The report examines the political dynamics in the southern Philippines (Mindanao and Sulu) in the... more The report examines the political dynamics in the southern Philippines (Mindanao and Sulu) in the lead-up to the October 2023 barangay elections. It looks specifically at sources of conflict in Sulu and Maguindanao, north and south and compares the context there with the 2006 elections in Aceh, Indonesia.
Acehnese voters registered clear displeasure with the ruling Partai Aceh in national legislative ... more Acehnese voters registered clear displeasure with the ruling Partai Aceh in national legislative elections, argues this report. Overview The 9 April 2014 legislative elections in Aceh produced three surprises. First, voters sent a strong message of displeasure to the ruling Partai Aceh (PA), the party controlled by leaders of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). PA still came out on top but with significantly reduced percentages in its east coast strongholds. Second, its major competition came not from a rival GAM-led local party but from national parties, particularly the newcomer NasDem. And third, despite its alliance with PA, Gerindra, the party of Prabowo Subianto, proved weaker than expected. In the provincial legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh, DPRA), Partai Aceh dropped from 33 out of 69 seats to 29 out of 81 seats, or a drop from 47.8 per cent to just under 36 per cent. The drop was particularly striking given the party’s perceived control...
This paper looks at how political power in Aceh is moving away from the old Free Aceh Movement go... more This paper looks at how political power in Aceh is moving away from the old Free Aceh Movement government-in-exile. Introduction Political dynamics within the top ranks of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) suggest that a generational transfer of power is underway. The old diaspora elite, led from abroad by Malik Mahmud until the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement, is losing influence. Authority derived from long-term service to the movement and closeness to its late founder, Hasan Tiro, is being replaced by authority derived from control of local resources and political institutions. By this measure, Muzakir Manaf, the former GAM guerrilla commander, who is simultaneously vice-governor, CEO of a business conglomerate and head of the Aceh Party (Partai Aceh), GAM’s main political vehicle for winning local elections, is the most powerful person in Aceh. His willingness to defer to his old political superiors in the struggle appears to be coming to an end. This...
The Partnership is a joint effort among the Government of Indonesia. Civil Society, the Private S... more The Partnership is a joint effort among the Government of Indonesia. Civil Society, the Private Sector as well as the International Community to facilitate and support governance reform in Indonesia. The Partnership strives to unite all elements, within the society and the Indonesian Government, who are committed to governance reform, and to create dialogue and cooperation among them. The Partnership's purpose is to support their efforts in developing ideas, strategies and programs, especially those that could be supported by the international community. Vision The Partnership aspires to promote governance reform towards a fair, democratic and prosperous lndonesia. Mission - To promote governance reform, where decision-making processes and resource atlocation are based on the involvement of all related stakeholders, a focus on gender equality and the inclusion of disadvantaged groups. ~ To serve as a model of good governance and equal partnership. Programs The Partnership will f...
A steep decline in terrorist acts in Indonesia in 2014 should have been good news, especially bec... more A steep decline in terrorist acts in Indonesia in 2014 should have been good news, especially because it underscored that police vigilance was high and extremist capacity was weak. But a third factor was also involved that was not such good news: more extremists were focused on getting to Syria and joining what they believed was a more important jihad than any they could wage at home. By late 2014, about 100 Indonesians, possibly more, were believed to have left to fight in Syria, some with their wives and children, and most to join the Islamic State.
Economic Liberalization, Democratization and Civil Society in the Developing World, 2000
In the wake of the dramatic fall of President Soeharto in May 1998, the International Monetary Fu... more In the wake of the dramatic fall of President Soeharto in May 1998, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and global capitalism were widely given twin billing as the agents most responsible for political change. Globalization meant that Indonesia was unable to escape the impact of the Asian economic crisis after the Thai currency collapsed in July 1997; its authoritarian political structure made it unable to mount an adequate response. According to this view, the successive IMF packages, in October 1997, January 1998 and April 1998, and the structural adjustment these packages required, fueled the social unrest that led the army and the middle class to decide that their only salvation lay in the removal of Soeharto and a process of political reform.
This report examines the number of Indonesian extremist prisoners due for parole, the recidivism ... more This report examines the number of Indonesian extremist prisoners due for parole, the recidivism rate, and the dynamics in prison between the “pragmatists” and the “rejectionists” among extremist inmates.IntroductionMany convicted Indonesian terrorists will be released over the next several years after serving time in prison. The Indonesian government has little capacity at present to provide adequate post-release monitoring, although it is taking some steps to remedy this. Under the circumstances, how much of a security risk do these releases pose? The answer is probably not as much as some people fear; the recidivism rate for convicted extremists remains low. The problem is that systems are not yet in place to keep track of individuals who are considered potential problems.Any evaluation of risk must take several factors into account. One is the numbers involved. In early 2013, articles appeared in the regional media suggesting that 300 prisoners were due for release by the end of...
This report looks at the origins and development of the ISIS support network in Indonesia. Introd... more This report looks at the origins and development of the ISIS support network in Indonesia. Introduction Support for the Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS) in Indonesia raises the risk of violence there even though the capacity of violent extremist groups remains low. This could change with the eventual return home of Indonesians now fighting in Syria and Iraq who will have the training, combat experience, and leadership potential now lacking in Indonesia’s extremist community. The 22 September 2014 exhortation by IS spokesman Al-Adnani to kill foreigners linked to the U.S.-led coalition could also provide an incentive to Indonesian ISIS supporters to target Westerners as a way of earning approval from leaders of the self-declared caliphate. The Indonesian translation of that exhortation includes this passage: If you do not have bombs or bullets, and a kafir (infidel) from America or France or one of their allies comes out, hit him in the head with a rock, carve him up with a...
This report examines how alliances for and against the "Islamic State" developed among ... more This report examines how alliances for and against the "Islamic State" developed among inmates in Indonesian prisons. Introduction A study of networks in Indonesian prisons that support the Islamic State (IS) suggests that relatively simple interventions by prison officials may be able to limit the influence of hardline ideologues. Only a minority of those convicted of terrorism in Indonesia support IS openly, and there is nothing to suggest that their numbers are increasing. If anything, they are declining. The need to understand the dynamics of prison networks is still urgent, however, because pro-IS inmates can constitute key nodes for encouraging or facilitating travel to Syria and because those who support IS generally support the use of violence at home.1 Preventing the growth of IS influence in prisons is therefore a way of reducing the security threat more generally. Indonesian officials are well aware of the problem, and there have been noticeable improvements in ...
A network of extremists in East Java illustrates how support for a local jihadi struggle in Poso,... more A network of extremists in East Java illustrates how support for a local jihadi struggle in Poso, Central Sulawesi is linked to support for the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), now called Islamic State. Understanding that network could lead to more effective counter-extremism programs. Introduction The trajectory of an extremist network in Lamongan, East Java illustrates how support for local jihadi struggles has been transformed into support for ISIS. Better understanding of that process could lead to the development of more targeted counter-extremism programs. Lamongan, a district some 50km west of Surabaya, Indonesia’s second largest city, first came to international attention in 2002 as the home of Bali bombers Amrozi, Mukhlas and Ali Imron and the boarding school their family ran, Pesantren al-Islam. It was in the news again in March 2015 when two sisters-in-law from Lamongan were deported from Turkey with their children after trying to get to ISIS-controlled Syr...
This report argues that the weakness of Indonesian extremists today may be propelling them toward... more This report argues that the weakness of Indonesian extremists today may be propelling them toward violence as the lack of training, experience or religious credentials leaves attacks as the only way to gain legitimacy.IntroductionIn December 2012, about a dozen men met in Bandung, West Java and proclaimed themselves Mujahidin of Western Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Barat, MIB). Five months, ten robberies and one murder later, they were a spent force – not that they had been much of a force to begin with. The short life of MIB illustrates the continuing decline of Indonesia’s extremists. It also shows, however, how leaders of weak groups with no hope of domestic, let alone international clout, have a need to plan acts of violence to keep their followers together and establish their own legitimacy. This motivation explains the proliferation of would-be jihadi groups and terrorist plots in Indonesia at a time when capacity may be at an all-time low. The apparently inexhaustible suppl...
Examines the effect of the current turmoil in the Middle East on Indonesian students studying in ... more Examines the effect of the current turmoil in the Middle East on Indonesian students studying in Egypt and Turkey. Summary In this Lowy Institute Report, Lowy Institute Deputy Director, Anthony Bubalo, together with Sidney Jones and Navhat Nuraniyah from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict in Jakarta examine the effect of the current turmoil in the Middle East on Indonesian students studying in Egypt and Turkey. Based on extensive face-to-face interviews, the Report looks at how political unrest in Egypt and Turkey, and the rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, have affected students’ views of democracy, religion, political leadership, and terrorism. The Report also examines the case of two young Indonesian students in Turkey who left to join Islamic State in Syria.
Indigenous rights and agrarian reform may be on a collision course in Indonesia, adding to the co... more Indigenous rights and agrarian reform may be on a collision course in Indonesia, adding to the complexity of resolving land conflicts there. Overview: A longstanding land conflict in Jambi province, Sumatra, highlights the tension between two strands of civil society: the movement to protect indigenous rights and the movement for agrarian reform. As the former succeeds in drawing attention to customary (adat) land unfairly taken in the past for corporate concessions, the latter sees the same land in terms of its potential for redistribution to the poor far beyond just the indigenous claimants. The goals of both movements are legitimate: customary groups deserve restitution for past injustices, including return of land wrongfully taken, while access to land could significantly improve the lives of the 14.4 per cent of rural Indonesians living below the poverty line. The problem is that using adat land as the vehicle for agrarian reform may be planting the seeds of future conflict bet...
Introduction: The conflict in Syria has captured the imagination of Indonesian extremists in a wa... more Introduction: The conflict in Syria has captured the imagination of Indonesian extremists in a way no foreign war has before. For the first time, Indonesians are going overseas to fight, not just to train, as in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and 1990s, or to give moral and financial support, as in the case of Palestine. The numbers are still limited – the Indonesian foreign ministry estimated about 50 in December 2013 – but they could rise. Four factors explain why the conflict has attracted such attention. First, the enthusiasm for Syria is directly linked to predictions in Islamic eschatology that the final battle at the end of time will take place in Sham, the region sometimes called Greater Syria or the Levant, encompassing Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Israel. Indeed within some extremist circles, the Syrian conflict is known as the “one-way ticket jihad” because anyone goes there to fight will be able to stay and see Islam’s final victory. Second, thanks to a best-sell...
The report examines the political dynamics in the southern Philippines (Mindanao and Sulu) in the... more The report examines the political dynamics in the southern Philippines (Mindanao and Sulu) in the lead-up to the October 2023 barangay elections. It looks specifically at sources of conflict in Sulu and Maguindanao, north and south and compares the context there with the 2006 elections in Aceh, Indonesia.
Acehnese voters registered clear displeasure with the ruling Partai Aceh in national legislative ... more Acehnese voters registered clear displeasure with the ruling Partai Aceh in national legislative elections, argues this report. Overview The 9 April 2014 legislative elections in Aceh produced three surprises. First, voters sent a strong message of displeasure to the ruling Partai Aceh (PA), the party controlled by leaders of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). PA still came out on top but with significantly reduced percentages in its east coast strongholds. Second, its major competition came not from a rival GAM-led local party but from national parties, particularly the newcomer NasDem. And third, despite its alliance with PA, Gerindra, the party of Prabowo Subianto, proved weaker than expected. In the provincial legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh, DPRA), Partai Aceh dropped from 33 out of 69 seats to 29 out of 81 seats, or a drop from 47.8 per cent to just under 36 per cent. The drop was particularly striking given the party’s perceived control...
This paper looks at how political power in Aceh is moving away from the old Free Aceh Movement go... more This paper looks at how political power in Aceh is moving away from the old Free Aceh Movement government-in-exile. Introduction Political dynamics within the top ranks of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) suggest that a generational transfer of power is underway. The old diaspora elite, led from abroad by Malik Mahmud until the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement, is losing influence. Authority derived from long-term service to the movement and closeness to its late founder, Hasan Tiro, is being replaced by authority derived from control of local resources and political institutions. By this measure, Muzakir Manaf, the former GAM guerrilla commander, who is simultaneously vice-governor, CEO of a business conglomerate and head of the Aceh Party (Partai Aceh), GAM’s main political vehicle for winning local elections, is the most powerful person in Aceh. His willingness to defer to his old political superiors in the struggle appears to be coming to an end. This...
The Partnership is a joint effort among the Government of Indonesia. Civil Society, the Private S... more The Partnership is a joint effort among the Government of Indonesia. Civil Society, the Private Sector as well as the International Community to facilitate and support governance reform in Indonesia. The Partnership strives to unite all elements, within the society and the Indonesian Government, who are committed to governance reform, and to create dialogue and cooperation among them. The Partnership's purpose is to support their efforts in developing ideas, strategies and programs, especially those that could be supported by the international community. Vision The Partnership aspires to promote governance reform towards a fair, democratic and prosperous lndonesia. Mission - To promote governance reform, where decision-making processes and resource atlocation are based on the involvement of all related stakeholders, a focus on gender equality and the inclusion of disadvantaged groups. ~ To serve as a model of good governance and equal partnership. Programs The Partnership will f...
A steep decline in terrorist acts in Indonesia in 2014 should have been good news, especially bec... more A steep decline in terrorist acts in Indonesia in 2014 should have been good news, especially because it underscored that police vigilance was high and extremist capacity was weak. But a third factor was also involved that was not such good news: more extremists were focused on getting to Syria and joining what they believed was a more important jihad than any they could wage at home. By late 2014, about 100 Indonesians, possibly more, were believed to have left to fight in Syria, some with their wives and children, and most to join the Islamic State.
Economic Liberalization, Democratization and Civil Society in the Developing World, 2000
In the wake of the dramatic fall of President Soeharto in May 1998, the International Monetary Fu... more In the wake of the dramatic fall of President Soeharto in May 1998, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and global capitalism were widely given twin billing as the agents most responsible for political change. Globalization meant that Indonesia was unable to escape the impact of the Asian economic crisis after the Thai currency collapsed in July 1997; its authoritarian political structure made it unable to mount an adequate response. According to this view, the successive IMF packages, in October 1997, January 1998 and April 1998, and the structural adjustment these packages required, fueled the social unrest that led the army and the middle class to decide that their only salvation lay in the removal of Soeharto and a process of political reform.
This report examines the number of Indonesian extremist prisoners due for parole, the recidivism ... more This report examines the number of Indonesian extremist prisoners due for parole, the recidivism rate, and the dynamics in prison between the “pragmatists” and the “rejectionists” among extremist inmates.IntroductionMany convicted Indonesian terrorists will be released over the next several years after serving time in prison. The Indonesian government has little capacity at present to provide adequate post-release monitoring, although it is taking some steps to remedy this. Under the circumstances, how much of a security risk do these releases pose? The answer is probably not as much as some people fear; the recidivism rate for convicted extremists remains low. The problem is that systems are not yet in place to keep track of individuals who are considered potential problems.Any evaluation of risk must take several factors into account. One is the numbers involved. In early 2013, articles appeared in the regional media suggesting that 300 prisoners were due for release by the end of...
This report looks at the origins and development of the ISIS support network in Indonesia. Introd... more This report looks at the origins and development of the ISIS support network in Indonesia. Introduction Support for the Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS) in Indonesia raises the risk of violence there even though the capacity of violent extremist groups remains low. This could change with the eventual return home of Indonesians now fighting in Syria and Iraq who will have the training, combat experience, and leadership potential now lacking in Indonesia’s extremist community. The 22 September 2014 exhortation by IS spokesman Al-Adnani to kill foreigners linked to the U.S.-led coalition could also provide an incentive to Indonesian ISIS supporters to target Westerners as a way of earning approval from leaders of the self-declared caliphate. The Indonesian translation of that exhortation includes this passage: If you do not have bombs or bullets, and a kafir (infidel) from America or France or one of their allies comes out, hit him in the head with a rock, carve him up with a...
This report examines how alliances for and against the "Islamic State" developed among ... more This report examines how alliances for and against the "Islamic State" developed among inmates in Indonesian prisons. Introduction A study of networks in Indonesian prisons that support the Islamic State (IS) suggests that relatively simple interventions by prison officials may be able to limit the influence of hardline ideologues. Only a minority of those convicted of terrorism in Indonesia support IS openly, and there is nothing to suggest that their numbers are increasing. If anything, they are declining. The need to understand the dynamics of prison networks is still urgent, however, because pro-IS inmates can constitute key nodes for encouraging or facilitating travel to Syria and because those who support IS generally support the use of violence at home.1 Preventing the growth of IS influence in prisons is therefore a way of reducing the security threat more generally. Indonesian officials are well aware of the problem, and there have been noticeable improvements in ...
A network of extremists in East Java illustrates how support for a local jihadi struggle in Poso,... more A network of extremists in East Java illustrates how support for a local jihadi struggle in Poso, Central Sulawesi is linked to support for the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), now called Islamic State. Understanding that network could lead to more effective counter-extremism programs. Introduction The trajectory of an extremist network in Lamongan, East Java illustrates how support for local jihadi struggles has been transformed into support for ISIS. Better understanding of that process could lead to the development of more targeted counter-extremism programs. Lamongan, a district some 50km west of Surabaya, Indonesia’s second largest city, first came to international attention in 2002 as the home of Bali bombers Amrozi, Mukhlas and Ali Imron and the boarding school their family ran, Pesantren al-Islam. It was in the news again in March 2015 when two sisters-in-law from Lamongan were deported from Turkey with their children after trying to get to ISIS-controlled Syr...
This report argues that the weakness of Indonesian extremists today may be propelling them toward... more This report argues that the weakness of Indonesian extremists today may be propelling them toward violence as the lack of training, experience or religious credentials leaves attacks as the only way to gain legitimacy.IntroductionIn December 2012, about a dozen men met in Bandung, West Java and proclaimed themselves Mujahidin of Western Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Barat, MIB). Five months, ten robberies and one murder later, they were a spent force – not that they had been much of a force to begin with. The short life of MIB illustrates the continuing decline of Indonesia’s extremists. It also shows, however, how leaders of weak groups with no hope of domestic, let alone international clout, have a need to plan acts of violence to keep their followers together and establish their own legitimacy. This motivation explains the proliferation of would-be jihadi groups and terrorist plots in Indonesia at a time when capacity may be at an all-time low. The apparently inexhaustible suppl...
Examines the effect of the current turmoil in the Middle East on Indonesian students studying in ... more Examines the effect of the current turmoil in the Middle East on Indonesian students studying in Egypt and Turkey. Summary In this Lowy Institute Report, Lowy Institute Deputy Director, Anthony Bubalo, together with Sidney Jones and Navhat Nuraniyah from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict in Jakarta examine the effect of the current turmoil in the Middle East on Indonesian students studying in Egypt and Turkey. Based on extensive face-to-face interviews, the Report looks at how political unrest in Egypt and Turkey, and the rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, have affected students’ views of democracy, religion, political leadership, and terrorism. The Report also examines the case of two young Indonesian students in Turkey who left to join Islamic State in Syria.
Indigenous rights and agrarian reform may be on a collision course in Indonesia, adding to the co... more Indigenous rights and agrarian reform may be on a collision course in Indonesia, adding to the complexity of resolving land conflicts there. Overview: A longstanding land conflict in Jambi province, Sumatra, highlights the tension between two strands of civil society: the movement to protect indigenous rights and the movement for agrarian reform. As the former succeeds in drawing attention to customary (adat) land unfairly taken in the past for corporate concessions, the latter sees the same land in terms of its potential for redistribution to the poor far beyond just the indigenous claimants. The goals of both movements are legitimate: customary groups deserve restitution for past injustices, including return of land wrongfully taken, while access to land could significantly improve the lives of the 14.4 per cent of rural Indonesians living below the poverty line. The problem is that using adat land as the vehicle for agrarian reform may be planting the seeds of future conflict bet...
Introduction: The conflict in Syria has captured the imagination of Indonesian extremists in a wa... more Introduction: The conflict in Syria has captured the imagination of Indonesian extremists in a way no foreign war has before. For the first time, Indonesians are going overseas to fight, not just to train, as in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and 1990s, or to give moral and financial support, as in the case of Palestine. The numbers are still limited – the Indonesian foreign ministry estimated about 50 in December 2013 – but they could rise. Four factors explain why the conflict has attracted such attention. First, the enthusiasm for Syria is directly linked to predictions in Islamic eschatology that the final battle at the end of time will take place in Sham, the region sometimes called Greater Syria or the Levant, encompassing Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Israel. Indeed within some extremist circles, the Syrian conflict is known as the “one-way ticket jihad” because anyone goes there to fight will be able to stay and see Islam’s final victory. Second, thanks to a best-sell...
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