Professor of Philosophy for many years in Trier Germany. Now regular Visiting Professor, U of Chicago.Main interests now: Ethics, Philosophy of Action and Practical Reason.
Abortionist arguments take different forms. Three kinds of argument in particular are common: (a)... more Abortionist arguments take different forms. Three kinds of argument in particular are common: (a) the (early) human foetus is not a human being; so (an early) abortion is not a case of killing innocent human beings. (b) Killing is intrinsically wrong only when directed against persons; up to a certain stage, however, the fetus (or even infant), though a human being alright, is not (yet) a person; so up to a certain stage of development abortion is not intrinsically wrong. (c) The human fetus is a human being (or person) and as such has a right to life; but in particular cases countervailing considerations may show that other rights or moral demands take precedence over the prohibition on killing the foetus.
So conceived, practical reasoning (inference, syllogism) is practical by virtue of its content or... more So conceived, practical reasoning (inference, syllogism) is practical by virtue of its content or subject matter: it is ordinary reasoning about practical matters that is properly contrasted with, e.g. historical, economic, and biological reasoning (i.e. reasoning towards the truth of historical, economic, and biological propositions). Anscombe complains that this view leads to practical reasoning’s ‘true character’ being ‘obscured’.3 She allows that practical reasoning has a distinctive subject matter, but denies ‘that this subject matter is enough to make reasoning about it practical’; there is, she contends, ‘a difference of form between reasoning leading to action [i.e. practical reasoning] and reasoning for the truth of a conclusion [i.e. theoretical reasoning]’.4
Respected traditions oppose emotionality to reason. In recent decades there has been growing awar... more Respected traditions oppose emotionality to reason. In recent decades there has been growing awareness of, and attention to, the rational side of feelings. In particular, emotions have been taken to embody value judgements. I argue instead that every type of emotion owes its specific character to a (quasi-)inferential pattern that connects the import of a token emotion’s occasion, or object, with the meaning of its manifestation in a response. Man’s ability and tendency to connect occasions with responses in this way constitutes a first degree of emotional rationality. A second degree is attained where the subject’s emotionality accords with their settled normative views on what to feel. And where these views are right, namely in a virtuous life, the subject is emotionally rational to a third degree.
Der Titel meines Vortrags steht fur eine Frage: Sind Verfahren arztlicher Behundlung, die das Leb... more Der Titel meines Vortrags steht fur eine Frage: Sind Verfahren arztlicher Behundlung, die das Leben eines oder einer schwer leidenden Kranken verlangern, nicht zu verurteilen, da sie zugleich das Sterben verlangern, einen ohnehin muhseligen Prozes, der zu nichts underem als zun Tod fuhrt?
When for the first time I read a paper to a philosophical audience—I had come to England only a s... more When for the first time I read a paper to a philosophical audience—I had come to England only a short while ago, and was still getting used to both a language and a style of argumentation—, it was Peter Geach who encouraged me to develop further the thoughts contained in that paper. Today, after a dozen of years, I wish to take up his encouragement and connect some of those thoughts, which concerned the idea of necessary properties, with the question whether identity is absolute or relative. If my considerations turn out to conflict with Peter’s answer to this question, I am nevertheless sure that he will recognize in their contribution to this volume a sign of deep respect, of friendship, and of gratitude for what I have learnt from him.
For Philippa Foot, the essence of morality consists in acting on the reasons on which, qua human ... more For Philippa Foot, the essence of morality consists in acting on the reasons on which, qua human being, one ought to act; and this ought is one of “natural normativity”—the same ought that also occurs in statements about what a plant or an animal, qua exhibiting a certain form of life, “ought” to be like in various respects, or how its organs “ought” to function. Of this conception Foot avails herself in order to refute the moral sceptic—an undertaking that raises various critical questions, in particular: 1) Is it the naturally normative ought that also occurs in a practical judgement of the form “I ought to F”? If so, how are we to account for what Foot calls the “practicality” of such a judgement? If not, what kind of intelligible step could an agent (or a philosopher) take, in order to get from a theoretical statement of natural normativity to a practical judgement that ceteris paribus issues in action? 2) Can we understand the validity of every moral requirement in terms of nat...
Abortionist arguments take different forms. Three kinds of argument in particular are common: (a)... more Abortionist arguments take different forms. Three kinds of argument in particular are common: (a) the (early) human foetus is not a human being; so (an early) abortion is not a case of killing innocent human beings. (b) Killing is intrinsically wrong only when directed against persons; up to a certain stage, however, the fetus (or even infant), though a human being alright, is not (yet) a person; so up to a certain stage of development abortion is not intrinsically wrong. (c) The human fetus is a human being (or person) and as such has a right to life; but in particular cases countervailing considerations may show that other rights or moral demands take precedence over the prohibition on killing the foetus.
So conceived, practical reasoning (inference, syllogism) is practical by virtue of its content or... more So conceived, practical reasoning (inference, syllogism) is practical by virtue of its content or subject matter: it is ordinary reasoning about practical matters that is properly contrasted with, e.g. historical, economic, and biological reasoning (i.e. reasoning towards the truth of historical, economic, and biological propositions). Anscombe complains that this view leads to practical reasoning’s ‘true character’ being ‘obscured’.3 She allows that practical reasoning has a distinctive subject matter, but denies ‘that this subject matter is enough to make reasoning about it practical’; there is, she contends, ‘a difference of form between reasoning leading to action [i.e. practical reasoning] and reasoning for the truth of a conclusion [i.e. theoretical reasoning]’.4
Respected traditions oppose emotionality to reason. In recent decades there has been growing awar... more Respected traditions oppose emotionality to reason. In recent decades there has been growing awareness of, and attention to, the rational side of feelings. In particular, emotions have been taken to embody value judgements. I argue instead that every type of emotion owes its specific character to a (quasi-)inferential pattern that connects the import of a token emotion’s occasion, or object, with the meaning of its manifestation in a response. Man’s ability and tendency to connect occasions with responses in this way constitutes a first degree of emotional rationality. A second degree is attained where the subject’s emotionality accords with their settled normative views on what to feel. And where these views are right, namely in a virtuous life, the subject is emotionally rational to a third degree.
Der Titel meines Vortrags steht fur eine Frage: Sind Verfahren arztlicher Behundlung, die das Leb... more Der Titel meines Vortrags steht fur eine Frage: Sind Verfahren arztlicher Behundlung, die das Leben eines oder einer schwer leidenden Kranken verlangern, nicht zu verurteilen, da sie zugleich das Sterben verlangern, einen ohnehin muhseligen Prozes, der zu nichts underem als zun Tod fuhrt?
When for the first time I read a paper to a philosophical audience—I had come to England only a s... more When for the first time I read a paper to a philosophical audience—I had come to England only a short while ago, and was still getting used to both a language and a style of argumentation—, it was Peter Geach who encouraged me to develop further the thoughts contained in that paper. Today, after a dozen of years, I wish to take up his encouragement and connect some of those thoughts, which concerned the idea of necessary properties, with the question whether identity is absolute or relative. If my considerations turn out to conflict with Peter’s answer to this question, I am nevertheless sure that he will recognize in their contribution to this volume a sign of deep respect, of friendship, and of gratitude for what I have learnt from him.
For Philippa Foot, the essence of morality consists in acting on the reasons on which, qua human ... more For Philippa Foot, the essence of morality consists in acting on the reasons on which, qua human being, one ought to act; and this ought is one of “natural normativity”—the same ought that also occurs in statements about what a plant or an animal, qua exhibiting a certain form of life, “ought” to be like in various respects, or how its organs “ought” to function. Of this conception Foot avails herself in order to refute the moral sceptic—an undertaking that raises various critical questions, in particular: 1) Is it the naturally normative ought that also occurs in a practical judgement of the form “I ought to F”? If so, how are we to account for what Foot calls the “practicality” of such a judgement? If not, what kind of intelligible step could an agent (or a philosopher) take, in order to get from a theoretical statement of natural normativity to a practical judgement that ceteris paribus issues in action? 2) Can we understand the validity of every moral requirement in terms of nat...
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