Extremism

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

This paper presents an initial assessment of the results of a four month research project studying the Ultras 1 groups in BiH. This research contributed to the Bosnia & Herzegovina Resilience Initiative (BHRI) Programme (implemented by the International Organization for Migration-United Nations , funded and closely coordinated with the U.S. Agency for International Development-USAID) aiming to reduce the threat of violent extremism in BiH and to counter extremist efforts to deepen or exploit community tensions.

The article is devoted to the investigation of methods of countering the spread of extremism and terrorism in the Internet in the European Union and the Russian Federation. The study was carried out on the basis of an analysis of the bulletins issued by the official sources of Europol and in the UK on the issue. The author concludes that it is necessary to apply the administrative and legal mechanisms under consideration to counter extremism and terrorism in the Russian Federation.

In the vast literature on terrorism the choice of weapons has received relatively limited attention, despite the importance and visibility of this topic. Building on the literature on innovation in terrorism, the article first proposes a multi-level analytical framework that helps study terrorist weapon selection. It then investigates the use of weapons in jihadist attacks in Europe from 2014, with the rise of the so-called Islamic State, until 2020, based on an original database. The empirical analysis shows that the two traditional types of weapon of modern terrorism, firearms and explosives, were largely replaced by more primitive tools like melee weapons. In fact, in recent years jihadist terrorists in Europe have become less technologically advanced. Based on the original analytical framework, the article examines the reasons of this evolution, paying special attention to the use of the most common type of weapon in the database, bladed weapons, and the most lethal type, firearms.

Čoraz častejšie sa terčom extrémistických skupín, populistických vyjadrení politikov a cirkvi stávajú príslušníci neheterosexuálnych menšín ako jednoduchý nástroj získavania politického kapitálu a vplyvu. V predloženom príspevku ozrejmujeme termíny súvisiace s problematikou extrémizmu, populizmu a popisujeme niektoré hostilné prejavy
v postojoch mládeže k LGBTI komunite. /// As a simple tool of acquiring political capital and influence, the members of sexual minorities are increasingly becoming the victims of extremist groups, populistic political statements and religious organisations. It is the aim of the following report to introduce the various notions connected to extremism, populism as well as to describe hostile manifestations in the opinions of the youth towards the LGBTI community.

The questionnaire VEAS allows to evaluate a probability of accepting radical ideology as well a probability of violent behavior against some social groups. The questionnaire can be applied for diagnose of the personal dispositions (general attitudes) to different types of extremism: nationalistic or racial, religious, political, football hooliganism etc. There are 11 scales, each of which contributes into the total scale of propensity to extremist behavior.

Violent extremism has become the global concern especially after the beginning of 21st Century. Therefore, understanding the various aspects of violent extremism particularly multifaceted communication strategies which will be fit to handle the modern challenges has become imperative. On incidences of terrorism and violent extremism, Pakistan has lost on socio, economic, cultural and educational grounds. Meanwhile, there are contending positions that the incessant attacks are due to the gap in proper Communication between security apparatus, government and the extremist groups. In view of this, the article examines the roles of strategic communication in the countering of violent extremism and its influence on Pakistani society. The paper also brought to the open, some of the critical context and drivers of violent extremism. Based on this, the paper proffers a model which captured the contemporary communication strategies for countering violent extremism. It also argues that strategic communication can be assimilated into policies and actions of the major stakeholders as a strategic measure to handle the radicalized and violent extremism. Moreover, with the help of few judicious approaches/strategies, a balance and a moderate society can be established. Further to this are the ideal practices being recommended in line with the theory of strategic communication planning format that will not only help in tackling extremism but also bringing peace.

The disruption and devastation created by the COVID-19 pandemic worldwide, be it in terms of loss of human life, economic uncertainties, health crisis or unemployment, is unprecedented. The impact of COVID-19 can be experienced in all aspects of life across the globe. One such aspect,
which is the focus point of this article, is the impact of COVID-19 on online violent extremism and terrorism.

This book explores the moral psychology of devotion. In the first part of the book, I provide I analysis of devotion; an examination of its motivational role; and an explanation of its connection to a distinctive form of valuing, in which certain values are seen as inviolable and are rendered invulnerable to the typical effects of justificatory reflection. In the second part of the book, I assess the ethical significance of devotion, arguing that certain forms of ethically praiseworthy relationships require devotion. In the third part, I examine how devotion can easily devolve into pathological forms. I focus on fanaticism, arguing that devotion can arise from a particular form of psychological fragility that is linked to group violence. I further argue that this form of fragility can be stoked by group resentment, and that certain social groups can thus be fanatical in the sense that they encourage the emergence of individual fanatics. In the final part of the book, I ask whether there are ways of preserving some of the beneficial features of devotion while avoiding their pathologies. I investigate whether we can be devoted through irony; through affirmation; and through what I call the "Deepening Move." Each of these stances preserves a degree of flexibility and openness in the object of devotion; each one tries to preserve a form of wholehearted devotion despite this openness. (The attached file contains the introductory chapter. Email or message me if you'd like a draft of the entire book.)

This joint report by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point offers a preliminary survey and analysis of one of the largest known online repositories of Islamic State materials in order to increase understanding of how violent extremist groups and their supporters manage, preserve, and protect information relevant to their cause. Seemingly managed by sympathizers of the Islamic State, the large cache of digital files, here nicknamed the “Cloud Caliphate,” provides researchers, policymakers, and counterterrorism practitioners additional insights into how and why groups and their adherents maintain archives of such material.

The core analysis breaks into seven different parts. After reviewing the likely origins of the repository, the first section describes its composition, and the second discusses evidence concerning cyber support from other online actors. Sections three through six explore specific folders within the archive, which pertain to matters concerning the Islamic State’s organizational predecessors and a range of notable leaders, ideologues, and scholars. Section seven of the report highlights a real-world case involving the use of the “Cloud Caliphate” archive by an Islamic State supporter. The report concludes with a reflective discussion that notes potential policy considerations for those tasked with confronting the Islamic State’s exploitation of information and communications technologies.

Sayyid Quṭb è oggigiorno considerato come una delle figure simbolo del radicalismo contemporaneo. A questo proposito vogliamo brevemente indagarne il pensiero evidenziandone l’evoluzione. Gli eventi che Quṭb si trovò a vivere in prima persona, come la sua permanenza negli Stati Uniti e i molteplici periodi di detenzione, lo toccarono nel profondo e lo indussero a maturare via via un islam sempre più radicale.

Our understanding of the risk assessment of terrorist and extremist prisoners is in its infancy, yet this is clearly a critical issue. How can one tell if a prisoner is still dangerous or not? What are valid measures to assess risk and what type of evidence is worth examining? In considering risk assessment of terrorists and extremists in prison settings there are a range of essential issues to consider.  Crucially, not all terrorist and extremist prisoners are the same and factors which apply clearly to one individual will not apply equally strongly to others. As a result, effective risk assessment processes need to be nuanced. This chapter highlights the range of issues which are likely to be of most use when considering risk assessment in the context of a terrorist prisoner, and also identifies what sources of information can provide the necessary insight to inform this assessment.

Terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism dominate sociological, political and cultural concerns in today's polarized social and political world. However, the role of governments and issues relating to state terrorism and the counter-terror state remain important considerations. This book presents an understanding of the concept of Countering Violent Extremism from a critical terrorism studies perspective using case studies from different countries while examining the issues it raises. Extremism and violence do not emerge in a vacuum – nor do the policies that counter these concerns. There are no simple solutions to violent extremism but the fixation on ideology can do more harm than good.

The questionnaire YES allows to evaluate a probability of accepting radical ideology as well a probability of violent behavior against some social groups. Conceptually, this technique is based on the psychological characteristics of youth, the authoritarian personality theory T.Adorno and the concept of right-wing authoritarianism  B.Altmayer. There are 11 scales, each of which contributes into the total scale of propensity to extremist behavior.

Terrorism poses a serious threat to security of any region and South Asia has become one of the most dangerous regions of world due to terrorist activities. Since the inception of SAARC in 1985, concerns over terrorism have been showed and realization for collective regional mechanism is prominently highlighted in its agenda as the terrorism is threatening political stability and mutual understanding in the region. Owing to increased threats, terrorism was high on agenda during the 3rd summit of SAARC at Kathmandu in 1987. All the seven members signed ‘SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and were agreed to take effective measures. The Convention warned the member countries against this menace and its dangerous effects towards regional security. In 1988, the convention came into force but did not control the terrorist activities by taking any effective measure. Several other initiatives have also been taken from this forum but the desired results are not achieved. The paper is to examine the counterterrorism initiatives taken by this forum and to explore impediments blocking the path of cooperation for an effective and joint strategy as well as suggestions for countering terrorism and securing regional peace and stability.

This provides an overview of the 1.5M ERC Starting Grant on the Epistemology and Ethics of fundamentalism that was recently awarded to me. I aim to carry out the research from 2020 to 2025 in the Philosophy Department (Faculty of Humanities) and the Faculty of Religion & Theology at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

In electoral terms, party-political ultranationalism has been unusually weak in post-Soviet Ukraine. In spite of their increased public visibility and rising nationalist sentiments within Ukraine’s population, the three major forces—the Freedom Party,Right Sector and National Corps—have remained politically marginal since the Euromaidan Revolution of 2013-2014. Neither the loss of Crimea nor the war in the Donbas has translated into electoral support of radical nationalist groups. However, in the context of Russia’s hybrid attack on Ukraine since 2014, far-right activist groups have gained greater acceptance from the Ukrainian public. The activities of anti-democratic non-governmental organizations and their occasional cooperation with the Ukrainian state demand careful monitoring by Ukrainian and foreign watchdogs.

The purpose of this chapter is to consider the question of whether respect for persons requires toleration of the expression of any extremist political or religious viewpoint within public discourse. The starting point of my discussion is Steven Heyman and Jonathan Quong’s interesting defences of a negative answer to this question. They argue that respect for persons requires that liberal democracies should not tolerate the public expression of extremist speech that can be regarded as recognition-denying or respect-denying speech – that is, speech or other expressive conduct that expresses viewpoints that explicitly reject that all persons should be regarded and treated as free and equal persons or citizens. According to Heyman and Quong, recognition-denying speech falls outside the scope of the right to participate in public discourse (i.e. what it is a right to). In contrast to Heyman and Quong, one can argue that a strong case can be made for viewpoint neutrality on the basis of what can be called a libertarian or Nozickean status-based theory of rights. According to this theory, toleration in a liberal democracy requires respect for the status of persons as thinking agents, and respect for thinking agents and their sovereignty over their own mind requires viewpoint neutrality – that is, a basic right to participate in public discourse as speakers and listeners free from state-imposed viewpoint-based restrictions. All persons should have a basic right to express, hear and consider any viewpoint within public discourse. This doctrine of viewpoint neutrality requires that citizens in liberal democracies ought to have a legal free speech right to do moral wrong – that is, a legal right to express and defend any viewpoint within public discourse, even if it is morally wrong to express, or expose others to, such views.

The madrasa and extremism interrelationship is a twenty-first-century discourse. It grabbed international limelight after terrorists struck United States on September 11, 2001, in one of the most audacious attacks ever leaving around 3000 people dead. The resultant outrage brought international attention to the Muslim lands with Muslim lives being scrutinized and categorized as the “other.” The Islamic educational institutions like madrasas came under intense international scrutiny being variously accused as perpetuating and nurturing “antiwestern” attitudes among the peoples leading to radicalism in Muslim lands. It was the Taliban fighter holding a Kalashnikov in Afghanistan as United States invaded that country subsequently in October 2001 that became a defining portrait of a Muslim “other” in the western mainstream media. The media trail of the madrasas conveniently overlooked the multiple socio-economic functions that these schools play in a Muslim public sphere by providing impoverished peoples’ basic education and instead created a false imagery of all the madrasas being dens of terrorists, factories of terror along with a host of other accusations. Since the discourse of putative links between madrasas and extremism started from South Asia towards the end of cold war, this chapter, therefore, makes an attempt to provide a holistic account of these schools by locating them in the socio-religious spaces of Muslims, dissecting what these teach in their curriculum and then deliberate on the interrelationship, if any, between madrasas and extremism.

The article describes approaches to diagnosing the propensity to the violent extremism. As diagnostic categories, it is suggested to use dispositions
reflecting a nonspecific tendency for extremist behavior and, depending on the situation, leading to the formation of certain hostile attitudes towards specific objects. The allocated dispositions were 11 scales of the questionnaire, including Likerttype
statements. The description of the method and the possibilities of its application are given, the construction of scales is disclosed, the results of a pilot study of their reliability and discrimination are presented.
В статье описаны подходы к диагностике склонности к насильственному экстремизму. В качестве диагностических категорий предложено использовать диспозиции, отражающие неспецифическую склонность к экстремистскому поведению и, в зависимости от ситуации, ведущих к формированию частных враждебных установок на конкретные объекты. Выделенные диспозиции составили 11 шкал опросника, включающих утверждения лайкертовского типа. Даны описания самой методики и возможностей ее применения, раскрыта конструкция шкал, приведены результаты пилотажного исследования их надежности и дискриминативности.

Riddled with spies, decimated by drones, plagued by infighting, Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) looks like yesterday's problem. It is not. This brief paper outlines AQAP's external and internal challenges, then explains why the group is still a threat.

During the “migration crisis” Serbia has been a transit country. However, several thousands of migrants and refugees remained “stuck” in the Western Balkans after the closure of the Balkan Route, and issues related to their potential integration provided a platform for Serbian far right movements and parties to establish new and stronger relationships with their European counterparts. This changed the far right landscape in the Western Balkans and allowed anti-European narratives to strengthen. This paper identifies the “new far right” which is on the rise in Serbia, and its relationships with the larger network of European far right movements. Based on field interviews and social media content analysis, the paper draws a conclusion that if the EU fails to take a more active role in making integration an attractive option for the Western Balkan countries, the rise of far right movements in the region could present a serious security threat.

In any state, not all information is made public, as information flows that circulate in society are frequently regulated by censorship. Control can be established over the mass media, print and oral expression of view. Censorship may develop in a society regardless of institutions engaged in censorship control and, in a number of cases, does not involve authorities. This essay argues that censorship can be justified in terms of protecting society against extremism, alcohol and cigarette propaganda and false information that may question the credibility of the media.

Resistance to girls’ education in Pakistan has long been an intractable problem; the lowest enrolment figures are in Pashtun
areas. This study focused on Pashtun men’s perceptions of girls’ education. Pashtun men of diverse backgrounds participated
in a two-round Delphi exercise, followed by in-depth qualitative interviews in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan
bordering Afghanistan. Although contradictory ideas from religion, culture, and politics were elicited, consensus developed
on major barriers to girls’ access to education: poverty, Pashtunwali (tribal code), religion, accessibility, resources, shortage
of female teachers, curriculum, and political apathy and corruption. Understanding the barriers to girls’ education could help
development professionals overcome them.

Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up."

تحاول هذه المقالة البحث في مشكلة الغلوِّ والتطرُّف، لا في مظاهرها ونتائجها، وإنَّما بالبحث في جذورها الأولى، من خلال العودة إلى المدرسة الأولى التي تنشأ فيها معارفُ المرء، وميولاتُه ورغباته، وعواطفه؛ وهي الأسرة. ثمَّ هي محاولةٌ لمطارحة بعض الآليات في التنشئة الأسريَّة، والتي من شأنها أن تضمن نموًّا روحيًّا دينيًّا متوازنًا للأطفال؛ ولتجعل أفرادها الشباب بالأساس –مستقبلاً- ذوي مناعةٍ من التوظيف الخاطئ للعاطفة الدِّينيَّة، واستغلالها في إطفاء نور العقل والروح الإنسانيَّة؛ والانسياق في مزالق مشؤومة العاقبة، من خلال التطرُّف.
This article aims to examine the problem of extremism, by seeking its roots and sources, we have to do that on referring to the family, which is the core of the formation of communities, and the first school in which people receive their knowledge and emotions. This article is an attempt to present some mechanisms that we could use in family education, and that would ensure the balanced growth of children spiritually and religiously, they thus ensure their safety against the dangers of extremism.

L’élection présidentielle du 22 avril 2007 et le scrutin législatif qui l’a suivie ont été une terrible désillusion pour Jean-Marie Le Pen et le Front national (FN). Après avoir dominé l’agenda politique et médiatique durant les années quatre-vingt-dix et créé une secousse inédite dans le système politique lors des élections présidentielles de 2002, le FN était ramené à une expression électorale et un poids politique extrêmement modestes. Ce résultat, en phase avec le mouvement de déclin observé dans les années 2000, est confirmé au scrutin municipal de 2008 où l’extrême droite française est évanescente. D’aucuns évoquent alors la fin sans gloire de Jean-Marie Le Pen et de son parti.

A la veille des élections présidentielles et législatives de 2012, la présentation et le regard sont pourtant tout autres. En janvier 2011, Marine Le Pen a « hérité » de la présidence du parti ; trente-neuf ans après l’accession de son père à cette même présidence. Le Front national a opéré une percée aux élections cantonales du printemps 2011 et les enquêtes d’opinion créditent Marine Le Pen de scores oscillant entre 15 et 20% des intentions de vote pour le premier tour de la présidentielle.

Après le pain noir, le pain blanc ? Les choses sont indubitablement plus nuancées. Dans un environnement européen où l’extrême droite a (re)trouvé des couleurs dans certains Etats, une nouvelle analyse approfondie du phénomène frontiste s’imposait, tant il est vrai que le déclin politico-électoral de la deuxième moitié des années 2000 avait asséché les recherches consacrées au Front national.

L’ouvrage, qui rassemble des contributions de spécialistes réputés de l’extrême droite française, retrace et analyse tour à tour l’histoire du Front national, les rapports du FN à l’extrême droite européenne, le modèle organisationnel et militant du parti, ses axes idéologiques et programmatiques, de même que son implantation électorale et la question des alliances politico-électorales. Enfin, trois zones de force du Front national, dissemblables dans leur profil, sont très finement observées : le Nord-Pas-de-Calais, l’Alsace et Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur.

Dissertation an der Universität Leiden. Betreuer: Alex P. Schmid und Edwin Bakker.

Radikalismus und Extremismus werden zwar oft verwendet, doch sehen sie sich als Konzepte bzw. Begriffe beide der Kritik ausgesetzt; dies hat nicht zuletzt damit zu tun, dass ihre Grenzen unklar sind. Da der Extremismusbegriff durch Behörden und Organisationen die mit Sicherheitsaufgaben zu tun haben genutzt wird, um (potenzielle) Verfassungsfeinde zu markieren, sind klare Definitionen gesellschaftlich wünschenswert und damit auch ein wichtiges wissenschaftliches Unterfangen.
Bisher ist eine Vielzahl an disparaten Definitionen durch Behörden und Wissenschaft entwickelt worden. Eine anerkannte juristische Definition existiert in Deutschland nicht. Die geläufigen Definitionen werden in dieser Doktorarbeit gesammelt und analysiert, um so eine konsensfähige Definition erarbeiten zu können und das Verhältnis zwischen Radikalismus und Extremismus näher zu bestimmen. Zwei wissenschaftliche Methoden werden hierzu benutzt: die Begriffsanalyse nach Koselleck und die Konzeptanalyse nach Sartori. Die Analyse wird sich von dieser Basis ausgehend, kritisch mit der Konzeptualisierung von Radikalismus und Extremismus beschäftigen. Konsensdefinitionen von Extremismus und Radikalismus zu erarbeiten, ist das Ziel dieser Arbeit. Hierbei dient der Schmidsche Ansatz zur Formulierung einer akademischen Konsensdefinition des Terrorismus als Vorbild.

Radicalism and Extremism are words frequently used, but as concepts or terms, they are contested. This, in part, can be explained by the fact, that their meanings are somehow fuzzy. The term extremism is, in the German context, used by authorities and government agencies that have mandates to ensure public safety. They use it to mark the enemies of the constitution –which makes a clear definition important. Over many decades, a large number of definitions has been developed by authorities and academics. Nevertheless a legal definition that is generally accepted is still lacking in Germany. In this doctoral thesis, many definitions have been brought together and analyzed, in order to differentiate between radicalism and extremism. Two scientific methods have been utilised in order to achieve this goal: the terminological analysis method introduced by Koselleck and the conceptual analysis method proposed by Sartori. On the basis of these two approaches, one more historical, the other more comparative, this thesis critically reviews radicalism and extremism. The goal of the thesis is, to develop two consensus definitions of radicalism and extremism respectively. The academic consensus definition of terrorism, that Schmid developed between 1984 and 2011, serves as role model and example.
In a first step, the two different methodologies are explained. The historical term analysis, developed by Koselleck, is used in order to analyse the change of meanings of a term over time. The analytical concept analysis, developed by Sartori, is used in order to generate lexical competence of a concept by comparing it with neighouring concepts, so that it is possible to highlight the scope of its contemporary meaning.

Radicalisme en Extremisme zijn woorden die veel worden gebruikt, maar als concepten of termen betwist zijn. Dit kan deels verklaard worden doordat hun betekenissen vaag lijken te zijn. De term extremisme wordt in Duitse context gebruikt door autoriteiten en overheidsdiensten die publieke veiligheid als mandaat hebben. Het wordt gebruikt om vijanden van de grondwet aan te duiden –wat een duidelijke definitie vereist. Over een span van enkele decennia is er een groot aantal definities gemaakt door autoriteiten en academici. Desalniettemin is er nog altijd geen officiële definitie van extremisme in Duitsland die algemeen geaccepteerd is. In deze thesis zijn vele definities bijeen gebracht en geanalyseerd met als doel te differentiëren tussen radicalisme en extremisme. Er zijn twee wetenschappelijke methoden gebruikt om dit doel te bereiken: de terminologische analyse methode van Koselleck en de conceptuele analyse methode voorgesteld door Sartori. Op basis van deze twee aanpakken, de een meer historisch, de ander meer vergelijkend, worden radicalisme en extremisme kritisch beschouwd. Het doel van deze thesis is om twee definities te ontwikken, van radicalisme en extremisme, respectievelijk. De academische definitie van terrorisme, ontwikkeld door Schmid tussen 1984 en 2011, dient als rolmodel en voorbeeld.

Der Autor gehörte bis Mitte 2020 zu den Verantwortlichen für Social Media in der Bundeswehr. In die Kritik geriet er, als das NDR-Magazin Panorama im Juli 2020 über seine Social-Media-Aktivitäten eine anscheinende Nähe zu rechtsradikalen Nutzern aufgezeigt hatte.

Bohnert distanzierte sich von „allen Rechtsradikalen“, er habe mit diesen Menschen und diesem Gedankengut nichts zu tun, er sei schlicht unaufmerksam gewesen.

Den Journalistinnen von Panorama wurde in der folgenden medialen Debatte unter dem Schlagwort #Panoramagate Gesinnungsschnüffelei, eine Diffamierung des Offiziers und eine verzerrte Recherche vorgeworfen.

Im Februar 2021 trat Bohnert als Kopf hinter der Online-Initiative #WirGegenExtremismus in Erscheinung, die positive Reaktionen im Bundesministerium der Verteidigung hervorrief. Ihr schlossen sich in den folgenden Monaten nationale sowie unter #WeAgainstExtremism internationale Soldatenverbände an.

[QUELLE: Wikipedia]

#Panoramagate #Bundeswehr #SocialMediaDivision

Studiul de față încearcă să prezinte câteva din problemele cu care se confruntă Europa – în speță Europa de Est- precum xenofobia, rasismul și anti-semitismul, atitudini care alimentează  o creștere a forței partidelor de extremă dreapta. Se observă tot mai multe atitudini bazate pe premise precum inegaliltatea de facto a oamenilor, care favorizează acțiuni discriminatorii și acțiuni violente bazate pe ură. 


Voi începe prin a prezenta câteva din conceptele cu care voi lucra pe parcursul acestui scurt studiu, concepte precum: ”extrema dreaptă”, ”xenofobie”, ”rasism”, ”anti-semitism”, etc.
În partea a treia a lucrării voi încerca să analizez pe scurt câteva state din Europa de Est din perspectiva dezvoltării mișcărilor extremiste. Care sunt pericolele pe care extrema dreaptă le reprezintă? Cum se organizează și cum se manifestă în aceste țări? Acestea sunt câteva din întrebările la care aceste studii de caz vor încerca să răspundă.

Depuis un quart de siècle, plusieurs partis d’extrême droite ou de la droite populiste ont opéré une percée dans leur système politique national : le Front national en France, le FPÖ en Autriche, le parti du progrès en Norvège et au Danemark, le parti populaire danois, le parti national slovaque, le Mouvement social italien-Alliance nationale, la Ligue du nord, les Republikaner, le NPD et la DVU en Allemagne, la Liste Pim Fortuyn et le parti de la Liberté aux Pays-Bas, Ataka en Bulgarie, le parti populaire de la Grande Roumanie, le Vlaams Belang et le Front national en Belgique, l’Union démocratique du Centre en Suisse, LAOS en Grèce… Au surplus, un fait politique nouveau s’est imposé ces dernières années : outre la progression électorale et politique observée par nombre de ces partis, plusieurs formations d’extrême droite ont accédé aux responsabilités gouvernementales ou ont soutenu des gouvernements de l’extérieur. Par-delà les riches travaux consacrés aux développements des partis d’extrême droite, il s’imposait donc d’analyser les conditions et les conséquences de cette nouvelle donne. Tel est l’angle d’approche de cet ouvrage, qui réunit des contributions des meilleurs spécialistes de la question. La réflexion porte sur la vie et les choix internes de ces partis. Souhaitent-ils accéder au pouvoir ? Cette question suscite-t-elle des débats difficiles ? Observe-t-on un processus de modération quand ces formations rentrent au gouvernement ? Les militants endossent-ils ce choix ? Le parti est-il sanctionné ou conforté aux élections suivantes ?... Mais elle se fixe aussi sur les dimensions extérieures à ces formations. Les thèmes portés par les partis d’extrême droite percolent-ils chez les partis démocratiques ? L’apport de l’extrême droite est-il marquant sur certains thèmes qui lui sont chers ? Embrasser l’extrême droite est-ce mieux l’étouffer ? ... A partir d’études de cas et d’approches comparées, l’ouvrage fournit des réponses inédites à ces questions contemporaines.

This paper analyzes the role of far right in the Ukrainian politics during the “Euromaidan” and the war in Donbas. The issue of the involvement of Ukrainian far right organizations in the “Euromaidan” and the war in Donbas have been politicized and polarized. Russian and separatist politicians and the media often presented the “Euromaidan” as a “fascist coup” and the Maidan government as a “fascist junta.” In contrast, the governments and the mainstream media in Western countries tended to present the role of the far right in the “Euromaidan” and in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically in the conflict in Donbas, as marginal. Previous academic studies generally reached similar conclusions. They focused on numerical strength and electoral support for the far right parties and ignored other aspects of influence of the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi parties, specifically their role in the political violence, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres and the war in Donbas. However, the number of academic studies of the contemporary far right in Ukraine is generally limited.
            The research question is as follows: What is the role of the far right in the Ukrainian politics during and after the “Euromaidan”? This study analyzes the involvement of specific Ukrainian radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations in the “Euromaidan,” the Odesa massacre, and the war in Donbas, their performance in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and the 2015 local elections in Ukraine. The analysis focuses on major Ukrainian far right organizations, such as Svoboda (Freedom), the Right Sector, the Social-National Assembly, the White Hammer, the UNA-UNSO, Bratstvo, and C14, and paramilitary formations or special police and National Guard units organized and controlled to various extent by them, such as the Azov regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. It uses various sources of data, such as online recordings of live broadcasts and videos of the Maidan and Odesa massacres and the war in Donbas, official database of court decisions in Ukraine concerning investigations of the involvement of the far right in major cases of political violence, video recordings of the Maidan massacre trial, information posted on websites and social media groups of far right organizations, and media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages.
            The study shows that the far right organizations had significant but minority representation among the Maidan leadership and protesters, the post-Maidan governments, and in the presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. However, the analysis also shows that the far right organizations and football ultras played a key role during violent attacks, such as attempts to storm the presidential administration on December 1, 2013 and the parliament of Ukraine in January and on February 18, 2014. There is also various evidence of the Right Sector involvement in a violent attack of the Berkut police during its highly publicized dispersal of protesters on November 30, 2013. The Right Sector and Svoboda and smaller organizations had a crucial role in the violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government, in particular, in the Maidan massacre of the protesters and the police on February 18-20, 2014. The study demonstrates that the Right Sector, the Social-National Assembly/ Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of football ultras were involved in the Odesa massacre on May 2, 2014. This paper also shows that the far right organizations and their volunteer battalions and paramilitary units had a significant role in the civil war in Donbas but a comparably minor role in fighting with several regular Russian military units during direct military interventions by Russia in August 2014 and February 2015. Major implications of this study for the Ukrainian politics and the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine are discussed in the conclusion. This paper implies that the far right has significant but not dominant role in the Ukrainian politics during and after the “Euromaidan.” But far right organizations and their armed units had a key role in major cases of political violence during and after the “Euromaidan,” and they attained ability to overthrow by force the government of the one of the largest European countries.