Judith Simon
Since February 2017 I work as a Professor for Ethics in Information Technologies at the University of Hamburg. Previously I was employed at the IT University of Copenhagen (as Associate Professor for Philosophy of Science and Technology), the University of Vienna (Department of Philosophy), the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (ITAS), the Institute Jean Nicod (CNRS/ENS) in Paris and the Research Centre Jülich, and have held visiting positions in the US (Stanford), Italy (Trento), Spain (IIIA-CSIC Barcelona) and Slovenia (Ljubljana). I hold a PhD in philosophy from the University of Vienna and an MA in psychology from the Free University of Berlin.
I serve as on the editorial boards of the journals "Philosophy & Technology" (Springer) and "Big Data & Society" (Sage), the "Open Library of Humanities", and the book series "Philosophy, Technology and Society" (Rowman & Littlefield International).
I have been elected into the executive boards of the International Society for Ethics and Information Technology (inseit.net) and the International Association for Computing and Philosophy (iacap.org).
I am interested in various epistemological and ethical issues around technologies of information, communication and computation. My approach is inspired by social epistemology, STS, Values in Design, computer ethics as well as feminist theory. At the moment I focus in particular on the topics of (epistemic) trust, reputation, epistemic responsibilities of different agents (e.g. user and designers of ICT) as well as the epistemology of big data practices.
In 2013 I won the Herbert A. Simon Award of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy (IACAP) for outstanding research at the intersection of philosophy and computing and gave a TEDx-Talk in Zurich, which you can find here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MmJ8lkS0-qk
I serve as on the editorial boards of the journals "Philosophy & Technology" (Springer) and "Big Data & Society" (Sage), the "Open Library of Humanities", and the book series "Philosophy, Technology and Society" (Rowman & Littlefield International).
I have been elected into the executive boards of the International Society for Ethics and Information Technology (inseit.net) and the International Association for Computing and Philosophy (iacap.org).
I am interested in various epistemological and ethical issues around technologies of information, communication and computation. My approach is inspired by social epistemology, STS, Values in Design, computer ethics as well as feminist theory. At the moment I focus in particular on the topics of (epistemic) trust, reputation, epistemic responsibilities of different agents (e.g. user and designers of ICT) as well as the epistemology of big data practices.
In 2013 I won the Herbert A. Simon Award of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy (IACAP) for outstanding research at the intersection of philosophy and computing and gave a TEDx-Talk in Zurich, which you can find here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MmJ8lkS0-qk
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Papers by Judith Simon
Value-sensitive design (VSD) refers to a field of research addressing the inscription of values in technologies in general and information and communication technologies (ICT) in particular. In this contribution, value-sensitive design, a term originally proposed by (Friedman et al. 2006) is used as an umbrella term encompassing also similar approaches developed by other proponents, such as values in design (Knobel & Bowker 2011), values at play (Nissenbaum 2005; Flanagan et al. 2008), and disclosive computer ethics (Brey 2000, 2010).
Value-sensitive design departs from the observation that in the process of designing technologies, societal values are often unintentionally inscribed into these technologies and that resulting technologies in return may promote or demote certain values, e.g. justice, fairness or privacy. The crucial idea behind value-sensitive design as a research approach and a methodology is then to turn this insight into a research question: if values are often unconsciously imparted in the process of designing and developing technologies, can we steer this inscription more reflexively, i.e. can we intentionally embed desired values into technologies? In line with this goal of embedding desired values into technologies, proponents of value-sensitive design have developed concrete methodologies to guide the design and development of technological artefacts that promote the values desired by the various stakeholders who are or can be affected by these technologies.
Value-sensitive design, therefore, a) aims at steering technology design and development to attune to shared societal values and b) promotes the early inclusion of various direct and indirect stakeholders into the process of technology design and development. As such VSD appears to be particularly suited to support and feed into initiatives promoting more “Responsible Research and Innovation”.
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) as a term refers to both strategic efforts of national and international funding bodies, most notably the European Commission to better align the process and the outcomes of research and innovation with the values, needs and expectations of society as well as to the academic discourse which has formed around these strategic initiatives (e.g. Grunwald 2011, Koops et al. 2015, Oftedal 2014, Owen et al. 2013a, von Schomberg 2013, Simon 2015, Stilgoe et al. 2013, Timmermans and Stahl 2013, or van den Hoven et al. 2014).
Linking RRI and value-sensitive design therefore appears only consequential: value- sensitive design can support RRI by providing a concrete methodology to both assess societal values, needs and expectations and to implement desired values into technologies. Moreover, RRI can benefit from the lessons learned in value-sensitive design as a research field, in particular with regards to the pitfalls of stakeholder inclusion and the performativity of value inscription. Accordingly, RRI as a strategy should learn from value-sensitive design as a research field and methodology (van den Hoven 2013; Simon 2016). In return, RRI can provide ample opportunity for value-sensitive design to be further applied, developed and refined in highly diverse research settings stretching beyond ICT design.
We would neither know when and where we are born and might even still believe that the sun rotates around the earth. Trust is an essential trait of our social life and our relation to our environment. Given the pervasiveness of trust in our lives, it comes as a surprise that trust has only very recently started to receive attention in philosophy. Apart from some early consideration on trust amongst friends, on trust in god as well as some contributions regarding the role of trust
in society by Hobbes, Locke and Hume, trust emerged as a topic of philosophical interest only in the last decades of the 20th century. As pervasive trust appears as a phenomenon, as elusive it seems as a concept. What is trust? Is it a belief, an expectation, an attitude or an emotion? Can trust be willed or can I merely decide to act as if I trusted? Moreover, while the intrinsic as well as the instrumental value of trust for cooperation and social life is almost commonsensical, trust always carries the risk of being unwarranted. Trusting those who are not worthy of our trust can lead to exploitation and betrayal. Yet, not trusting those who would be trustworthy can also be a mistake and cause harm. It has been particularly feminist scholars, who have emphasizes the janus-faced nature of trust. How trust is defined and characterized depends strongly on the examples chosen. It makes a difference whether we analyze trust relations between children and their parents, between humans of equal power, between friends, lovers or strangers. Trust in other persons differs from trust in groups, trust in a specific representative of the state differs from trust in more abstract entities such as governments, democracy or society. Technology is yet another important if neglected patient of trust as well as a mediator of many human-to-human trust relations in our contemporary world. Instead of distinguishing proper and improper uses of the term trust, we should carefully attend to these different meanings of the word “trust” to provide a rich and multi-facetted perspective on this complex and important phenomenon."
In contrast to Christopher Kelty’s case for the “careful cultural analysis of the domesticated forms that open source is taking” – which we agree to be a very useful endeavor – we would like to stick with the original call for papers for this special issue, that explicitly addresses the critical power of free software and a necessary shift to epistemologies. In our contribution we are responding to the aims of this special issue and to some of the contributions from the perspective of feminist epistemology. There are several reasons for this decision. First of all, feminist scholars have been amongst the first and most explicit to stress the linkages between knowledge and power. Apart from this generic focus, specific feminist approaches, namely the approaches proposed by Helen Longino, Karen Barad and Lucy Suchman, offer invaluable insights for understanding the critical power of free software as a practice, which enables the materialization of principles into objects, as Kelty rightly emphasizes. Furthermore, feminist approaches suggest looking at epistemological politics and the situatedness of knowledge practices including effects of perspectivism and marginalization (cf. Haraway 1988). We adopt a performative understanding of epistemic practices, an understanding that take the interrelations between epistemology, ontology and ethics seriously.
Cite as: Buechner, J., Simon, J., and Tavani, H.T. (2014). “ Re-Thinking Trust and Trustworthiness in Digital Environments.” In Autonomous Technologies: Philosophical Issues, Practical Solutions, Human Nature: Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Computer Ethics Philosophical Enquiry: CEPE 2013. (Edited by E. Buchanan, et al.). Menomonie, WI: INSEIT, pp. 65-79.
Value-sensitive design (VSD) refers to a field of research addressing the inscription of values in technologies in general and information and communication technologies (ICT) in particular. In this contribution, value-sensitive design, a term originally proposed by (Friedman et al. 2006) is used as an umbrella term encompassing also similar approaches developed by other proponents, such as values in design (Knobel & Bowker 2011), values at play (Nissenbaum 2005; Flanagan et al. 2008), and disclosive computer ethics (Brey 2000, 2010).
Value-sensitive design departs from the observation that in the process of designing technologies, societal values are often unintentionally inscribed into these technologies and that resulting technologies in return may promote or demote certain values, e.g. justice, fairness or privacy. The crucial idea behind value-sensitive design as a research approach and a methodology is then to turn this insight into a research question: if values are often unconsciously imparted in the process of designing and developing technologies, can we steer this inscription more reflexively, i.e. can we intentionally embed desired values into technologies? In line with this goal of embedding desired values into technologies, proponents of value-sensitive design have developed concrete methodologies to guide the design and development of technological artefacts that promote the values desired by the various stakeholders who are or can be affected by these technologies.
Value-sensitive design, therefore, a) aims at steering technology design and development to attune to shared societal values and b) promotes the early inclusion of various direct and indirect stakeholders into the process of technology design and development. As such VSD appears to be particularly suited to support and feed into initiatives promoting more “Responsible Research and Innovation”.
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) as a term refers to both strategic efforts of national and international funding bodies, most notably the European Commission to better align the process and the outcomes of research and innovation with the values, needs and expectations of society as well as to the academic discourse which has formed around these strategic initiatives (e.g. Grunwald 2011, Koops et al. 2015, Oftedal 2014, Owen et al. 2013a, von Schomberg 2013, Simon 2015, Stilgoe et al. 2013, Timmermans and Stahl 2013, or van den Hoven et al. 2014).
Linking RRI and value-sensitive design therefore appears only consequential: value- sensitive design can support RRI by providing a concrete methodology to both assess societal values, needs and expectations and to implement desired values into technologies. Moreover, RRI can benefit from the lessons learned in value-sensitive design as a research field, in particular with regards to the pitfalls of stakeholder inclusion and the performativity of value inscription. Accordingly, RRI as a strategy should learn from value-sensitive design as a research field and methodology (van den Hoven 2013; Simon 2016). In return, RRI can provide ample opportunity for value-sensitive design to be further applied, developed and refined in highly diverse research settings stretching beyond ICT design.
We would neither know when and where we are born and might even still believe that the sun rotates around the earth. Trust is an essential trait of our social life and our relation to our environment. Given the pervasiveness of trust in our lives, it comes as a surprise that trust has only very recently started to receive attention in philosophy. Apart from some early consideration on trust amongst friends, on trust in god as well as some contributions regarding the role of trust
in society by Hobbes, Locke and Hume, trust emerged as a topic of philosophical interest only in the last decades of the 20th century. As pervasive trust appears as a phenomenon, as elusive it seems as a concept. What is trust? Is it a belief, an expectation, an attitude or an emotion? Can trust be willed or can I merely decide to act as if I trusted? Moreover, while the intrinsic as well as the instrumental value of trust for cooperation and social life is almost commonsensical, trust always carries the risk of being unwarranted. Trusting those who are not worthy of our trust can lead to exploitation and betrayal. Yet, not trusting those who would be trustworthy can also be a mistake and cause harm. It has been particularly feminist scholars, who have emphasizes the janus-faced nature of trust. How trust is defined and characterized depends strongly on the examples chosen. It makes a difference whether we analyze trust relations between children and their parents, between humans of equal power, between friends, lovers or strangers. Trust in other persons differs from trust in groups, trust in a specific representative of the state differs from trust in more abstract entities such as governments, democracy or society. Technology is yet another important if neglected patient of trust as well as a mediator of many human-to-human trust relations in our contemporary world. Instead of distinguishing proper and improper uses of the term trust, we should carefully attend to these different meanings of the word “trust” to provide a rich and multi-facetted perspective on this complex and important phenomenon."
In contrast to Christopher Kelty’s case for the “careful cultural analysis of the domesticated forms that open source is taking” – which we agree to be a very useful endeavor – we would like to stick with the original call for papers for this special issue, that explicitly addresses the critical power of free software and a necessary shift to epistemologies. In our contribution we are responding to the aims of this special issue and to some of the contributions from the perspective of feminist epistemology. There are several reasons for this decision. First of all, feminist scholars have been amongst the first and most explicit to stress the linkages between knowledge and power. Apart from this generic focus, specific feminist approaches, namely the approaches proposed by Helen Longino, Karen Barad and Lucy Suchman, offer invaluable insights for understanding the critical power of free software as a practice, which enables the materialization of principles into objects, as Kelty rightly emphasizes. Furthermore, feminist approaches suggest looking at epistemological politics and the situatedness of knowledge practices including effects of perspectivism and marginalization (cf. Haraway 1988). We adopt a performative understanding of epistemic practices, an understanding that take the interrelations between epistemology, ontology and ethics seriously.
Cite as: Buechner, J., Simon, J., and Tavani, H.T. (2014). “ Re-Thinking Trust and Trustworthiness in Digital Environments.” In Autonomous Technologies: Philosophical Issues, Practical Solutions, Human Nature: Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Computer Ethics Philosophical Enquiry: CEPE 2013. (Edited by E. Buchanan, et al.). Menomonie, WI: INSEIT, pp. 65-79.