Osservazione

This  contribution  is  a  kind  of  continuum  of  the  previous  paper,  published  in  2/2018  issue.  The article is divided into three parts: the first contains a presentation of the “Asilo nel Bosco” of Ostia Antica (Kindergarten in the Forest), which draws upon the Outdoor Education model. The second part, in turn, presents the findings of an exploratory investigation conducted in this educational organization with  the  aim  of  verifying  and  highlighting  the  strengths  of  the  methodology  of  Outdoor  Education  applied in the experience. Finally, the third part examines both the psychophysical benefits of outdoor education  and  the  socio-cultural  challenges  to  which  schools  in  the  forest  are  exposed  in  the  Italian  context. Contribution of many educators of the past, such as J. J. Rousseau, M. Montessori, R. Steiner and P. Freire, are tangibly re-emerging in schools in the woods in Italy, in Europe and around the world, creating one of the most precious opportunities for healthy development of the child.

by Marcos Rodrigues da Silva and Debora Minikoski

Resumo: o breve artigo é uma réplica à resposta de Alessio Gava ao artigo "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação", publicado em Problemata (v. 7. n. 1, 2016), de autoria de Marcos Rodrigues da Silva e Debora Minikoski.

Palavras-chave: Alessio Gava; empirismo construtivo; realismo.

Constructive empiricism is a prominent anti-realist position whose aim is to make sense of science. As is well known, it also crucially depends on the distinction between what is observable and what scientific theories postulate but is unobservable to us. Accordingly, adopting an adequate notion of observability is in order, on pain of failing to achieve the goal of grasping science and its aim. Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, identifies observation with unaided (at least in principle) human perception. So far, though, he has not put forward any convincing argument to support this (unpopular) stand. He did it on the grounds that it is (allegedly) a matter for empirical investigation and not for philosophical analysis. Nonetheless, he seems to have introduced a criterion for observability that is not the result of any scientific research and is not supported by any scientific theory. Countering his own words, he seems to have instead reflected qua philosopher on how an empiricist should interpret the meaning of the verb " to observe. " And then he has tried to defend his point of view by means of metaphors and analogies. But the very same metaphors and analogies van Fraassen has put forward could be used to back up the opposite position. Worse, not only does his criterion counter common sense, it does not work either. Perhaps the time has come for van Fraassen to put forward or endorse alternative criteria of observability.

In a recent work published in this journal, "Van Fraassen e a inferência da melhor explicação" (2016), Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva identify four critical lines proposed by Bas van Fraassen against the form of abductive reasoning known as 'inference to the best explanation' (IBE). The first one, put forward by the Dutch philosopher in his seminal book The Scientific Image (1980), concerns the distinction between observable and unobservable entities. Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva consider that the distinction is of no relevance to the scientific practice. For this reason, they address van Fraassen's allegations against IBE qua justification of the existence of unobservable entities in a couple of pages and prefer focusing on the other lines they identified. The aim of this work is to pour over the analysis that the two authors perform about van Fraassen's mentioned argument and some realists' replies, particularly in the section that Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva devote to this topic. This will allow us to clarify van Fraassen's vision on scientific practice and on the 'immersion in the theoretical world-picture'. The importance and the relevance of the distinction between observables and unobservables will also be reaffirmed.

According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is its inner (concave) part of the farther, reflective one, and not the always-facing-Earth side of our natural satellite. To make his point clearer, he put forward the famous example of a double eclipse involving the fictional planets Far and Near. From the observer's vantage point, the two planets have the same apparent diameter and overlap. What the agent sees is a dark disk, but believes that what she is seeing is Near, because Far is behind it. Sorensen claims that what she actually sees is planet Far and that the causal theory of perception explains why this is the case. Of course, this position stands against common sense. Sorensen shows that it counters Alvin Goldman's renowned observation criteria too. Nonetheless, he maintains, since Near is causally idle and the agent does see something, the only possible conclusion is that she sees Far, pace Goldman – and common sense. In this paper, I try to demonstrate that Sorensen is wrong and that the correct solution to the eclipse riddle is that the observer sees Near. As a matter of fact, besides meeting common sense and Goldman's observability criteria (along with others), Near can be legitimately be considered the object of a successful perceptual discrimination even in the light of the causal theory of perception .

The emphasis on the role of observation, one of the hallmarks of Empiricism, is
reaffirmed by the primacy of the distinction between observable and
unobservable in Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. In this paper it
will be showed that, despite being one the main topics of discussion in
contemporary philosophy of science, particularly thanks to van Fraassen, the
question of observation and observability is actually so old as philosophy itself
and has to do with the willingness, that defines empiricism, to keep ‘within the
limits’.

1.Introduction: The Relevance of an Adequate Characterization of Observability (for Constructive Empiricism)According to Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, if one accepts science, then she is ready to believe what its theories say about the observable parts of the world as true, while the rest needs no matter (see van Fraassen, 2005: 111).What van Fraassen means by "observable" has been an object of debate over the last decades, but there exists a simple way of disposing of the matter, by saying that we can use whichever meaning of the word we want "and go from there." As if whether there is something wrong with van Fraassen's characterization of "observable" or not were irrelevant for his view of science.If we adopt voluntarism as our epistemological framework, this might apparently be the case. Within voluntarist epistemology, issues of justification do not arise and one's set of beliefs just needs to show logical consistency and ...

Il lavoro del sociologo non può prescindere dall’uso dello sguardo, dall’osservazione di ciò che accade e dal tentativo di provare a “restituire” in qualche modo quella parte di realtà sociale cui si sta interessando. Se già il vedere ha un rilevante valore sociologico, spesso messo da parte o non sufficientemente analizzato, la stretta interconnessione di visuale e linguistico compone l’attività sociologica stessa, un’attività pratica che nel suo intento descrittivo-interpretativo si avvale di determinate categorie e compie scelte che possono essere anche viste come piccoli esercizi di potere, che costituiscono ciò che descrivono mentre lo descrivono. Se l’iconic o pictorial turn ci spingesse, invece, a prendere le distanze dal rilievo che assume la dimensione linguistica, rivendicando l’autonomia di quella visuale e discutendo l’idea stessa di descrizione, si tratterebbe allora di mettere meglio a fuoco i compiti della sociologia. Questo volume dà spazio a diverse prospettive e approfondisce alcuni aspetti epistemico-metodologici della ricerca visuale, proponendo tecniche di integrazione tra scrittura accademica e dimensione visuale nella diffusione dei risultati di ricerca.

Observation and observability represent a crucial topic in the philosophy of science, as the huge production of papers and books on the subject attests. Philosophy of perception, on the other hand, is a field of study that took root effectively in the last decades. Even then, apparently, the main theories on observation have neglected the issue of determining which is the object of a successful perception. As a consequence, some theses that have recently been proposed are actually paradoxical, despite deriving from renowned and, prima facie, satisfactory and complete theories. This is the situation of van Fraassen’s assertions on the (putative?) observation of images and rainbows (see 2001 and 2008) and of Sorensen’s claims on what one actually sees during a solar eclipse (see 2008). After putting forward a possible characterization of the object of perception, with no need of discussing the issue of intentionality, in this paper it will be shown that devoting adequate attention to this topic, together with acknowledging that observation is an action, in which the subject plays an indeed active role, would make it possible to avoid drawing conclusions that do not seem to be correct, such as the ones just mentioned. Any theory about observation will only be complete and adequate provided the object of perception is taken into account.