Gabriel Encinas is a Humboldt Research Fellow at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg where he works on "Interlegal Reasoning and Interlegal Balancing" under the supervision of Prof. Jan Sieckmann. He holds a PhD from Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna Pisa. Collaborator in the Center for Interlegality Research. Supervisors: Klaus Günther (LLM), Ralf Seinecke (LLM), Alberto Pirni (PhD), Martin Borowski (research stay), and Jan Sieckmann (Humboldt Postdoc Fellowship supervisor)
Recensión de Núñez, Jorge Emilio (2024): Cosmopolitanism, State Sovereignty and Internati... more Recensión de Núñez, Jorge Emilio (2024): Cosmopolitanism, State Sovereignty and International Law and Politics: A Theory (Abingdon y Nueva York, Routledge) 202+xiv pp
Call for papers and participation in the "Interlegal Reasoning and Balancing at the Interfaces" S... more Call for papers and participation in the "Interlegal Reasoning and Balancing at the Interfaces" Special Workshop at IVR 2024 in Seoul (July 7-12, 2024)
Theme: Vulnerabilities, human rights, the protection of common goods, as well as climate change, are irreducible to the mastering and control of any single state. Everyday legal relations include a transnational or pre-institutional dimension. And yet, the idea that the rule of law is relative to each system has proven difficult to shake off from our concepts and theories of legal practices.
To better understand this complex reality, this workshop sets to gather diverse case studies and reflections on the feasibility and the legitimacy of cross-regime, interlegal reasoning and balancing at the interfaces of multiple and diverse legalities.
All perspectives —empirical, analytical, methodological, normative, critical— are welcome.
II Jornadas Internacionales y III Jornadas Nacionales “Nuevas Perspectivas de la Argumentación en el Siglo XXI. Avances y discusiones en torno a la argumentación jurídica, 2022
Las teorías sobre la argumentación jurídica ya no pueden referirse a un solo sistema jurídico, im... more Las teorías sobre la argumentación jurídica ya no pueden referirse a un solo sistema jurídico, impermeabilizado bajo axiomas de 'completitud', 'clausura' y 'exclusividad'. Nuestro mundo cambió. Requerimos dar cuenta de reenvíos, interfaces, diálogos, referencias, contradicciones, recepciones condicionadas, ponderaciones, y una multitud de razonamientos sobre normas con orígenes en más de un solo ordenamiento o espacio jurídico. El razonamiento jurídico hoy es tanto singular como plural. La argumentación ya no se ciñe a un solo sistema, la argumentación es interjurídica. Este escrito busca atender a las bases teóricas disponibles para ello, con la estrategia de acudir ante tres grandes autores, Neil MacCormick, Klaus Günther, y Robert Alexy, anotando tanto sus ideas como, acaso, sus silencios, sobre la condición interlegal.
In this rejoinder, I proceed through the three main sections in Wei Feng’s comments. In the first... more In this rejoinder, I proceed through the three main sections in Wei Feng’s comments. In the first section, hierarchy and legal order, I address the following four points: the aims in the first main section of my working paper; the conceptual necessity of hierarchy for a legal order; the compatibility of Kelsen’s take on primacy with “rules with significant contents or values”; and the cumulative construction of hierarchy between legal orders. In a second section, I address the detached sense in which I invoke the ideas of classifying and qualifying criteria of (inter-)legality. In the third section, on modes of balancing concerning formal principles, I address the following four points: the limited scope of my argument regarding models for balancing formal principles; the nature of competence rules and their relation to formal principles; the choice among models for balancing formal principles; and whether my qualifying criteria of interlegality should be read inlegal positivist or ...
Balancing is closely related to paradigmatic cases of interlegality. This close relation between ... more Balancing is closely related to paradigmatic cases of interlegality. This close relation between interlegality and balancing will be presented and discussed availing myself of two distinctions. One concerns implicit and explicit uses of balancing. The other refers to a contextual difference: multilevel settings on the one hand, and more horizontal constellations on the other hand. I will first provide a brief word on how interlegality and balancing are rather congenial as they share the aim of considering all relevant reasons for a decision. Then, I will gather a working conceptualization of balancing in practical reasoning on the one hand, and proportionality assessments and other balancing models as its (more or less) standardized institutionalizations in legal reasoning on the other hand. It is on this basis that I will propose a distinction of two possible situations of intertwined legal orders (i.e., multilevel settings and other more horizontal constellations) which lead to balancing norms sourced in the different legal orders involved. I will then point out three of the core challenges related to the notion of interlegal balancing: the nature of jurisdictional collisions and competence norms, the comparability of norms sourced in different legal orders, and possible criteria for weighting and balancing across legal orders. I conclude with a summary and open questions.
In this rejoinder, I proceed through the three main sections in Wei Feng’s comments. In the first... more In this rejoinder, I proceed through the three main sections in Wei Feng’s comments. In the first section, hierarchy and legal order, I address the following four points: the aims in the first main section of my working paper; the conceptual necessity of hierarchy for a legal order; the compatibility of Kelsen’s take on primacy with “rules with significant contents or values”; and the cumulative construction of hierarchy between legal orders. In a second section, I address the detached sense in which I invoke the ideas of classifying and qualifying criteria of (inter-)legality. In the third section, on modes of balancing concerning formal principles, I address the following four points: the limited scope of my argument regarding models for balancing formal principles; the nature of competence rules and their relation to formal principles; the choice among models for balancing formal principles; and whether my qualifying criteria of interlegality should be read inlegal positivist or ...
<b>Spanish Abstract:</b> En la presente contribución se ofrece una visión de la crisi... more <b>Spanish Abstract:</b> En la presente contribución se ofrece una visión de la crisis del Estado-nación, partiendo desde la premisa del desarrollo de un nuevo paradigma jurídico en la posguerra, tanto en sede nacional como internacional. También se esboza una distinción entre dos corrientes de prospecciones teóricas que compiten para dar cuenta de los fenómenos actuales del derecho internacional público y de la cooperación: por una parte, la constitucionalización del derecho internacional, con tintes jerárquicos y posconsensuales; por otra, el pluralismo, basado en el diálogo racional y el respeto a las democracias. Sobre estas premisas, se sostiene que las características del derecho a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XX exigen tanto cooperación hacia la comunidad internacional como racionalidad material, con la dignidad humana como eje axiológico, fundamento y parámetro objetivo del poder. De esta manera, se advierte la inconveniencia de una integración supraestatal que mine las bases democráticas del Estado-nación y se postula, en armonía con los fundamentos del paradigma jurídico actual, que la construcción del Estado abierto desde sedes nacionales se erige como base para la consecución de una democracia y una convivencia social que optimice el ejercicio de los derechos humanos en América Latina.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> In this paper we offer a vision of the crisis of the nation-state, based on the premise of the development of a new legal paradigm after the war, both at the national and the international levels. We also outline a distinction between two competing theoretical currents which seek to explain contemporary phenomena in international public law and cooperation; that is, on one hand, the constitutionalization of international law, with hierarchical and post-consensual overtones; and on the other, pluralism, based on rational dialogue and respect for democracy. Based on these premises, we put forth that after the second half of the 20th century, the law requires both cooperation with the international community as material rationality, and also with human dignity as the axiological principle, foundation and objective standard of power. We therefore show the inappropriateness of a supranational integration which undermines the democratic foundation of the nation-state, and we suggest, in line with the basic concepts of the current legal paradigm, that the construction of the open State at the national level is essential for building democracy and the kind of social coexistence that enhances the realization of human rights in Latin America.
Normative pluralism may be understood in opposition to universalistic accounts of rationality. Th... more Normative pluralism may be understood in opposition to universalistic accounts of rationality. The purpose of this paper is to identify one way in which both conceptions require each other. A case will be made that in contemporary law, there is a necessary tension between the universalism of constructivist theories of normativity on the one hand, and normative accounts of pluralism on the other hand. As a result of this irreducible element, pluralism may be understood as enhancing the role of morality in law. Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation will be taken as a departure point to assess the rationality of the ‘re-entry’ and effectiveness of extrinsic (‘non-legal’) discourses in the legal order. This is an ongoing and reciprocal process of permeability in legal spaces which is perhaps most evident in the relations between national law and law beyond the state. In this paper, I will answer the title question in the affirmative, submitting that there is a degree of implicati...
El objetivo de este escrito se delimita a anotar la posibili-dad de tender un puente conceptual. ... more El objetivo de este escrito se delimita a anotar la posibili-dad de tender un puente conceptual. Éste mediaría entre la teoría de la democracia en sus versiones contemporá-neas (más específicamente, tomando en cuenta la persis-tente tensión entre sus concepciones procedimentales y epistémicas) y la teoría de los principios (en cuanto de-sarrollo ulterior de la teoría de la argumentación jurídica y de los derechos en Robert Alexy). Para esto, se tomarán los siguientes pasos. Primero (1), un breve balance de los puntos de oposición actual entre concepciones procedi-mentales y epistémicas en la democracia. Después (2), un balance igualmente breve de las actuales teorías de los principios a partir de algunos de sus más relevantes pos-tulados teórico-sistemáticos. Por último (3), una vez efec-tuados ambos mapeos, se presentan consideraciones que nos apuntan hacia la posibilidad de un futuro recorrido integrador entre ambas disciplinas. Abstract This article aims at pointing the possibility of drawing a conceptual bridge. It concerns democratic theory in its contemporary versions (more specifically, regarding the persistent tensions between its procedural and epistemic conceptions), and principles theory (as a further development of the theories on legal argumentation and basic rights of Robert Alexy). The following steps will be taken for this purpose. First (1), a brief overview will be provided on current points of contention among procedural and
Center for Inter-Legality Research Working Paper No. 07/2021, 2021
Balancing is closely related to paradigmatic cases of interlegality. This close relation between ... more Balancing is closely related to paradigmatic cases of interlegality. This close relation between interlegality and balancing will be presented and discussed availing myself of two distinctions. One concerns implicit and explicit uses of balancing. The other refers to a contextual difference: multilevel settings on the one hand, and more horizontal constellations on the other hand. I will first provide a brief word on how interlegality and balancing are rather congenial as they share the aim of considering all relevant reasons for a decision. Then, I will gather a working conceptualization of balancing in practical reasoning on the one hand, and proportionality assessments and other balancing models as its (more or less) standardized institutionalizations in legal reasoning on the other hand. It is on this basis that I will propose a distinction of two possible situations of intertwined legal orders (i.e., multilevel settings and other more horizontal constellations) which lead to balancing norms sourced in the different legal orders involved. I will then point out three of the core challenges related to the notion of interlegal balancing: the nature of jurisdictional collisions and competence norms, the comparability of norms sourced in different legal orders, and possible criteria for weighting and balancing across legal orders. I conclude with a summary and open questions.
Reflexiones sobre Estado de Derecho y Justicia, 2020
El presente capítulo pretende contribuir al trazo de una postura analítica-conceptual sobre la in... more El presente capítulo pretende contribuir al trazo de una postura analítica-conceptual sobre la interacción de ordenamientos jurídicos en consonancia con un paradigma argumentativo del derecho. Para ello, y con base en resultados recientes de autores en el campo de la teoría de los principios, se sugiere una distinción sobre dos variables. Estas son la presencia de una estructura jerárquica y el rol de interfaz desempeñado por reglas o principios. De esta forma, diversas teorías desarrolladas en el debate entre pluralismos jurídicos y constitucionalismos más allá del estado podrán ser reconstruidas y comparadas como partes a lo largo de una escala. Como herramienta analítica, se deben distinguir cuatro “segmentos” en ésta: pluralismo fuerte, pluralismo moderado, constitucionalismo moderado y constitucionalismo fuerte. De manera prospectiva, la teoría de los principios que aquí se recoge nos dirige hacia una tesis de constitucionalismo moderado.
En este artículo presento la tesis del desplazo funcional de la tolerancia como respuesta institu... more En este artículo presento la tesis del desplazo funcional de la tolerancia como respuesta institucional ante el pluralismo por el ejercicio de la discrecionalidad en sede judicial. El eje central para ello yace en la relevancia y límites de la argumentación sustantiva y con pretensiones de corrección. Primero, tras exponer un concepto de tolerancia, recabo argumentos que indican que ésta deviene insuficiente ante los logros del constitucionalismo. Esto es así porque la tolerancia implica un contexto social comprehensivo, o bien, presupone un sesgo antiuniversalista en las razones públicas y en la fundamentación de los derechos humanos. Después, indico que esta incompatibilidad, por sí misma, no implica un obstáculo para la estabilidad social, o bien, la operación del constitucionalismo. La razón de ello es que en los Estados constitucionales encontramos como equivalente funcional a la garantía de los derechos. Ahora bien, es la abstracción de los derechos humanos, así como los desacuerdos en la justificación pública, los que nos obligan a reconocer un problemático pero necesario margen de discrecionalidad, especialmente en sede judicial mediante el control de constitucionalidad. Así, por último, planteo la pregunta democrática sobre la adecuación de que sea el juzgador constitucional quien trace límites en forma puntual al pluralismo razonable. Se postula que una clave para abordar esto radica en los compromisos que implica la pretensión de corrección en la fundamentación judicial, ya sea en un sentido bivalente o de razonabilidad gradual.
Apply! for the Special Workshop, Luzern Legal Philosophy World Congress, July 2019, 2018
Legal thinking is anchored upon a series of dichotomies. The concept of a (state) legal order is ... more Legal thinking is anchored upon a series of dichotomies. The concept of a (state) legal order is often explained upon the basis of distinguishing the internal and external, public and private, local and global, and ultimately law from non-law. Globalization is said to call these divisions into challenge. If taken seriously, this entails a series of transformations for legal philosophy, e.g., what should be the point of departure for legal theory? Should more traditional debates in legal philosophy (e.g. on positivism and non-positivism, or the nature of the authority of law) be reorganized? Which criteria are relevant for this? At a fundamental level, the direction of possible research questions remains unsettled. There is the possibility of questioning the significance of globalization to legal philosophy, or reappraising the state in legal philosophy. These orientations can serve as a preemption, or consequence, of 'statist' arguments as a strand of anti-globalist developments. Upon these grounds, this workshop welcomes applications from authors working on topics including, but not limited to, the following.
Law and Morals (André de Paula, Andrés Santacoloma eds), 2019
Normative pluralism may be understood in opposition to universalistic accounts of rationality. Th... more Normative pluralism may be understood in opposition to universalistic accounts of rationality. The purpose of this paper is to identify one way in which both conceptions require each other. A case will be made that in contemporary law, there is a necessary tension between the universalism of constructivist theories of normativity on the one hand, and normative accounts of pluralism on the other hand. As a result of this irreducible element, pluralism may be understood as enhancing the role of morality in law. Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation will be taken as a departure point to assess the rationality of the ‘re-entry’ and effectiveness of extrinsic (‘non-legal’) discourses in the legal order. This is an ongoing and reciprocal process of permeability in legal spaces which is perhaps most evident in the relations between national law and law beyond the state. In this paper, I will answer the title question in the affirmative, submitting that there is a degree of implication between certain versions of both. It is structured as follows: (Part One): The effectiveness of practical moral principles in law (its ‘claim to correctness’, which is required by the nature of law to avoid performative contradictions) is positively ratified by a sort of structural coupling posed as a consequence of the Second World War: national and international safeguards on the base of human dignity and human rights. This amounts to a constructivist frame, and, in first instance, to an overlapping consensus of a plurality of ethical-political conceptions. (Part Two): The operationalization of this paradigm has been a plural process: the reconstruction of nation-states through constitutionalism, the enlargement of liberal democracies, and the development of contemporary international, supranational and transnational law. In law, this is translated as a material claim for its formal opening toward different normative orders. In other words, contemporary pluralism can be understood as an upshot of this model. Legal pluralism thus rests heavily upon a connection with pluralisms of interests in the ethical-political and axiological senses, displaying structural similarities. (Part Three): The normative sense of legal pluralism is assessed affirmatively from argumentation theory, although espousing a ‘non-radical’ version of pluralism. It is important to keep in mind that validity and certainty in law are at odds with the indeterminacy fostered by adjudicating normatively porous law. In this sense, pluralism precludes the dworkinian ‘one right answer’ thesis. However, there are reasons to conclude that positivist conceptions of law fall short of the normative claims posed for law after the Second World War. Argumentation theory is found to have an upper hand insofar as it conceives of rationality as discursive and thus, not always yielding just one right answer. ISBN 978-3-515-12278-8 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-12279-5 (eBook)
Versión penúltima a la publicación [2015]; la versión publicada se encuentra en Neria Govea (coor... more Versión penúltima a la publicación [2015]; la versión publicada se encuentra en Neria Govea (coord.), Derecho Constitucional en la Encrucijada, Tirant Lo Blanch, ISBN: 9788491692256.
Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano, 2015
En la presente contribución se ofrece una visión de la crisis del Estado-nación, partiendo desde ... more En la presente contribución se ofrece una visión de la crisis del Estado-nación, partiendo desde la premisa del desarrollo de un nuevo paradigma jurídico en la posguerra, tanto en sede nacional como internacional. También se esboza una distinción entre dos corrientes de prospecciones teóricas que compiten para dar cuenta de los fenómenos actuales del derecho internacional público y de la cooperación: por una parte, la constitucionalización del derecho internacional, con tintes jerárquicos y posconsensuales; por otra, el pluralismo, basado en el diálogo racional y el respeto a las democracias. Sobre estas premisas, se sostiene que las características del derecho a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XX exigen tanto cooperación hacia la comunidad internacional como racionalidad material, con la dignidad humana como eje axiológico, fundamento y parámetro objetivo del poder. De esta manera, se advierte la inconveniencia de una integración supraestatal que mine las bases democráticas del Estado-nación y se postula, en armonía con los fundamentos del paradigma jurídico actual, que la construcción del Estado abierto desde sedes nacionales se erige como base para la consecución de una democracia y una convivencia social que optimice el ejercicio de los derechos humanos en América Latina. Palabras clave: constitucionalización, pluralismo, posguerra, erosión estatal, cooperación.
Abstract: In this paper we offer a vision of the crisis of the nation-state, based on the premise of the development of a new legal paradigm after the war, both at the national and the international levels. We also outline a distinction between two competing theoretical currents which seek to explain contemporary phenomena in international public law and cooperation; that is, on one hand, the constitutionalization of international law, with hierarchical and post-consensual overtones; and on the other, pluralism, based on rational dialogue and respect for democracy. Based on these premises, we put forth that after the second half of the 20th century, the law requires both cooperation with the international community as material rationality, and also with human dignity as the axiological principle, foundation and objective standard of power. We therefore show the inappropriateness of a supranational integration which undermines the democratic foundation of the nation-state, and we suggest, in line with the basic concepts of the current legal paradigm, that the construction of the open State at the national level is essential for building democracy and the kind of social coexistence that enhances the realization of human rights in Latin America. Keywords: Constitutionalization, pluralism, post-war, erosion of the State, cooperation.
Recensión de Núñez, Jorge Emilio (2024): Cosmopolitanism, State Sovereignty and Internati... more Recensión de Núñez, Jorge Emilio (2024): Cosmopolitanism, State Sovereignty and International Law and Politics: A Theory (Abingdon y Nueva York, Routledge) 202+xiv pp
Call for papers and participation in the "Interlegal Reasoning and Balancing at the Interfaces" S... more Call for papers and participation in the "Interlegal Reasoning and Balancing at the Interfaces" Special Workshop at IVR 2024 in Seoul (July 7-12, 2024)
Theme: Vulnerabilities, human rights, the protection of common goods, as well as climate change, are irreducible to the mastering and control of any single state. Everyday legal relations include a transnational or pre-institutional dimension. And yet, the idea that the rule of law is relative to each system has proven difficult to shake off from our concepts and theories of legal practices.
To better understand this complex reality, this workshop sets to gather diverse case studies and reflections on the feasibility and the legitimacy of cross-regime, interlegal reasoning and balancing at the interfaces of multiple and diverse legalities.
All perspectives —empirical, analytical, methodological, normative, critical— are welcome.
II Jornadas Internacionales y III Jornadas Nacionales “Nuevas Perspectivas de la Argumentación en el Siglo XXI. Avances y discusiones en torno a la argumentación jurídica, 2022
Las teorías sobre la argumentación jurídica ya no pueden referirse a un solo sistema jurídico, im... more Las teorías sobre la argumentación jurídica ya no pueden referirse a un solo sistema jurídico, impermeabilizado bajo axiomas de 'completitud', 'clausura' y 'exclusividad'. Nuestro mundo cambió. Requerimos dar cuenta de reenvíos, interfaces, diálogos, referencias, contradicciones, recepciones condicionadas, ponderaciones, y una multitud de razonamientos sobre normas con orígenes en más de un solo ordenamiento o espacio jurídico. El razonamiento jurídico hoy es tanto singular como plural. La argumentación ya no se ciñe a un solo sistema, la argumentación es interjurídica. Este escrito busca atender a las bases teóricas disponibles para ello, con la estrategia de acudir ante tres grandes autores, Neil MacCormick, Klaus Günther, y Robert Alexy, anotando tanto sus ideas como, acaso, sus silencios, sobre la condición interlegal.
In this rejoinder, I proceed through the three main sections in Wei Feng’s comments. In the first... more In this rejoinder, I proceed through the three main sections in Wei Feng’s comments. In the first section, hierarchy and legal order, I address the following four points: the aims in the first main section of my working paper; the conceptual necessity of hierarchy for a legal order; the compatibility of Kelsen’s take on primacy with “rules with significant contents or values”; and the cumulative construction of hierarchy between legal orders. In a second section, I address the detached sense in which I invoke the ideas of classifying and qualifying criteria of (inter-)legality. In the third section, on modes of balancing concerning formal principles, I address the following four points: the limited scope of my argument regarding models for balancing formal principles; the nature of competence rules and their relation to formal principles; the choice among models for balancing formal principles; and whether my qualifying criteria of interlegality should be read inlegal positivist or ...
Balancing is closely related to paradigmatic cases of interlegality. This close relation between ... more Balancing is closely related to paradigmatic cases of interlegality. This close relation between interlegality and balancing will be presented and discussed availing myself of two distinctions. One concerns implicit and explicit uses of balancing. The other refers to a contextual difference: multilevel settings on the one hand, and more horizontal constellations on the other hand. I will first provide a brief word on how interlegality and balancing are rather congenial as they share the aim of considering all relevant reasons for a decision. Then, I will gather a working conceptualization of balancing in practical reasoning on the one hand, and proportionality assessments and other balancing models as its (more or less) standardized institutionalizations in legal reasoning on the other hand. It is on this basis that I will propose a distinction of two possible situations of intertwined legal orders (i.e., multilevel settings and other more horizontal constellations) which lead to balancing norms sourced in the different legal orders involved. I will then point out three of the core challenges related to the notion of interlegal balancing: the nature of jurisdictional collisions and competence norms, the comparability of norms sourced in different legal orders, and possible criteria for weighting and balancing across legal orders. I conclude with a summary and open questions.
In this rejoinder, I proceed through the three main sections in Wei Feng’s comments. In the first... more In this rejoinder, I proceed through the three main sections in Wei Feng’s comments. In the first section, hierarchy and legal order, I address the following four points: the aims in the first main section of my working paper; the conceptual necessity of hierarchy for a legal order; the compatibility of Kelsen’s take on primacy with “rules with significant contents or values”; and the cumulative construction of hierarchy between legal orders. In a second section, I address the detached sense in which I invoke the ideas of classifying and qualifying criteria of (inter-)legality. In the third section, on modes of balancing concerning formal principles, I address the following four points: the limited scope of my argument regarding models for balancing formal principles; the nature of competence rules and their relation to formal principles; the choice among models for balancing formal principles; and whether my qualifying criteria of interlegality should be read inlegal positivist or ...
<b>Spanish Abstract:</b> En la presente contribución se ofrece una visión de la crisi... more <b>Spanish Abstract:</b> En la presente contribución se ofrece una visión de la crisis del Estado-nación, partiendo desde la premisa del desarrollo de un nuevo paradigma jurídico en la posguerra, tanto en sede nacional como internacional. También se esboza una distinción entre dos corrientes de prospecciones teóricas que compiten para dar cuenta de los fenómenos actuales del derecho internacional público y de la cooperación: por una parte, la constitucionalización del derecho internacional, con tintes jerárquicos y posconsensuales; por otra, el pluralismo, basado en el diálogo racional y el respeto a las democracias. Sobre estas premisas, se sostiene que las características del derecho a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XX exigen tanto cooperación hacia la comunidad internacional como racionalidad material, con la dignidad humana como eje axiológico, fundamento y parámetro objetivo del poder. De esta manera, se advierte la inconveniencia de una integración supraestatal que mine las bases democráticas del Estado-nación y se postula, en armonía con los fundamentos del paradigma jurídico actual, que la construcción del Estado abierto desde sedes nacionales se erige como base para la consecución de una democracia y una convivencia social que optimice el ejercicio de los derechos humanos en América Latina.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> In this paper we offer a vision of the crisis of the nation-state, based on the premise of the development of a new legal paradigm after the war, both at the national and the international levels. We also outline a distinction between two competing theoretical currents which seek to explain contemporary phenomena in international public law and cooperation; that is, on one hand, the constitutionalization of international law, with hierarchical and post-consensual overtones; and on the other, pluralism, based on rational dialogue and respect for democracy. Based on these premises, we put forth that after the second half of the 20th century, the law requires both cooperation with the international community as material rationality, and also with human dignity as the axiological principle, foundation and objective standard of power. We therefore show the inappropriateness of a supranational integration which undermines the democratic foundation of the nation-state, and we suggest, in line with the basic concepts of the current legal paradigm, that the construction of the open State at the national level is essential for building democracy and the kind of social coexistence that enhances the realization of human rights in Latin America.
Normative pluralism may be understood in opposition to universalistic accounts of rationality. Th... more Normative pluralism may be understood in opposition to universalistic accounts of rationality. The purpose of this paper is to identify one way in which both conceptions require each other. A case will be made that in contemporary law, there is a necessary tension between the universalism of constructivist theories of normativity on the one hand, and normative accounts of pluralism on the other hand. As a result of this irreducible element, pluralism may be understood as enhancing the role of morality in law. Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation will be taken as a departure point to assess the rationality of the ‘re-entry’ and effectiveness of extrinsic (‘non-legal’) discourses in the legal order. This is an ongoing and reciprocal process of permeability in legal spaces which is perhaps most evident in the relations between national law and law beyond the state. In this paper, I will answer the title question in the affirmative, submitting that there is a degree of implicati...
El objetivo de este escrito se delimita a anotar la posibili-dad de tender un puente conceptual. ... more El objetivo de este escrito se delimita a anotar la posibili-dad de tender un puente conceptual. Éste mediaría entre la teoría de la democracia en sus versiones contemporá-neas (más específicamente, tomando en cuenta la persis-tente tensión entre sus concepciones procedimentales y epistémicas) y la teoría de los principios (en cuanto de-sarrollo ulterior de la teoría de la argumentación jurídica y de los derechos en Robert Alexy). Para esto, se tomarán los siguientes pasos. Primero (1), un breve balance de los puntos de oposición actual entre concepciones procedi-mentales y epistémicas en la democracia. Después (2), un balance igualmente breve de las actuales teorías de los principios a partir de algunos de sus más relevantes pos-tulados teórico-sistemáticos. Por último (3), una vez efec-tuados ambos mapeos, se presentan consideraciones que nos apuntan hacia la posibilidad de un futuro recorrido integrador entre ambas disciplinas. Abstract This article aims at pointing the possibility of drawing a conceptual bridge. It concerns democratic theory in its contemporary versions (more specifically, regarding the persistent tensions between its procedural and epistemic conceptions), and principles theory (as a further development of the theories on legal argumentation and basic rights of Robert Alexy). The following steps will be taken for this purpose. First (1), a brief overview will be provided on current points of contention among procedural and
Center for Inter-Legality Research Working Paper No. 07/2021, 2021
Balancing is closely related to paradigmatic cases of interlegality. This close relation between ... more Balancing is closely related to paradigmatic cases of interlegality. This close relation between interlegality and balancing will be presented and discussed availing myself of two distinctions. One concerns implicit and explicit uses of balancing. The other refers to a contextual difference: multilevel settings on the one hand, and more horizontal constellations on the other hand. I will first provide a brief word on how interlegality and balancing are rather congenial as they share the aim of considering all relevant reasons for a decision. Then, I will gather a working conceptualization of balancing in practical reasoning on the one hand, and proportionality assessments and other balancing models as its (more or less) standardized institutionalizations in legal reasoning on the other hand. It is on this basis that I will propose a distinction of two possible situations of intertwined legal orders (i.e., multilevel settings and other more horizontal constellations) which lead to balancing norms sourced in the different legal orders involved. I will then point out three of the core challenges related to the notion of interlegal balancing: the nature of jurisdictional collisions and competence norms, the comparability of norms sourced in different legal orders, and possible criteria for weighting and balancing across legal orders. I conclude with a summary and open questions.
Reflexiones sobre Estado de Derecho y Justicia, 2020
El presente capítulo pretende contribuir al trazo de una postura analítica-conceptual sobre la in... more El presente capítulo pretende contribuir al trazo de una postura analítica-conceptual sobre la interacción de ordenamientos jurídicos en consonancia con un paradigma argumentativo del derecho. Para ello, y con base en resultados recientes de autores en el campo de la teoría de los principios, se sugiere una distinción sobre dos variables. Estas son la presencia de una estructura jerárquica y el rol de interfaz desempeñado por reglas o principios. De esta forma, diversas teorías desarrolladas en el debate entre pluralismos jurídicos y constitucionalismos más allá del estado podrán ser reconstruidas y comparadas como partes a lo largo de una escala. Como herramienta analítica, se deben distinguir cuatro “segmentos” en ésta: pluralismo fuerte, pluralismo moderado, constitucionalismo moderado y constitucionalismo fuerte. De manera prospectiva, la teoría de los principios que aquí se recoge nos dirige hacia una tesis de constitucionalismo moderado.
En este artículo presento la tesis del desplazo funcional de la tolerancia como respuesta institu... more En este artículo presento la tesis del desplazo funcional de la tolerancia como respuesta institucional ante el pluralismo por el ejercicio de la discrecionalidad en sede judicial. El eje central para ello yace en la relevancia y límites de la argumentación sustantiva y con pretensiones de corrección. Primero, tras exponer un concepto de tolerancia, recabo argumentos que indican que ésta deviene insuficiente ante los logros del constitucionalismo. Esto es así porque la tolerancia implica un contexto social comprehensivo, o bien, presupone un sesgo antiuniversalista en las razones públicas y en la fundamentación de los derechos humanos. Después, indico que esta incompatibilidad, por sí misma, no implica un obstáculo para la estabilidad social, o bien, la operación del constitucionalismo. La razón de ello es que en los Estados constitucionales encontramos como equivalente funcional a la garantía de los derechos. Ahora bien, es la abstracción de los derechos humanos, así como los desacuerdos en la justificación pública, los que nos obligan a reconocer un problemático pero necesario margen de discrecionalidad, especialmente en sede judicial mediante el control de constitucionalidad. Así, por último, planteo la pregunta democrática sobre la adecuación de que sea el juzgador constitucional quien trace límites en forma puntual al pluralismo razonable. Se postula que una clave para abordar esto radica en los compromisos que implica la pretensión de corrección en la fundamentación judicial, ya sea en un sentido bivalente o de razonabilidad gradual.
Apply! for the Special Workshop, Luzern Legal Philosophy World Congress, July 2019, 2018
Legal thinking is anchored upon a series of dichotomies. The concept of a (state) legal order is ... more Legal thinking is anchored upon a series of dichotomies. The concept of a (state) legal order is often explained upon the basis of distinguishing the internal and external, public and private, local and global, and ultimately law from non-law. Globalization is said to call these divisions into challenge. If taken seriously, this entails a series of transformations for legal philosophy, e.g., what should be the point of departure for legal theory? Should more traditional debates in legal philosophy (e.g. on positivism and non-positivism, or the nature of the authority of law) be reorganized? Which criteria are relevant for this? At a fundamental level, the direction of possible research questions remains unsettled. There is the possibility of questioning the significance of globalization to legal philosophy, or reappraising the state in legal philosophy. These orientations can serve as a preemption, or consequence, of 'statist' arguments as a strand of anti-globalist developments. Upon these grounds, this workshop welcomes applications from authors working on topics including, but not limited to, the following.
Law and Morals (André de Paula, Andrés Santacoloma eds), 2019
Normative pluralism may be understood in opposition to universalistic accounts of rationality. Th... more Normative pluralism may be understood in opposition to universalistic accounts of rationality. The purpose of this paper is to identify one way in which both conceptions require each other. A case will be made that in contemporary law, there is a necessary tension between the universalism of constructivist theories of normativity on the one hand, and normative accounts of pluralism on the other hand. As a result of this irreducible element, pluralism may be understood as enhancing the role of morality in law. Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation will be taken as a departure point to assess the rationality of the ‘re-entry’ and effectiveness of extrinsic (‘non-legal’) discourses in the legal order. This is an ongoing and reciprocal process of permeability in legal spaces which is perhaps most evident in the relations between national law and law beyond the state. In this paper, I will answer the title question in the affirmative, submitting that there is a degree of implication between certain versions of both. It is structured as follows: (Part One): The effectiveness of practical moral principles in law (its ‘claim to correctness’, which is required by the nature of law to avoid performative contradictions) is positively ratified by a sort of structural coupling posed as a consequence of the Second World War: national and international safeguards on the base of human dignity and human rights. This amounts to a constructivist frame, and, in first instance, to an overlapping consensus of a plurality of ethical-political conceptions. (Part Two): The operationalization of this paradigm has been a plural process: the reconstruction of nation-states through constitutionalism, the enlargement of liberal democracies, and the development of contemporary international, supranational and transnational law. In law, this is translated as a material claim for its formal opening toward different normative orders. In other words, contemporary pluralism can be understood as an upshot of this model. Legal pluralism thus rests heavily upon a connection with pluralisms of interests in the ethical-political and axiological senses, displaying structural similarities. (Part Three): The normative sense of legal pluralism is assessed affirmatively from argumentation theory, although espousing a ‘non-radical’ version of pluralism. It is important to keep in mind that validity and certainty in law are at odds with the indeterminacy fostered by adjudicating normatively porous law. In this sense, pluralism precludes the dworkinian ‘one right answer’ thesis. However, there are reasons to conclude that positivist conceptions of law fall short of the normative claims posed for law after the Second World War. Argumentation theory is found to have an upper hand insofar as it conceives of rationality as discursive and thus, not always yielding just one right answer. ISBN 978-3-515-12278-8 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-12279-5 (eBook)
Versión penúltima a la publicación [2015]; la versión publicada se encuentra en Neria Govea (coor... more Versión penúltima a la publicación [2015]; la versión publicada se encuentra en Neria Govea (coord.), Derecho Constitucional en la Encrucijada, Tirant Lo Blanch, ISBN: 9788491692256.
Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano, 2015
En la presente contribución se ofrece una visión de la crisis del Estado-nación, partiendo desde ... more En la presente contribución se ofrece una visión de la crisis del Estado-nación, partiendo desde la premisa del desarrollo de un nuevo paradigma jurídico en la posguerra, tanto en sede nacional como internacional. También se esboza una distinción entre dos corrientes de prospecciones teóricas que compiten para dar cuenta de los fenómenos actuales del derecho internacional público y de la cooperación: por una parte, la constitucionalización del derecho internacional, con tintes jerárquicos y posconsensuales; por otra, el pluralismo, basado en el diálogo racional y el respeto a las democracias. Sobre estas premisas, se sostiene que las características del derecho a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XX exigen tanto cooperación hacia la comunidad internacional como racionalidad material, con la dignidad humana como eje axiológico, fundamento y parámetro objetivo del poder. De esta manera, se advierte la inconveniencia de una integración supraestatal que mine las bases democráticas del Estado-nación y se postula, en armonía con los fundamentos del paradigma jurídico actual, que la construcción del Estado abierto desde sedes nacionales se erige como base para la consecución de una democracia y una convivencia social que optimice el ejercicio de los derechos humanos en América Latina. Palabras clave: constitucionalización, pluralismo, posguerra, erosión estatal, cooperación.
Abstract: In this paper we offer a vision of the crisis of the nation-state, based on the premise of the development of a new legal paradigm after the war, both at the national and the international levels. We also outline a distinction between two competing theoretical currents which seek to explain contemporary phenomena in international public law and cooperation; that is, on one hand, the constitutionalization of international law, with hierarchical and post-consensual overtones; and on the other, pluralism, based on rational dialogue and respect for democracy. Based on these premises, we put forth that after the second half of the 20th century, the law requires both cooperation with the international community as material rationality, and also with human dignity as the axiological principle, foundation and objective standard of power. We therefore show the inappropriateness of a supranational integration which undermines the democratic foundation of the nation-state, and we suggest, in line with the basic concepts of the current legal paradigm, that the construction of the open State at the national level is essential for building democracy and the kind of social coexistence that enhances the realization of human rights in Latin America. Keywords: Constitutionalization, pluralism, post-war, erosion of the State, cooperation.
El primer capítulo “El uso de jurisprudencias como razones autoritativas no perentorias para la p... more El primer capítulo “El uso de jurisprudencias como razones autoritativas no perentorias para la protección de derechos humanos”, plantea que ninguna jurisprudencia en materia de derechos humanos debe considerarse obligatoria, ya que siempre se debe analizar si contiene las acciones y los efectos que otorgue la protección más amplia de los derechos fundamentales. Por lo tanto, inclusive la jurisprudencia emitida por la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación en materia de derechos humanos sería vinculante (por la fuente autoritativa), más no obligatoria, hasta en tanto, el órgano jurisdiccional que deba aplicarla determine que no existe otra interpretación que más proteja o desarrolle, el derecho fundamental en estudio. En el segundo capítulo, “Revaloración de la soberanía en el Estado constitucional. De soberanía tradicional a soberanía cooperativa”, el autor reflexiona que México transita al Estado constitucional, y por tanto, la dignidad humana -base para el respeto a los derechos humanos-, constituye el parámetro fundamental para regir toda la conducta del Estado. Por tanto, sostiene que deben revalorarse bajo esta luz conceptos fundamentales del Estado moderno, como la soberanía, de manera que el ejercicio del poder supremo comprenda una dimensión cooperativa hacia la comunidad internacional e, incluso, la delegación de atribuciones respecto a la última instancia en tutela de derechos humanos; pues así se optimiza la consecución de los principios y valores constitucionales comunes. En el tercer capítulo, “El modelo de Constitución red en el derecho constitucional local en México”, se resalta la importancia de las constituciones locales. De bajar la configuración de un Estado constitucional, a las entidades federativas, y verlas como verdaderas constituciones, y pasar de ver nuestro federalismo a la visión de un federalismo cooperativo y a un verdadero pluralismo constitucional. En el cuarto capítulo, “Derecho, motivación de la conducta y quaestio fact”, el autor hace un análisis desde la teoría del derecho, sobre la relación entre derecho y verdad en los términos expuestos por la teoría racionalista de la prueba. Se propone que la función de la averiguación de la verdad no es necesaria para que el derecho pueda motivar la conducta. En el quinto capítulo “Argumentación y lenguaje jurídico. El tribunal Constitucional Mexicano ante el discurso homofóbico”, el autor propone un análisis sobre una sentencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, utilizando teorías de argumentación jurídica. Ello para poner en evidencia la importancia de la argumentación jurídica en el Estado constitucional. Así, a través de los capítulos que integran el presente libro, se plantean diferentes reflexiones sobre los cambios que se han producido en el derecho a partir del cambio de paradigma jurídico. Y en especial en la encrucijada que se encuentra actualmente el Derecho Constitucional, es decir, si evoluciona para aceptar esos cambios teóricos y metodológicos, o se queda reticente en la transición al Estado constitucional contemporáneo.
Al derecho mexicano le es inherente un margen decisorio para las autoridades de los constituciona... more Al derecho mexicano le es inherente un margen decisorio para las autoridades de los constitucionalismos locales mexicanos. Sin embargo, esta doctrina está aún en ciernes (en nuestro país y en el extranjero), por lo que el enfoque de este capítulo es primariamente conceptual, buscando darle algunos contornos doctrinales, de la mano de la teoría del margen de apreciación y la doctrina del margen de apreciación local desarrollada en la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (CSJN) argentina. La estructura de este capítulo es la siguiente: Tras ciertas consideraciones contextuales (§1.3), la primera sección principal busca fijar algunas precisiones conceptuales mínimas e indispensables (§2). En primer término, se ofrece una caracterización del federalismo mexicano, a través de rasgos tanto teóricos (analíticos) como doctrinales (jurídicos) (§2.1). Acto seguido, se recaba el concepto de margen de apreciación y una categoría novedosa surgida en la jurisprudencia constitucional argentina: el margen de apreciación local (§2.2). Se estipula una conclusión intermedia en el sentido de la conveniencia de poner la doctrina mexicana sobre el margen decisorio en relación con la doctrina argentina sobre el margen de apreciación local (§2.3). Sobre ello, se enuncian algunos argumentos con respecto a la deseabilidad de consolidar la figura de un margen de apreciación local en el contexto de la dogmática jurídica mexicana (§3). Esto, considerando tanto argumentos a favor (§3.1) como en contra (§3.2). Se ofrece un balance breve de dichos argumentos (§3.3). Se concluye con en pos de un amplio intercambio social y académico sobre el margen de apreciación local en nuestros constitucionalismos locales mexicanos (§3.4).
Handout for the presentation "The Possibility of Interlegal Balancing", in the Seminar Diskurs, R... more Handout for the presentation "The Possibility of Interlegal Balancing", in the Seminar Diskurs, Recht, Vernunft (FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg, November 3, 2023). It comprises representations and charts of "Third-Order Correctness", the conceptual space of balancing, a flow chart on the types of roles played by merits (substantive) and non-merits (formal principles) considerations, and constellations of interlegal balancing.
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Papers by Gabriel Encinas
Theme: Vulnerabilities, human rights, the protection of common goods, as well as climate change, are irreducible to the mastering and control of any single state. Everyday legal relations include a transnational or pre-institutional dimension. And yet, the idea that the rule of law is relative to each system has proven difficult to shake off from our concepts and theories of legal practices.
To better understand this complex reality, this workshop sets to gather diverse case studies and reflections on the feasibility and the legitimacy of cross-regime, interlegal reasoning and balancing at the interfaces of multiple and diverse legalities.
All perspectives —empirical, analytical, methodological, normative, critical— are welcome.
I will first provide a brief word on how interlegality and balancing are rather congenial as they share the aim of considering all relevant reasons for a decision. Then, I will gather a working conceptualization of balancing in practical reasoning on the one hand, and proportionality assessments and other balancing models as its (more or less) standardized institutionalizations in legal reasoning on the other hand. It is on this basis that I will propose a distinction of two possible situations of intertwined legal orders (i.e., multilevel settings and other more horizontal constellations) which lead to balancing norms sourced in the different legal orders involved. I will then point out three of the core challenges related to the notion of interlegal balancing: the nature of jurisdictional collisions and competence norms, the comparability of norms sourced in different legal orders, and possible criteria for weighting and balancing across legal orders. I conclude with a summary and open questions.
(Part One): The effectiveness of practical moral principles in law (its ‘claim to correctness’, which is required by the nature of law to avoid performative contradictions) is positively ratified by a sort of structural coupling posed as a consequence of the Second World War: national and international safeguards on the base of human dignity and human rights. This amounts to a constructivist frame, and, in first instance, to an overlapping consensus of a plurality of ethical-political conceptions.
(Part Two): The operationalization of this paradigm has been a plural process: the reconstruction of nation-states through constitutionalism, the enlargement of liberal democracies, and the development of contemporary international, supranational and transnational law. In law, this is translated as a material claim for its formal opening toward different normative orders. In other words, contemporary pluralism can be understood as an upshot of this model. Legal pluralism thus rests heavily upon a connection with pluralisms of interests in the ethical-political and axiological senses, displaying structural similarities.
(Part Three): The normative sense of legal pluralism is assessed affirmatively from argumentation theory, although espousing a ‘non-radical’ version of pluralism. It is important to keep in mind that validity and certainty in law are at odds with the indeterminacy fostered by adjudicating normatively porous law. In this sense, pluralism precludes the dworkinian ‘one right answer’ thesis. However, there are reasons to conclude that positivist conceptions of law fall short of the normative claims posed for law after the Second World War.
Argumentation theory is found to have an upper hand insofar as it conceives of rationality as discursive and thus, not always yielding just one right answer.
ISBN 978-3-515-12278-8 (Print)
ISBN 978-3-515-12279-5 (eBook)
Palabras clave: constitucionalización, pluralismo, posguerra, erosión estatal, cooperación.
Abstract: In this paper we offer a vision of the crisis of the nation-state, based on the premise of the development of a new legal paradigm after the war, both at the national and the international levels. We also outline a distinction between two competing theoretical currents which seek to explain contemporary phenomena in international public law and cooperation; that is, on one hand, the constitutionalization of international law, with hierarchical and post-consensual overtones; and on the other, pluralism, based on rational dialogue and respect for democracy. Based on these premises, we put forth that after the second half of the 20th century, the law requires both cooperation with the international community as material rationality, and also with human dignity as the axiological principle, foundation and objective standard of power. We therefore show the inappropriateness of a supranational integration which undermines the democratic foundation of the nation-state, and we suggest, in line with the basic concepts of the current legal paradigm, that the construction of the open State at the national level is essential for building democracy and the kind of social coexistence that enhances the realization of human rights in Latin America.
Keywords: Constitutionalization, pluralism, post-war, erosion of the State, cooperation.
Theme: Vulnerabilities, human rights, the protection of common goods, as well as climate change, are irreducible to the mastering and control of any single state. Everyday legal relations include a transnational or pre-institutional dimension. And yet, the idea that the rule of law is relative to each system has proven difficult to shake off from our concepts and theories of legal practices.
To better understand this complex reality, this workshop sets to gather diverse case studies and reflections on the feasibility and the legitimacy of cross-regime, interlegal reasoning and balancing at the interfaces of multiple and diverse legalities.
All perspectives —empirical, analytical, methodological, normative, critical— are welcome.
I will first provide a brief word on how interlegality and balancing are rather congenial as they share the aim of considering all relevant reasons for a decision. Then, I will gather a working conceptualization of balancing in practical reasoning on the one hand, and proportionality assessments and other balancing models as its (more or less) standardized institutionalizations in legal reasoning on the other hand. It is on this basis that I will propose a distinction of two possible situations of intertwined legal orders (i.e., multilevel settings and other more horizontal constellations) which lead to balancing norms sourced in the different legal orders involved. I will then point out three of the core challenges related to the notion of interlegal balancing: the nature of jurisdictional collisions and competence norms, the comparability of norms sourced in different legal orders, and possible criteria for weighting and balancing across legal orders. I conclude with a summary and open questions.
(Part One): The effectiveness of practical moral principles in law (its ‘claim to correctness’, which is required by the nature of law to avoid performative contradictions) is positively ratified by a sort of structural coupling posed as a consequence of the Second World War: national and international safeguards on the base of human dignity and human rights. This amounts to a constructivist frame, and, in first instance, to an overlapping consensus of a plurality of ethical-political conceptions.
(Part Two): The operationalization of this paradigm has been a plural process: the reconstruction of nation-states through constitutionalism, the enlargement of liberal democracies, and the development of contemporary international, supranational and transnational law. In law, this is translated as a material claim for its formal opening toward different normative orders. In other words, contemporary pluralism can be understood as an upshot of this model. Legal pluralism thus rests heavily upon a connection with pluralisms of interests in the ethical-political and axiological senses, displaying structural similarities.
(Part Three): The normative sense of legal pluralism is assessed affirmatively from argumentation theory, although espousing a ‘non-radical’ version of pluralism. It is important to keep in mind that validity and certainty in law are at odds with the indeterminacy fostered by adjudicating normatively porous law. In this sense, pluralism precludes the dworkinian ‘one right answer’ thesis. However, there are reasons to conclude that positivist conceptions of law fall short of the normative claims posed for law after the Second World War.
Argumentation theory is found to have an upper hand insofar as it conceives of rationality as discursive and thus, not always yielding just one right answer.
ISBN 978-3-515-12278-8 (Print)
ISBN 978-3-515-12279-5 (eBook)
Palabras clave: constitucionalización, pluralismo, posguerra, erosión estatal, cooperación.
Abstract: In this paper we offer a vision of the crisis of the nation-state, based on the premise of the development of a new legal paradigm after the war, both at the national and the international levels. We also outline a distinction between two competing theoretical currents which seek to explain contemporary phenomena in international public law and cooperation; that is, on one hand, the constitutionalization of international law, with hierarchical and post-consensual overtones; and on the other, pluralism, based on rational dialogue and respect for democracy. Based on these premises, we put forth that after the second half of the 20th century, the law requires both cooperation with the international community as material rationality, and also with human dignity as the axiological principle, foundation and objective standard of power. We therefore show the inappropriateness of a supranational integration which undermines the democratic foundation of the nation-state, and we suggest, in line with the basic concepts of the current legal paradigm, that the construction of the open State at the national level is essential for building democracy and the kind of social coexistence that enhances the realization of human rights in Latin America.
Keywords: Constitutionalization, pluralism, post-war, erosion of the State, cooperation.
En el segundo capítulo, “Revaloración de la soberanía en el Estado constitucional. De soberanía tradicional a soberanía cooperativa”, el autor reflexiona que México transita al Estado constitucional, y por tanto, la dignidad humana -base para el respeto a los derechos humanos-, constituye el parámetro fundamental para regir toda la conducta del Estado. Por tanto, sostiene que deben revalorarse bajo esta luz conceptos fundamentales del Estado moderno, como la soberanía, de manera que el ejercicio del poder supremo comprenda una dimensión cooperativa hacia la comunidad internacional e, incluso, la delegación de atribuciones respecto a la última instancia en tutela de derechos humanos; pues así se optimiza la consecución de los principios y valores constitucionales comunes.
En el tercer capítulo, “El modelo de Constitución red en el derecho constitucional local en México”, se resalta la importancia de las constituciones locales. De bajar la configuración de un Estado constitucional, a las entidades federativas, y verlas como verdaderas constituciones, y pasar de ver nuestro federalismo a la visión de un federalismo cooperativo y a un verdadero pluralismo constitucional.
En el cuarto capítulo, “Derecho, motivación de la conducta y quaestio fact”, el autor hace un análisis desde la teoría del derecho, sobre la relación entre derecho y verdad en los términos expuestos por la teoría racionalista de la prueba. Se propone que la función de la averiguación de la verdad no es necesaria para que el derecho pueda motivar la conducta.
En el quinto capítulo “Argumentación y lenguaje jurídico. El tribunal Constitucional Mexicano ante el discurso homofóbico”, el autor propone un análisis sobre una sentencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, utilizando teorías de argumentación jurídica. Ello para poner en evidencia la importancia de la argumentación jurídica en el Estado constitucional.
Así, a través de los capítulos que integran el presente libro, se plantean diferentes reflexiones sobre los cambios que se han producido en el derecho a partir del cambio de paradigma jurídico. Y en especial en la encrucijada que se encuentra actualmente el Derecho Constitucional, es decir, si evoluciona para aceptar esos cambios teóricos y metodológicos, o se queda reticente en la transición al Estado constitucional contemporáneo.
La estructura de este capítulo es la siguiente: Tras ciertas consideraciones contextuales (§1.3), la primera sección principal busca fijar algunas precisiones conceptuales mínimas e indispensables (§2). En primer término, se ofrece una caracterización del federalismo mexicano, a través de rasgos tanto teóricos (analíticos) como doctrinales (jurídicos) (§2.1). Acto seguido, se recaba el concepto de margen de apreciación y una categoría novedosa surgida en la jurisprudencia constitucional argentina: el margen de apreciación local (§2.2). Se estipula una conclusión intermedia en el sentido de la conveniencia de poner la doctrina mexicana sobre el margen decisorio en relación con la doctrina argentina sobre el margen de apreciación local (§2.3).
Sobre ello, se enuncian algunos argumentos con respecto a la deseabilidad de consolidar la figura de un margen de apreciación local en el contexto de la dogmática jurídica mexicana (§3). Esto, considerando tanto argumentos a favor (§3.1) como en contra (§3.2). Se ofrece un balance breve de dichos argumentos (§3.3). Se concluye con en pos de un amplio intercambio social y académico sobre el margen de apreciación local en nuestros constitucionalismos locales mexicanos (§3.4).
It comprises representations and charts of "Third-Order Correctness", the conceptual space of balancing, a flow chart on the types of roles played by merits (substantive) and non-merits (formal principles) considerations, and constellations of interlegal balancing.