Can a fact constituted by an object A be grounded exclusively in facts which do not entail A as a... more Can a fact constituted by an object A be grounded exclusively in facts which do not entail A as a constituent? I call this the problem of extrinsic grounding. Prima facie, it seems that there are such cases. In this paper I provide a negative answer to this question. Firstly, I show why this is an important problem. Secondly, I will argue that all apparent cases of extrinsic grounding are merely apparent. My solution is based on the notion of the 'impure object'. In my view, to each apparent case of extrinsic grounding there is an underlying perspicuous intrinsic grounding link, in which the object of the grounded fact is constituted by an impure object. In the last section, I argue that my solution also works in the 'hard case' of grounding the existence of ordinary objects.
Naturalism in philosophy is characterized by the assumption that nature is the whole of reality. ... more Naturalism in philosophy is characterized by the assumption that nature is the whole of reality. Thus, the naturalist must try to show how concepts considered irreducible and trans-natural by traditional transcendental philosophy can be reduced to categories of natural science. In this article I analyze two strategies of reducing the notion of identity in naturalism proposed respectively by Quine and Wittgenstein. Key words: Naturalism, Identity, Quine, Wittgenstein.
In this chapter, I discuss two solutions to the Problem of Universal which are based on the notio... more In this chapter, I discuss two solutions to the Problem of Universal which are based on the notion of metaphysical grounding, viz. priority and grounding nominalism. In the first section I present the four many formulations of the Problem. In the second section I briefly introduce ostrich nominalism and the notion of metaphysical grounding. This is important because both priority and grounding nominalism claim, like ostrich nominalism, that first-order predicative facts are fundamental and justify this claim in terms of grounding. In the third section I explain why first-order facts should be considered fundamental. In the fourth section I deal with the One over Many argument and show why, according to the priority nominalism, universals do not exist. Finally, in the fifth section priority and grounding nominalism will be compared and evaluated. This is the main difference: while grounding nominalism rejects the existence of universals, grounding universalism accepts their existence as merely derivative.
The Problem of Universals is one of the oldest problems of metaphysics. And still, there is no ag... more The Problem of Universals is one of the oldest problems of metaphysics. And still, there is no agreement, neither about its explanandum nor about its explanans. What is the most adequate formulation of the problem? And what kind of explanation does it require? My aim in this paper is to offer an overview of these two basic questions in the contemporary debate. I will present the four most important formulations (section 1), discuss their connections (section 2) and how the three most prominent explanantia are related to these formulations (section 3). We will see that, despite the long history of the problem, in recent years new formulations and approaches have been proposed which may open up original perspectives on its solution.
Peter van Inwagen (2001) has given a probabilistic answer to the fundamental question 'why is the... more Peter van Inwagen (2001) has given a probabilistic answer to the fundamental question 'why is there something rather than nothing?': There is something, because the probability of there being nothing is 0. Some authors recently examined van Inwagen's argument and concluded that it does not really work. Three points are central in their criticism: (i) the premise which states that there is only one empty possible world is false, (ii) the premise which states that all possible worlds have the same probability is not plausible and (iii) the argument is not significant for the question it sets out to answer. In this paper, I shall show that (i) even if there are many empty worlds, this does not necessarily invalidate the argument in its general lines, (ii) the examples they offer to support the intuition that possible worlds may have different probabilities fail, and (iii) even if the conclusion of the argument does not really answer the question van Inwagen sets out to answer, it is still not an insignificant response to the question.
Fregeans and Russellians defend different conceptions on the truth-conditions of reports of attit... more Fregeans and Russellians defend different conceptions on the truth-conditions of reports of attitude ascriptions. Very often, they appeal to our intuitions and to pragmatic aspects to support their view. In this paper I propose a principle of adequacy of attitude-ascriptions. In the first section, I review the old puzzle concerning the failure of the principle of substitution salva veritate in attitude ascriptions. In the second section, I present my principle, which is based on the claim that by choosing a designator for an attitude-ascription a competent speaker is usually oriented by her supposition of the hearer’s epistemic state concerning the referent. In section 3, I apply my conception to some traditional tricky examples of attitude ascriptions in the literature. In section 4, I argue that even in non-standard situations (e.g. context of irony) a competent speaker must take into account the hearer’s epistemic state. Then, in the fifth section I suggest a consequence of my proposal for the discussion on exportation. Finally, in the concluding remarks I sketch some thoughts about the possibility of extending my pragmatic proposal to a semantic account of the truth-conditions of attitude-ascriptions.
Can a fact constituted by an object A be grounded exclusively in facts which do not entail A as a... more Can a fact constituted by an object A be grounded exclusively in facts which do not entail A as a constituent? I call this the problem of extrinsic grounding. Prima facie, it seems that there are such cases. In this paper I provide a negative answer to this question. Firstly, I show why this is an important problem. Secondly, I will argue that all apparent cases of extrinsic grounding are merely apparent. My solution is based on the notion of the 'impure object'. In my view, to each apparent case of extrinsic grounding there is an underlying perspicuous intrinsic grounding link, in which the object of the grounded fact is constituted by an impure object. In the last section, I argue that my solution also works in the 'hard case' of grounding the existence of ordinary objects.
In this paper I present an inferential criterion for distinguishing proper names and definite des... more In this paper I present an inferential criterion for distinguishing proper names and definite descriptions.
Can a fact constituted by an object A be grounded exclusively in facts which do not entail A as a... more Can a fact constituted by an object A be grounded exclusively in facts which do not entail A as a constituent? I call this the problem of extrinsic grounding. Prima facie, it seems that there are such cases. In this paper I provide a negative answer to this question. Firstly, I show why this is an important problem. Secondly, I will argue that all apparent cases of extrinsic grounding are merely apparent. My solution is based on the notion of the 'impure object'. In my view, to each apparent case of extrinsic grounding there is an underlying perspicuous intrinsic grounding link, in which the object of the grounded fact is constituted by an impure object. In the last section, I argue that my solution also works in the 'hard case' of grounding the existence of ordinary objects.
Naturalism in philosophy is characterized by the assumption that nature is the whole of reality. ... more Naturalism in philosophy is characterized by the assumption that nature is the whole of reality. Thus, the naturalist must try to show how concepts considered irreducible and trans-natural by traditional transcendental philosophy can be reduced to categories of natural science. In this article I analyze two strategies of reducing the notion of identity in naturalism proposed respectively by Quine and Wittgenstein. Key words: Naturalism, Identity, Quine, Wittgenstein.
In this chapter, I discuss two solutions to the Problem of Universal which are based on the notio... more In this chapter, I discuss two solutions to the Problem of Universal which are based on the notion of metaphysical grounding, viz. priority and grounding nominalism. In the first section I present the four many formulations of the Problem. In the second section I briefly introduce ostrich nominalism and the notion of metaphysical grounding. This is important because both priority and grounding nominalism claim, like ostrich nominalism, that first-order predicative facts are fundamental and justify this claim in terms of grounding. In the third section I explain why first-order facts should be considered fundamental. In the fourth section I deal with the One over Many argument and show why, according to the priority nominalism, universals do not exist. Finally, in the fifth section priority and grounding nominalism will be compared and evaluated. This is the main difference: while grounding nominalism rejects the existence of universals, grounding universalism accepts their existence as merely derivative.
The Problem of Universals is one of the oldest problems of metaphysics. And still, there is no ag... more The Problem of Universals is one of the oldest problems of metaphysics. And still, there is no agreement, neither about its explanandum nor about its explanans. What is the most adequate formulation of the problem? And what kind of explanation does it require? My aim in this paper is to offer an overview of these two basic questions in the contemporary debate. I will present the four most important formulations (section 1), discuss their connections (section 2) and how the three most prominent explanantia are related to these formulations (section 3). We will see that, despite the long history of the problem, in recent years new formulations and approaches have been proposed which may open up original perspectives on its solution.
Peter van Inwagen (2001) has given a probabilistic answer to the fundamental question 'why is the... more Peter van Inwagen (2001) has given a probabilistic answer to the fundamental question 'why is there something rather than nothing?': There is something, because the probability of there being nothing is 0. Some authors recently examined van Inwagen's argument and concluded that it does not really work. Three points are central in their criticism: (i) the premise which states that there is only one empty possible world is false, (ii) the premise which states that all possible worlds have the same probability is not plausible and (iii) the argument is not significant for the question it sets out to answer. In this paper, I shall show that (i) even if there are many empty worlds, this does not necessarily invalidate the argument in its general lines, (ii) the examples they offer to support the intuition that possible worlds may have different probabilities fail, and (iii) even if the conclusion of the argument does not really answer the question van Inwagen sets out to answer, it is still not an insignificant response to the question.
Fregeans and Russellians defend different conceptions on the truth-conditions of reports of attit... more Fregeans and Russellians defend different conceptions on the truth-conditions of reports of attitude ascriptions. Very often, they appeal to our intuitions and to pragmatic aspects to support their view. In this paper I propose a principle of adequacy of attitude-ascriptions. In the first section, I review the old puzzle concerning the failure of the principle of substitution salva veritate in attitude ascriptions. In the second section, I present my principle, which is based on the claim that by choosing a designator for an attitude-ascription a competent speaker is usually oriented by her supposition of the hearer’s epistemic state concerning the referent. In section 3, I apply my conception to some traditional tricky examples of attitude ascriptions in the literature. In section 4, I argue that even in non-standard situations (e.g. context of irony) a competent speaker must take into account the hearer’s epistemic state. Then, in the fifth section I suggest a consequence of my proposal for the discussion on exportation. Finally, in the concluding remarks I sketch some thoughts about the possibility of extending my pragmatic proposal to a semantic account of the truth-conditions of attitude-ascriptions.
Can a fact constituted by an object A be grounded exclusively in facts which do not entail A as a... more Can a fact constituted by an object A be grounded exclusively in facts which do not entail A as a constituent? I call this the problem of extrinsic grounding. Prima facie, it seems that there are such cases. In this paper I provide a negative answer to this question. Firstly, I show why this is an important problem. Secondly, I will argue that all apparent cases of extrinsic grounding are merely apparent. My solution is based on the notion of the 'impure object'. In my view, to each apparent case of extrinsic grounding there is an underlying perspicuous intrinsic grounding link, in which the object of the grounded fact is constituted by an impure object. In the last section, I argue that my solution also works in the 'hard case' of grounding the existence of ordinary objects.
In this paper I present an inferential criterion for distinguishing proper names and definite des... more In this paper I present an inferential criterion for distinguishing proper names and definite descriptions.
The Handbook presents over 130 compact original contributions to contemporary research on part-wh... more The Handbook presents over 130 compact original contributions to contemporary research on part-whole relations. The aim of the collection is to show that mereology is much more than the study of axiomatized reasoning systems. The relationship between part and whole is one of the most basic schemata of cognitive organization that operates not only at the level of language processing and propositional thought, but also at the level of sensory input processing. In all research disciplines, part-whole relations organize all three core components of research: data domains, methods, and theories. In short, part-whole relations play a fundamental role in how we perceive and interact with nature, how we speak and think about the world and ourselves, as societies and as individuals. For this reason the study of part-whole relations, both within and across domains, begins long before the meta-mathematically motivated inquiries of logicians at the beginning of the 20th century, and goes far beyond it. To convey for the first time structured access to this fecund and diversified research landscape is the aim of this collection.
These new essays mark the one hundredth anniversary of the publication of Bertrand Russell’s arti... more These new essays mark the one hundredth anniversary of the publication of Bertrand Russell’s article “On Denoting” in the journal Mind. The contributors are an international collection of scholars of Russell and the topics that he discussed. Starting with a reprint of the original article, the essays include historical studies of the antecedents of “On Denoting” in Russell’s earlier manuscript writings, the details of Russell’s arguments in the paper, including the notorious “Gray’s Elegy Argument”, Russell’s rejection of alternative theories of Gottlob Frege and Alexius Meinong, as well as various ideas about logical form and natural language that arise from the essay. Russell’s theory of definite descriptions still remains the “paradigm of philosophy” that Frank Ramsey called it, a model of analytic philosophy that has remained current from 1905 to 2005 and promises to continue to inspire philosophers.
Possible worlds have enjoyed a remarkable philosophical career. From the Scholastic era in medie... more Possible worlds have enjoyed a remarkable philosophical career. From the Scholastic era in medieval times through their later informal thematization, especially in Leibniz, and more contemporary model set theoretical formalization, and all the lively philosophical controversy that surrounds them today, the concept of a logically possible world has played a significant role in metaphysics and ontology, mathematical logic, formal and intuitive semantics, and in the exact modeling of many different kinds of relations. This new collection of previously unpublished essays includes reflective analyses of the current state of logically possible worlds ontology and semantics in modal logic and philosophical thought experiments by such eminent logicians and philosophers of logic and language as Jean-Yves Beziau, Hans Burkhardt, Manfred Kupffer, Nicholas Rescher, Johan van Benthem, John Woods, and the contributing editors Guido Imaguire and Dale Jacquette. The volume in its entirety represents a detailed and in-depth discussion of vital topics in the uses, abuses, meaning, and logical and metaphysical debate currently surrounding the concept of a logically possible world.
Beitragsautoren: Ignacio Angelelli, Berit Brogaard, Ralph M. Cahn, Wolfgang Degen, Carlos Dufour,... more Beitragsautoren: Ignacio Angelelli, Berit Brogaard, Ralph M. Cahn, Wolfgang Degen, Carlos Dufour, Guido Imaguire, Thomas Mormann, Kevin Mulligan, Christina Schneider, Barry Smith
Der Sammelband umfasst historische Beiträge von I.Angelelli und R. Cairn.
Die Beiträge von W. Degen und K.Mulligan nehmen Themen der Verbindung von Semantik, Logik und Ontologie auf. Th. Mormann bearbeitet ein mathematisch mereologisches Thema.
Ontologische Fragestellungen im engeren Sinne stehen im Zentrum der Arbeiten von C. Dufour,
G. Imaguire und C. Schneider. Schließlich stellt der Aufsatz von B. Brogaard und B. Smith einen Beitrag zu einem Forschungsgebiet der Ontologie der Medizin dar.
Der Band enthält ein Literaturverzeichnis, einen Sach- und Autorenindex und stellt in der gebotenen Kürze die Autoren und die Herausgeber vor.
Review of Metametaphysics, edited by David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman. Oxford Uni... more Review of Metametaphysics, edited by David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman. Oxford University Press, 2009, 544 pp.
Abstract Guido Imaguire:
In Logical Forms II Chateaubriand puts the simple question: Why should ... more Abstract Guido Imaguire:
In Logical Forms II Chateaubriand puts the simple question: Why should we accept Ockham's razor? He blames the principle of reduction as an unjustified dogma of nominalism. In this paper I present a justification for it. Contrary to Russelìs conception of reduction as elimination, I propose the thesis that reduction is explanation.
Abstract response:
Guido Imaguire proposes an epistemological (and ontological) formulation of Ockham’s razor in terms of the notion of explanatory reduction. Although in my response I express reservations about some aspects of the specific formulations, I agree with the general epistemological idea.
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Papers by Guido Imaguire
Starting with a reprint of the original article, the essays include historical studies of the antecedents of “On Denoting” in Russell’s earlier manuscript writings, the details of Russell’s arguments in the paper, including the notorious “Gray’s Elegy Argument”, Russell’s rejection of alternative theories of Gottlob Frege and Alexius Meinong, as well as various ideas about logical form and natural language that arise from the essay. Russell’s theory of definite descriptions still remains the “paradigm of philosophy” that Frank Ramsey called it, a model of analytic philosophy that has remained current from 1905 to 2005 and promises to continue to inspire philosophers.
This new collection of previously unpublished essays includes reflective analyses of the current state of logically possible worlds ontology and semantics in modal logic and philosophical thought experiments by such eminent logicians and philosophers of logic and language as Jean-Yves Beziau, Hans Burkhardt, Manfred Kupffer, Nicholas Rescher, Johan van Benthem, John Woods, and the contributing editors Guido Imaguire and Dale Jacquette.
The volume in its entirety represents a detailed and in-depth discussion of vital topics in the uses, abuses, meaning, and logical and metaphysical debate currently surrounding the concept of a logically possible world.
Der Sammelband umfasst historische Beiträge von I.Angelelli und R. Cairn.
Die Beiträge von W. Degen und K.Mulligan nehmen Themen der Verbindung von Semantik, Logik und Ontologie auf. Th. Mormann bearbeitet ein mathematisch mereologisches Thema.
Ontologische Fragestellungen im engeren Sinne stehen im Zentrum der Arbeiten von C. Dufour,
G. Imaguire und C. Schneider. Schließlich stellt der Aufsatz von B. Brogaard und B. Smith einen Beitrag zu einem Forschungsgebiet der Ontologie der Medizin dar.
Der Band enthält ein Literaturverzeichnis, einen Sach- und Autorenindex und stellt in der gebotenen Kürze die Autoren und die Herausgeber vor.
In Logical Forms II Chateaubriand puts the simple question: Why should we accept Ockham's razor? He blames the principle of reduction as an unjustified dogma of nominalism. In this paper I present a justification for it. Contrary to Russelìs conception of reduction as elimination, I propose the thesis that reduction is explanation.
Abstract response:
Guido Imaguire proposes an epistemological (and ontological) formulation of Ockham’s razor in terms of the notion of explanatory reduction. Although in my response I express reservations about some aspects of the specific formulations, I agree with the general epistemological idea.