Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, May 29, 2007
When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be calle... more When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I'm thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which can be taken to reveal directly the subject's present mental condition. We are able to improve on special access accounts and deflationary accounts, as well as familiar expressive accounts, by explaining both the asymmetries and the continuities between avowals and other pronouncements, and by locating a genuine though non-epistemic source for first-person privilege.
I defend the thesis that psychological states can be literally ascribed only to living creatures ... more I defend the thesis that psychological states can be literally ascribed only to living creatures and not to nonliving machines, such as sophisticated robots. My theme is that defenders of machine consciousness do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of the biological nature of a subject for the psychological significance of its behavior.
Language, Mind, and Art: Essays in Appreciation and Analysis, in Honor of Paul Ziff, ed. Dale Jamieson, 1994
Over three decades ago, in a brief but provocative essay, Paul Ziff argued for the thesis that ro... more Over three decades ago, in a brief but provocative essay, Paul Ziff argued for the thesis that robots cannot have feelings because they are "mechanisms, not organisms, not living creatures. There could be a broken-down robot but not a dead one. Only living creatures can literally have feelings." Since machines are not living things they cannot have feelings. Ziff's claim that machines cannot have feelings and the more general thesis that life is necessary to mind, which I will tag the LNM Thesis, seem to have the backing of common sense. Few of us would regard "animated" figures which we know to be mechanical automata as being conscious or sentient, even when they are artfully contrived to appear human. Although the thesis that there is a connection between life and mind has common sense appeal, it is surprisingly difficult to spell out that connection persuasively. That life is necessary to mind was disputed by philosophically astute critics at the time Ziff wrote, and it has become increasingly controversial as both hardware and software have become more sophisticated. If an organism is a complex physical entity whose consciousness arises from its electrochemical activity, then it seems that an appropriately designed system of nonliving electronics could harbor consciousness as well. Therefore, the LNM Thesis requires careful defense if we are to have philosophical warrant for Ziff's conclusion that no computer, for example, could ever be made to think and feel, or, in the broadest sense, to have a mind.
In the first half of what follows I will review Ziff's arguments against the idea that robots could be conscious, especially his appeal to our linguistic usage. In the second half I develop the idea that the active behavior of living animals and human beings, unlike the motions of inanimate mechanisms, carries special psychological significance. Machines cannot think or feel because they are different in kind from living human beings and animals, a difference which is obscured when we focus on the superficial fact that they are all highly structured "material systems."
An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all ... more An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an objective world beyond our subjective experiences. I argue that there is there is a fatal flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "external world." Therefore, no such justification is necessary. The feature of skepticism which I believe renders it vulnerable is the assumption that each of us has a right to be certain of his own existence as a subject of conscious experience even in the face of comprehensive doubt about our empirical beliefs.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 373-375, Jun 1994
In "The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism" I argue that traditional global epistemological s... more In "The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism" I argue that traditional global epistemological skepticism is incoherent because it mistakenly assumes that we can question our knowledge of the external world without undermining our self-knowledge. The rationale behind my argument is the idea that, since we are substantial agents who exist and act "in the world" among other material beings, the view that our knowledge of our own existence and nature is or can be exclusively subjective is misguided.
In a critical response to my essay, Anthony Brueckner claims that my reasoning fails to discredit the idea that one can adopt both "the Cartesian conception of self-knowledge as involving an inference to the existence of a mental substance" and "the Cartesian skeptical view concerning knowledge of the external world. Brueckner believes that my argument is of the "transcendental" variety, and I suspect he also believes that any reasoning of that kind is fatally flawed. In this discussion I explain why my argument escapes Brueckner's objection.
Body, Mind, and Method, ed by Donald Gustafson and Bangs Tapscott, 1979
Hovering in the background of investigations into human physiology is the promise or threat, depe... more Hovering in the background of investigations into human physiology is the promise or threat, depending upon how one looks at the matter that human beings are complete physical-chemical systems and that all events taking place within their bodies and all movements of their bodies could be accounted for by physical causes if we but knew enough. In this paper I consider the important question whether our coming to believe that this "mechanistic" hypothesis is true would warrant our relinquishing our conception of ourselves as beings who are capable of acting for reasons to achieve ends of our own choosing.
The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an... more The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments, the transmigration of souls, and the like. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. I will explore the problem of disembodiment from a somewhat different direction than has been tried before, one that leads to what seem to me more interesting and more definite conclusions about its unintelligibility. Furthermore, the approach I will be taking puts both the traditional mind-body problem and the competing claims of dualism and physicalism in a fresh light that can help us to understand better the nature of our embodied existence.
Much mischief concerning the concept of a human body is generated by the failure of philosophers ... more Much mischief concerning the concept of a human body is generated by the failure of philosophers to distinguish various important senses of the term 'body.' I discuss three of those senses and illustrate the issues they can generate by discussing the concept of a Lockean exchange of bodies as well as the brain-body switch.
After establishing his own existence by the Cogito argument, Descartes inquires into the nature o... more After establishing his own existence by the Cogito argument, Descartes inquires into the nature of the self that he claims to know with certainty to exist. He concludes that he is a res cogitans, an unextended entity whose essence is to be conscious. Although a considerable amount of critical effort has been expended in attempts to show how he thought he could move to this important conclusion, his reasoning has remained quite unconvincing. In particular, his critics have insisted, and I think quite rightly, that his claim to be "entirely and absolutely distinct" from his body is not justified by the reasoning which he offers in its support. Nevertheless, I also believe that the proffered criticisms of Descartes' sketchy defense of his position fail to provide us with a full understanding of either the force of his argument or the errors which he commits in reaching his conclusion. In what follows I propose to explain how his arguments may be filled in with certain reasonable premises which make his reasoning concerning his nature" appear less implausible and his mistakes more interesting than his critics have acknowledged.
Berkeley, Hume, and Russell rejected the traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities... more Berkeley, Hume, and Russell rejected the traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities which are supported by an "unknowable substratum." To them the proper alternative seemed obvious. Eliminate the substratum in which qualities are alleged to inhere, leaving a bundle of coexisting qualities--a view that we may call the Bundle Theory or BT. I examine two major types of BT developed by Russell and by G. F. Stout with the intention of showing that (1) the seemingly innocuous concept of "a quality" employed by these versions cannot be used to state their theories coherently, and (2) the fatal problems that the BT encounters point to a more satisfactory and interesting alternative to both the Substratum Doctrine and the BT. This is a view that I call the Qualified Particulars Theory. In a final section I draw morals from this discussion that apply to the Humean view that a mind is a "bundle of perceptions and sensations."
I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in term... more I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution.
In his article "Thoughts" (MIND, July 1960) William Ginnane argues that "thought is pure intenti... more In his article "Thoughts" (MIND, July 1960) William Ginnane argues that "thought is pure intentionality," and that our thoughts are not embodied essentially in the mental imagery and other elements of phenomenology that cross our minds along with the thoughts. Such images merely illustrate out thoughts. In my discussion I resist this claim pointing out that our thoughts are often embodied in events that can be described in pheno¬menological terms, especially when our reports of our thinking are introduced by the colorful phrases that Ginnane himself suggests, such as "It crossed my mind that.." or "It occurred to me that…" It is true that we also have a mode of speech in which we report what we have thought in well-formed sentences. Sometimes the very utterance of such sentences is what we call thinking out loud. More often than not, however, our thoughts are fragmentary enough so that if someone asks us what we were thinking, we must stop and rather carefully formulate the expression of those thoughts. In this case there has been nothing running through our minds which can be phenomenologically described as complete sentences, yet in formu¬lating the significance of what has been passing through our minds we do use complete sentences. It is true that one of the confusions we have been bothered by in the past is the idea that in describing the contents of our minds we must somehow find there a proto-type of the report we give in propositional form. The philo¬sopher's pompous phrase "entertaining a proposition" only encour¬ages this confusion, as it looks like an attempt to describe one's mental history phenomenologically. Nevertheless, the successive phenomenological events that occur in our minds often seem to be not merely illustrations accompanying our thoughts, but to embody what we say occurred to us.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, May 29, 2007
When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be calle... more When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I'm thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which can be taken to reveal directly the subject's present mental condition. We are able to improve on special access accounts and deflationary accounts, as well as familiar expressive accounts, by explaining both the asymmetries and the continuities between avowals and other pronouncements, and by locating a genuine though non-epistemic source for first-person privilege.
I defend the thesis that psychological states can be literally ascribed only to living creatures ... more I defend the thesis that psychological states can be literally ascribed only to living creatures and not to nonliving machines, such as sophisticated robots. My theme is that defenders of machine consciousness do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of the biological nature of a subject for the psychological significance of its behavior.
Language, Mind, and Art: Essays in Appreciation and Analysis, in Honor of Paul Ziff, ed. Dale Jamieson, 1994
Over three decades ago, in a brief but provocative essay, Paul Ziff argued for the thesis that ro... more Over three decades ago, in a brief but provocative essay, Paul Ziff argued for the thesis that robots cannot have feelings because they are "mechanisms, not organisms, not living creatures. There could be a broken-down robot but not a dead one. Only living creatures can literally have feelings." Since machines are not living things they cannot have feelings. Ziff's claim that machines cannot have feelings and the more general thesis that life is necessary to mind, which I will tag the LNM Thesis, seem to have the backing of common sense. Few of us would regard "animated" figures which we know to be mechanical automata as being conscious or sentient, even when they are artfully contrived to appear human. Although the thesis that there is a connection between life and mind has common sense appeal, it is surprisingly difficult to spell out that connection persuasively. That life is necessary to mind was disputed by philosophically astute critics at the time Ziff wrote, and it has become increasingly controversial as both hardware and software have become more sophisticated. If an organism is a complex physical entity whose consciousness arises from its electrochemical activity, then it seems that an appropriately designed system of nonliving electronics could harbor consciousness as well. Therefore, the LNM Thesis requires careful defense if we are to have philosophical warrant for Ziff's conclusion that no computer, for example, could ever be made to think and feel, or, in the broadest sense, to have a mind.
In the first half of what follows I will review Ziff's arguments against the idea that robots could be conscious, especially his appeal to our linguistic usage. In the second half I develop the idea that the active behavior of living animals and human beings, unlike the motions of inanimate mechanisms, carries special psychological significance. Machines cannot think or feel because they are different in kind from living human beings and animals, a difference which is obscured when we focus on the superficial fact that they are all highly structured "material systems."
An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all ... more An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an objective world beyond our subjective experiences. I argue that there is there is a fatal flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "external world." Therefore, no such justification is necessary. The feature of skepticism which I believe renders it vulnerable is the assumption that each of us has a right to be certain of his own existence as a subject of conscious experience even in the face of comprehensive doubt about our empirical beliefs.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 373-375, Jun 1994
In "The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism" I argue that traditional global epistemological s... more In "The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism" I argue that traditional global epistemological skepticism is incoherent because it mistakenly assumes that we can question our knowledge of the external world without undermining our self-knowledge. The rationale behind my argument is the idea that, since we are substantial agents who exist and act "in the world" among other material beings, the view that our knowledge of our own existence and nature is or can be exclusively subjective is misguided.
In a critical response to my essay, Anthony Brueckner claims that my reasoning fails to discredit the idea that one can adopt both "the Cartesian conception of self-knowledge as involving an inference to the existence of a mental substance" and "the Cartesian skeptical view concerning knowledge of the external world. Brueckner believes that my argument is of the "transcendental" variety, and I suspect he also believes that any reasoning of that kind is fatally flawed. In this discussion I explain why my argument escapes Brueckner's objection.
Body, Mind, and Method, ed by Donald Gustafson and Bangs Tapscott, 1979
Hovering in the background of investigations into human physiology is the promise or threat, depe... more Hovering in the background of investigations into human physiology is the promise or threat, depending upon how one looks at the matter that human beings are complete physical-chemical systems and that all events taking place within their bodies and all movements of their bodies could be accounted for by physical causes if we but knew enough. In this paper I consider the important question whether our coming to believe that this "mechanistic" hypothesis is true would warrant our relinquishing our conception of ourselves as beings who are capable of acting for reasons to achieve ends of our own choosing.
The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an... more The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments, the transmigration of souls, and the like. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. I will explore the problem of disembodiment from a somewhat different direction than has been tried before, one that leads to what seem to me more interesting and more definite conclusions about its unintelligibility. Furthermore, the approach I will be taking puts both the traditional mind-body problem and the competing claims of dualism and physicalism in a fresh light that can help us to understand better the nature of our embodied existence.
Much mischief concerning the concept of a human body is generated by the failure of philosophers ... more Much mischief concerning the concept of a human body is generated by the failure of philosophers to distinguish various important senses of the term 'body.' I discuss three of those senses and illustrate the issues they can generate by discussing the concept of a Lockean exchange of bodies as well as the brain-body switch.
After establishing his own existence by the Cogito argument, Descartes inquires into the nature o... more After establishing his own existence by the Cogito argument, Descartes inquires into the nature of the self that he claims to know with certainty to exist. He concludes that he is a res cogitans, an unextended entity whose essence is to be conscious. Although a considerable amount of critical effort has been expended in attempts to show how he thought he could move to this important conclusion, his reasoning has remained quite unconvincing. In particular, his critics have insisted, and I think quite rightly, that his claim to be "entirely and absolutely distinct" from his body is not justified by the reasoning which he offers in its support. Nevertheless, I also believe that the proffered criticisms of Descartes' sketchy defense of his position fail to provide us with a full understanding of either the force of his argument or the errors which he commits in reaching his conclusion. In what follows I propose to explain how his arguments may be filled in with certain reasonable premises which make his reasoning concerning his nature" appear less implausible and his mistakes more interesting than his critics have acknowledged.
Berkeley, Hume, and Russell rejected the traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities... more Berkeley, Hume, and Russell rejected the traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities which are supported by an "unknowable substratum." To them the proper alternative seemed obvious. Eliminate the substratum in which qualities are alleged to inhere, leaving a bundle of coexisting qualities--a view that we may call the Bundle Theory or BT. I examine two major types of BT developed by Russell and by G. F. Stout with the intention of showing that (1) the seemingly innocuous concept of "a quality" employed by these versions cannot be used to state their theories coherently, and (2) the fatal problems that the BT encounters point to a more satisfactory and interesting alternative to both the Substratum Doctrine and the BT. This is a view that I call the Qualified Particulars Theory. In a final section I draw morals from this discussion that apply to the Humean view that a mind is a "bundle of perceptions and sensations."
I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in term... more I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution.
In his article "Thoughts" (MIND, July 1960) William Ginnane argues that "thought is pure intenti... more In his article "Thoughts" (MIND, July 1960) William Ginnane argues that "thought is pure intentionality," and that our thoughts are not embodied essentially in the mental imagery and other elements of phenomenology that cross our minds along with the thoughts. Such images merely illustrate out thoughts. In my discussion I resist this claim pointing out that our thoughts are often embodied in events that can be described in pheno¬menological terms, especially when our reports of our thinking are introduced by the colorful phrases that Ginnane himself suggests, such as "It crossed my mind that.." or "It occurred to me that…" It is true that we also have a mode of speech in which we report what we have thought in well-formed sentences. Sometimes the very utterance of such sentences is what we call thinking out loud. More often than not, however, our thoughts are fragmentary enough so that if someone asks us what we were thinking, we must stop and rather carefully formulate the expression of those thoughts. In this case there has been nothing running through our minds which can be phenomenologically described as complete sentences, yet in formu¬lating the significance of what has been passing through our minds we do use complete sentences. It is true that one of the confusions we have been bothered by in the past is the idea that in describing the contents of our minds we must somehow find there a proto-type of the report we give in propositional form. The philo¬sopher's pompous phrase "entertaining a proposition" only encour¬ages this confusion, as it looks like an attempt to describe one's mental history phenomenologically. Nevertheless, the successive phenomenological events that occur in our minds often seem to be not merely illustrations accompanying our thoughts, but to embody what we say occurred to us.
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Papers by Douglas C Long
In the first half of what follows I will review Ziff's arguments against the idea that robots could be conscious, especially his appeal to our linguistic usage. In the second half I develop the idea that the active behavior of living animals and human beings, unlike the motions of inanimate mechanisms, carries special psychological significance. Machines cannot think or feel because they are different in kind from living human beings and animals, a difference which is obscured when we focus on the superficial fact that they are all highly structured "material systems."
In a critical response to my essay, Anthony Brueckner claims that my reasoning fails to discredit the idea that one can adopt both "the Cartesian conception of self-knowledge as involving an inference to the existence of a mental substance" and "the Cartesian skeptical view concerning knowledge of the external world. Brueckner believes that my argument is of the "transcendental" variety, and I suspect he also believes that any reasoning of that kind is fatally flawed. In this discussion I explain why my argument escapes Brueckner's objection.
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In the first half of what follows I will review Ziff's arguments against the idea that robots could be conscious, especially his appeal to our linguistic usage. In the second half I develop the idea that the active behavior of living animals and human beings, unlike the motions of inanimate mechanisms, carries special psychological significance. Machines cannot think or feel because they are different in kind from living human beings and animals, a difference which is obscured when we focus on the superficial fact that they are all highly structured "material systems."
In a critical response to my essay, Anthony Brueckner claims that my reasoning fails to discredit the idea that one can adopt both "the Cartesian conception of self-knowledge as involving an inference to the existence of a mental substance" and "the Cartesian skeptical view concerning knowledge of the external world. Brueckner believes that my argument is of the "transcendental" variety, and I suspect he also believes that any reasoning of that kind is fatally flawed. In this discussion I explain why my argument escapes Brueckner's objection.
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