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This paper represents a counterreply to “A rejoinder to Alessio Gava’s ‘Van Fraassen, a inferência da melhor explicação e a Matrix realista’”, by Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva, released in Problemata (v. 12, n. 2, 2021). The authors... more
This paper represents a counterreply to “A rejoinder to Alessio Gava’s ‘Van Fraassen, a inferência da melhor explicação e a Matrix realista’”, by Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva, released in Problemata (v. 12, n. 2, 2021). The authors originally published an essay in the same journal, “Van Fraassen and inference to the best explanation” (2016), the object of critic - ‘friendly and gentle’ - in a work of mine that also appeared in Problemata, in 2019. In this paper I will show that, even when the subject matter is the inference to the best explanation, realists and antirealists end up debating about the same old topics, that represent the essence of the controversy between the two philosophical stances
Tradução de "Bas van Fraassen’s Philosophy of Science and His Epistemic Voluntarism", de Kathleen Okruhlik (2014). Bas van Fraassen’s anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His... more
Tradução de "Bas van Fraassen’s Philosophy of Science and His Epistemic Voluntarism", de Kathleen Okruhlik (2014).

Bas van Fraassen’s anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, his relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen’s empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens’s epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science.
2020 is the year of the fortieth anniversary of Bas van Fraassen’s seminal book The Scientific Image. It is quite surprising, after such a long time, and considering how much the author’s proposal was debated during the last four decades,... more
2020 is the year of the fortieth anniversary of Bas van Fraassen’s seminal book The Scientific Image. It is quite surprising, after such a long time, and considering how much the author’s proposal was debated during the last four decades, to find a new review of it on the March issue of Metascience. In “Concluding Unscientific Image”, Hans Halvorson claims that, in the work of the founder of constructive empiricism, not only is there a defense of an anti-realist perspective on science—and, at the same time, a critique of scientific realism—, but also a revolt against the way of doing philosophy that, since Quine, seemed to be hegemonic in analytical philosophy. The present study focuses on Halvorson’s allegations about what maintaining the empirical adequacy of a theory would encompass—and that, according to him, van Fraassen has in mind—and aims at showing that, perhaps, they do not correspond to what van Fraassen actually defends in his book.
Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. Still, the output of a telescope is different from that of a microscope, for in the latter case it is not possible to empirically investigate... more
Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. Still, the output of a telescope is different from that of a microscope, for in the latter case it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between the observer, the image and the detected entity, while in the former it is - at least in principle. In this paper I argue that this is a weak argument to support the belief in the existence of exoplanets that, according to van Fraassen, comes with accepting a theory that posits these entities. If a constructive empiricist asserts the empirical adequacy of such a theory, she might be relying on typical realist arguments, instead - of the very same ilk as the ones used to defend the veridicality of microscopic images. Perhaps the time has come for van Fraassen to explain his view on telescopes.
Bas van Fraassen's antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously rests upon a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In order to back his empiricist stance, the Dutch philosopher put... more
Bas van Fraassen's antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously rests upon a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In order to back his empiricist stance, the Dutch philosopher put forward his own characterization of observability. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the point of constructive empiricism is not lost if the line is drawn in a somewhat different way from how he draws it. This means that other characterizations of observability can support this antirealist stance, provided they allow for a viable distinction between the observable and the unobservable. The aim of this work, however, is not to propose another characterization of observability that fits constructive empiricism, but to put forward a little amendment to van Fraassen's own antirealism, to the effect that it can actually be seen as a coherent position, albeit controversial, since its present consistency might be called into question.
Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen's controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not "windows on an invisible world", but rather "image generators". Both authors also claim that, since in a... more
Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen's controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not "windows on an invisible world", but rather "image generators". Both authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic view about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary to what Kusch maintains, this might not be a neutral way to render scientific evidence. Moreover, a constructive empiricist can support a realist interpretation of microscopic images. In fact, constructive empiricism and van Fraassen's own anti-realism do not necessarily amount to the same thing.
In a recent work published in this journal, "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação" (2016), Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva identify four critical lines proposed by Bas van Fraassen against the form of abductive reasoning... more
In a recent work published in this journal, "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação" (2016), Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva identify four critical lines proposed by Bas van Fraassen against the form of abductive reasoning known as 'inference to the best explanation' (IBE). The first one, put forward by the Dutch philosopher in his seminal book The Scientific Image (1980), concerns the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva consider that the distinction is of no relevance to the scientific practice. For this reason, they address van Fraassen's allegations against IBE qua justification of the existence of unobservable entities in a couple of pages and prefer focusing on the other lines they identified. The aim of this work is to pour over the analysis that the two authors perform about van Fraassen's mentioned argument and some realists' replies, particularly in the section that Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva devote to this topic. This will allow us to clarify van Fraassen's vision on scientific practice and on the 'immersion in the theoretical world-picture'. The importance and the relevance of the distinction between observables and unobservables will also be reaffirmed.
In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this position from a quite famous criticism put forward by Rosen (1994), according to which while manifestationalism can be seen as more compatible... more
In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this position from a quite famous criticism put forward by Rosen (1994), according to which while manifestationalism can be seen as more compatible with the letter of empiricism than other popular stances, such as constructive empiricism, it fails nonetheless to make sense of science. The two authors reckon that Rosen's argument is actually flawed. In their view, manifestationalism could in fact represent a legitimate thesis about the nature of scientific inquiry. In this paper, I will show that Asay and Bordner's criticisms to Rosen are actually off target. Moreover, they rest upon an understanding of what the aim of science is that might serve to their purposes, but that does not seem to be in line with the scientific enterprise. Perhaps constructive empiricism still represents the best compromise so far presented between strict empiricism and the acknowledgment of the rationality of science.
Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particle physics. In a recent paper on this topic, Brigitte Falkenburg (2012) defended that only scientific realism can make sense of it and that... more
Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particle physics. In a recent paper on this topic, Brigitte Falkenburg (2012) defended that only scientific realism can make sense of it and that realistic beliefs constitute an indispensable methodological principle of research in this discipline. The aim of this work is to show that there exists an anti-realist alternative to this account, along the lines of what Bas van Fraassen showed in his famous book The Scientific Image (1980). Problems and results of astroparticle physics can be understood from an empiricist point of view too, namely that of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, which is a more modest and metaphysics-free alternative to scientific realism. Although constructive empiricism can make sense of science no worse than scientific realism does, van Fraassen's goal is not to demonstrate that his stance is the only viable position, but just that it is not incoherent or proven false by his opponents (see Kusch 2015, 172). In this paper it will be shown that the constructive empiricist stance constitutes a legitimate alternative to scientific realism even when it gets to astroparticle physics and that it does indeed make sense of this new discipline, pace Falkenburg.
In 1985, Alan Musgrave raised a serious objection against the possibility that a constructive empiricist could coherently draw the distinction – crucial to her – between observables and unobservables. In his brief response, in the same... more
In 1985, Alan Musgrave raised a serious objection against the possibility that a constructive empiricist could coherently draw the distinction – crucial to her – between observables and unobservables. In his brief response, in the same year, Bas van Fraassen claimed that Musgrave’s argument only works within the so-called “syntactic view” of theories, while it loses its force in the context of the “semantic view”. But that was not enough, or so claimed F. A. Muller, who published two articles (2004 and 2005) in order to extend the epistemic policy of constructive empiricism. In order to do so, Muller provided a rigorous characterization of observability, but this could only be accomplished by using modal logic. The outcome was a new (extended) epistemic policy for constructive empiricism, which van Fraassen apparently endorsed (cf. MULLER; VAN FRAASSEN, 2008). As it will be shown in this article, however, Muller’s extended epistemic policy is superfluous. Moreover, and more importantly, Musgrave’s argument seems to be a pseudo-problem.
In his last book (2008), Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, put forward a table containing a categorization of images. His aim, however, was to discuss the reality of what they represent and not addressing the... more
In his last book (2008), Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, put forward a table containing a categorization of images. His aim, however, was to discuss the reality of what they represent and not addressing the issue of images per se. One of the consequences is that it remained an open question what 'public hallucinations'-reflections in the water, rainbows and the like-are. In this paper it will be defended that only images in the relevant (representational) sense should be considered as such. For this and other reasons, van Fraassen's diagram should be amended. Moreover, as Physics teaches us, the class of the so-called 'images' that are actually objects is wider than van Fraassen reckons. The set of the observable objects do not contain only concrete things, but goes beyond what 'common sense realism' suggests. In addition to rocks, oceans and bicycles, we can also see rainbows, reflections in the water and the like.
In his famous book "Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows" (2008), Roy Sorensen put forward a 'blocking theory of shadows', a causal view on these entities according to which a shadow is an absence of light caused by blockage.... more
In his famous book "Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows" (2008), Roy Sorensen put forward a 'blocking theory of shadows', a causal view on these entities according to which a shadow is an absence of light caused by blockage. This approach allows him to solve a quite famous riddle on shadows, 'the Yale puzzle', that was devised by Robert Fogelin in the late 1960s and that Sorensen presents in the form mentioned by Bas van Fraassen (1989). István Aranyosi has recently criticized Sorensen's solution to the Yale puzzle, on the grounds that it does not resist another version of the riddle, that Aranyosi calls 'the Bilkent puzzle'. A new perspective on shadows, the 'Material Exstitution View', that allegedly permits to solve both puzzles, could be adopted as an alternative. In this paper I will show that Sorensen's blockage theory can actually handle both the Yale and the Bilkent puzzle, plus another one that I put forward ('the donut puzzle'), which instead is fatal to Aranyosi's position. As Sorensen puts it, nothing aside from the original blockage of light is needed.
Reliabilism is an epistemological theory about justification, which defends the possibility that a belief be justified merely because of the reliability of its mechanism of production. The claim that, in some cases, true beliefs can be... more
Reliabilism is an epistemological theory about justification, which
defends the possibility that a belief be justified merely because of the reliability of its mechanism of production. The claim that, in some cases, true beliefs can be classified as knowledge, despite (apparently) not satisfying the condition of justification in the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief, constitutes, according to Robert Brandom, the Founding Insight of reliabilist epistemologies. Still, as it will be shown in this article, this does not lead to a change in the object of epistemology, from reasons to reliability. Moreover, the fact that true beliefs can, in some cases, be classified as knowledge, despite not satisfying the (classical interpretation of the) condition of justification, is in no conflict with the capacity of providing reasons for having them. As a matter of fact, according to Brandom, it is possible to identify reasons for having a certain belief even when the subject is in no condition to
provide them, as in the case of the reliability of the process that led to it. Changing the focus of justification from the subject to the belief – as the externalists seem to suggest – seems also to confirm Kent Bach’s claim that the apparent conflict between internalism and externalism perhaps has no reason to exist. Still, at first sight, the two competing positions are actually getting closer over the years. In this work, the possibility of an even closer convergence will be discussed.
Microscopes - not only the optic ones - are commonly considered, particularly by scientists and laboratory technicians, as devices that allow to widen the scope of our limited sensory system and see entities that would otherwise be... more
Microscopes - not only the optic ones - are commonly considered, particularly by scientists and laboratory technicians, as devices that allow to widen the scope of our limited sensory system and see entities that would otherwise be unobservable. A notorious exception is Bas van Fraassen’s interpretation. This important and well-known philosopher of science sees these instruments as ‘engines of creation’ (of images), thus rejecting the ‘window onto the unobservable world’ metaphor. In this paper I will present, under the perspective of the realism/anti-realism debate in philosophy of science, the Dutch author’s position and show that, despite being a peculiar and isolated stand, it does not exhibit flaws or contradictions - from a strictly logical point of view, at least. The case of the mesosome, a folded invagination in the plasma membrane of bacteria that is produced by chemical fixation (for electron microscopy), is particularly instructive in this respect.
Observation plays a key role in the empirical science; for this reason, but not only, it is also a crucial topic of discussion in the philosophy of science. As a matter of fact, observability, under different perspectives, spans through... more
Observation plays a key role in the empirical science; for this reason, but not only, it is also a crucial topic of discussion in the philosophy of science. As a matter of fact, observability, under different perspectives, spans through the XX and XXI century philosophy of science debate and represents one of the main issues in the realism vs anti-realism dispute. Important contemporary authors, such as Bas van Fraassen, endorse Paul Feyerabend’s thesis that observability is a mere pragmatic concept. According to the famous Austrian philosopher, when we observe, we are on a par with an instrument. It is just a matter of ‘stimulus-response’. In this paper it will be defended that, on the contrary, any attempt of dealing with this issue by the philosophers is legitimate. In this topic, it is philosophy – and not science – that should have the last word.
Observation and observability represent a crucial topic in the philosophy of science, as the huge production of papers and books on the subject attests. Philosophy of perception, on the other hand, is a field of study that took root... more
Observation and observability represent a crucial topic in the philosophy of science, as the huge production of papers and books on the subject attests. Philosophy of perception, on the other hand, is a field of study that took root effectively in the last decades. Even then, apparently, the main theories on observation have neglected the issue of determining which is the object of a successful perception. As a consequence, some theses that have recently been proposed are actually paradoxical, despite deriving from renowned and, prima facie, satisfactory and complete theories. This is the situation of van Fraassen’s assertions on the (putative?) observation of images and rainbows (see 2001 and 2008) and of Sorensen’s claims on what one actually sees during a solar eclipse (see 2008). After putting forward a possible characterization of the object of perception, with no need of discussing the issue of intentionality, in this paper it will be shown that devoting adequate attention to this topic, together with acknowledging that observation is an action, in which the subject plays an indeed active role, would make it possible to avoid drawing conclusions that do not seem to be correct, such as the ones just mentioned. Any theory about observation will only be complete and adequate provided the object of perception is taken into account.
According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is its inner (concave) part of the farther, reflective one, and not the always-facing-Earth side of our natural satellite. To make his point... more
According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is its inner (concave) part of the farther, reflective one, and not the always-facing-Earth side of our natural satellite. To make his point clearer, he put forward the famous example of a double eclipse involving the fictional planets Far and Near. From the observer's vantage point, the two planets have the same apparent diameter and overlap. What the agent sees is a dark disk, but believes that what she is seeing is Near, because Far is behind it. Sorensen claims that what she actually sees is planet Far and that the causal theory of perception explains why this is the case. Of course, this position stands against common sense. Sorensen shows that it counters Alvin Goldman's renowned observation criteria too. Nonetheless, he maintains, since Near is causally idle and the agent does see something, the only possible conclusion is that she sees Far, pace Goldman – and common sense. In this paper, I try to demonstrate that Sorensen is wrong and that the correct solution to the eclipse riddle is that the observer sees Near. As a matter of fact, besides meeting common sense and Goldman's observability criteria (along with others), Near can be legitimately be considered the object of a successful perceptual discrimination even in the light of the causal theory of perception .
Constructive Empiricism, the anti-realist position about science proposed by the Dutch philosopher Bas van Fraassen in 1980, heavily relies upon the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In 2004 and 2005, F. A. Muller... more
Constructive Empiricism, the anti-realist position about science proposed by the Dutch philosopher Bas van Fraassen in 1980, heavily relies upon the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In 2004 and 2005, F. A. Muller provided a rigorous characterization of observability, later endorsed, apparently, by van Fraassen (cf. Muller & van Fraassen 2008). However, an analysis of what it means to observe is needed to secure Muller’s ‘definition’. Van Fraassen always maintained that observation is an empirical matter, but I argue that a philosophical analysis is also needed and that van Fraassen himself relied on philosophical principles to address the issue of observability.
An analysis of the contemporary debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology shows that, nowadays, this branch of philosophy focuses almost entirely on justification, which is, according to the classical definition, the... more
An analysis of the contemporary debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology shows that, nowadays, this branch of philosophy focuses almost entirely on justification, which is, according to the classical definition, the third condition for knowledge. Neither externalism nor internalism seems to be able to deal with it without some concession to the other position, though. In other words, someone might even think that these opposite epistemological positions actually deal with different things, but in fact there is no difference in the subject matter. For this reason, the debate cannot be considered meaningless. On the contrary, it represents just another instance of dialectical interaction between distinct positions, which, we may say, is the very essence of philosophy.
PRELIMINARY NOTE: the following paper is an extended (and amended, following the referees' suggestions) version of the article by the same name, published in the journal Archai in 2014. Due to technical problems, the first version ended... more
PRELIMINARY NOTE: the following paper is an extended (and amended, following the referees' suggestions) version of the article by the same name, published in the journal Archai in 2014. Due to technical problems, the first version ended up being published at the time, without the enhancements suggested by the reviewers. What follows is then the 'ultimate' version of " Zeno and the impossibility of analogy " .
Research Interests:
The notion of epistemic community is crucial for the characterization of observability, a cornerstone for Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. As a matter of fact, observable is, to him, a short for observable-by-us. In this work,... more
The notion of epistemic community is crucial for the characterization of observability, a cornerstone for Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. As a matter of fact, observable is, to him, a short for observable-by-us. In this work, it will be shown that the alleged rigidity of the author of The Scientific Image, apparently not very keen to admitting changes in the epistemic community (constituted – according to him – by the human race), is actually an assumption of modesty and good judgment; it means recognizing that scientific enterprise is just a human activity, among many others.
In order to defend his controversial claim that observation is unaided perception, Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, suggested that, for all we know, the images produced by a microscope could be in a situation... more
In order to defend his controversial claim that observation is unaided perception, Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, suggested that, for all we know, the images produced by a microscope could be in a situation analogous to that of the rainbows, which are 'images of nothing'. He added that reflections in the water, rainbows, and the like are 'public hallucinations', but it is not clear whether this constitutes an ontological category apart or an empty set. In this paper an argument will be put forward to the effect that rainbows can be thought of as events, that is, as part of a subcategory of entities that van Fraassen has always considered legitimate phenomena. I argue that rainbows are actually not images in the relevant (representational) sense and that there is no need to ontologically inflate the category of entities in order to account for them, which would run counter to the empiricist principle of parsimony.
How does empirical knowledge arise? According to the empiricist tradition, it is 'caused', mechanically, through observation, by the interaction between the subject and physical reality. Despite not rejecting completely the empiricist... more
How does empirical knowledge arise? According to the empiricist tradition, it is 'caused', mechanically, through observation, by the interaction between the subject and physical reality. Despite not rejecting completely the empiricist view, Wilfrid Sellars criticizes what he calls 'the Myth of the Given', a form of foundationalist epistemology based on the idea that sense data, that we obtain via sensible experience, constitute the foundation of empirical knowledge. The argument Sellars put forward against this idea and (his) Kantian alternative to the empiricist approach are presented in this paper. Resumo. Como se forma o conhecimento empírico? Segundo a tradição empirista, esse seria 'causado', de um modo mecânico, pela interação entre o sujeito e a realidade física, através da observação. Apesar de não rejeitar completamente o empirismo, Wilfrid Sellars critica aquilo que chama de 'o Mito do Dado', uma forma de epistemologia fundacionalista baseada na ideia segundo a qual os dados sensorias que obtemos através da experiência sensível constituiriam o fundamento de nosso conhecimento empírico. Serão aqui apresentados o argumento que Sellars utiliza para derrubar essa ideia e a (sua) alternativa kantiana à abordagem empirista. Palavras-chave. Wilfrid Sellars; conhecimento empírico; Mito do Dado; sentenças observacionais; Kant. Um traço característico da tradição empirista é a ideia segundo a qual o conhecimento (empírico) encontraria seu fundamento no impacto da realidade física sobre o aparato conceitual humano, de uma maneira causal, como se os seres humanos
ABSTRACT. The act of observing is crucial for constructive empiricism, Bas van Fraassen’s celebrated position on the aim of science. As Buekens and Muller noted in 2012, the Dutch philosopher should have characterized observation as an... more
ABSTRACT. The act of observing is crucial for constructive empiricism, Bas van Fraassen’s celebrated position on the aim of science. As Buekens and Muller noted in 2012, the Dutch philosopher should
have characterized observation as an intentional act, because observation in science has a purpose. In the present article, which will also address the distinction between observing and observing that,
introduced by Hanson and Dretske, it will be shown that considerations about the intentionality of the act of observing are, on the contrary, unnecessary for drawing the distinction between observable and unobservable entities on which constructive empiricism depends.

RESUMO: No âmbito do empirismo construtivo, a célebre posição acerca dos objetivos da ciência de Bas van Fraassen, o ato de observar desempenha um papel crucial. Segundo Buekens e Muller defendem, em um artigo de 2012, o filósofo holandês deveria caracterizá-lo como um ato intencional, porque, na ciência, as observações são realizadas com um propósito. Nesta análise, que abordará também a distinção entre observar e observar que, introduzida por Hanson e Dretske, será mostrado que, ao contrário, considerações ligadas à intencionalidade do ato de observar são supérfluas para traçar a distinção entre entidades observáveis e inobserváveis da qual o empirismo construtivo depende.
The emphasis on the role of observation, one of the hallmarks of Empiricism, is reaffirmed by the primacy of the distinction between observable and unobservable in Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. In this paper it will be... more
The emphasis on the role of observation, one of the hallmarks of Empiricism, is
reaffirmed by the primacy of the distinction between observable and
unobservable in Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. In this paper it
will be showed that, despite being one the main topics of discussion in
contemporary philosophy of science, particularly thanks to van Fraassen, the
question of observation and observability is actually so old as philosophy itself
and has to do with the willingness, that defines empiricism, to keep ‘within the
limits’.
Constructive empiricism is a prominent anti-realist position whose aim is to make sense of science. As is well known, it also crucially depends on the distinction between what is observable and what scientific theories postulate but is... more
Constructive empiricism is a prominent anti-realist position whose aim is to make sense of science. As is well known, it also crucially depends on the distinction between what is observable and what scientific theories postulate but is unobservable to us. Accordingly, adopting an adequate notion of observability is in order, on pain of failing to achieve the goal of grasping science and its aim. Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, identifies observation with unaided (at least in principle) human perception. So far, though, he has not put forward any convincing argument to support this (unpopular) stand. He did it on the grounds that it is (allegedly) a matter for empirical investigation and not for philosophical analysis. Nonetheless, he seems to have introduced a criterion for observability that is not the result of any scientific research and is not supported by any scientific theory. Countering his own words, he seems to have instead reflected qua philosopher on how an empiricist should interpret the meaning of the verb " to observe. " And then he has tried to defend his point of view by means of metaphors and analogies. But the very same metaphors and analogies van Fraassen has put forward could be used to back up the opposite position. Worse, not only does his criterion counter common sense, it does not work either. Perhaps the time has come for van Fraassen to put forward or endorse alternative criteria of observability.
The present work is the translation of an article originally published (in Portuguese) on Scientiæ Studia, São Paulo, v. 13, n. 1, p. 123-141, 2015. Any comments (or suggestions for a better translation) are welcome.
Research Interests:
Philosophy of Science, Perception, General Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Science (Education), Philosophy of Science, History of the Philosophy of Science, Epistemology of Experimentation, History of the Human sciences, and 22 more
The primacy of the act of observation, one of the hallmarks of Empiricism, found new life in the centrality of the distinction between observable and unobservable of Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. As Elliott Sober (and... more
The primacy of the act of observation, one of the hallmarks of Empiricism, found new life in the centrality of the distinction between observable and unobservable of Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. As Elliott Sober (and others) pointed out, though, it is not clear what observing an object involves, according to van Fraassen. Worse, the Dutch philosopher does not seem to consider that a clarification of this point is necessary. This, of course, represents an important lacuna in a position generally considered as the main reference for modern Empiricism. Our goal is to retrieve the counterfactual conditionals characterizing perception that Otávio Bueno presented in 2011 on this journal and to also consider the observability and the existence criteria proposed by Filip Buekens (1999) and Michel Ghins (2005), in order to get to a ‘definition’ of observation that should give van Fraassen’s observability concept the support it actually lacks, but without presenting itself as an ad hoc solution.
The concept of observability is of key importance for a consistent defense of Constructive Empiricism. This anti-realist position, originally presented in 1980 by Bas van Fraassen in his book The Scientific Image, crucially depends on the... more
The concept of observability is of key importance for a consistent defense of Constructive Empiricism. This anti-realist position, originally presented in 1980 by Bas van Fraassen in his book The Scientific Image, crucially depends on the observable/ unobservable dichotomy. Nevertheless, the question of what it means to observe has been faced in an unsatisfactory and inadequate manner by van Fraassen and this represents an important lacuna in his philosophical position. The aim of this work is to propose a characterization of the act of observation able to give the necessary support to the ‘rough guide’ of ‘observable’ that can be found in the aforementioned book.
Countering van Fraassen’s own statements, that observability is not a matter for philosophy, but for scientific inquiry only, we maintain that any attempt to deal with this subject by the philosophers is legitimate. We will show that van Fraassen ended up doing a philosophical analysis of observation himself, albeit in a fragmentary way. We believe that this question should be dealt with methodically, though, ‘following the rules’ of a ‘proper’ philosophical analysis, as we attempted to do in this work. We will propose a way of conceiving the act of observation, different from van Fraassen’s one, that can help not only to ground the distinction between observable and unobservable, upon which Constructive Empiricism rests, but to get this anti-realist position closer to scientific practice as well, which is one of its desiderata. Without neglecting the philosophical dimension of the issue, though. However, this proposal does not represent an ad hoc ‘solution’ for Constructive Empiricism, but a characterization aspiring to have a universal reach.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Aristotle is frequently presented as a sort of ‘enemy’ of Physics as we conceive it, or as the responsible for a two thousand years deadlock of scientific progress. In this article we will show that this judgment is incorrect: in fact,... more
Aristotle is frequently presented as a sort of ‘enemy’ of Physics as we conceive it, or as the responsible for a two thousand years deadlock of scientific progress. In this article we will show that this judgment is incorrect: in fact, some intuitions of the Stagirite appear to be totally in line with classical Physics, while others, like his concept of time and the necessity of considering the subject’s role in the study of nature, seem to somehow anticipate concepts typical of contemporary Physics. The relativity of time, distinctive of Einstein’s theories, is actually a profoundly different concept from Aristotle’s ones, but it stems from the fact that time is intimately bound to motion, in such a way that neither Newton nor classical Physics could conceive, and that was present in Aristotle’s Physics.
According to Bas van Fraassen, a postulated entity which can only be detected by means of some instrument should not be considered observable. In this paper I argue that (1) this is not correct; (2) someone can be a constructive... more
According to Bas van Fraassen, a postulated entity which can only be detected by means of some instrument should not be considered observable. In this paper I argue that (1) this is not correct; (2) someone can be a constructive empiricist, adhering to van Fraassen’s famous anti-realist position, even admitting that many entities only detectable with a microscope are observable. The case of the paramecium, a very well-known single-celled organism, is particularly instructive in this respect. I maintain that we actually observe paramecia and not just detect them, contrary to what van Fraassen claims. As a matter of fact, even if we can only perceive these protozoans by using a microscope, we are in condition to know that the relevant counterfactual conditions (like the ones Bueno proposed in 2011) are met. Moreover, paramecia satisfy observability and existence criteria proposed by Buekens (1999) and Ghins (2005). But admitting paramecia and the like among the observables does not threaten Constructive Empiricism, for there will always be a line between observables and unobservables on which van Fraassen’s anti-realism can rest.
Is there an ontological question relative to van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism? It seems so, despite this philosophical position, a reference for contemporary Empiricism, presenting itself as an epistemological thesis. It is,... more
Is there an ontological question relative to van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism? It seems so, despite this philosophical position, a reference for contemporary Empiricism, presenting itself as an epistemological thesis. It is, furthermore, a very up-to-date matter, as the Dutch philosopher has recently changed his mind about the possibility for us to observe common optical phenomena as the rainbow. This reveals the necessity for a discussion about the concept of phenomena as used by van Fraassen, as Foss stated more than twenty years ago, but also – and this is an intertwined question – about what ontology is assumed by Constructive Empiricism.
The problem of the justification of inductive inferences, also known as ‘Hume’s problem’, seems to have lost strength since the early 20th century, following several authors’ denial that induction is the method of science. Van Fraassen... more
The problem of the justification of inductive inferences, also known as ‘Hume’s problem’, seems to have lost strength since the early 20th century, following several authors’ denial that induction is the method of science. Van Fraassen went beyond this denial and recently stated that induction does not exist. It is our aim to show that, in order to bring forward a coherent vision of science, in his reconstruction it is the observable (a crucial term for his Constructive Empiricism) that is logically prior to the act of observing
and not the other way round. We called this ‘the reverse image of observation’.
The reductio ad absurdum has been elected by Zeno as the only method permitting to descry the true reality, invisible both to the senses and to the common way of thinking. Showing some continuity with the previous philosophers, not only... more
The reductio ad absurdum has been elected by Zeno as the only method permitting to descry the true reality, invisible both to the senses and to the common way of thinking. Showing some continuity with the previous philosophers, not only in the search for a procedure in order to speculation to advance, but also on the same route departing from what is nearer, more acquainted and particular (visible) toward what is less acquainted, more distant and universal (invisible), to say it with aristothelic words, Zeno made use of aporetic arguments as the only possible way to catch a glimpse of the ‘domain of Being’. This, in fact, is invisible not only to our senses, but also to our ordinary reasoning. Therefore, just the ‘way of not-being’, the only one that could be walked after Parmenides, as Wolff says, allows us to have an insight of what is ‘really invisible’. So invisible that it is unreachable also to thought.
The aim of this work is to analyze and present Bas van Fraassen’s concept of observability and its relevance for the philosophical stance known as Constructive Empiricism. We will show how the issue of distinguishing between the... more
The aim of this work is to analyze and present Bas van Fraassen’s concept of observability and its relevance for the philosophical stance known as Constructive Empiricism. We will show how the issue of distinguishing between the observable and the unobservable part of the world plays a crucial role in the discussion about the scientific enterprise, regardless of  the conflicting philosophical positions.
The observable / unobservable dichotomy is fundamental for Logical Empiricism, but not less important for its adversary, Scientific Realism. We will show that a new anti-realist stance, van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism, appearing to be an intermediate position, is based on this distinction. The central role of the concept of observability in the present debate in Philosophy of Science will also be demonstrated in this work.
John Perry endorses the theses that, when we interpret a sentence, the mere linguistic meaning usually does not suffice to completely determine its truth conditions. Some sentences admit different interpretations depending on the context... more
John Perry endorses the theses that, when we interpret a sentence, the mere linguistic meaning usually does not suffice to completely determine its truth conditions. Some sentences admit different interpretations depending on the context of use and the difference rests on an aspect that has no linguistic counterpart. According to Perry, a proposition is constituted both by articulated constituents, representing the semantic value of the elements of the so-called logical form of the sentence, and by (possible) unarticulated constituents, directly provided by the context of use. The truth conditions of a sentence can therefore only be determined at the cognitive (post-semantic) context  level. The semantic context does not suffice.
by Marcos Rodrigues da Silva and Debora Minikoski Resumo: o breve artigo é uma réplica à resposta de Alessio Gava ao artigo "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação", publicado em Problemata (v. 7. n. 1, 2016), de autoria de... more
by Marcos Rodrigues da Silva and Debora Minikoski

Resumo: o breve artigo é uma réplica à resposta de Alessio Gava ao artigo "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação", publicado em Problemata (v. 7. n. 1, 2016), de autoria de Marcos Rodrigues da Silva e Debora Minikoski.

Palavras-chave: Alessio Gava; empirismo construtivo; realismo.
Review of: "Biology as a postmodern science: Universals, historicity, and context"
Review of: "Zeno and Einstein"
Review of: "Straightening the 'Value-Laden Turn': Minimising the Influence of Values in Science"
Review of: "Objectivity and Honesty in Science: The case of Light Interference Phenomena"
This is a critical review of the book Variational Approach to Gravity Field Theories-From Newton to Einstein and Beyond (2017), written by the Italian astrophysicist Alberto Vecchiato. In his work, Vecchiato shows that physics, as we know... more
This is a critical review of the book Variational Approach to Gravity Field Theories-From Newton to Einstein and Beyond (2017), written by the Italian astrophysicist Alberto Vecchiato. In his work, Vecchiato shows that physics, as we know it, can be built up from simple mathematical models that become more complex step by step by gradually introducing new principles. The reader is invited to follow the steps that lead from classical physics to relativity and to understand how this happens and why. Moreover, while presenting the variational approach to gravity field theories in a clear and elegant manner, Vecchiato shows a constant worry in leading the readers in such a way that they understand the relevance of what the author considers to be the most powerful technique and unifying concept of theoretical physics-and how it works. Each chapter is enriched with exercises, of which a step-by-step solution is offered, so that the reader can gain a real insight into the topic presented and follow the reading as fruitfully as possible. The most innovative aspect of the book, however, is not the rigorousness and the clarity of the treatment of the variational approach but rather the point of view that Vecchiato keeps and that the reader is led to endorse too: physics is a human enterprise, prone to error and open to improvement, and not a complete and definite system of truths about our world.
Il professore vittoriese: "Mia moglie è in Brasile, vi racconto l'orda fascista".
Il 52enne ci ha inviato un contributo riguardante i fatti accaduti a Brasilia, e noi abbiamo scelto di pubblicarlo integralmente
Un nostro lettore che abita nella capitale russa, ci ha segnalato un 'caso' mediatico molto interessante
Alessio Gava: “Sabato andrò a comprarmi una valigia”. Anche se per ora si tratta solo di una precauzione, rischia di dover lasciare la Russia
VITTORIO VENETO/MOSCA - Alessio Gava, professore giramondo, vive in Russia. Il 51enne vittoriese insegna matematica e fisica presso il liceo linguistico italiano “Italo Calvino” di Mosca. Gli abbiamo chiesto di parlarci dell’aria che si... more
VITTORIO VENETO/MOSCA - Alessio Gava, professore giramondo, vive in Russia. Il 51enne vittoriese insegna matematica e fisica presso il liceo linguistico italiano “Italo Calvino” di Mosca. Gli abbiamo chiesto di parlarci dell’aria che si respira nella capitale dopo l’inizio del conflitto tra Russia e Ucraina.
Alessio Gava racconta la sua esperienza VITTORIO VENETO - "Il Covid? Qui alcuni sostengono che è un'invenzione occidentale". Alessio Gava, professore giramondo, attualmente si trova in Russia. Il 51enne vittoriese, infatti, insegna... more
Alessio Gava racconta la sua esperienza

VITTORIO VENETO - "Il Covid? Qui alcuni sostengono che è un'invenzione occidentale". Alessio Gava, professore giramondo, attualmente si trova in Russia. Il 51enne vittoriese, infatti, insegna matematica e fisica presso il liceo linguistico italiano "Italo Calvino" di Mosca. Dopo le esperienze in Marocco e in Brasile, l'insegnante sta iniziando a conoscere anche la cultura e le usanze russe.
Alessio Gava racconta la sua esperienza
OggiTreviso > Vittorio Veneto > Coronavirus: il Brasile il nuovo epicentro dell'epidemia

di Alessio Gava

26/05/2020
No presente artigo se relata o desenvolvimento de uma atividade de ensino-aprendizagem de matemática, realizada em um colégio estadual paranaense, na qual utilizou-se o Soroban, o ábaco japonês. O uso desse antigo instrumento, tanto em... more
No presente artigo se relata o desenvolvimento de uma atividade de ensino-aprendizagem de matemática, realizada em um colégio estadual paranaense, na qual utilizou-se o Soroban, o ábaco japonês. O uso desse antigo instrumento, tanto em sua versão manual tradicional quanto naquela tecnológica moderna, permite lidar com a aritmética de forma produtiva, proporcionando maior compreensão dos conceitos matemáticos e maior agilidade na realização de cálculos. O Soroban pode ser considerado uma maneira eficiente e empolgante de o professor realizar intervenções em sala de aula, de modo a envolver os alunos. Na atividade de ensino-aprendizagem aqui descrita, o uso desse instrumento despertou nos discentes grande interesse pelo conteúdo matemático desenvolvido, o que permitiu uma aquisição mais eficaz do mesmo. A utilização do Soroban nos anos escolares iniciais contribui de modo importante para o desenvolvimento da agilidade mental e do raciocínio lógico, pois com o tempo essa prática supre a falta do objeto manual e permite a desenvoltura do cálculo mental.
Employing recreational activities in the teaching field, such as playing educational games in class, is nowadays a common practice. In this paper, an experience that took place in a state college in Paraná, as part of the PIBID program,... more
Employing recreational activities in the teaching field, such as playing educational games in class, is nowadays a common practice. In this paper, an experience that took place in a state college in Paraná, as part of the PIBID program, will be presented. Considerations about the use and the contribution of Maths games in the teaching-learning process, together with a reflection on the importance of these resources and didactic strategies as learning object and reinforcement, will also be proposed.
The present study approaches the use of games in mathematics teaching, in search of a more effective and consistent learning of concepts of this subject. We will present, in particular, the results of an activity developed with secondary... more
The present study approaches the use of games in mathematics teaching, in search of a more effective and consistent learning of concepts of this subject. We will present, in particular, the results of an activity developed with secondary level classes of the "Heitor Cavalcanti de Alencar Furtado" state college (Apucarana, PR). A game devised by one of the authors of this work, called "1º grau ou grau?" was used, which involves two important topics of secondary level mathematics contents: first-degree equations and trigonometry. The objective of the activity was to work on these two concepts in a ludic and collaborative way, but also to verify if this can simultaneously be an efficient and productive manner of carrying out the teaching-learning process of the subject. From the observations made by the teachers who monitored the activity and from the answers the students gave to a survey made afterwards, we conclude that math games are indeed a valuable tool for teachers, enabling them to capture the students' attention and interest and helping them in the acquisition of essential notions of the subject.
In this paper, we will discuss possible uses of the free educational software GeoGebra in solving math problems. The software’s resources allow doing it in a variety of ways, which makes GeoGebra a complete tool and an important support... more
In this paper, we will discuss possible uses of the free educational software GeoGebra in solving math problems. The software’s resources allow doing it in a variety of ways, which makes GeoGebra a complete tool and an important support for math teachers. Data relative to the thirteenth edition of the GeoGebra course promoted by Paraná State University have been scrutinized. Some of the solutions to two specific problems, performed by some of the participants, have been analyzed in details. By doing so, it was possible to appraise GeoGebra’s versatility and usefulness, since it allows undertaking dynamical constructions in various areas of mathematics and provides teachers with a great opportunity to enrich their classes.
The processes of teaching and learning mathematics represent a path notoriously fraught with difficulties. Historically, such a discipline has always been viewed as 'difficult' by students, not only in Brazil. It's a common view that it... more
The processes of teaching and learning mathematics represent a path notoriously fraught with difficulties. Historically, such a discipline has always been viewed as 'difficult' by students, not only in Brazil. It's a common view that it requires a lot of effort and concentration and that failure is always in the lurch. To reverse this negative image, there is a constant search for alternative methodologies in the daily school life, in order to facilitate these processes. The purpose of this article is to report an experience of activity in the perspective of the Inquiry Teaching, carried out in a class of the sixth year of elementary school, devoted to the teaching of fractions. It will be shown that this teaching perspective aroused the students' interest and participation, providing moments in which they could conduct a mathematical discussion under the coordination of the teacher, a characteristic that distinguishes Inquiry Teaching from directive teaching.
The aim of this work is to present the results of a workshop concerning the use of cell phone, developed by three fellows of the PIBID Math project of the Universidade Estadual do Paraná - campus Apucarana. The workshop involved four... more
The aim of this work is to present the results of a workshop concerning the use of cell phone, developed by three fellows of the PIBID Math project of the Universidade Estadual do Paraná - campus Apucarana. The workshop involved four sixth grade classes of the Colégio Estadual Antônio dos Três Reis de Oliveira, in Apucarana. The goal of the activity was to integrate technology into the classroom and show the students how they can use their smartphones to favor the understanding of a certain subject. In this specific case, the idea was to learn the multiplication table, but in a pleasant and dynamic way, for a test was due the next week. We will also weave considerations on the importance of playing games and using technology in class. Why don’t we have game-centered subjects in our teacher training colleges?

Resumo: O presente trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar o resultado de uma oficina envolvendo um aplicativo de celular, desenvolvida por três bolsistas do projeto de matemática do PIBID da Universidade Estadual do Paraná - campus Apucarana e realizada com quatro turmas do sexto ano do Colégio Estadual Antônio dos Três Reis de Oliveira, da cidade de Apucarana. O objetivo da atividade foi trazer a tecnologia para dentro da sala de aula e mostrar para os estudantes como podem utilizar seus smartphones para a compreensão de uma determinada matéria. A proposta principal foi a de que os alunos aprendessem a tabuada de multiplicação, estudando de uma forma mais divertida e dinâmica, em vista de uma prova que teriam na semana seguinte. Considerações sobre a importância tanto do lúdico quanto das novas tecnologias em sala de aula também serão tecidas. Por que, em nossas universidades, na formação de educadores/professores, não existem disciplinas centradas no lúdico?
In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this position from a quite famous criticism put forward by Rosen (1994), according to which while manifestationalism can be seen as more compatible... more
In their recent "A modest defense of manifestationalism" (2015), Asay and Bordner defend this position from a quite famous criticism put forward by Rosen (1994), according to which while manifestationalism can be seen as more compatible with the letter of empiricism than other popular stances, such as constructive empiricism, it fails nonetheless to make sense of science. The two authors reckon that Rosen's argument is actually flawed. In their view, manifestationalism could in fact represent a legitimate thesis about the nature of scientific inquiry. In this paper, I will show that Asay and Bordner's criticisms to Rosen are actually off target. Moreover, they rest upon an understanding of what the aim of science is that might serve to their purposes, but that does not seem to be in line with the scientific enterprise. Perhaps constructive empiricism still represents the best compromise so far presented between strict empiricism and the acknowledgment of the rationality of science.
Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. Still, the output of a telescope is different from that of a microscope, for in the latter case it is not possible to empirically investigate... more
Bas van Fraassen maintains that the actual function of optical instruments is producing images. Still, the output of a telescope is different from that of a microscope, for in the latter case it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between the observer, the image and the detected entity, while in the former it is - at least in principle. In this paper I argue that this is a weak argument to support the belief in the existence of exoplanets that, according to van Fraassen, comes with accepting a theory that posits these entities. If a constructive empiricist asserts the empirical adequacy of such a theory, she might be relying on typical realist arguments, instead - of the very same ilk as the ones used to defend the veridicality of microscopic images. Perhaps the time has come for van Fraassen to explain his view on telescopes.
O presente artigo aborda possiveis usos do software livre GeoGebra na resolucao de problemas matematicos. Os recursos disponiveis no referido software permitem resolver o mesmo problema de varias maneiras, o que torna o GeoGebra uma... more
O presente artigo aborda possiveis usos do software livre GeoGebra na resolucao de problemas matematicos. Os recursos disponiveis no referido software permitem resolver o mesmo problema de varias maneiras, o que torna o GeoGebra uma ferramenta completa e um importante auxilio para os docentes de matematica em sala de aula. Pesquisando dados referentes a decima terceira edicao do curso de GeoGebra promovido pela Universidade Estadual do Parana, foram analisados dois enunciados de problemas e algumas resolucoes dos mesmos, realizadas por cursistas. Ao faze-lo, pode-se constatar a versatilidade e a utilidade do GeoGebra, o qual permite realizar construcoes dinâmicas em varias areas da matematica, fornecendo aos docentes uma grande oportunidade para enriquecer suas aulas.
O problema da justificacao das inferencias indutivas, tambem conhecido como ‘o problema de Hume’, parece ter perdido forca a partir do seculo passado, depois que varios autores negaram que a ciencia siga o metodo  indutivo.  Van ... more
O problema da justificacao das inferencias indutivas, tambem conhecido como ‘o problema de Hume’, parece ter perdido forca a partir do seculo passado, depois que varios autores negaram que a ciencia siga o metodo  indutivo.  Van  Fraassen  foi  alem  e  recentemente  negou  que  a  inducao  exista. O  objetivo  deste trabalho e mostrar como, para propor uma visao da ciencia coerente com essa rejeicao, na reconstrucao do filosofo  holandes  e  o observavel  (termo  crucial  para  o  empirismo  construtivo  dele)  que  antecede logicamente o ato de observar e nao vice-versa, segundo aquela que chamamos de ‘imagem reversa da observacao’.
Resumo: A visão antirrealista acerca da ciência de Bas van Fraassen desempenhou um papel determinante no desenvolvimento da filosofia da ciência recente. Particularmente, seu empirismo construtivo tem sido amplamente discutido e... more
Resumo: A visão antirrealista acerca da ciência de Bas van Fraassen desempenhou um papel determinante no desenvolvimento da filosofia da ciência recente. Particularmente, seu empirismo construtivo tem sido amplamente discutido e criticado, nas revistas especializadas, e constitui um tópico comumente abordado nos programas das disciplinas de filosofia da ciência. Outros aspectos do empirismo de van Fraassen são menos conhecidos. Entre eles, sua abordagem empirista às leis científicas, sua reavaliação, relativamente recente, do que significa ser um empirista e seu estruturalismo empirista. O presente estudo visa a oferecer uma panorâmica desses diferentes aspectos do empirismo de van Fraassen e mostrar como estão relacionados entre si. Detém-se, ainda, sobre a natureza do voluntarismo epistêmico de van Fraassen e seu nexo com a filosofia da ciência empirista desse autor.
O presente trabalho apresenta o resultado de uma oficina envolvendo um aplicativo de celular, desenvolvida por três bolsistas do Projeto de Matemática do PIBID da Universidade Estadual do Paraná - campus Apucarana e realizada com quatro... more
O presente trabalho apresenta o resultado de uma oficina envolvendo um aplicativo de celular, desenvolvida por três bolsistas do Projeto de Matemática do PIBID da Universidade Estadual do Paraná - campus Apucarana e realizada com quatro turmas do 6º ano do Colégio Estadual Antônio dos Três Reis de Oliveira, da cidade de Apucarana. O objetivo da atividade foi trazer a tecnologia para dentro da sala de aula, mostrando para os estudantes como eles podem utilizar seus smartphones para a compreensão de uma determinada matéria. A proposta principal foi a de que os alunos aprendessem a tabuada de multiplicação, estudando de uma forma mais divertida e dinâmica, em vista de uma prova que teriam que realizar na semana seguinte. Considerações sobre a importância tanto do lúdico, quanto das novas tecnologias em sala de aula também serão tecidas. Por que, em nossas universidades, na formação de educadores/professores, não existem disciplinas centradas no lúdico?
RESUMO: A ênfase no papel da observação, uma das características salientes do empirismo, está reafirmada no empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen através da primazia atribuída por esse à distinção entre observável e inobservável.... more
RESUMO: A ênfase no papel da observação, uma das características salientes do empirismo, está reafirmada no empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen através da primazia atribuída por esse à distinção entre observável e inobservável. Neste artigo será mostrado que, apesar de sua atualidade em filosofia da ciência, particularmente graças â enfase que van Fraassen lhe atribui, a questão da observação e da observabilidade na verdade é tão antiga quanto a própria filosofia e remete ao desejo, definitório do empirismo, de manter-se 'dentro dos limites'.
RESUMO: A noção de comunidade epistêmica é essencial para a caracterização da observabilidade, conceito-chave para o empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen. Segundo o filósofo holandês, com efeito, observável seria uma abreviação de... more
RESUMO: A noção de comunidade epistêmica é essencial para a caracterização da observabilidade, conceito-chave para o empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen. Segundo o filósofo holandês, com efeito, observável seria uma abreviação de observável-para-nós. Neste trabalho será mostrado que a suposta rigididade do autor de A Imagem Científica, o qual parece não estar disposto a admitir mudanças na composição da comunidade epistêmica (constituída, segundo ele, pela raça humana), é na verdade uma assunção de modéstia e de bom senso; trata-se do reconhecimento de que o empreendimento científico nada mais é do que uma atividade humana, entre muitas outras. ABSTRACT: The notion of epistemic community is crucial for the characterization of observability, a cornerstone for Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. As a matter of fact, observable is, to him, a short for observable-by-us. In this work, it will be shown that the alleged rigidity of the author of The Scientific Image, appa...
Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particle physics. In a recent paper on this topic (2012), Brigitte Falkenburg defended that only scientific realism can make sense of it and that... more
Astroparticle physics is an interdisciplinary field embracing astronomy, astrophysics and particle physics. In a recent paper on this topic (2012), Brigitte Falkenburg defended that only scientific realism can make sense of it and that realist beliefs constitute an indispensable methodological principle of research in this discipline. The aim of this work is to show that there exists an anti-realist alternative to this account, along the lines of what Bas van Fraassen showed in his famous book The Scientific Image (1980). Problems and results of astroparticle physics can be understood from an empiricist point of view too, namely that of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, which is a more modest and metaphysics-free alternative to scientific realism. Although constructive empiricism can make sense of science no worse than scientific realism does, van Fraassen’s goal is not to demonstrate that his stance is the only viable position, but just that it is not incoherent or proven fal...
Neste ano de 2020, celebra-se o quadragésimo aniversário de The Scientific Image, o seminal livro de Bas van Fraassen. Causa surpresa, depois de tanto tempo, ainda mais considerando o quanto a proposta desse autor foi debatida nestas... more
Neste ano de 2020, celebra-se o quadragésimo aniversário de The Scientific Image, o seminal livro de Bas van Fraassen. Causa surpresa, depois de tanto tempo, ainda mais considerando o quanto a proposta desse autor foi debatida nestas quatro décadas, a publicação, no número de março da revista Metascience, de mais uma resenha da obra do fundador do empirismo construtivo. Em “Concluding unscientific image”, Hans Halvorson defende que nela não se propõe apenas uma defesa de uma perspectiva antirrealista acerca da ciência - e, ao mesmo tempo, uma crítica ao realismo científico -, mas se coloca também em discussão o próprio modo de fazer filosofia que, desde Quine, parecia dominar a filosofia analítica. O presente estudo pretende focar nas alegações de Halvorson acerca daquilo que a afirmação da adequação empírica de uma teoria comportaria - e que segundo ele, van Fraassen teria em mente - e mostrar que talvez não correspondam àquilo que van Fraassen realmente defende em seu livro.
Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen’s controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not “windows on an invisible world”, but rather “image generators”. Both authors also claim that, since in a... more
Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen’s controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not “windows on an invisible world”, but rather “image generators”. Both authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic view about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary to what Kusch maintains, this might not be a neutral way to render scientific evidence. Moreover, a constructive empiricist can support a realist interpretation of microscopic images. In fact, constructive empiricism and van Fraassen’s own anti-realism do not necessarily amount to the same thing.
Resumo Apresenta-se uma resenha crítica do livro Variational Approach to Gravity Field Theories - From Newton to Einstein and Beyond (2017), de autoria do astrofísico italiano Alberto Vecchiato. Na obra, Vecchiato mostra que a física... more
Resumo Apresenta-se uma resenha crítica do livro Variational Approach to Gravity Field Theories - From Newton to Einstein and Beyond (2017), de autoria do astrofísico italiano Alberto Vecchiato. Na obra, Vecchiato mostra que a física assim como a conhecemos pode ser construída a partir de modelos matemáticos simples, gradativamente complexificados ao introduzir novos princípios. O leitor é guiado, progressivamente, a percorrer os passos que conduzem da física clássica àquela relativística e a entender como isso acontece e quais são as motivações. Ademais, ao apresentar de modo claro e elegante a abordagem variacional às teorias de campo gravitacional, Vecchiato mostra uma preocupação constante em conduzir o leitor de forma que esse entenda o funcionamento e a relevância da técnica que o autor considera a mais poderosa e o conceito mais unificador da física teórica. Cada capítulo é enriquecido com exercícios, dos quais é oferecida uma resolução passo a passo, de modo que o leitor pos...
A ênfase no papel da observação, uma das características salientes do empirismo, está reafirmada no empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen através da primazia atribuída por esse à distinção entre observável e inobservável. Neste artigo... more
A ênfase no papel da observação, uma das características salientes do empirismo, está reafirmada no empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen através da primazia atribuída por esse à distinção entre observável e inobservável. Neste artigo será mostrado que, apesar de sua atualidade em filosofia da ciência, particularmente graças â enfase que van Fraassen lhe atribui, a questão da observação e da observabilidade na verdade é tão antiga quanto a própria filosofia e remete ao desejo, definitório do empirismo, de manter-se ‘dentro dos limites’.
A noção de comunidade epistêmica é essencial para a caracterização da observabilidade, conceito-chave para o empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen. Segundo o filósofo holandês, com efeito, observável seria uma abreviação de... more
A noção de comunidade epistêmica é essencial para a caracterização da observabilidade, conceito-chave para o empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen. Segundo o filósofo holandês, com efeito, observável seria uma abreviação de observável-para-nós. Neste trabalho será mostrado que a suposta rigididade do autor de A Imagem Científica, o qual parece não estar disposto a admitir mudanças na composição da comunidade epistêmica (constituída, segundo ele, pela raça humana), é na verdade uma assunção de modéstia e de bom senso; trata-se do reconhecimento de que o empreendimento científico nada mais é do que uma atividade humana, entre muitas outras.
O presente artigo irá discorrer sobre o uso de jogos para o ensino da matemática, em busca de um aprendizado mais efetivo e consistente dos conceitos dessa disciplina. Em particular, será apresentado o resultado de uma oficina aplicada em... more
O presente artigo irá discorrer sobre o uso de jogos para o ensino da matemática, em busca de um aprendizado mais efetivo e consistente dos conceitos dessa disciplina. Em particular, será apresentado o resultado de uma oficina aplicada em turmas do segundo e do terceiro ano do ensino médio do colégio estadual “Heitor Cavalcanti de Alencar Furtado” (Apucarana, PR). Nela, foi utilizado um jogo criado pela autora do presente trabalho,“1º grau ou grau?”, que envolve dois tópicos importantes do conteúdo programático de matemática do ensino médio: às equações de primeiro grau e a trigonometria. O objetivo da oficina foi trabalhar esses dois conceitos de maneira lúdica e colaborativa, mas também verificar se esse pode ser ao mesmo tempo um modo eficaz e produtivo de desenvolver o processo de ensino-aprendizagem da disciplina. Pelas observações das professoras que supervisionaram a atividade e pelas respostas que os discentes forneceram em um questionário aplicado posteriormente, concluimos...
En su reciente artículo “A modest defense of manifestationalism” (2015), Asay y Bordner defienden la posición de una famosa crítica presentada por Rosen (1994), según la cual, aunque el manifestacionalismo puede ser más compatible con el... more
En su reciente artículo “A modest defense of manifestationalism” (2015), Asay y Bordner defienden la posición de una famosa crítica presentada por Rosen (1994), según la cual, aunque el manifestacionalismo puede ser más compatible con el espíritu del empirismo que otras vertientes bastante conocidas, tales como el empirismo constructivo, no logra, sin embargo, interpretar de manera efectiva la ciencia. Los dos autores consideran que, en realidad, el argumento de Rosen falla. Según ellos, el manifestacionalismo puede de hecho representar una tesis legítima acerca de la naturaleza de la investigación científica. En este trabajo mostraré que las críticas de Asay y Bordner a Rosen en realidad no dan en el blanco. Además, reposan sobre una interpretación del objetivo de la ciencia que puede servir para los propósitos de los autores, pero que no es aceptable. Quizás el empirismo constructivo todavía sea el mejor compromiso encontrado hasta la fecha entre un empirismo riguroso y el reconoc...
Resumo Em 1985, Alan Musgrave levantou uma séria objeção contra a possibilidade, por parte de um empirista construtivo, de traçar de maneira coerente a distinção - crucial para ele - entre observáveis e inobserváveis. Em sua sucinta... more
Resumo Em 1985, Alan Musgrave levantou uma séria objeção contra a possibilidade, por parte de um empirista construtivo, de traçar de maneira coerente a distinção - crucial para ele - entre observáveis e inobserváveis. Em sua sucinta resposta, no mesmo ano, Bas van Fraassen afirmou que o argumento de Musgrave funciona somente no interior da chamada “abordagem sintática” das teorias, porém, perde sua força no contexto da “visão semântica”. Mas isso não é suficiente, segundo F. A. Muller, que publicou dois artigos (2004 e 2005), com o objetivo de estender a política epistêmica do empirismo construtivo. Para tanto, Muller propôs uma caracterização rigorosa da observabilidade, que só pode ser realizada utilizando-se a lógica modal. O resultado foi uma nova política epistêmica (mais ampla) para o empirismo construtivo, que o próprio Van Fraassen aparentemente endossou (MULLER; VAN FRAASSEN, 2008). Neste artigo, será mostrado que, todavia, a política epistêmica emendada de Muller é supérfl...
Em seu último livro (2008), Bas van Fraassen, o fundador do empirismo construtivo, propôs uma categorização das imagens em forma de tabela. O intuito dele, todavia, era discutir da realidade daquilo que essas representam e não enfrentar a... more
Em seu último livro (2008), Bas van Fraassen, o fundador do empirismo construtivo, propôs uma categorização das imagens em forma de tabela. O intuito dele, todavia, era discutir da realidade daquilo que essas representam e não enfrentar a questão das imagens em si. Uma das consequências é que permaneceu em aberto saber o que seriam, então, aquelas imagens que o filósofo holandês chama de alucinações públicas – reflexos na água, miragens no deserto, arco-íris, etc. Neste artigo será defendido que somente deveriam ser consideradas como imagens aquelas que o são no sentido relevante (representacional) e que, por essa e outras razões, a tabela de van Fraassen deveria ser corrigida. Ademais, como a física nos ensina, a classe das imagens que têm esse nome, mas que na verdade são objetos, é mais ampla do que van Fraassen pensa(va). O conjunto dos objetos que podem ser observados não contém somente coisas concretas, mas vai além daquilo que o ‘realismo do senso comum’ sugere. Além de pedra...
RESUMO: No âmbito do empirismo construtivo, a célebre posição acerca dos objetivos da ciência de Bas van Fraassen, o ato de observar desempenha um papel crucial. Segundo Buekens e Muller defendem, em um artigo de 2012, o filósofo holandês... more
RESUMO: No âmbito do empirismo construtivo, a célebre posição acerca dos objetivos da ciência de Bas van Fraassen, o ato de observar desempenha um papel crucial. Segundo Buekens e Muller defendem, em um artigo de 2012, o filósofo holandês deveria caracterizá-lo como um ato intencional, porque, na ciência, as observações são realizadas com um propósito. Nesta análise, que abordará também a distinção entre observar e observar que, introduzida por Hanson e Dretske, será mostrado que, ao contrário, considerações ligadas à intencionalidade do ato de observar são supérfluas para traçar a distinção entre entidades observáveis e inobserváveis da qual o empirismo construtivo depende.
Recorrer a atividades lúdicas na área do ensino, como por exemplo utilizar jogos em sala de aula, é hoje em dia uma prática cada vez mais comum. Neste artigo é relatada uma experiência realizada no âmbito do PIBID em um colégio estadual... more
Recorrer a atividades lúdicas na área do ensino, como por exemplo utilizar jogos em sala de aula, é hoje em dia uma prática cada vez mais comum. Neste artigo é relatada uma experiência realizada no âmbito do PIBID em um colégio estadual do interior do Paraná, derivando algumas conclusões sobre a utilização e a contribuição dos jogos matemáticos nas práticas de ensino e aprendizagem de crianças e jovens, assim como sobre a importância desses recursos e estratégias didáticas como objeto de aprendizagem e fixação do conhecimento.  
A reductio ad absurdum foi elevada por Zenao de Eleia a unico metodo que permitiria vislumbrar a verdadeira realidade, invisivel tanto aos sentidos quanto a maneira de pensar comum. Mostrando uma certa continuidade com os filosofos... more
A reductio ad absurdum foi elevada por Zenao de Eleia a unico metodo que permitiria vislumbrar a verdadeira realidade, invisivel tanto aos sentidos quanto a maneira de pensar comum. Mostrando uma certa continuidade com os filosofos anteriores, nao so na busca de um procedimento para que a especulacao pudesse avancar, como tambem na mesma rota de afastamento daquilo que e mais proximo, conhecido e particular (visivel) em direcao aquilo que e menos conhecido, distante e universal (invisivel), para dize-lo em termos aristotelicos, Zenao utilizou-se de argumentos aporeticos como unico caminho possivel para poder entrever o ‘reino do Ser’. Esse, com efeito, e invisivel nao somente aos nossos sentidos, como tambem ao nosso raciocinio ordinario. Eis que somente a ‘via do nao-ser’, a unica que poderia ser trilhada apos Parmenides, como diz Wolff, nos permite ter uma ideia, por quanto vaga, daquilo que e ‘verdadeiramente invisivel’. Tao invisivel ao ponto de ser inalcancavel ate mesmo pelo p...
O objetivo do presente estudo e analisar o conceito de observabilidade segundo Bas van Fraassen e a relevância desse conceito para a vertente filosofica conhecida como Empirismo Construtivo. Nosso exame mostrara como a questao da... more
O objetivo do presente estudo e analisar o conceito de observabilidade segundo Bas van Fraassen e a relevância desse conceito para a vertente filosofica conhecida como Empirismo Construtivo. Nosso exame mostrara como a questao da discriminacao entre a parte observavel e a parte inobservavel do mundo desenvolve um papel crucial na discussao acerca do empreendimento cientifico, independentemente das posicoes filosoficas conflitantes. A dicotomia observavel / inobservavel e fundamental para o empirismo logico, mas nao deixa de ser relevante para a posicao adversaria, o realismo cientifico. Procuraremos demonstrar que a emergencia de uma nova forma de antirrealismo, o empirismo construtivo de van Fraassen, como uma terceira via entre as duas vertentes, sera alicercada nessa dicotomia. A centralidade da nocao de observabilidade no debate atual da filosofia da ciencia sera tambem evidenciada neste trabalho.
Existe um discurso ontologico inerente ao empirismo construtivo de van Fraassen? Parece que sim, apesar dessa vertente filosofica, referencia para o empirismo contemporâneo, se propor como tese epistemologica. Trata-se, alias, de uma... more
Existe um discurso ontologico inerente ao empirismo construtivo de van Fraassen? Parece que sim, apesar dessa vertente filosofica, referencia para o empirismo contemporâneo, se propor como tese epistemologica. Trata-se, alias, de uma questao muito atual, considerando como em epoca recente o filosofo holandes mudou de opiniao acerca da possibilidade de observarmos fenomenos opticos comuns, como o arcoiris. Isso torna necessaria uma discussao acerca do que e um fenomeno no uso de van Fraassen, como Foss afirmava ha mais de vinte anos atras, mas tambem – e essa e uma questao entrelacada – de qual ontologia e assumida pelo empirismo contrutivo.
1.Introduction: The Relevance of an Adequate Characterization of Observability (for Constructive Empiricism)According to Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, if one accepts science, then she is ready to believe what its... more
1.Introduction: The Relevance of an Adequate Characterization of Observability (for Constructive Empiricism)According to Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, if one accepts science, then she is ready to believe what its theories say about the observable parts of the world as true, while the rest needs no matter (see van Fraassen, 2005: 111).What van Fraassen means by "observable" has been an object of debate over the last decades, but there exists a simple way of disposing of the matter, by saying that we can use whichever meaning of the word we want "and go from there." As if whether there is something wrong with van Fraassen's characterization of "observable" or not were irrelevant for his view of science.If we adopt voluntarism as our epistemological framework, this might apparently be the case. Within voluntarist epistemology, issues of justification do not arise and one's set of beliefs just needs to show logical consistency and ...
According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is its inner (concave) part of the farther, reflective one, and not the always-facing-Earth side of our natural satellite . To make his point... more
According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is its inner (concave) part of the farther, reflective one, and not the always-facing-Earth side of our natural satellite . To make his point clearer, he put forward the famous example of a double eclipse involving the fictional planets Far and Near . From the observer’s vantage point, the two planets have the same apparent diameter and overlap . What the agent sees is a dark disk, but believes that what she is seeing is Near, because Far is behind it . Sorensen claims that what she actually sees is planet Far and that the causal theory of perception explains why this is the case . Of course, this position stands against common sense . Sorensen shows that it counters Alvin Goldman’s renowned observation criteria too . Nonetheless, he maintains, since Near is causally idle and the agent does see something, the only possible conclusion is that she sees Far, pace Goldman – and common sense . In...
According to Bas van Fraassen, a postulated entity which can only be detected by means of some instrument should not be considered observable. In this paper I argue that (1) this is not correct; (2) someone can be a constructive... more
According to Bas van Fraassen, a postulated entity which can only be detected by means of some instrument should not be considered observable. In this paper I argue that (1) this is not correct; (2) someone can be a constructive empiricist, adhering to van Fraassen’s famous anti-realist position, even admitting that many entities only detectable with a microscope are observable. The case of the paramecium, a very well-known single-celled organism, is particularly instructive in this respect. I maintain that we actually observe paramecia and not just detect them, contrary to what van Fraassen claims. As a matter of fact, even if we can only perceive these protozoans by using a microscope, we are in condition to know that the relevant counterfactual conditions (like the ones Bueno proposed in 2011) are met. Moreover, paramecia satisfy observability and existence criteria proposed by Buekens (1999) and Ghins (2005). But admitting paramecia and the like among the observables does not th...
Os processos de ensino e aprendizagem da matematica representam um caminho notoriamente repleto de dificuldades. Historicamente, tal disciplina sempre foi vista como ‘dificil’ por parte dos estudantes, nao apenas no Brasil. E opiniao... more
Os processos de ensino e aprendizagem da matematica representam um caminho notoriamente repleto de dificuldades. Historicamente, tal disciplina sempre foi vista como ‘dificil’ por parte dos estudantes, nao apenas no Brasil. E opiniao comum que ela exige muito esforco e concentracao e que o insucesso esta sempre a espreita. Para reverter essa imagem negativa no cotidiano escolar existe uma busca constante por metodologias alternativas, que propiciem e facilitem os referidos processos. O presente artigo tem por objetivo relatar uma experiencia de atividade na perspectiva do Ensino Exploratorio, realizada em uma turma do 6o ano do Ensino Fundamental e finalizada ao ensino de fracoes. Sera mostrado que essa perspectiva de ensino despertou o interesse e a participacao dos alunos, proporcionando momentos nos quais os mesmos puderam realizar uma discussao matematica sob a coordenacao do professor, caracteristica que distingue o Ensino Exploratorio do ensino diretivo.
Bas van Fraassen’s antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously rests upon a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In order to back his empiricist stance, the Dutch philosopher put... more
Bas van Fraassen’s antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously rests upon a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In order to back his empiricist stance, the Dutch philosopher put forward his own characterization of observability. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the point of constructive empiricism is not lost if the line is drawn in a somewhat different way from how he draws it. This means that other characterizations of observability can support this antirealist stance, provided they allow for a viable distinction between the observable and the unobservable. The aim of this work, however, is not to propose another characterization of observability that fits constructive empiricism, but to put forward a little amendment to van Fraassen’s own antirealism, to the effect that it can actually be seen as a coherent position, albeit controversial, since its present consistency might be called into question. Palavras-chave: antireali...
In a recent work published in this journal, "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação" (2016), Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva identify four critical lines proposed by Bas van Fraassen against the form of... more
In a recent work published in this journal, "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação" (2016), Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva identify four critical lines proposed by Bas van Fraassen against the form of abductive reasoning known as 'inference to the best explanation' (IBE). The first one, put forward by the Dutch philosopher in his seminal book The Scientific Image (1980), concerns the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva consider that the distinction is of no relevance to the scientific practice. For this reason, they address van Fraassen's allegations against IBE qua justification of the existence of unobservable entities in a couple of pages and prefer focusing on the other lines they identified. The aim of this work is to pour over the analysis that the two authors perform about van Fraassen's mentioned argument and some realists' replies, particularly in the section that Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva devote to this topic. This will allow us to clarify van Fraassen's vision on scientific practice and on the 'immersion in the theoretical world-picture'. The importance and the relevance of the distinction between observables and unobservables will also be reaffirmed.
A visão antirrealista acerca da ciência de Bas van Fraassen desempenhou um papel determinante no desenvolvimento da filosofia da ciência recente. Particularmente, seu empirismo construtivo tem sido amplamente... more
A  visão  antirrealista  acerca  da  ciência  de  Bas  van  Fraassen  desempenhou  um  papel  determinante  no  desenvolvimento  da  filosofia  da  ciência  recente.  Particularmente,  seu  empirismo  construtivo  tem  sido  amplamente  discutido  e  criticado,  nas  revistas  especializadas,  e  constitui  um  tópico  comumente  abordado  nos  programas  das  disciplinas  de  filosofia  da  ciência.  Outros  aspectos  do  empirismo  de  van  Fraassen  são  menos  conhecidos.  Entre  eles,  sua  abordagem  empirista  às  leis  científicas, sua reavaliação, relativamente recente, do que significa ser um empirista e seu estruturalismo empirista. O presente estudo visa a oferecer uma panorâmica desses diferentes aspectos do empirismo de  van  Fraassen  e  mostrar  como  estão  relacionados  entre  si.  Detém-se,  ainda,  sobre  a  natureza  do  voluntarismo epistêmico de van Fraassen e seu nexo com a filosofia da ciência empirista desse autor.
O empirismo construtivo e o argumento de Musgrave Artigos / Articles O empirismO cOnstrutivO e O argumentO de musgrave: um prOblema Ou um pseudOprOblema? 1 Alessio Gava 2 resumO: Em 1985, Alan Musgrave levantou uma séria objeção contra a... more
O empirismo construtivo e o argumento de Musgrave Artigos / Articles O empirismO cOnstrutivO e O argumentO de musgrave: um prOblema Ou um pseudOprOblema? 1 Alessio Gava 2 resumO: Em 1985, Alan Musgrave levantou uma séria objeção contra a possibilidade, por parte de um empirista construtivo, de traçar de maneira coerente a distinção-crucial para ele-entre observáveis e inobserváveis. Em sua sucinta resposta, no mesmo ano, Bas van Fraassen afirmou que o argumento de Musgrave funciona somente no interior da chamada "abordagem sintática" das teorias, porém, perde sua força no contexto da "visão semântica". Mas isso não é suficiente, segundo F. A. Muller, que publicou dois artigos (2004 e 2005), com o objetivo de estender a política epistêmica do empirismo construtivo. Para tanto, Muller propôs uma caracterização rigorosa da observabilidade, que só pode ser realizada utilizando-se a lógica modal. O resultado foi uma nova política epistêmica (mais ampla) para o empirismo construtivo, que o próprio Van Fraassen aparentemente endossou (MULLER; VAN FRAASSEN, 2008). Neste artigo, será mostrado que, todavia, a política epistêmica emendada de Muller é supérflua. Ademais, e sobretudo, o argumento de Musgrave parece, na verdade, ser um pseudoproblema. palavras-chave: Empirismo construtivo. Observabilidade. Política epistêmica. Problema de Musgrave. Bas van Fraassen. 1 O presente trabalho se beneficiou de conversas esclarecedoras com o Prof. Otávio Bueno, da University of Miami (EUA), ao qual registro meu agradecimento.