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This paper will discuss the gradual formalisation of a status group in the later Roman Republic (122 – 23 BCE), which became the ordo equester under the principate. The political influence of the equites has long been acknowledged by scholars of the late Republic, although research on this topic has continuously focussed on the the publicani. Aside from the economic interests of this specific group, however, throughout this period the very diverse and loose group of the equites attempted to claim more public influence and extend its status. This paper claims that the transformation of the more loosely defined elite category of the equites had important consequences for how the tribunes of the plebs operated. The interaction between equites and the tribunate can elucidate the functioning of this institution in this crucial period of societal transformation. We will examine several instances of tribunician legislative proposals where groups of equites played a discernible role. This will be linked to a broader theory of how the tribunate of the plebs has to be analysed in the late Republic.

In this paper I shall research how the tribunes of the plebs decided between resisting or adopting claims that were put to them by members of the common people – the plebs. Instead of the model most prevalent in current academic theories, which sees the ambition of young elite members as the foremost factor, I shall propose an analysis on different levels. It was a complex interaction between ideological discourse, institutional expectations, personal ideology, perceived interests, and political contention by the plebeians themselves which steered the decision of the individual tribune. When multiple groups in society acted on a single issue, the frictions between these different factors became all the more important for the tribunes involved. Using some short case studies from the late Republic, I shall explain the theory proposed here and attempt to show both its usefulness and verifiability. Thereby I aim to introduce more complexity in our present-day view of how these tribunes dealt with multiple groups of ‘others’ in the late Roman Republic.

In this paper, I shall research the political aspects of the food supply in the metropolis of urban Rome in the Late Republic (133-23 BCE). By examining the problematic elements in the explanatory models that are pervasive in studies of Republican politics, a new model shall be proposed to better interpret interaction between the elite magistrates, especially the plebeian tribunes, and other social groups such as the urban plebs. This model, which is still work in progress, is based on various theories in the social sciences, including Tilly’s (and other’s) contentious politics and North’s new institutional economics.

Two features in traditional interpretations of the tribunes’ role in the various grain laws of the Roman Republic shall be closely examined. The first is the functional bias: to my knowledge, the tribunes’ motives have always been interpreted as part of an instrumental strategy. Propositions concerning the food supply were interpreted as a means to a greater end, such as further career advancement or a political base to use in advancing or legitimizing other policies. The second problem is the nobility bias: grain laws were clever initiatives by the Roman political elite (tribunes, other magistrates, or members of the senate).

This image perpetuates the vision of a strongly aristocratic Roman Republic. The notion that the plebs themselves considered the grain laws as an end is usually superficially assumed, but very few scholars would agree that they could take a certain level of initiative. This paper will propose that this was possible: the plebs were themselves partly responsible for instigating grain laws. However, this will not be a simple solution of turning the top-down perspective around. I shall suggest that the tribuni plebis, the primary magistrates to deal with these issues, were confronted with much more complex mechanisms between different social groups, and that these magistrates occupied a position of institutionalized contention.

"During the previous decade, Fergus Millar’s (1998) interpretation of the contio and comitia as elements of a democratic Late Roman Republic has inspired a vigorous debate. It has been argued that these assemblies did not represent the Roman population and must be understood as ritual reaffirmations of Rome’s social order. Only recently some critics have reviewed their rigorous dismissal of popular power. General studies on how the relation between masses and elites in this society can be described are still lacking. In this paper, I shall take one approach commonly ignored or dismissed by questioning how the masses interpreted politics and how they communicated this interpretation to the elites.
First, I shall research the possibility of a distinct ‘subaltern’ discourse of what shall be provisionally called the urban plebs. The problems presented by our sources do not permit the simple statement that the contiones were the only instances of political cultivation for these groups. Various alternative settings for possible interaction among the urban plebs will be proposed. I shall analyze how we can understand the political thought originating there as distinct from elite discourse. We shall see that there was a remarkable understanding among the plebs of elite politics, but understood in more confrontational and personified terms.
Second, possible avenues of bottom-up communication of grievances and demands formed by this discourse shall be explored. Robert Morstein-Marx, one of Millar’s critics, has already noticed how political graffiti was one means of expression. Other forms of collective action, such as besieging a house or contentious performances that can be described as carnavalesque shall be analyzed. Lastly, I shall emphasize the role of the tribuni plebis as mediators of bilateral communication."

In de Klassieke Oudheid is er een duidelijke ontwikkeling van de haveninfrastructuren door de staat merkbaar. Maar is het intensief ontwikkelen van die commerciële havens, zoals we bijvoorbeeld zien bij dePortus Trajanus, wel verenigbaar met de duidelijke afkeer die zowel Grieken als Romeinen hadden voor handel?  De auteur onderzoekt drie redenen waarom belasting op de handel geld in het laadje brengt.