Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the mai... more Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the main title question are identified and a conclusion of some significance is drawn: a pervasive bipartisan presupposition of twentieth century ethical theory and deontic logic is false. Next, an intuitive model-theoretic framework for "must" and "ought" is hypothesized. It is then shown how this hypothesis helps to explain and predict all the pre-theoretic phenomena previously observed. Next, I show that the framework hypothesized possesses additional expressive and explanatory power, thus adding further confirmation that it is on the right track.
I specify a very large class of logics with monadic and dyadic modal operators, primarily (but no... more I specify a very large class of logics with monadic and dyadic modal operators, primarily (but not exclusively) intended to represent monadic and dyadic agency in the tradition of Kanger, Pörn, Elgesem, etc. I explore logics both for pure monadic agency, pure dyadic agency, and mixed monadic-dyadic agency. Employing neighborhood semantic frames, but with an extra parameter governed by a modest algebraic structure, I prove determination theorems for all the consistent logics of those specified. I briefly present some motivation and rationales for some of the principles, but the main focus is on the framework and key meta-theorems.
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1, 2011
McNamara (UNH) 1. Introduction Consider a classic case of supererogation 2 : Tiny Tim Rescue Case... more McNamara (UNH) 1. Introduction Consider a classic case of supererogation 2 : Tiny Tim Rescue Case: A toddler is caught in a burning building. The fire and child's position are such that even experienced fire personnel might be at serious risk in an attempted rescue. The mailwoman passes by, and sizing up the situation, and its risks, and hearing the fire engines at a considerable distance, enters the building and eventually reaches the infant. She waits, trapped in an upper floor for the fire personnel to arrive, and drops the infant to the fire personal below. 3 Traditionally, friends of supererogation presuppose that the actions they have in mind are ones their agents are praiseworthy (in varying degrees) for performing. That is, the classical conception of supererogation embodies: The Link: If it is supererogatory for Jane Doe's to do A, it praiseworthy for her to do A. 4 The Link is encoded in what I will call the "The Standard Analysis" 5 :
... Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth, even though the fountain of youth didn&... more ... Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth, even though the fountain of youth didn't exist. ... purpose -- just as an arrow-shaped rock might actually become an arrowhead in virtue of being recruited for that purpose) Let me now sketch a variation on Dretske's Buster Case. ...
... Nor would it, be enougt~ to simply say that the nornmtivc notions of (leontic logic arc alway... more ... Nor would it, be enougt~ to simply say that the nornmtivc notions of (leontic logic arc always t)ractical, since the operator "it, ougtlt to t)e the case that", t)ertmt)s the most stlulie(1 oI)crator in (leontic l()gic, ai)t)ears to have no greater intrinsic link to t)racticality thail (loes "cre(lit)le ...
... Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth, even though the fountain of youth didn&... more ... Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth, even though the fountain of youth didn't exist. ... purpose -- just as an arrow-shaped rock might actually become an arrowhead in virtue of being recruited for that purpose) Let me now sketch a variation on Dretske's Buster Case. ...
Abstract. Continuing prior work ([1, 2]), I integrate a simple system for per-sonal obligation wi... more Abstract. Continuing prior work ([1, 2]), I integrate a simple system for per-sonal obligation with a system for aretaic (agent-evaluative) appraisal. I then explore various relationships between definable aretaic statuses such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and deontic ...
... Christine M. Korsgaard is the Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy and director of ... more ... Christine M. Korsgaard is the Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy and director of graduate studies in philosophy at Harvard University. She is a past president of the Eastern Division of the America Philosophical Association ...
Continuing prior work by the author, a simple classical system for personal obligation is integra... more Continuing prior work by the author, a simple classical system for personal obligation is integrated with a fairly rich system for aretaic (agent-evaluative) appraisal. I then explore various relationships between definable aretaic statuses such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and deontic statuses such as obligatoriness and impermissibility. I focus on partitions of the normative statuses generated ("normative positions" but without explicit representation of agency). In addition to being able to model and explore fundamental questions in ethical theory about the connection between blame, praise, permissibility and obligation, this allows me to carefully represent schemes for supererogation and kin. These controversial concepts have provided challenges to both ethical theory and deontic logic, and are among deontic logic's test cases.
Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the mai... more Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the main title question are identified and a conclusion of some significance is drawn: a pervasive bipartisan presupposition of twentieth century ethical theory and deontic logic is false. Next, an intuitive model-theoretic framework for "must" and "ought" is hypothesized. It is then shown how this hypothesis helps to explain and predict all the pre-theoretic phenomena previously observed. Next, I show that the framework hypothesized possesses additional expressive and explanatory power, thus adding further confirmation that it is on the right track.
In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate threads within ethical th... more In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate threads within ethical theory, one on "supererogation", one on "common-sense morality". I bring these threads together by systematically reflecting on doing more than one has to do . A rich and coherent set of concepts at the core of common-sense morality is identified, along with various logical connections between these core concepts. Various issues in common-sense morality emerge naturally, as does a demonstrably productive definition of doing more than one has to do. I then present an interpreted model-theoretic framework with the expressive power to generate truth-conditions for the core concepts, and the explanatory power to predict and explain the independently motivated logical connections between these concepts. The framework also has a certain heuristic power for "discovering" substantive ethical theories that can derivatively generate the model-theoretic framework for the core concepts. Two theories discussed are expansions of traditional theories; two others, each giving pride of place to justice, are devised to resonate with more recent concerns. Methodologically, it is hoped that the approach within might suggest the possibility of bridging another gap: that between formal and informal studies of moral notions.
I explore various ways of integrating the framework for predeterminism, agency, and ability in [P... more I explore various ways of integrating the framework for predeterminism, agency, and ability in [P. McNamara, Nordic J. Philos. Logic 5 (2) (2000) 135] with a framework for obligations. However, the agential obligation operator explored here is defined in terms of a non-agential yet personal obligation operator and a non-deontic (and non-normal) agency operator. This is contrary to the main current trend, which assumes statements of personal obligation always take agential complements. Instead, I take the basic form to be an agent's being obligated to be such that p. I sketch some logics for agential obligation based on personal obligation and agency, first in a fairly familiar context that rules out conflicting personal obligations (and derivatively, conflicting agential obligations), and then in contexts that do allow for conflicts (of both sorts). Finally, a solution to van Fraassen's puzzle is sketched, and an important theorem is proved. (P. McNamara).
Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the mai... more Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the main title question are identified and a conclusion of some significance is drawn: a pervasive bipartisan presupposition of twentieth century ethical theory and deontic logic is false. Next, an intuitive model-theoretic framework for "must" and "ought" is hypothesized. It is then shown how this hypothesis helps to explain and predict all the pre-theoretic phenomena previously observed. Next, I show that the framework hypothesized possesses additional expressive and explanatory power, thus adding further confirmation that it is on the right track.
I specify a very large class of logics with monadic and dyadic modal operators, primarily (but no... more I specify a very large class of logics with monadic and dyadic modal operators, primarily (but not exclusively) intended to represent monadic and dyadic agency in the tradition of Kanger, Pörn, Elgesem, etc. I explore logics both for pure monadic agency, pure dyadic agency, and mixed monadic-dyadic agency. Employing neighborhood semantic frames, but with an extra parameter governed by a modest algebraic structure, I prove determination theorems for all the consistent logics of those specified. I briefly present some motivation and rationales for some of the principles, but the main focus is on the framework and key meta-theorems.
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1, 2011
McNamara (UNH) 1. Introduction Consider a classic case of supererogation 2 : Tiny Tim Rescue Case... more McNamara (UNH) 1. Introduction Consider a classic case of supererogation 2 : Tiny Tim Rescue Case: A toddler is caught in a burning building. The fire and child's position are such that even experienced fire personnel might be at serious risk in an attempted rescue. The mailwoman passes by, and sizing up the situation, and its risks, and hearing the fire engines at a considerable distance, enters the building and eventually reaches the infant. She waits, trapped in an upper floor for the fire personnel to arrive, and drops the infant to the fire personal below. 3 Traditionally, friends of supererogation presuppose that the actions they have in mind are ones their agents are praiseworthy (in varying degrees) for performing. That is, the classical conception of supererogation embodies: The Link: If it is supererogatory for Jane Doe's to do A, it praiseworthy for her to do A. 4 The Link is encoded in what I will call the "The Standard Analysis" 5 :
... Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth, even though the fountain of youth didn&... more ... Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth, even though the fountain of youth didn't exist. ... purpose -- just as an arrow-shaped rock might actually become an arrowhead in virtue of being recruited for that purpose) Let me now sketch a variation on Dretske's Buster Case. ...
... Nor would it, be enougt~ to simply say that the nornmtivc notions of (leontic logic arc alway... more ... Nor would it, be enougt~ to simply say that the nornmtivc notions of (leontic logic arc always t)ractical, since the operator "it, ougtlt to t)e the case that", t)ertmt)s the most stlulie(1 oI)crator in (leontic l()gic, ai)t)ears to have no greater intrinsic link to t)racticality thail (loes "cre(lit)le ...
... Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth, even though the fountain of youth didn&... more ... Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth, even though the fountain of youth didn't exist. ... purpose -- just as an arrow-shaped rock might actually become an arrowhead in virtue of being recruited for that purpose) Let me now sketch a variation on Dretske's Buster Case. ...
Abstract. Continuing prior work ([1, 2]), I integrate a simple system for per-sonal obligation wi... more Abstract. Continuing prior work ([1, 2]), I integrate a simple system for per-sonal obligation with a system for aretaic (agent-evaluative) appraisal. I then explore various relationships between definable aretaic statuses such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and deontic ...
... Christine M. Korsgaard is the Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy and director of ... more ... Christine M. Korsgaard is the Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy and director of graduate studies in philosophy at Harvard University. She is a past president of the Eastern Division of the America Philosophical Association ...
Continuing prior work by the author, a simple classical system for personal obligation is integra... more Continuing prior work by the author, a simple classical system for personal obligation is integrated with a fairly rich system for aretaic (agent-evaluative) appraisal. I then explore various relationships between definable aretaic statuses such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and deontic statuses such as obligatoriness and impermissibility. I focus on partitions of the normative statuses generated ("normative positions" but without explicit representation of agency). In addition to being able to model and explore fundamental questions in ethical theory about the connection between blame, praise, permissibility and obligation, this allows me to carefully represent schemes for supererogation and kin. These controversial concepts have provided challenges to both ethical theory and deontic logic, and are among deontic logic's test cases.
Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the mai... more Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the main title question are identified and a conclusion of some significance is drawn: a pervasive bipartisan presupposition of twentieth century ethical theory and deontic logic is false. Next, an intuitive model-theoretic framework for "must" and "ought" is hypothesized. It is then shown how this hypothesis helps to explain and predict all the pre-theoretic phenomena previously observed. Next, I show that the framework hypothesized possesses additional expressive and explanatory power, thus adding further confirmation that it is on the right track.
In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate threads within ethical th... more In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate threads within ethical theory, one on "supererogation", one on "common-sense morality". I bring these threads together by systematically reflecting on doing more than one has to do . A rich and coherent set of concepts at the core of common-sense morality is identified, along with various logical connections between these core concepts. Various issues in common-sense morality emerge naturally, as does a demonstrably productive definition of doing more than one has to do. I then present an interpreted model-theoretic framework with the expressive power to generate truth-conditions for the core concepts, and the explanatory power to predict and explain the independently motivated logical connections between these concepts. The framework also has a certain heuristic power for "discovering" substantive ethical theories that can derivatively generate the model-theoretic framework for the core concepts. Two theories discussed are expansions of traditional theories; two others, each giving pride of place to justice, are devised to resonate with more recent concerns. Methodologically, it is hoped that the approach within might suggest the possibility of bridging another gap: that between formal and informal studies of moral notions.
I explore various ways of integrating the framework for predeterminism, agency, and ability in [P... more I explore various ways of integrating the framework for predeterminism, agency, and ability in [P. McNamara, Nordic J. Philos. Logic 5 (2) (2000) 135] with a framework for obligations. However, the agential obligation operator explored here is defined in terms of a non-agential yet personal obligation operator and a non-deontic (and non-normal) agency operator. This is contrary to the main current trend, which assumes statements of personal obligation always take agential complements. Instead, I take the basic form to be an agent's being obligated to be such that p. I sketch some logics for agential obligation based on personal obligation and agency, first in a fairly familiar context that rules out conflicting personal obligations (and derivatively, conflicting agential obligations), and then in contexts that do allow for conflicts (of both sorts). Finally, a solution to van Fraassen's puzzle is sketched, and an important theorem is proved. (P. McNamara).
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