, de manter-se 'dentro dos limites'.
RESUMO: A noção de comunidade epistêmica é essencial para a caracterização da observabilidade, co... more RESUMO: A noção de comunidade epistêmica é essencial para a caracterização da observabilidade, conceito-chave para o empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen. Segundo o filósofo holandês, com efeito, observável seria uma abreviação de observável-para-nós. Neste trabalho será mostrado que a suposta rigididade do autor de A Imagem Científica, o qual parece não estar disposto a admitir mudanças na composição da comunidade epistêmica (constituída, segundo ele, pela raça humana), é na verdade uma assunção de modéstia e de bom senso; trata-se do reconhecimento de que o empreendimento científico nada mais é do que uma atividade humana, entre muitas outras. ABSTRACT: The notion of epistemic community is crucial for the characterization of observability, a cornerstone for Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. As a matter of fact, observable is, to him, a short for observable-by-us. In this work, it will be shown that the alleged rigidity of the author of The Scientific Image, appa...
Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particl... more Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particle physics. In a recent paper on this topic (2012), Brigitte Falkenburg defended that only scientific realism can make sense of it and that realist beliefs constitute an indispensable methodological principle of research in this discipline. The aim of this work is to show that there exists an anti-realist alternative to this account, along the lines of what Bas van Fraassen showed in his famous book The Scientific Image (1980). Problems and results of astroparticle physics can be understood from an empiricist point of view too, namely that of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, which is a more modest and metaphysics-free alternative to scientific realism. Although constructive empiricism can make sense of science no worse than scientific realism does, van Fraassen’s goal is not to demonstrate that his stance is the only viable position, but just that it is not incoherent or proven fal...
Neste ano de 2020, celebra-se o quadragésimo aniversário de The Scientific Image, o seminal livro... more Neste ano de 2020, celebra-se o quadragésimo aniversário de The Scientific Image, o seminal livro de Bas van Fraassen. Causa surpresa, depois de tanto tempo, ainda mais considerando o quanto a proposta desse autor foi debatida nestas quatro décadas, a publicação, no número de março da revista Metascience, de mais uma resenha da obra do fundador do empirismo construtivo. Em “Concluding unscientific image”, Hans Halvorson defende que nela não se propõe apenas uma defesa de uma perspectiva antirrealista acerca da ciência - e, ao mesmo tempo, uma crítica ao realismo científico -, mas se coloca também em discussão o próprio modo de fazer filosofia que, desde Quine, parecia dominar a filosofia analítica. O presente estudo pretende focar nas alegações de Halvorson acerca daquilo que a afirmação da adequação empírica de uma teoria comportaria - e que segundo ele, van Fraassen teria em mente - e mostrar que talvez não correspondam àquilo que van Fraassen realmente defende em seu livro.
Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen’s controversial view on microscopes, accordin... more Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen’s controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not “windows on an invisible world”, but rather “image generators”. Both authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic view about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary to what Kusch maintains, this might not be a neutral way to render scientific evidence. Moreover, a constructive empiricist can support a realist interpretation of microscopic images. In fact, constructive empiricism and van Fraassen’s own anti-realism do not necessarily amount to the same thing.
Resumo Apresenta-se uma resenha crítica do livro Variational Approach to Gravity Field Theories -... more Resumo Apresenta-se uma resenha crítica do livro Variational Approach to Gravity Field Theories - From Newton to Einstein and Beyond (2017), de autoria do astrofísico italiano Alberto Vecchiato. Na obra, Vecchiato mostra que a física assim como a conhecemos pode ser construída a partir de modelos matemáticos simples, gradativamente complexificados ao introduzir novos princípios. O leitor é guiado, progressivamente, a percorrer os passos que conduzem da física clássica àquela relativística e a entender como isso acontece e quais são as motivações. Ademais, ao apresentar de modo claro e elegante a abordagem variacional às teorias de campo gravitacional, Vecchiato mostra uma preocupação constante em conduzir o leitor de forma que esse entenda o funcionamento e a relevância da técnica que o autor considera a mais poderosa e o conceito mais unificador da física teórica. Cada capítulo é enriquecido com exercícios, dos quais é oferecida uma resolução passo a passo, de modo que o leitor pos...
A ênfase no papel da observação, uma das características salientes do empirismo, está reafirmada ... more A ênfase no papel da observação, uma das características salientes do empirismo, está reafirmada no empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen através da primazia atribuída por esse à distinção entre observável e inobservável. Neste artigo será mostrado que, apesar de sua atualidade em filosofia da ciência, particularmente graças â enfase que van Fraassen lhe atribui, a questão da observação e da observabilidade na verdade é tão antiga quanto a própria filosofia e remete ao desejo, definitório do empirismo, de manter-se ‘dentro dos limites’.
A noção de comunidade epistêmica é essencial para a caracterização da observabilidade, conceito-c... more A noção de comunidade epistêmica é essencial para a caracterização da observabilidade, conceito-chave para o empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen. Segundo o filósofo holandês, com efeito, observável seria uma abreviação de observável-para-nós. Neste trabalho será mostrado que a suposta rigididade do autor de A Imagem Científica, o qual parece não estar disposto a admitir mudanças na composição da comunidade epistêmica (constituída, segundo ele, pela raça humana), é na verdade uma assunção de modéstia e de bom senso; trata-se do reconhecimento de que o empreendimento científico nada mais é do que uma atividade humana, entre muitas outras.
O presente artigo irá discorrer sobre o uso de jogos para o ensino da matemática, em busca de um ... more O presente artigo irá discorrer sobre o uso de jogos para o ensino da matemática, em busca de um aprendizado mais efetivo e consistente dos conceitos dessa disciplina. Em particular, será apresentado o resultado de uma oficina aplicada em turmas do segundo e do terceiro ano do ensino médio do colégio estadual “Heitor Cavalcanti de Alencar Furtado” (Apucarana, PR). Nela, foi utilizado um jogo criado pela autora do presente trabalho,“1º grau ou grau?”, que envolve dois tópicos importantes do conteúdo programático de matemática do ensino médio: às equações de primeiro grau e a trigonometria. O objetivo da oficina foi trabalhar esses dois conceitos de maneira lúdica e colaborativa, mas também verificar se esse pode ser ao mesmo tempo um modo eficaz e produtivo de desenvolver o processo de ensino-aprendizagem da disciplina. Pelas observações das professoras que supervisionaram a atividade e pelas respostas que os discentes forneceram em um questionário aplicado posteriormente, concluimos...
En su reciente artículo “A modest defense of manifestationalism” (2015), Asay y Bordner defienden... more En su reciente artículo “A modest defense of manifestationalism” (2015), Asay y Bordner defienden la posición de una famosa crítica presentada por Rosen (1994), según la cual, aunque el manifestacionalismo puede ser más compatible con el espíritu del empirismo que otras vertientes bastante conocidas, tales como el empirismo constructivo, no logra, sin embargo, interpretar de manera efectiva la ciencia. Los dos autores consideran que, en realidad, el argumento de Rosen falla. Según ellos, el manifestacionalismo puede de hecho representar una tesis legítima acerca de la naturaleza de la investigación científica. En este trabajo mostraré que las críticas de Asay y Bordner a Rosen en realidad no dan en el blanco. Además, reposan sobre una interpretación del objetivo de la ciencia que puede servir para los propósitos de los autores, pero que no es aceptable. Quizás el empirismo constructivo todavía sea el mejor compromiso encontrado hasta la fecha entre un empirismo riguroso y el reconoc...
Resumo Em 1985, Alan Musgrave levantou uma séria objeção contra a possibilidade, por parte de um ... more Resumo Em 1985, Alan Musgrave levantou uma séria objeção contra a possibilidade, por parte de um empirista construtivo, de traçar de maneira coerente a distinção - crucial para ele - entre observáveis e inobserváveis. Em sua sucinta resposta, no mesmo ano, Bas van Fraassen afirmou que o argumento de Musgrave funciona somente no interior da chamada “abordagem sintática” das teorias, porém, perde sua força no contexto da “visão semântica”. Mas isso não é suficiente, segundo F. A. Muller, que publicou dois artigos (2004 e 2005), com o objetivo de estender a política epistêmica do empirismo construtivo. Para tanto, Muller propôs uma caracterização rigorosa da observabilidade, que só pode ser realizada utilizando-se a lógica modal. O resultado foi uma nova política epistêmica (mais ampla) para o empirismo construtivo, que o próprio Van Fraassen aparentemente endossou (MULLER; VAN FRAASSEN, 2008). Neste artigo, será mostrado que, todavia, a política epistêmica emendada de Muller é supérfl...
A visão antirrealista acerca da ciência de Bas van Fraassen desempenhou um papel det... more A visão antirrealista acerca da ciência de Bas van Fraassen desempenhou um papel determinante no desenvolvimento da filosofia da ciência recente. Particularmente, seu empirismo construtivo tem sido amplamente discutido e criticado, nas revistas especializadas, e constitui um tópico comumente abordado nos programas das disciplinas de filosofia da ciência. Outros aspectos do empirismo de van Fraassen são menos conhecidos. Entre eles, sua abordagem empirista às leis científicas, sua reavaliação, relativamente recente, do que significa ser um empirista e seu estruturalismo empirista. O presente estudo visa a oferecer uma panorâmica desses diferentes aspectos do empirismo de van Fraassen e mostrar como estão relacionados entre si. Detém-se, ainda, sobre a natureza do voluntarismo epistêmico de van Fraassen e seu nexo com a filosofia da ciência empirista desse autor.
O empirismo construtivo e o argumento de Musgrave Artigos / Articles O empirismO cOnstrutivO e O ... more O empirismo construtivo e o argumento de Musgrave Artigos / Articles O empirismO cOnstrutivO e O argumentO de musgrave: um prOblema Ou um pseudOprOblema? 1 Alessio Gava 2 resumO: Em 1985, Alan Musgrave levantou uma séria objeção contra a possibilidade, por parte de um empirista construtivo, de traçar de maneira coerente a distinção-crucial para ele-entre observáveis e inobserváveis. Em sua sucinta resposta, no mesmo ano, Bas van Fraassen afirmou que o argumento de Musgrave funciona somente no interior da chamada "abordagem sintática" das teorias, porém, perde sua força no contexto da "visão semântica". Mas isso não é suficiente, segundo F. A. Muller, que publicou dois artigos (2004 e 2005), com o objetivo de estender a política epistêmica do empirismo construtivo. Para tanto, Muller propôs uma caracterização rigorosa da observabilidade, que só pode ser realizada utilizando-se a lógica modal. O resultado foi uma nova política epistêmica (mais ampla) para o empirismo construtivo, que o próprio Van Fraassen aparentemente endossou (MULLER; VAN FRAASSEN, 2008). Neste artigo, será mostrado que, todavia, a política epistêmica emendada de Muller é supérflua. Ademais, e sobretudo, o argumento de Musgrave parece, na verdade, ser um pseudoproblema. palavras-chave: Empirismo construtivo. Observabilidade. Política epistêmica. Problema de Musgrave. Bas van Fraassen. 1 O presente trabalho se beneficiou de conversas esclarecedoras com o Prof. Otávio Bueno, da University of Miami (EUA), ao qual registro meu agradecimento.
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Bas van Fraassen’s anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, his relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen’s empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens’s epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science.
defends the possibility that a belief be justified merely because of the reliability of its mechanism of production. The claim that, in some cases, true beliefs can be classified as knowledge, despite (apparently) not satisfying the condition of justification in the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief, constitutes, according to Robert Brandom, the Founding Insight of reliabilist epistemologies. Still, as it will be shown in this article, this does not lead to a change in the object of epistemology, from reasons to reliability. Moreover, the fact that true beliefs can, in some cases, be classified as knowledge, despite not satisfying the (classical interpretation of the) condition of justification, is in no conflict with the capacity of providing reasons for having them. As a matter of fact, according to Brandom, it is possible to identify reasons for having a certain belief even when the subject is in no condition to
provide them, as in the case of the reliability of the process that led to it. Changing the focus of justification from the subject to the belief – as the externalists seem to suggest – seems also to confirm Kent Bach’s claim that the apparent conflict between internalism and externalism perhaps has no reason to exist. Still, at first sight, the two competing positions are actually getting closer over the years. In this work, the possibility of an even closer convergence will be discussed.
Manicômios nunca mais!!
Bas van Fraassen’s anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, his relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen’s empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens’s epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science.
defends the possibility that a belief be justified merely because of the reliability of its mechanism of production. The claim that, in some cases, true beliefs can be classified as knowledge, despite (apparently) not satisfying the condition of justification in the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief, constitutes, according to Robert Brandom, the Founding Insight of reliabilist epistemologies. Still, as it will be shown in this article, this does not lead to a change in the object of epistemology, from reasons to reliability. Moreover, the fact that true beliefs can, in some cases, be classified as knowledge, despite not satisfying the (classical interpretation of the) condition of justification, is in no conflict with the capacity of providing reasons for having them. As a matter of fact, according to Brandom, it is possible to identify reasons for having a certain belief even when the subject is in no condition to
provide them, as in the case of the reliability of the process that led to it. Changing the focus of justification from the subject to the belief – as the externalists seem to suggest – seems also to confirm Kent Bach’s claim that the apparent conflict between internalism and externalism perhaps has no reason to exist. Still, at first sight, the two competing positions are actually getting closer over the years. In this work, the possibility of an even closer convergence will be discussed.
Resumo: o breve artigo é uma réplica à resposta de Alessio Gava ao artigo "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação", publicado em Problemata (v. 7. n. 1, 2016), de autoria de Marcos Rodrigues da Silva e Debora Minikoski.
Palavras-chave: Alessio Gava; empirismo construtivo; realismo.
Il 52enne ci ha inviato un contributo riguardante i fatti accaduti a Brasilia, e noi abbiamo scelto di pubblicarlo integralmente
VITTORIO VENETO - "Il Covid? Qui alcuni sostengono che è un'invenzione occidentale". Alessio Gava, professore giramondo, attualmente si trova in Russia. Il 51enne vittoriese, infatti, insegna matematica e fisica presso il liceo linguistico italiano "Italo Calvino" di Mosca. Dopo le esperienze in Marocco e in Brasile, l'insegnante sta iniziando a conoscere anche la cultura e le usanze russe.
di Alessio Gava
26/05/2020
Resumo: O presente trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar o resultado de uma oficina envolvendo um aplicativo de celular, desenvolvida por três bolsistas do projeto de matemática do PIBID da Universidade Estadual do Paraná - campus Apucarana e realizada com quatro turmas do sexto ano do Colégio Estadual Antônio dos Três Reis de Oliveira, da cidade de Apucarana. O objetivo da atividade foi trazer a tecnologia para dentro da sala de aula e mostrar para os estudantes como podem utilizar seus smartphones para a compreensão de uma determinada matéria. A proposta principal foi a de que os alunos aprendessem a tabuada de multiplicação, estudando de uma forma mais divertida e dinâmica, em vista de uma prova que teriam na semana seguinte. Considerações sobre a importância tanto do lúdico quanto das novas tecnologias em sala de aula também serão tecidas. Por que, em nossas universidades, na formação de educadores/professores, não existem disciplinas centradas no lúdico?