Deontic Modality

This monograph focuses on modality in Spanish. It presents the theoretical approach to this category formulated by Bohumil Zavadil and, consequently, it analyses its possible application to Spanish. We concentrate on specific areas of the Spanish modal system where two modal meanings combine. Theoretical analyses are combined with corpus-based studies concentrating on the choice of mood or contextual interpretation of selected constructions. We veryfied that areas where two modal meanings meet are a natural part of the Spanish modal system and that the combination of modal meanings has consequences on the mood selection.

There are at least two kinds of normativity. They can easily be distinguished, but nevertheless they are sometimes confused. This article aims to clarify the distinction and thereby to prevent more confusion. The one kind of normativity has to do with what ought to be done, or what ought to be the case. In connection with this kind of normativity, I will use the word “deontic”, a term which is traditionally used in the logic for ought-to-do and ought-to-be.
The other kind of normativity has to do with facts that exist as the result of applying a rule. In connection with this kind of normativity, I will use the word “rule-based”. Rule-based facts are also known as “institutional facts”. 
Being deontic and being rule-based do not exclude each other. However, being deontic is not a subcategory of being rule-based, and neither is it the other way around. Therefore there are two kinds of normativity, which are (onto)logically independent of each other,

RESUMEN En este trabajo atacamos el cuerno 2 del dilema de Jørgensen (tesis prohibitiva), con la idea de así fortalecer el cuerno 1 (tesis permisiva). Asimismo, exploramos parcialmente la idea de una solución sintáctica tomando como punto de partida que los imperativos carecen de valor de verdad. Palabras clave: Dilema de Jørgensen, lógica de imperativos, naturaleza de la lógica, pluralismo lógico, consecuencia lógica. ABSTRACT In this paper we attack the Horn 2 of the Jørgensen's dilemma (prohibitive thesis), so we enforce horn1 (permissive thesis). Also, we explore partially the idea of a syntactical solution for a logic of imperatives based on the fact of the lack of truth value of imperatives.

In our  article we present the translation of English modal meanings in Hungarian target texts. We analysed English and Hungarian law and literal text from that point of view. The differences show the slight change or modification of modal meanings. The study after the theoretical dabate about modal meanings, presents the forms of modification of modal values in translation, and emphasizes that the differences are often rooted in the different modal categories at word level of Hungarian and English. Someteimes the modell meaning differences at syntax level can change the meaning of a whole passage of a text. The analyses show that in the translation the modal meanings are metainformation, which need extra attention in the translation activity.

Το παρόν άρθρο εκπονήθηκε στο πλαίσιο παρακολούθησης της Θεματικής Ενότητας: «ΕΓΛ 50 – Ελληνική Γλώσσα και Γλωσσολογία», η οποία υπάγεται στο Μεταπτυχιακό Πρόγραμμα Σπουδών “Ελληνική Γλώσσα και Λογοτεχνία” του Ανοικτού Πανεπιστημίου Κύπρου. Πρόκειται για μία ευσύνοπτη, αλλά όσο το δυνατόν εμπεριστατωμένη συγκριτική παρουσίαση των μηχανισμών πραγμάτωσης και των υποκατηγοριών δύο βασικών σημασιολογικών λειτουργιών, της Τροπικότητας και της Δείξης, στην Αρχαία και στην Νέα Ελληνική.

Abstract in English: This article was elaborated in the gulfs of the Module: «ΕGL 50 - Greek Language and Linguistics», which is part of the Post-Graduate Program “Greek Language and Literature” of the Open University of Cyprus. It is a succinct, but as detailed as possible, comparative presentation of the mechanisms and the subclasses of two basic semantic functions, Modality and Deixis, in Ancient and Modern Greek language.

"Quaeris quid agas, in quo te occupes? Modalität der Notwendigkeit
in der «Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei» Wilhelms von St. Thierry
in lateinischer und mittelhochdeutscher Fassung".

Im Beitrag werden einige Ergebnisse einer text- und textsortengebunden
Untersuchung zu dominierenden grammatischen Strukturen
in der spätmittelalterlichen geistlichen Prosatexten exemplarisch
vorgestellt. Als Untersuchungsmaterial wurden Traktate der
geistlichen Unterweisung für Novizen gewählt, daher stehen Sprachmittel
zur Wiedergabe der deontischen Modalität im Vordergrund
der Analyse. Es wird über eine speziell zu diesem Zweck entworfene
Klassifikation stereotyper modaler Konstruktionen berichtet, der ich
einerseits strukturell-syntaktische, andererseits funktional-semantische
Kriterien zu Grunde gelegt habe. Nach dem Prinzip einer
felderbezogenen Darstellung sprachlicher Mittel werden zentrale und
periphere Typen syntaktischer Konstruktionen unterschieden.
Beim Vergleich der ‚Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei’ Wilhelms
von St. Thierry mit ihrer aus der Augsburger Gegend stammenden
mhd. Übersetzung (um 1300) lässt sich vor allem eine
erhebliche strukturelle Asymmetrie zwischen lateinischen und deutschen
syntaktischen Konstruktionen mit deontischer Semantik feststellen.
So gilt für die lateinische ‚Epistola’ die Conjugatio periphrastica
futuri passivi als dominierende grammatische Struktur zur
Wiedergabe der deontischen Semantik, während in der verdeutschten
Version der ‚Epistola’ Sätze mit Modalverben vorherrschen.
Kein strukturelles Äquivalent konnte in der mhd. Übersetzung
für lateinische unpersönliche Konstruktionen mit deontischer
Bedeutung gefunden werden: a) unpersönliches Matrixverb
OPORTET + Accusativus cum infinitivo; b) unpersönliches Matrixverb
EXPEDIT + Infinitivgruppe; c) Conjunctivus imperativus des
Matrixverbs; d) Konstruktionen mit Genitivus characteristicus.
Während strukturelle Ähnlichkeit zwischen ermittelten syntaktischen
Grundtypen relativ selten ist, sind im Gegenteil bei polyprädikativen
hypotaktischen Konstruktionen meistenteils symmetrische
syntaktische Relationen zwischen Klauseln in beiden Fassungen
festzustellen.

Insgesamt zeichnet sich die ‚Epistola’ durch eine intensive
Variation verschiedener sprachlicher Elemente des Modalfeldes aus.
Ein Grund dafür könnte in der Textsortenmischung und in der
Eigenartigkeit der Textfunktion liegen. Im Gegenteil weist der als
Vergleichsmaterial untersuchte 1. Teil des Novizentraktats ‚De exterioris
et interioris hominis compositione’ Davids von Augsburg
sowie seine alemannische Übersetzung aus der Mitte des 14. Jh.
einen weitgehend einheitlichen Gebrauch modaler Strukturen auf.

Over the last decades, relationships among language, culture and identity have become a favourite topic in social science, due to this fact, some scholars have lately begun to pay systematic attention to many areas in the field of pragmatic failure (Dunworth 2002), however, little research has been devoted to both the pragmatic failure considering the deontic and epistemic illocutionary force in the answers provided by Spanish tertiary students and the way these students answer in terms of politeness. This has become an important aspect of analysis as it is in its infancy. As Leech (1983) and Brown and Levinson (1987:216) explain that the pragmatic force of an utterance is normally contradictory or uncertain, even in context, and often deliberately. For reasons of politeness, the speaker and hearer should intentionally exploit this contrariness. Along this line, this paper aims at answering the following research questions:
(1) With what frequency do deontic modals cause pragmatic failure in students’ responses in contrast to epistemic modals?
(2) Does “language transfer” cause a major limitation when interpreting the illocutionary
forces of epistemic and deontic modals? Could language transfer break down communication?
(3) Can deontic and epistemic pragmatic failure be interpreted as impolite?
Data for this research were gathered from 30 Spanish tertiary students in English linguistics who ranged in age from 22 to 24 having just graduated from college (BA) and finding themselves at a postgraduate level of studies. This study used a questionnaire which was developed by considering two variables. The first variable included participant’s native language, cultural background and place of residence, age and foreign language knowledge.  The second variable referred to the intention purported in the questionnaire, that is, the participants had limited options in the answers they could provide, two options were given regarding epistemic modality (could and may) and two referring to deontic modality (can and must); students were expected to answer using one of these options only, but in those cases in which the students considered that any of the possibilities were suitable, they were allowed to provide an optional free answer. The dialogue-type focused on different scenarios ranging from formal to colloquial situations.
The findings reveal that Spanish tertiary students do often commit more errors when interpreting the illocutionary force of epistemic modals in contrast to the use of deontic modals. The deontic modals cause less problems in its interpretation due to language transfer and similarity across cultures and languages. However, when using epistemic modal verbs students showed less capacity of cross-cultural pragmatics, being unable to identify the illocutionary force of the question and claims and therefore setting up a linguistic-cultural barrier in communication.

This article analyses different approaches to the study of the Spanish subjunctive. We concentrate on Spanish monographs and larger series
of articles published in the last twenty years and trace two main lines of
investigation: works that postulate one central rule for the use of subjunctive and those that study its different uses separately. We compare them and point out a number of questions that still remain unresolved.
We claim that works proposing a single value of the Spanish subjunctive often leave aside some problematic aspects and do not pay sufficient
attention to the Indicative. Consequently, we analyse works on the subjunctive written by Czech linguists, offering, thus, a contrastive point
of view on the topic.

According to a recent challenge to Kratzer's canonical contextualist semantics for deontic modal expressions, no contextualist view can make sense of cases in which such a modal must be information-sensitive in some way. Here I show how Kratzer's semantics is compatible with readings of the targeted sentences that fit with the data. I then outline a general account of how contexts select parameter values for modal expressions and show, in terms of that account, how the needed, contextualist-friendly readings might plausibly get selected in the challenge cases.

Modality has been a field of deep study by semantictians and pragmatists. This field  has  been  of  interest  for  professors  of  Complutense  University  of  Madrid  as  Marta  Carretero
(1995) and Angela Downing (2015), among others. The present study aims to analyze the use  of the modal verb “can” and its counterparts “could”, “cannot” and “could not” in written texts  by  English  native  students  (NS)  and  Spanish  non-native  students  of  English  (NNS).  More specifically,  the  study  tries  to  answer  the  following  research  questions:  (1)  Are  the  modals  under  analysis  used  more  frequently  by  NS  or  NNS?  and  (2),  Do  NS  or  NNS  use  modality  differently regarding the degree of formality? To this purpose, two subcorpora (academic and  informal  texts)  were  gathered  by  means  of  analyzing  online  journals  and  online  chats,  rendering a total of 243 modals in NS and 282 in NNS texts. The analysis of the data reveals  that a high frequency of modality depends on a high degree of formality

This paper discusses the textual fit of translated EU law – that is, how its language differs from that of nontranslated Polish law – at the level of deontic modality patterns. The study is part of a larger three-year project and was conducted on the following multilingual comparative corpora: (1) The Polish Translation JRC Acquis Corpus, a corpus of acquis built by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre from which regulations and directives were isolated as separate sub-corpora (14.7m and 7.2m words, respectively), and corresponding English versions of translated regulations and directives. Translated regulations become automatically binding law in Poland while directives undergo intralingual translation by transposition into national law; (2) The reference corpus compiled by the author – the Polish Law Corpus, of 6.8m words, comprising Polish statutes as a source of naturally occurring legal Polish.

The primary functions of law are to impose duty and to confer power. As a result, the language of the law is marked by a high frequency of deontic modals because of its need to express obligation and permission. Obligation and permission-coding modals are strong genre markers and have very high salience in translated and nontranslated law. However, they have a strikingly different distribution across the corpora, as well as within each corpus (between resolutions and directives as well as between codes and ordinary statutes of Polish law), with most modals ranking high in keywords lists. In Polish legislation, obligation and permission are mainly expressed through semi-modals, present tense and special phrasemes (e.g. jest obowiązany do ‘is obliged to’), which are not prompted in translated language. The distribution of modals in the Polish version of EU law directly reflects source language modality patterns, pointing to strong interference, overreliance on literal translation techniques and lack of normalisation to generic conventions of legislative Polish. The differences may also be attributed to a different structure of EU legal instruments (extensive non-normative preambles), the institutional culture of translating (guidelines for translators on how to translate certain modals) and power relations (interaction between majority and minority culture). In view of other differences between translated and nontranslated law, it may be argued that the low textual fit of translated law creates a distinct, more ‘European’ genre within the Polish language of the law, invading the integrity of and colonising the national genre. Such departures from generic conventions require a greater cognitive effort on the part of the reader and may increase interpretive doubts.

Logic has traditionally been construed as a normative discipline; it sets forth standards of correct reasoning. Explosion is a valid principle of classical logic. It states that an inconsistent set of propositions entails any proposition whatsoever. However, ordinary agents presumably do---occasionally, at least---have inconsistent belief sets. Yet it is false that such agents may, let alone ought, to believe any proposition they please. Therefore, our logic should not recognize explosion as a logical law. Call this the `normative argument against explosion'. Arguments of this type play---implicitly or explicitly---a central role in motivating paraconsistent logics.  Branden Fitelson (2008), in a throwaway remark, has conjectured that there is no plausible 'bridge principle' articulating the normative link between logic and reasoning capable of supporting such arguments. This paper offers a critical evaluation of Fitelson's conjecture and hence of normative arguments for paraconsistency and the conceptions of logic's normative status on which they repose. It is argued that Fitelson's conjecture turns out to be correct: normative arguments for paraconsistency probably fail.

This chapter reports on a data-driven contrastive study of Greek men’s and women’s lifestyle magazines. Integrating methodologies of corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis, it explores the hypothesis that, despite their apparently dichotomic gender-oriented differentiation, these two types of publication bear fundamental discoursal and ideological similarities. The initial quantitative (n-gram-based) analysis of the two corpora reveals an equally striking prominence of the power-expressing feature of deontic modality in both men’s and women’s magazines. The in-depth qualitative (concordance-based) analysis of the instances of deonticity demonstrates that magazine texts systematically simulate and creatively rearticulate a multitude of recognizable voices of authority of the public and private spheres (e.g. official institutions, professional experts, educators, parents and older relatives, lovers, friends), seamlessly incor- porating the relevant styles and registers (e.g. information leaflet, instructions manual, self-help book, teacher scolding, parent counseling, lover’s reprimand, friend’s mock-impolite criticism, etc.) in the magazines’ proposed life scripts. The relentlessly regulative tone is invariably mitigated by the implication that the rules posed are for the benefit of the reader. It appears that the extensive appropriation of canonistic discourses and their skillful and imaginative hybridisation with other replicated non-regulative genres and registers renders deontic modality a powerful rhetorical instrument for effectively conveying gender-differential and other crucial (e.g. consumerist/commercial, political) messages in both types of lifestyle magazines.

I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, that is, logical equivalent contents cannot be substituted in their scope. I give two arguments, one is deductive and the other abductive. First, I simply prove that the contrary thesis leads to falsity; second, I claim that a hyperintensional theory of deontic modals fares better than its rivals in terms of elegance, theoretical simplicity, and explanatory power (e.g. Ross's paradox, the Gentle Murderer, The Good Samaritan, Free Choice Permission, and the Miners' Paradox disappear). I then propose a philosophical analysis of this thesis, and outline some consequences. In section 1 I introduce and define deontic modality and hyperinten-sionality. In section 2 I give a reductio for the hyperintensionality of de-ontic modals. If the argument is sound, a useful corollary is that deontic modals are also non-intensional, and therefore possible-world semantics accounts are ill-fitted for them. I then show how the main result can be strengthened or weakened by varying the definition of logical validity. In section 3 I give an abductive argument for the hyperintensionality of de-ontic modals, arguing that with a single move we are able to solve many paradoxes and puzzles traditionally troubling deontic logic. I present a version of a hyperintensional deontic logic in an appendix, which I prove is sound and complete with respect to a version of truthmaker semantics.

This paper discusses the non-epistemic meanings of the modal verb  može ‘can’ in standard Macedonian in an attempt to apply the categorization principles used in defining modal categories. The main goal is to determine the types of root modality meanings coded by this verb and separate the dynamic modality meanings from the deontic ones. Both deontic and dynamic modality express possibility but differ with respect to the source. The semantic analysis of over 500 collected examples from literary prose shows that može may express the following modal meanings: deontic possibility (participant external modality), dynamic ability (participant internal modality) and circumstantial ability. The features defining these meanings are explained and illustrated by authentic examples. In addition, we analyze various speech acts with non-epistemic može in order to find out how these meanings depend on contextual factors and the pragmatic function of može.

Potere nel diritto assume molteplici significati: dai diritti potestativi al potere di ordinanza sindacale, dal potere disciplinare del privato datore di lavoro ai poteri amministrativi propri degli organi pubblici. Il concetto di potere giuridico, inteso quale possibilità normativa di produrre degli effetti giuridici immediati sfavorevoli alla controparte in un rapporto giuridico, conosce delle applicazioni giurisprudenziali anche nel suo rovescio negativo: l'impossibilità giuridica (esempi: il reato impossibile o l'impossibilità di adempiere un'obbligazione). Partendo dall'analisi del linguaggio normativo, l'autore studia la natura, i tipi e le leggi logiche che regolano i concetti di potere giuridico e di impossibilità giuridica in dieci prospettive filosofico-giuridiche: la deontica filosofica, la teoria generale del diritto, la teoria della norma, la dottrina pura del diritto, la logica giuridica, la logica deontica, l'assiomatica del normativo, l'ontologia sociale, la filosofia politica e la scienza giuridica. La fecondità filosofica di questa teoria generale del potere è inoltre saggiata nell'ordinamento giuridico italiano vigente, con particolare attenzione al diritto civile, al diritto penale, al diritto pubblico e al diritto amministrativo degli enti locali.

On the classical, Kratzer-style semantics  for deontic modals, what one ought to do or how things ought to be is tied directly to what one does or how things are in some set of “best” worlds.  A number of recent challenges to that semantics have focused on the logical principles it validates.  Among such principles are Inheritance, Agglomeration, and Deontic Detachment.  Another challenge stems from Sloman’s Principle, which it allegedly does not validate, but, it is argued, a plausible semantics should.  Finally, further challenges stem from the claim that there are possibilities, such as the possibility of deontic conflicts and of supererogation, the classical semantics is alleged to foreclose.
  Here I will consider some of the cases that motivate these challenges, showing that they do not have their prima facie force.

Prompted by the thesis that an organism’s umwelt possesses not just a descriptive dimension, but a normative one as well, some have sought to annex semiotics with ethics. Yet the pronouncements made in this vein have consisted mainly in rehearsing accepted moral intuitions, and have failed to concretely further our knowledge of why or how a creature comes to order objects in its environment in accordance with axiological charges of value or disvalue. For want of a more explicit account, theorists writing on the topic have relied almost exclusively on semiotic insights about perception originally designed as part of a sophisticated refutation of idealism. The end result, which has been a form of direct givenness, has thus been far from convincing. In an effort to bring substance to the right-headed suggestion that values are rooted in the biological and conform to species-specific requirements, we present a novel conception that strives to make explicit the elemental structure underlying umwelt normativity. Building and expanding on the seminal work of Ayn Rand in metaethics, we describe values as an intertwined lattice which takes a creature’s own embodied life as its ultimate standard; and endeavour to show how, from this, all subsequent valuations can in principle be determined.

Standard possible-worlds semantics faces a range of difficulties for at least certain types of modals. This paper outlines a new semantics of modals that aims to overcome those difficulties. The semantics is motivated by a range of novel, linguistically reflected intuitions and is based on an ontology of modal objects (entities like obligations, permissions, epistemic states, abilities, and essences) as well as on the notion of truthmaking, in the sense of Fine’s recent truthmaker semantics. This 'object-based truthmaker semantics', as I will call it, applies particularly well to deontic modals (with their distinction between heavy and light permissions), though it is meant to apply to all modals. The paper will in particular propose an application of object-based truthmaker semantics to metaphysical modality based on essences as modal objects.

G.H. von Wright’s contribution into the logical research in the USSR is hard to overestimate. His influence can only be compared with that of his disciple, Jaakko Hintikka, which in some sense is a part of von Wright’s contribution. In this paper I discuss the scholarly repercussions of von Wright’s deontic legacy, proposed by two eminent Russian logicians, Alexander Zinoviev (1922-2006) and Alexander Esenin-Volpin (1924-2016), on their Anti-Soviet activities.
My aim is to show how Zinoviev’s and Esenin-Volpin’s conceptually and formally diverse contributions to the development of deontic logic in the USSR influenced two different trends in the Anti-Soviet movement, which to a large extent have been shaped up by political activities of these scholars. The conceptual connection of von Wright’s being the founding father of deontic logic to the rise of deontic studies in the USSR, in which Zinoviev’s and Esenin-Volpin’s contributions played their roles, appears straightforward. However, the connection between the political activities of the two and their deontic ideas is less transparent, which invites both formal and conceptual evidence that I hope to present here.

This paper motivates and develops a novel semantic framework for deontic modals. The framework is designed to shed light on two things: the relationship between deontic modals and substantive theories of practical rationality and the interaction of deon- tic modals with conditionals, epistemic modals and probability operators. I argue that, in order to model inferential connections between deontic modals and probability operators, we need more structure than is provided by classical intensional theories. In particular, we need probabilistic structure that interacts directly with the compositional semantics of de- ontic modals. However, I reject theories that provide this probabilistic structure by claiming that the semantics of deontic modals is linked to the Bayesian notion of expectation. I offer a probabilistic premise semantics that explains all the data that create trouble for the rival theories.

Во оваа статија авторите ги анализираат флексивните модални има да-конструкции во кои глаголот има категоријално е обележан по лице и број. Тргнувајќи од хипотеза дека има од посесивен глагол се граматикализирал во модален во специфично синтаксичко опкружување како што е нефактивната да-реченица авторите имаат за цел да докажат дека постојат повеќе под-типови на личните има да-конструкции со различни семантичко-синтаксичките својства. Постоењето повеќе типови конструкции го одразува различниот степен на нивната граматикализација. Во појдовната конструкција глаголот има го задржува посесивното значење, во втората фаза тоа значење постепено ослабнува и се засилува модалното, додека во третата фаза глаголот има и да-конструкцијата градат перифрастична модална (деонтичка) конструкција. Тоа се потврдува и со ширењето на конструкцијата на некои непреодни глаголи, но сепак не може да се тврди за потполна граматикализацијата на личното има во модален глагол.

There are two types of modally marked but semantically different ima da-constructions in Macedonian: with uninflected and inflected for person/number forms of ima. The focus of this paper are the “personal” constructions and their development into a periphrastic modal ima. The paper examines the semantic and syntactic properties of these constructions in order to establish their grammaticalization path. Based on the analysis of corpus examples the authors filter out three types of constructions that reflect the stages in their grammaticalization process. In the source construction the verb ima still retains its possessive meaning but modal inferences arise in different contexts. In the second and the third stage these inferences strengthen into modal deontic meanings, gradually replacing the possessive meaning. The third stage is characterized by the reanalysis of the original construction and inclusion of intransitive verbs. However, several properties of this construction indicate that ima has not been fully grammaticalized into a modal verb.

意見を表す動詞の補足節における叙法選択－発話の「引き受け prise en charge」の観点から

井上大輔

SOUTET(2000)は、疑問文において直説法が用いられるのは、que以下が真実であることが、発話の主語（sujet d’énoncé）から切り離されているにもかかわらず、発話行為の主体によって保証され続けている（la vérité de q continue d’être garantie par le sujet d’énonciation）からであると述べている。例えば、神父が洗礼志願者に対して質問をする時に、(2)に違和感を覚えるのは、(1)は発話行為の主体である神父がque以下の内容を保証しているのに対し、(2)は発話行為の主体である神父がque以下の内容を保証しておらず、洗礼志願者に対して疑問を投げかけているように感じられるからである。

(1) Croyez-vous que le Christ est ressuscité des morts?
(2) Croyez-vous que le Christ soit ressuscité des morts?
(Soutet, 2000, 81)

しかし、Frantextを探してみると、(3)のように発話行為の主体ではなく、発話の主語であるtuがque以下を事実だと見なしていると話者が判断しているため、直説法が使われているとしか思えない例が多数見つかる。

(3) -Quelle plaisanterie, madame Lerat ?
-Crois-tu que je ne vous ai pas vus passer dans la galerie ? Ma parole, je n'en croyais pas mes yeux.

本発表では、croireに代表される意見を表す動詞（verbe d’opinion）のque節で見られるこのような現象に対して、フランス言語学において保証の概念と関連して述べられることの多いprise en charge（引き受け）の観点から分析を試みる。（上智大学博士課程）

In this paper, I argue that imperatives do not incorporate a covert modal component (contra Han 1998, 1999, 2001; Schwager 2005a, 2005b, 2006a; as Kaufmann 2012) and deontic modals do not incorporate an imperative-like performative component (contra Portner 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2012; Ninan 2005) showing that we do not need extra layers in the logical form adding unnecessary and complicating steps in the interpretation. In addition, I show that imperatives do not have predetermined modal force (universal or existential), and that their range of quantification is not fixed. Finally, I present data illustrating that deontic expressions do not commit the addressee to the realization of the modal proposition, and prove that mood and modal expressions do not always equate with each other.

Статья посвящена проблеме языкового представления семантического комплекса долженствования – необходимости в памятниках правовой прозы восточношвабского языкового ареала. В качестве материала выбраны немецкие уставы и статуты францисканского ордена, составленные в XIV–XV вв. для женских монастырских общин Аугсбургского епископата. С помощью лексико-грамматического анализа нескольких стереотипных конструкций описывается характер взаимодействия разных деонтических значений в тексте.

This paper aims to investigate various linguistic strategies of counterfactuality in a simple clause and their semantic/ grammatical properties. First of all, a typology of counterfactuality in a simple clause was shown and some instances handled in cross-linguistic researches illustrated together. Then, it was particularly examined how counterfactuality appears in a simple clause in Korean. There are three types of counterfactual constructions; dedicated markers and conditional constructions in a level of encoded meaning, and constructions combining irrealis element and past tense marker in a level of pragmatic implicature. Through this inquiry, the two things which are worthy of being commented are confirmed. One is the fact that various constructions, which denote counterfactuality in a different linguistic level(semantic vs. pragmatic), are coexisting in Korean. The other is the fact that every construction is associated with a certain kind of marker involved in potentiality such as modality or irrealis; dedicated markers are concerned with emotive modality, conditional constructions and constructions referring to pretense are related to a domain of irrealis, and there are various markers belonging to a subtype of modality in combined constructions. This result could be interpreted from a perspective that potentiality triggers an implication of quantity as indicated in Van linden and Verstraete(2008).

This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed.

Here we focus on two questions: What is the proper semantics for deontic modal expressions in English?  And what is the connection between true deontic modal statements and normative reasons?  Our contribution towards thinking about the first, which makes up the bulk of our paper, considers a representative sample of recent challenges to a Kratzer-style formal semantics for modal expressions,  as well as the rival views—Fabrizio Cariani’s contrastivism, John MacFarlane’s relativism, and Mark Schroeder’s ambiguity theory—those challenges are thought to motivate. These include the Professor Procrastinate challenge to Inheritance (the principle that ‘If ought  and  entails , then ought ), as well as Parfit’s miners puzzle regarding information-sensitive deontic modals. Here we argue that a Kratzer-style view is able to meet all of the challenges we’ll consider.  In addition, we’ll identify challenges for each of those rival views.  Our overall conclusion is that a Kratzer-style semantics remains the one to beat.
With this assumption in place, we then ask how we should understand the relationship between true deontic modal statements and normative reasons.  Should, for example, we hold that the truth of such a statement entails the existence of a normative reason for some agent to comply?  Here we argue that, in many cases, acceptance of Kratzer’s semantics for deontic modals leaves open for substantive normative theorizing the question of whether an agent has a normative reason to comply with what she ought to do.

Recently, our judgments about disagreement cases have been accorded a significant evidential role in assessing rival semantic theories for deontic modal expressions.  In particular, such judgments have been used to motivate rivals to the canonical, contextualist semantics on the grounds that it is insufficiently complex to explain them.  This challenge rests on the assumption that a semantics should be able to represent our sense that two parties genuinely disagree at the level of what is said.  If that assumption is correct, such judgments have a constraining role to play in assessing the comparative merits of the canonical contextualist versus revisionary semantic proposals. 
Here I examine whether that methodological assumption is correct for a particular type of disagreement case, one that prima facie is animated by a dispute over what morality primarily requires. To that end, I consider a variety of disagreements, identifying their hallmarks and using those hallmarks to devise tests to distinguish them.  With those tests in hand, I'll show that our disagreement case is one for this methodological assumption is most plausible.  A central conclusion here is that rivals to the canonical view that add a parameter for information to the points of evaluation deontic modals are sensitive to undercuts the ability of the resulting views to explain disagreement between those who hold that our primary moral requirements are information-sensitive and those that don’t. If successful, the argument here turns an alleged pro-revisionary challenge on its head, by showing that some cases of disagreement undermine, rather than support, revisions to the canonical view.

Il presente saggio "Deontica del potere" si propone di offrire un frammento d’analisi dei fondamenti filosofici e filologici del verbo modale “potere” così come espresso nel linguaggio giuridico tedesco; in particolare, saranno illustrati alcuni casi peculiari in cui è paradossalmente invertito il significato primo e principale dei verbi modali tedeschi ’sollen’ e ’dürfen’. Proprio questa paradossale inversione giustifica il paradossale titolo del presente saggio: "Deontica del potere."

The principal aim of this study is to examine the Spanish modal verb deber 'must' in its deontic readings, relating it to the notions of evidentiality and intersubjectivity. Deber has often been compared to the modal verb tener que 'have to' and described in rather vague terms, for example as an expression of weak, internal obligation, but this paper proposes that it is better understood as an intersubjective verb. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses have been carried out, with a special focus on the in-depth qualitative study. It will be shown that deontic deber can convey evidential meanings when used in the conditional form. First, it can refer to a norm shared between the speaker and the hearer, and, second, it can convey an inferential process, a conclusion presented by the speaker, which is based on shared information, available to a larger group (or all) of the interlocutors. Evidentiality is regarded here as an intersubjective strategy, used when the speaker wants to reach consensus, arguing for the most reasonable, morally defensible way to act. Thus, this study also offers a new perspective of evidentiality, looking at this notion in interaction with deontic modality instead of epistemic modality, which is usually the case.

This paper examines the acquisition process of the English modal verbs for expressing obligation (must, have to, should and need to) by Macedonian learners across several proficiency levels (A1, A2, B1 and B2) using data from the Macedonian English Learner Corpus. We examine how they are used in the writings of learners at each level from formal, semantic and pragmatic perspective. The frequencies will show the order of occurrence of the uses of these modal verbs and the comparison with data from native speaker corpora will determine how close or different the use of Macedonian learners is. Error types at each level and L1 influence are also identified and explained and suggestions for dealing with them in the classroom are discussed.
Key words: learner corpora, interlanguage, modal verbs, epistemic and deontic modality, language acquisition

The aim of this paper is to outline a suitable analysis of certain deontic modalities. To avoid confusion as much as possible, I specify the subject-matter of my analysis explicitly. Subsequently, the paper argues that Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) is an appropriate framework for developing deontic logic. The main contribution of the paper consists in a proposal concerning the analysis of deontic modalities in TIL as well as in offering a semantically based distinction between implicit and explicit deontic modalities. Finally, I introduce some definitions along with some inferential rules and show (using Ross’ paradox) how it is possible to deal with the paradoxes of deontic logic in terms of my analysis.