Coup D`etats

This article is about the behavior patterns that challenge the legitimacy of the law. The analysis focuses on the basic forms of questioning the legitimacy of such rights namely the right to resistance, civil disobedience and revolution. The considerations made in this article are designed to synthetic analysis of the issues related to the questioning of state power by the citizens. The questions which are the subject of the following scientic reection of an academic nature can be examined from the point of view of dierent branches of science. They are intensely analyzed on the ground of philosophy of history, political and economic history, political science, and many others. What seems obvious, in this paper emphasis is put on the subject of study of the law. e rights to resistance, civil disobedience and revolution as forms of challenging the legitimacy of the law are insuciently elaborated on in the science of the law and constitute a research area which few representatives of jurisprudence have the courage to step into. Typically, the aforementioned issues are raised in the science of the constitutional law however in a clearly insucient way. For centuries, problems related to challenging the legitimacy of the law have been the subject of interest of the philosophy of the law and it is mainly there where we can nd both questions and answers related to the binding force of the law as a system of norms of behaviour of particular importance. The following considerations are aimed at indicating basic theses to be coped with by a modern researcher focused on these socio-legal phenomena. Secondly, the following scientic reections onto the forms of challenging the legitimacy of the law stimulate further research onto the area which should denitely be carried out due to its importance and nature, as well as meaning in the context of problems we face in modern times.

What are we to make of the contradiction between a military commander saying that the constitution could be torn up if not followed, and a takeover that the military says it conducted under the rules of the constitution, even as it bypassed them? Can these positions be reconciled?

Anti-populism is antagonistic opposition to what it names-pejoratively-as "populism", going beyond criticism of aspects of a perceived populist movement or government to become a radical antagonist to it. The anti-populist field is capable of including right wing, liberal and left sectors, even though right wing and liberal sectors will tend to have predominance over left wing ones there. In Latin America even though it tends to present itself as a defense of liberal democracy it has supported or paved the way for anti-democratic coups against perceived "populist" governments. Classist, racist and neoliberal economic discourses are historically prominent in Latin American antipopulism. This shows historic socio-political forms and narratives linked to economic, social, and ethnic cleavages of the region manifesting in political conflict around discourse about "populism". An overview of the phenomenon of anti-populism is provided, then an analysis with it of the 3 historical waves of "populism" in Latin America.

Issues regarding coup d’etat are of interest to many academic disciplines and are subject of studies in both political and legal sciences (history of the law and state, constitutional law, criminal law and criminal proceedings). The following article focuses on the concept of coup d’etat as one form of questioning the legitimacy of the law. The author considers the broad scope of coup d’etat, and includes its various forms such as the right to resistance, civil disobedience and revolution from the historical and normative perspectives.

Peru has a long history of democracy’s breakdowns where the construction of political discourse has been very important to legitimize authoritarian measures. Therefore, this article analyzes Alberto Fujimori’s discourse in the last Peruvian coup d’état in 1992. Owing to the fact that authoritarian discourse could become legitimate once again in a future political or economic crisis in Peru, this research concludes that the Peruvian government should consider the real importance of the issue of political order in contemporary politics.

Myanmar’s Spring Revolution is a grassroots, bottom-to-top
nationwide resistance against the military ruling class that retook
state power in February 2021. It is unprecedented in scale,
fascinating in form and shows a profound societal change within
the country.
http://crisea.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Policy-brief-Michal-Lubina.pdf

Türkiye‟de askerler söylemsel bazda sürekli olarak bir yandan politikanın dışında olduklarını vurgularlarken diğer yandan da, ya rejim üzerindeki nüfuzlarını çeşitli uygulamalarla dolaylı olarak hissettirmişler ya da en nihayetinde doğrudan askerî darbeler gerçekleştirmişlerdir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, söylem ve eylemin bu çelişkisinin izinden giderek, Türkiye‟de askerlerin siyasete yönelik tutumlarının ikircikli örüntüsünü çözümlemeye çalışmaktır. Bu amaçla II. Meşrutiyet‟ten 1980‟lere değin çeşitli rütbelerden askerler tarafından yazılan anılardan faydalanılmıştır. Bu kaynaklardan hareketle yapılan incelemelerde, askerlerin siyasetle ilişkisinde dört ana düzey tespit edilmiştir. Bunlardan birincisi askerlerin “siyasete mesafeli durma” düzeyidir. İzleme olarak adlandırılabilecek ikinci düzey ise vatan, memleket ve misyon gibi güdüler uyarınca askerlerin siyaseti sürekli izlemesine atıf yapmaktadır. Üçüncü ve dördüncü düzeyler, izlemenin sonucuna göre iki şekilde tezahür etmektedir. Bunların birinde yasadışı uygulamalar, diğerinde ise yasal denilebilecek çeşitli uygulamalarla gerçekleştirilen karşı-siyaset eylemleri yer almaktadır. Bunların arasında zorunlu olarak zamansal bir hiyerarşi bulunmamakta birlikte; belirli bir anda bunların birçoğunun bir arada yer alabildiği görülmektedir.

ENGLISH: Military in Turkey always emphasized that it stand out-of-politics while, on the other hand, they continuously intervened into politics if not overtly ousted it. Tracking down this dilemma amid discourse versus praxis, this study aims to analyse the ambivalent nature of Turkish military‟s attitude towards politics. For this aim, a set of life narratives written by soldiers at various ranks from 1908 to 1980s is reviewed. As a conclusion, it is argued that Turkish military‟s attitude towards politics shall be identified at four discrepant moments. The first can be called as the principle discourse moment which refers to be out-of-politics. The second moment, which may be called as “observing”, embraces an aptitude contradictory to former one. The third and fourth moments emerge as a consequence of so called “observing” act. One of these is some illegal praxis like committees and juntas; and the other one is several techniques of anti-political actions in a legal framework. It is worth noting that there is not a temporality among them necessarily; which means that more than one of those moments may be effective at a given era.

Myanmar is a complex country with an unlucky history that includes oppressive British colonization, Japanese invasion during World War II followed by independence, the world’s longest-running civil wars, and disastrous military coups. The coup of 1962 resulted in half a century of authoritarian military rule.  The most recent coup on 1 February 2021 reversed a decade of political and economic reforms, resulted in crimes against humanity, and removed any glimmer of hope for Myanmar’s future.  The terrifying trauma of a third wave of COVID-19 in mid-2021, dominated by the Delta variant, left much of the country sick and gasping for breath.

Since the health system was left stricken by the February coup and its consequences, it is reasonable to lay many of the excess deaths from the COVID-19 outbreak at the feet of the military junta, on top of those—over one thousand deaths by September 2021—more  directly attributed to the regime through the repression and torture of its opponents.

The question then arises of what action the international community can, or should, take to minimize this suffering and pursue justice for the victims. There are a range of legal options for seeking redress through international courts, but the most extreme international response is humanitarian intervention, or military intrusion by a country or countries to protect at-risk communities. This option is typically reserved for the most egregious examples of repression or human suffering.

However, this intervention has a controversial and contested history. Developing countries of the Global South have often considered it is an excuse for former imperial or colonial powers to breach their sovereignty and reimpose colonial forms of servitude, arguing that there is no basis for it in the UN Charter or international law.  As a result, over the last two decades there has been a global diplomatic attempt to provide a more liberal and collaborative approach to responding to mass human suffering under the banner of “the Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).

Despite being a somewhat obscure UN-supported concept, many protesters in Myanmar held up signs calling for R2P during large anti-junta demonstrations following the coup.  While these calls reflected the desperation of protesters, they were in stark contrast to the demonstrations held little more than twelve months earlier against the UN, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the international community more broadly over a genocide case brought against Myanmar and its military for the massacres and repression of the long-suffering Muslim Rohingya ethnic group in 2017. The brutal repression of the Rohingya resulted in 740,000 refugees fleeing across the border to Bangladesh in a matter of months but the general population held little sympathy for the ethnic minority, believing the military’s false assertions that they were all “terrorists”. The coup has resulted in a reassessment of the treatment of the Rohingya in Myanmar, with some people now arguing that they were misled by the military.

The fickle response of Myanmar’s people to potential or actual international attempts to provide redress for injustices within the country demonstrates the diplomatic high-wire act required to achieve widely accepted outcomes when engaging in acts that might undermine a state’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, the international community has a responsibility to act in cases of extreme human suffering and, within the R2P doctrine, there are a range of international legal and diplomatic responses that fall short of military intervention.

It was clear, even before the coup, that the crises and suffering in Myanmar required this sort of concerted international action. Following the coup, the urgency of this response has only increased. Nevertheless, there has always been a limit to the extent that external actors can solve internal dilemmas within states. After the Cold War there was a belief in some quarters that liberal democracy would become the norm throughout the world as we reached “the end of history”.  This belief was hopelessly optimistic, even at the time, and the rise of China in particular has meant that authoritarian regimes throughout Southeast Asia and beyond now have avenues of diplomatic and material support beyond liberal democratic states and their multilateral development banks.

This development has severely limited the capacity of states to apply financial pressure on repressive regimes, although there are still levers that can be pulled; in the days after the coup the US froze $1 billion of Myanmar’s funds in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York after the military tried to withdraw it.  Nevertheless, the shift towards a multipolar world has imposed severe constraints on the options for any actors that seek to address suffering and injustices in tyrannical states.

There are three aspects of contemporary Myanmar that have caused enormous human suffering and require an international response, whether under the banner of R2P or not: ethnic conflicts including the Rohingya massacres, the military coup, and the COVID-19 outbreak. The rest of this article begins with an analysis of the concept of R2P, then investigates these three dark features of contemporary Myanmar and the current international responses. It concludes by discussing some potentially useful diplomatic actions for the international community to take within the limits that face international actors in this dire situation.

Together, for better or worse: King Michael’s companions in exile
Abstract
On January 3rd 1948, King Michael unwillingly left Romania, after His Majesty’s forced abdication, together with his mother, Queen-Mother Helen, and a number of loyal friends from the Palace staff: his aides-de-camp Constantin Petre-Lazăr and Jacques Vergotti, the marechal of the Royal Court Dimitrie Negel, his secretary Mircea Ionniţiu with his fiancée and brother, his close friend Vania Negroponte with his wife and son, the Queen’s lady in waiting Nelly Catargi, the head of the palace security Eugen Bianu, and Palace servants Konrad and Anna Schöpp, husband and wife. In this article, the author studies the existing testimonies regarding the whereabouts of King Michael, Queen Helen and their devoted supporters from the communist coup on December 30 until they left Romania by train, reaching Switzerland. All evidence show that all of them were strictly supervised by the communist authorities and the soviet-organized „Tudor Vladimirescu” Division (some, like Vergotti, were temporarily arrested), and neither the King, his mother or his companions weren’t allowed to take with them any valuable possessions, excepting a part of the usufruct of the Crown Domains (to which the King was legally intitled), invalidating the allegations that the Romanian monarch left the country in a luxuriant manner.

This publication aims at giving an overview of the history and development of political art in Myanmar with a focus on the most important artists and their art works. It features three generations of artists and also includes the period of political reforms and the recent events in 2021.

The developments on February 1 — when the Tatmadaw detained Suu Kyi, president Win Myint along with other senior political leaders and slapped a ‘state of emergency’ for one year in a power grab — flips Myanmar’s politics formally back to the template India is accustomed with for decades, and this time New Delhi may even hold a marginal leverage over China.

As we know that Turkey faced with 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, 2007 and 2016 military coup or coup attempt, each in a different character. But, in this study we evaluated before and after May 27th 1960 Military Coup D’état in Turkey and its results, briefly. / Bilindiği üzere Türkiye; 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, 2007 ve 2016’da gerçekleştirilen askeri darbeler ya da darbe girişimleri ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bunların her biri farklı bir karaktere sahiptir. Bu çalışma özelinde, öncesi ve sonrası zemininde Türkiye'deki 27 Mayıs 1960 askeri darbesinin sonuçları kısaca değerlendirilmiştir.

This article analyzes the hierarchy of factors in the development of crisis trends in a consolidated democracy using the example of the United States of America. The authors assess the surge of political instability in the United States, which led to the deconsolidation of the liberal democracy regime, through the prism of centrifugal processes within the American elite and the erosion of democratic institutions over the past 30 years. The main problem of the study is the contradiction between the crisis of democratic regimes in the countries of the Euro-Atlantic region and the high indicators of the factors of the consolidation of democracy, according to classical political science theories. The authors use the path analysis method to determine the main path and hierarchy of factors of erosion of the liberal democracy regime in the United States, which is an example of the "old" democracy and, according to traditional political science, is the most protected from destructive processes. Consideration of the case of deconsolidation of the liberal democracy regime in the United States, thus, sheds light on the possible ways of democracy reversion and risk factors for stability of democratic political systems.

The focus of my dissertation is put on three of the most prominent and ambiguous figures in 20th century Iran: Nematollah Nassiri (1910-1979), Tayyeb Hajj Rezai (1912-1963), and Shaban Jafari (1921-2006). All three can be seen as paradigmatic actors who in their specific milieus possessed the capacity to control and conduct violence. All three actors are highly polarizing figures, bundling the public discourses both in the historical moment and in retrospective commemorative cultures. Therefore, the protagonists ideally demonstrate the processes, in which configurations of masculinity are determined and embedded in the discursive substructure of the prevailing gender order. Additionally, the different paths of life of these three men crossed on several significant occasions, coinciding with major events in Iranian history. Furthermore, evaluating the interactions of these actors is theoretically framed in terms of the theory of rackets of Horkeimer and Adorno, because the actors exemplify and confirm the hypothesis that cliquishness and racketeering are the fundamental factors in the formation of all societies.

La presente investigación aborda las actitudes autoritarias de la opinión pública en los tiempos de crisis económica, política y social. Para esto se estudia el golpe de estado de abril de 1992 del ex presidente Alberto Fujimori en el Perú. Asimismo, se compara esta coyuntura con otras en donde la crisis ha sido controlada, por lo cual las demandas de orden son superadas y la opinión pública se centra en temas como la corrupción, la economía, entre otros. Este artículo quiere resaltar que el reto de investigación en América Latina no está en estudiar si la opinión pública tiene o no una cultura política autoritaria, sino más bien en comprender la lógica de las crisis políticas excepcionales y su efecto en la opinión pública.

The article is devoted to an ‘econometric’ analysis of the events in Egypt that happened in summer 2013. The analysis of the Egyptian Stock Exchange indices suggests that the 2013 Egyptian coup d’état was prepared to a very considerable extent by the reconciliation between the Egyptian economic and military elites. It also suggests some additional hints regarding the split between the Arabian monarchies (Qatar, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates on the other) that displayed itself during the Egyptian crisis.

Resumen: Esta investigación tiene por objetivo analizar los acontecimientos que tuvieron lugar en la cabecera de la II Región Militar, la ciudad de Sevilla, durante el golpe de Estado del 23-F. Su importancia radica en que rompe la idea tra-dicional sobre este acontecimiento, que siempre se ha considerado limitado a tres grandes prota-gonistas-el teniente general Jaime Milans del Bosch y Ussía, el general de división Alfonso Ar-mada Comyn, y el teniente coronel de la Guardia Civil Antonio Tejero Molina-, y dos localizacio-nes: Madrid y el territorio de la III Región Militar, con cabecera en Valencia. Palabras clave: Fuerzas Armadas; Golpe de Es-tado; 23-F; transición española; involución mili-tar ______________________________________ Abstract: This research aims to analyze the events that took place at the head of the Second Military Region, the city of Seville, during the coup d' etat of 23-F. Its importance lies in breaking the traditional idea of this event, which has always been considered limited to three protagonists Lieutenant General Jaime Milans del Bosch and Ussía, Mayor General Alfonso Armada Comyn and Lieutenant Colonel of the Civil Guard Antonio Tejero Molina, and two locations: Ma-drid and the territory of the Third Military Region , with head in Valencia. 1 Soto Carmona, Álvaro, "La transición a la democra-cia en el sur de Europa. La historia como instrumento para su comparación". Estudios Internacionales, 162 (2009), pp. 17-18. 1. LA TRANSICIÓN INACABADA Y LA CRISIS DE FINALES DE LOS AÑOS 70. LA PERVIVENCIA DEL PODER MILITAR l proceso de transición a la democracia, iniciado en España a partir del 3 de julio de 1976 con la elección de Adolfo Suárez González como presidente del Gobierno por el Jefe del Estado, Juan Carlos I, cul-minó, en su primera fase, con la aprobación de la constitución de 1978. Sin embargo, quedaban todavía tres procesos abiertos de gran importan-cia: la debilidad del sistema de partidos, la orga-nización territorial del Estado, que sólo se había perfilado en el texto constitucional y sobre todo el control de las Fuerzas Armadas (FAS), que im-plicaba la desaparición definitiva del poder mili-tar, heredado del régimen franquista 1. La debilidad del sistema de partidos tenía su má-xima expresión en los dos grandes partidos de la democracia española. En el caso de la Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD)-el partido que bajo el liderazgo de Suárez, lideró el proceso de cam-bio político-, se inició, tras las elecciones de 1979, su crisis definitiva, plasmada en la apari-ción de un sector "crítico" a la persona de Suárez en la UCD 2. En el caso del Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), su crisis se manifestó en dos acontecimientos de gran importancia. El pri-mero, fue la crisis provocada en esta organiza-ción política durante su XXVIII congreso (mayo de 1979), donde el sector encabezado por el se-2 Attard, Emilio, Vida y muerte de la UCD. Barcelona,

The coup attempt in 2016 emerged in the mid of a deep crisis. The efforts of the government to deal with the crisis by repressive means increasingly strained Turkey’s international reputation – which is crucial for the highly internationalised regulation of the Turkish economy. Nevertheless, AK Parti survived the coup attempt in July 2016. Employing a Gramscian understanding of hegemony and a Neogramscian approach on international relations, this chapter argues, that AK Parti survived the crisis and the coup attempt because there had been no alternative actor capable to politically organise bourgeois hegemony as AK Parti did it throughout the 2000’s.

https://books.google.de/books?id=enm6DwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=de#v=onepage&q&f=false

Öz Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihinin ilk askeri darbesi 27 Mayıs 1960 tarihinde gerçek-leşti. Darbenin sonrasında diğer medya organlarında olduğu gibi mizah basınında da yaşananlarla ilgili yoğun bir içerik üretilmiştir. Bu içeriğin niteliği üzerine genel değerlendirmeler yapılmış olmakla beraber, farklı mizah türlerinden örneklerle dö-nemin içeriği yorumlanmamıştır. Bu incelemede 1960'ın mizah basınında darbenin nasıl algılanıp yorumlandığı değerlendirilecektir. Makalenin girişinde iktidar, güç ve bunların mizahla ilişkisi teorik yaklaşımlarla ele alındıktan sonra ikinci bölümde Demokrat Parti dönemi siyasi gelişmeleri kronolojik olarak özetlenecek, üçüncü ve dördüncü bölümdeyse sırasıyla 27 Mayıs sonrası mizah basınının yapısı ve darbe hakkında üretilen içeriğin niteliği örneklerle yorumlanacaktır.




The first coup d’état in the Republic of Turkey occurred on May 27, 1960. It generated a great deal of discussion around the event in the media, including the humor press. While there has been general commentary on the characteristics of such content, the reviews have failed to analyze the content with examples from various humor media.This study examines how the coup was perceived and interpreted in 1960’s humor media. The introduction explores politics, power, and their relation to humor from a theoretical perspective. Section two summarizes, in chronological order, the political events of the Democratic Party era. Sections three and four elaborate further on the structure of humor media post-coup, and the characteristics of content created relating to coup with examples.

This paper looks at the shifting manner in which paramilitarism has been reproduced in Haiti, examining how it has evolved from the Cold War into the era of capitalist globalisation. The central argument of this article is that paramilitarism has not disappeared but has been altered, and that this has occurred in part due to the changing strategies of elites in the global era. Rather than a permanent and widespread force, paramilitary groups are utilised in smaller numbers and only in certain ‘emergency periods’, serving a purpose of containment: targeting political threats and beating down those large populations whose social reproduction is not required by transnational capital. This has been a difficult situation for elites to manage, as they often have only limited control over such ruthless, corrupt and violent elements, which they sometimes require. Following the 1991 and 2004 coup d’états in Haiti, a military–paramilitary–bourgeoisie grouping has repeatedly worked to recover its impunity and revamp its coercive apparatus. Under these conditions, and even more increasingly in the wake of the 2010 earthquake, a variety of elites and technocrats (most importantly, US policymakers) have sought to politically remake the
country alongside processes

Starting on January 2, Kazakhstan was rocked by weeks of unprecedented violent protests triggered by rising fuel prices. The protesters clashed with police and security forces across major cities, killing dozens of people, including 16 security personnel. On January 13, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev claimed that the violence was an attempted coup d’etat. So far, security forces have detained 12,000 people. Given the structural issues like high inflation, high and rising unemployment, the youth bulge, domestic, regional and global power-tussles among various clans, corporations and countries, orderly rule will not come easily to chaotic Kazakhstan. It is still unclear how long the foreign troops will stay on. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken ominously said the other day, “one lesson of recent history is that once Russians are in your house, it’s sometimes very difficult to get them to leave”. The Russian foreign ministry found Blinken’s remarks offensive and stated: “When Americans are in your house, it can be difficult to stay alive and not be robbed or raped”.

This special report provides updates on the military coup that took place in Myanmar on 1 February 2021, with special emphasis on the actions of Myanmar’s armed forces (Tatmadaw) and the subsequent resistance by the people that prompted a nationwide civil disobedience movement (အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမုှ or CDM) and other anti-coup protests. It also led to the creation of a parallel government and the exodus of hundreds of protestors to the borderlands.
Equally importantly, the report analyses the degree to which, and why, Myanmar’s eastern neighbour, India, has (or has not) responded to the coup and the subsequent events. It explores the reasons for India’s position on the current coup which is fractured between words and deeds, where upholding democracy is encouraged in diplomatic statements issued by India’s foreign ministry, but the strength of the language is tempered by links with the military forged over the past decade persist in managing geopolitical, realpolitik and national interests. These include, among others, balancing China and securing India’s Northeast borders as well as economic interests in Southeast Asia.
Keywords: Military Coup, Tatmadaw, Civil Disobedience Movement, Myanmar, India.

Turkish-US relations intensified after the Second World War and have continued till today without any interruption. What have ensured the continuity of these bilateral relations can be explained over several factors. This paper takes the military coups d‟etat as the principal factorand examines how Turkish-US relations have been affected by the three military coups in Turkey with ten-year intervals between each. We analysed the developments before and after the coups in order to see what kinds of change and continuity took place in those periods in terms of the quality of Turkish-US relations. Before the military coups, it is seen in general that Turkey questioned its unconditional dependency on the USA, wanted to diversify its foreign relations, and tried to convert its relations with the USA into a balanced dependency at least. Following the coups, however, the bilateral relations were put into the orbit of unbalanced dependency again. This situation makes one think that the issues of dissidence in Turkish-American relations before the military coups were tried to be solved through those coups d‟etat, and Turkey‟s efforts to be more independent in its domestic and foreign policy remained inconclusive in this way. From this point of view, it can be said that the three coups d‟etat in Turkey played an active and determinant role in ensuring the continuity of Turkish-US relations in favour of the USA at most.

There are two ideas being presented: first is that a new leader would need to pick up where Bhindranwale left off. The transition from Bhindranwale to this yet-unnamed commander acts as a microcosm for the progression of Sikh martial character from the peaceful Guru Nanak to Maharajah Ranjit Singh. The progression in martial character among Sikh leadership will give credit to the idea that a leader who is seasoned in tactical objectives will resonate with Sikhs, as a reminiscence of Ranjit Singh, and parallels will be drawn between the distant past’s evolution of leadership tactics, and the evolution from those of Bhindranwale to his successor. It will be evinced that a new leader would likely look past Bhindranwale’s sant persona and instead focus on succeeding Ranjit Singh’s position as the new Maharajah of a new Sikh State. The second part of this essay will be a bit of war gaming, putting forth that a coup d’état is the most probable course of action for such a leader. A coup is logical for many reasons: it aligns with the ideology of a dharam yudh, or just war;  as will be shown, a coup is the most probable conclusion that Sikh militant factions will ultimately come to; the idea of militant factions uniting for a mission is not new; and a new commander with military and political savvy will be needed to organize a coup. First, it is necessary to provide an overview of the evolving Sikh identity through the centuries. This essay can be viewed equally as both an academic investigation and security analysis.

Our empirical tests generally support the hypothesis that up to
certain values of the average per capita income its growth tends to
lead to increased risks of sociopolitical destabilization, and only in
the upper range of this indicator its growth tends to be associated
with the decrease of sociopolitical destabilization risks. However,
our analysis has shown that for various indices of sociopolitical
destabilization this curvilinear relationship can be quite different in
some important details. On the other hand, we detect the presence
of a very important exception. We show that the relationship
between per capita GDP and the intensity of coups and coup
attempts is not curvilinear; in this case we are rather dealing with a
pronounced negative correlation; a particularly strong negative
correlation is observed between this index and the logarithm of GDP
per capita. We demonstrate that this fact makes the
abovementioned bell-shaped relationship with respect to the
integral index of sociopolitical destabilization considerably less
distinct and makes a very significant contribution to the formation
of its asymmetry (when the negative correlation between per capita
GDP and sociopolitical destabilization among the richer countries
looks much stronger than the positive correlation among poorer
countries). However, our analysis shows that for all the other
indices of sociopolitical destabilization we do witness the bellshaped
relationship. On the other hand, for example, in relation to
such indices, as political strikes, riots and anti-government
demonstrations we deal with such an asymmetry that is directly
opposite to that mentioned above - with such an asymmetry, when a
positive correlation between GDP and instability for poorer
countries is much stronger than the negative correlation for richer
countries.

The Context: “Democracy doesn’t happen by accident. And we have to renew it with each generation… In my view, this is the defining challenge of our time.” – U.S. President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Summit for Democracy, December 9, 2021. There is no question that democratic institutions around the world are in peril. In 2020, nearly 75 percent of the world’s population resided in a country that experienced democratic backsliding. The Economist Intelligence Unit rated American democracy as “flawed” for five consecutive years (circa 2010s-2020s). In late 2020 and early 2021, the United States experienced its greatest democratic challenge in over 150 years with the January 6 attempted autogolpe, or self-coup d’état and accompanied insurrection spearheaded by mob violence.

The Course: is “[a]n examination of the role of the career administrator in a democratic system. Topics include the nature of the American democratic system and the ethical implications of non-elected administrators playing a key role in that system” (2015 Valdosta State University). We will explore the nexus of democracy and public administration, as well as provide an abbreviated intellectual heritage of the field. The main focus of this course will be on the inevitable tension and value conflicts that exist between public agencies, managed by unelected civil servants, and the political environment in which they operate. There are three principal themes of this course: (1) the intellectual and conceptual foundations of democracy; (2) unpacking the politics of the administrative state; and (3) understanding contemporary challenges to American democracy.