My research focuses on civil society participation in peace processes, mediation, transitional governance, power-sharing, agreement implementation and the African Peace and Security Architecture, with a particular focus on the Southern African Development Community and Zimbabwe. Before becoming a visiting postdoc at the University of Edinburgh, I was a research associate of the University of Cape Town worked for the Graduate Institute and Swisspeace, and obtained a PhD from the University of Basel.
Introduction
After focusing on pastoralist conflicts in three crossborder
areas for ten years, th... more Introduction After focusing on pastoralist conflicts in three crossborder areas for ten years, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN) adopted an ambitious new Strategy Framework in 2012. The strategy transformed CEWARN into a system to detect and respond timeously to the potential escalation of violent conflicts that may be triggered by economic, environmental, governance, security and social matters in all member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Besides expanding the thematic and geographical range, the strategy enhanced CEWARN’s partnership with civil society, which was initiated by the pioneering CEWARN Protocol in 2002.2 This article reviews the implementation of CEWARN’s partnerships with civil society organisations (CSOs) for data collection, analysis and response under the current Strategy Framework. It identifies outstanding challenges and lessons for (inter)governmental conflict early-warning and response systems (CEWRS).
Over the past 20 years, the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (REC) have becom... more Over the past 20 years, the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (REC) have become pivotal peacemakers in Africa. The intergovernmental organisations, which jointly established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), have facilitated numerous peace agreements to contain violent intrastate conflicts. These agreements, however, often collapse without being implemented. This report explores how African organisations support the implementation of framework agreements for transitions through continued mediation, guarantees and monitoring. To this end, it traces how the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) supported the implementation of framework agreements in Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe.
The African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (REC) have become pivotal peacemakers in... more The African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (REC) have become pivotal peacemakers in the two decades since they began the construction of a joint African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the objective to provide “African solutions to African problems.” The African organisations have developed normative policy frameworks and organisational structures for mediation and preventive diplomacy. The peacemaking institutions, which were developed with the assistance of international development partners, reflect the long-standing peacemaking experience, practices and principles of the African organisations, as well as international norms, technical standards and peacebuilding paradigms. Whereas the African organisations and Western states share a catalogue of common values, in peacemaking interventions, their priorities and approaches often diverge.
This policy brief explores how African organisations envision peacemaking, how the African solutions differ from Western approaches, and to what extent the approaches are compatible. To this end, it reviews the policy frameworks and structures for peacemaking of the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). The study forms part of PeaceRep’s Global Transitions project, which examines the role of non-Western state actors and intergovernmental organisations in the management of conflicts and peace processes worldwide.
Cognisant of the need to institutionalise mediation
capacity and to foster the participation of n... more Cognisant of the need to institutionalise mediation capacity and to foster the participation of non-state actors in conflict prevention and peacemaking, the African Union and Regional Economic Communities, which form the building blocks of the African Peace and Security Architecture, have established Mediation Support Structures and developed partnerships with civil society organisations. This report offers comparative insights on the framework for civil society inclusion in peacemaking and the potential contributions of African civil society organisations to the continued development of mediation support capacity in the African Union, Economic Community of West African States and Southern African Development Community.
Southern Africa is likely to experience more social
unrest in the foreseeable future. That is one... more Southern Africa is likely to experience more social unrest in the foreseeable future. That is one of the conclusions in this policy dialogue, which provides an overview of political and economic developments relevant to regional peace and security in Southern Africa. While the region continues to experience isolated armed conflicts, and while developmental backlogs present a major risk to regional stability in the long run, currently the most acute source of instability stems from governance deficits, which in the past decade have prompted crises in many of the member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC’s institutional framework for regional peace and security has proven ineffective because SADC leaders have prioritised national sovereignty over the enforcement of democratic principles. The institutions have little capacity as they lack material and political support. The governance deficits and SADC’s lacklustre conflict management may in the long run arrest development in Southern Africa.
Signatories, guarantors and stakeholders of peace treaties and global political agreements (GPA) ... more Signatories, guarantors and stakeholders of peace treaties and global political agreements (GPA) need reliable information on the agreement’s implementation to track progress, ensure compliance and prevent renewed conflict. Implementation monitoring mechanisms (IMMs) are, therefore, an important component of peace and transitional governance processes. Whereas monitoring can be entrusted to an independent third party, the signatories of Zimbabwe’s GPA set up a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC). This article outlines the implementation of the GPA and discusses the hybrid design and workings of JOMIC, which sought to build peace among monitors from powersharing parties, who jointly observed the agreement’s implementation. It argues that JOMIC was not a viable substitution for an independent IMM despite having some merit in observing political violence and gathering information for the power-sharing parties. JOMIC’s basic concept of permitting political elites to monitor their own compliance with the agreement was impractical, its proceedings non-transparent and its outputs of little use to guarantors and stakeholders. The absence of an official independent IMM, for which civil society monitors could not fully compensate, impeded the transitional governance process and its facilitation by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was meant to guarantee that the GPA was implemented. Zimbabwe’s GPA offers cautionary lessons for the design of implementation mechanisms that serve multiple purposes, which can compromise the quality of monitoring. It points to the need to institutionalise implementation monitoring in the African peace and security architecture to improve the ability of the African Union and regional economic communities to guarantee that agreements that they facilitate are implemented.
This article contributes to the debate on the merits and perils of interim executive powersharing... more This article contributes to the debate on the merits and perils of interim executive powersharing as a means of conflict management by examining the functioning of Zimbabwe’s power-sharing government during the interregnum of 2009–13. Based on the insider accounts of numerous executive members, the article argues that the inter-party dynamics in the Government of National Unity were characterised by selective co-operation and obstruction. The extent of co-operation between ministers from the three parties in the coalition varied depending on the domain of governance and constellation of officials involved, rather than being exclusively determined by party strategies. New government organs introduced to the existing executive structure to enable power-sharing failed effectively to balance power between the three parties. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU[PF]), which had dominated government since the introduction of majority-rule democracy in 1980, consistently flouted government protocol. Yet inter-party relations within government improved gradually, and the power-sharing parties generally co-operated on economic, social and infrastructure policies. Democratic gains were minor, owing to ZANU(PF)’s resistance to reform, but the power-sharing process considerably reduced polarisation and fostered dialogue among hostile political elites. Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity thus illustrates that interim powersharing can have a significant peace-building effect at the elite level. Yet it also shows that an interim governance process is unlikely to achieve decisive democratic reforms where parties lack commitment, engage in power-sharing with ulterior motives and undermine reforms from within. Although interim power-sharing may foster dialogue and ease hostility, conflict actors who internalised coercion and authoritarianism in their habitus are unlikely to adopt a democratic political culture.
This article investigates the Southern African Development Community’s mediation mandate for Zimb... more This article investigates the Southern African Development Community’s mediation mandate for Zimbabwe. The mandate was to facilitate a dialogue to promote peace, stability, sovereignty, and democracy. These aims were hard to reconcile. Short-term stability and protecting Zimbabwe’s sovereignty took precedence over democratization. The article examines tensions between the mandate’s components and traces the interaction between the mandators and the mediators. It shows how the mandate evolved as the conflict resolution process went through different stages.
The paper examines the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Zimbabwe's interim power-sha... more The paper examines the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Zimbabwe's interim power-sharing process. It identifies CSOs’ organisational capacity, nature of engagement in the political process and relations with the power-sharing parties as the principal issues affecting CSOs’ ability to promote peace-making and democratisation in the context of a transitional executive power-sharing process. Based on these analytical themes, the case analysis argues that CSOs’ sway on the transition was particularly constrained by organisational fragmentation and disunity, divergent strategies vis-à-vis the interregnum, diminishing access to political elites, the latter's refusal to permit greater civic involvement, and continued repression.
Following a post-electoral crisis and a surge in violence in Zimbabwe in 2008, a team of South Af... more Following a post-electoral crisis and a surge in violence in Zimbabwe in 2008, a team of South African facilitators brokered a power-sharing agreement between the country’s regime and the major opposition parties. The Global Political Agreement embroiled Zimbabwe in a gruelling transition that was characterised by a protracted struggle over democratic reforms and fought out between the political protagonists, civil society and the guarantors of the pact. Zimbabwe’s ‘Inclusive Government’ was one of several power-sharing executives that interlocutors mandated by the African Union and regional economic communities mediated in response to intrastate conflicts in the past decades. Consequently, although the benefits and conditions for power-sharing remain subject to debate, peacemakers have brokered unity governments as an ostensibly ‘African solution’ in response to various crises. Combining a historical study with an in-depth case analysis on interim power-sharing, this PhD thesis not only constitutes the most comprehensive study on Zimbabwe’s gruelling transition, but offers valuable insights in respect of the effectiveness of power-sharing arrangements as means of containing intrastate conflicts in Africa and beyond. The book traces the Zimbabwean transition from the power-sharing negotiations to the 2013 elections, and discusses the political process in its specific historical, societal and international context. As the thesis is based on interviews with a multitude of participants of Zimbabwe’s transition, it sheds light into the internal functioning of the power-sharing executive and transitional institutions. The thesis moreover develops an expedient analytical instrument to study power-sharing mechanisms, and analyses the Zimbabwean case in respect of factors affecting the extent to which power-sharing succeeds in promoting peace, stability and democratisation. By doing so, the thesis feeds into the debate on the conditions for successful power-sharing and provides a solid empirical base for future comparative research.
Introduction
After focusing on pastoralist conflicts in three crossborder
areas for ten years, th... more Introduction After focusing on pastoralist conflicts in three crossborder areas for ten years, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN) adopted an ambitious new Strategy Framework in 2012. The strategy transformed CEWARN into a system to detect and respond timeously to the potential escalation of violent conflicts that may be triggered by economic, environmental, governance, security and social matters in all member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Besides expanding the thematic and geographical range, the strategy enhanced CEWARN’s partnership with civil society, which was initiated by the pioneering CEWARN Protocol in 2002.2 This article reviews the implementation of CEWARN’s partnerships with civil society organisations (CSOs) for data collection, analysis and response under the current Strategy Framework. It identifies outstanding challenges and lessons for (inter)governmental conflict early-warning and response systems (CEWRS).
Over the past 20 years, the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (REC) have becom... more Over the past 20 years, the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (REC) have become pivotal peacemakers in Africa. The intergovernmental organisations, which jointly established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), have facilitated numerous peace agreements to contain violent intrastate conflicts. These agreements, however, often collapse without being implemented. This report explores how African organisations support the implementation of framework agreements for transitions through continued mediation, guarantees and monitoring. To this end, it traces how the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) supported the implementation of framework agreements in Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe.
The African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (REC) have become pivotal peacemakers in... more The African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (REC) have become pivotal peacemakers in the two decades since they began the construction of a joint African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the objective to provide “African solutions to African problems.” The African organisations have developed normative policy frameworks and organisational structures for mediation and preventive diplomacy. The peacemaking institutions, which were developed with the assistance of international development partners, reflect the long-standing peacemaking experience, practices and principles of the African organisations, as well as international norms, technical standards and peacebuilding paradigms. Whereas the African organisations and Western states share a catalogue of common values, in peacemaking interventions, their priorities and approaches often diverge.
This policy brief explores how African organisations envision peacemaking, how the African solutions differ from Western approaches, and to what extent the approaches are compatible. To this end, it reviews the policy frameworks and structures for peacemaking of the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). The study forms part of PeaceRep’s Global Transitions project, which examines the role of non-Western state actors and intergovernmental organisations in the management of conflicts and peace processes worldwide.
Cognisant of the need to institutionalise mediation
capacity and to foster the participation of n... more Cognisant of the need to institutionalise mediation capacity and to foster the participation of non-state actors in conflict prevention and peacemaking, the African Union and Regional Economic Communities, which form the building blocks of the African Peace and Security Architecture, have established Mediation Support Structures and developed partnerships with civil society organisations. This report offers comparative insights on the framework for civil society inclusion in peacemaking and the potential contributions of African civil society organisations to the continued development of mediation support capacity in the African Union, Economic Community of West African States and Southern African Development Community.
Southern Africa is likely to experience more social
unrest in the foreseeable future. That is one... more Southern Africa is likely to experience more social unrest in the foreseeable future. That is one of the conclusions in this policy dialogue, which provides an overview of political and economic developments relevant to regional peace and security in Southern Africa. While the region continues to experience isolated armed conflicts, and while developmental backlogs present a major risk to regional stability in the long run, currently the most acute source of instability stems from governance deficits, which in the past decade have prompted crises in many of the member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC’s institutional framework for regional peace and security has proven ineffective because SADC leaders have prioritised national sovereignty over the enforcement of democratic principles. The institutions have little capacity as they lack material and political support. The governance deficits and SADC’s lacklustre conflict management may in the long run arrest development in Southern Africa.
Signatories, guarantors and stakeholders of peace treaties and global political agreements (GPA) ... more Signatories, guarantors and stakeholders of peace treaties and global political agreements (GPA) need reliable information on the agreement’s implementation to track progress, ensure compliance and prevent renewed conflict. Implementation monitoring mechanisms (IMMs) are, therefore, an important component of peace and transitional governance processes. Whereas monitoring can be entrusted to an independent third party, the signatories of Zimbabwe’s GPA set up a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC). This article outlines the implementation of the GPA and discusses the hybrid design and workings of JOMIC, which sought to build peace among monitors from powersharing parties, who jointly observed the agreement’s implementation. It argues that JOMIC was not a viable substitution for an independent IMM despite having some merit in observing political violence and gathering information for the power-sharing parties. JOMIC’s basic concept of permitting political elites to monitor their own compliance with the agreement was impractical, its proceedings non-transparent and its outputs of little use to guarantors and stakeholders. The absence of an official independent IMM, for which civil society monitors could not fully compensate, impeded the transitional governance process and its facilitation by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was meant to guarantee that the GPA was implemented. Zimbabwe’s GPA offers cautionary lessons for the design of implementation mechanisms that serve multiple purposes, which can compromise the quality of monitoring. It points to the need to institutionalise implementation monitoring in the African peace and security architecture to improve the ability of the African Union and regional economic communities to guarantee that agreements that they facilitate are implemented.
This article contributes to the debate on the merits and perils of interim executive powersharing... more This article contributes to the debate on the merits and perils of interim executive powersharing as a means of conflict management by examining the functioning of Zimbabwe’s power-sharing government during the interregnum of 2009–13. Based on the insider accounts of numerous executive members, the article argues that the inter-party dynamics in the Government of National Unity were characterised by selective co-operation and obstruction. The extent of co-operation between ministers from the three parties in the coalition varied depending on the domain of governance and constellation of officials involved, rather than being exclusively determined by party strategies. New government organs introduced to the existing executive structure to enable power-sharing failed effectively to balance power between the three parties. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU[PF]), which had dominated government since the introduction of majority-rule democracy in 1980, consistently flouted government protocol. Yet inter-party relations within government improved gradually, and the power-sharing parties generally co-operated on economic, social and infrastructure policies. Democratic gains were minor, owing to ZANU(PF)’s resistance to reform, but the power-sharing process considerably reduced polarisation and fostered dialogue among hostile political elites. Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity thus illustrates that interim powersharing can have a significant peace-building effect at the elite level. Yet it also shows that an interim governance process is unlikely to achieve decisive democratic reforms where parties lack commitment, engage in power-sharing with ulterior motives and undermine reforms from within. Although interim power-sharing may foster dialogue and ease hostility, conflict actors who internalised coercion and authoritarianism in their habitus are unlikely to adopt a democratic political culture.
This article investigates the Southern African Development Community’s mediation mandate for Zimb... more This article investigates the Southern African Development Community’s mediation mandate for Zimbabwe. The mandate was to facilitate a dialogue to promote peace, stability, sovereignty, and democracy. These aims were hard to reconcile. Short-term stability and protecting Zimbabwe’s sovereignty took precedence over democratization. The article examines tensions between the mandate’s components and traces the interaction between the mandators and the mediators. It shows how the mandate evolved as the conflict resolution process went through different stages.
The paper examines the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Zimbabwe's interim power-sha... more The paper examines the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Zimbabwe's interim power-sharing process. It identifies CSOs’ organisational capacity, nature of engagement in the political process and relations with the power-sharing parties as the principal issues affecting CSOs’ ability to promote peace-making and democratisation in the context of a transitional executive power-sharing process. Based on these analytical themes, the case analysis argues that CSOs’ sway on the transition was particularly constrained by organisational fragmentation and disunity, divergent strategies vis-à-vis the interregnum, diminishing access to political elites, the latter's refusal to permit greater civic involvement, and continued repression.
Following a post-electoral crisis and a surge in violence in Zimbabwe in 2008, a team of South Af... more Following a post-electoral crisis and a surge in violence in Zimbabwe in 2008, a team of South African facilitators brokered a power-sharing agreement between the country’s regime and the major opposition parties. The Global Political Agreement embroiled Zimbabwe in a gruelling transition that was characterised by a protracted struggle over democratic reforms and fought out between the political protagonists, civil society and the guarantors of the pact. Zimbabwe’s ‘Inclusive Government’ was one of several power-sharing executives that interlocutors mandated by the African Union and regional economic communities mediated in response to intrastate conflicts in the past decades. Consequently, although the benefits and conditions for power-sharing remain subject to debate, peacemakers have brokered unity governments as an ostensibly ‘African solution’ in response to various crises. Combining a historical study with an in-depth case analysis on interim power-sharing, this PhD thesis not only constitutes the most comprehensive study on Zimbabwe’s gruelling transition, but offers valuable insights in respect of the effectiveness of power-sharing arrangements as means of containing intrastate conflicts in Africa and beyond. The book traces the Zimbabwean transition from the power-sharing negotiations to the 2013 elections, and discusses the political process in its specific historical, societal and international context. As the thesis is based on interviews with a multitude of participants of Zimbabwe’s transition, it sheds light into the internal functioning of the power-sharing executive and transitional institutions. The thesis moreover develops an expedient analytical instrument to study power-sharing mechanisms, and analyses the Zimbabwean case in respect of factors affecting the extent to which power-sharing succeeds in promoting peace, stability and democratisation. By doing so, the thesis feeds into the debate on the conditions for successful power-sharing and provides a solid empirical base for future comparative research.
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After focusing on pastoralist conflicts in three crossborder
areas for ten years, the Conflict Early Warning
and Response Network (CEWARN) adopted an
ambitious new Strategy Framework in 2012.
The strategy transformed CEWARN into a system to
detect and respond timeously to the potential
escalation of violent conflicts that may be triggered
by economic, environmental, governance, security
and social matters in all member states of the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
Besides expanding the thematic and geographical
range, the strategy enhanced CEWARN’s partnership
with civil society, which was initiated by the
pioneering CEWARN Protocol in 2002.2 This article
reviews the implementation of CEWARN’s partnerships
with civil society organisations (CSOs) for data
collection, analysis and response under the current
Strategy Framework. It identifies outstanding
challenges and lessons for (inter)governmental
conflict early-warning and response systems
(CEWRS).
This policy brief explores how African organisations envision peacemaking, how the African solutions differ from Western approaches, and to what extent the approaches are compatible. To this end, it reviews the policy frameworks and structures for peacemaking of the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). The study forms part of PeaceRep’s Global Transitions project, which examines the role of non-Western state actors and intergovernmental organisations in the management of conflicts and peace processes worldwide.
capacity and to foster the participation of non-state
actors in conflict prevention and peacemaking, the
African Union and Regional Economic Communities,
which form the building blocks of the African Peace
and Security Architecture, have established Mediation
Support Structures and developed partnerships with
civil society organisations. This report offers
comparative insights on the framework for civil
society inclusion in peacemaking and the potential
contributions of African civil society organisations to
the continued development of mediation support
capacity in the African Union, Economic Community
of West African States and Southern African
Development Community.
unrest in the foreseeable future. That is one of the
conclusions in this policy dialogue, which provides an
overview of political and economic developments relevant
to regional peace and security in Southern Africa.
While the region continues to experience isolated
armed conflicts, and while developmental backlogs
present a major risk to regional stability in the long
run, currently the most acute source of instability
stems from governance deficits, which in the past
decade have prompted crises in many of the member
states of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). SADC’s institutional framework for regional
peace and security has proven ineffective because
SADC leaders have prioritised national sovereignty
over the enforcement of democratic principles. The institutions
have little capacity as they lack material and
political support. The governance deficits and SADC’s
lacklustre conflict management may in the long run
arrest development in Southern Africa.
https://issuu.com/nordicafricainstitute/docs/entire_book_including_cover_final_version_for_diva?fbclid=IwAR2Jn8Gs2G77RU97De1CUSxQlYjEv7a8jwkb5PZfuyfh7pFmmYU7qGN-I3Y
as a means of conflict management by examining the functioning of Zimbabwe’s
power-sharing government during the interregnum of 2009–13. Based on the insider
accounts of numerous executive members, the article argues that the inter-party dynamics
in the Government of National Unity were characterised by selective co-operation and
obstruction. The extent of co-operation between ministers from the three parties in the
coalition varied depending on the domain of governance and constellation of officials
involved, rather than being exclusively determined by party strategies. New government
organs introduced to the existing executive structure to enable power-sharing failed
effectively to balance power between the three parties. The Zimbabwe African National
Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU[PF]), which had dominated government since the
introduction of majority-rule democracy in 1980, consistently flouted government protocol.
Yet inter-party relations within government improved gradually, and the power-sharing
parties generally co-operated on economic, social and infrastructure policies. Democratic
gains were minor, owing to ZANU(PF)’s resistance to reform, but the power-sharing
process considerably reduced polarisation and fostered dialogue among hostile political
elites. Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity thus illustrates that interim powersharing
can have a significant peace-building effect at the elite level. Yet it also shows
that an interim governance process is unlikely to achieve decisive democratic reforms
where parties lack commitment, engage in power-sharing with ulterior motives and
undermine reforms from within. Although interim power-sharing may foster dialogue and
ease hostility, conflict actors who internalised coercion and authoritarianism in their
habitus are unlikely to adopt a democratic political culture.
Combining a historical study with an in-depth case analysis on interim power-sharing, this PhD thesis not only constitutes the most comprehensive study on Zimbabwe’s gruelling transition, but offers valuable insights in respect of the effectiveness of power-sharing arrangements as means of containing intrastate conflicts in Africa and beyond. The book traces the Zimbabwean transition from the power-sharing negotiations to the 2013 elections, and discusses the political process in its specific historical, societal and international context. As the thesis is based on interviews with a multitude of participants of Zimbabwe’s transition, it sheds light into the internal functioning of the power-sharing executive and transitional institutions. The thesis moreover develops an expedient analytical instrument to study power-sharing mechanisms, and analyses the Zimbabwean case in respect of factors affecting the extent to which power-sharing succeeds in promoting peace, stability and democratisation. By doing so, the thesis feeds into the debate on the conditions for successful power-sharing and provides a solid empirical base for future comparative research.
After focusing on pastoralist conflicts in three crossborder
areas for ten years, the Conflict Early Warning
and Response Network (CEWARN) adopted an
ambitious new Strategy Framework in 2012.
The strategy transformed CEWARN into a system to
detect and respond timeously to the potential
escalation of violent conflicts that may be triggered
by economic, environmental, governance, security
and social matters in all member states of the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
Besides expanding the thematic and geographical
range, the strategy enhanced CEWARN’s partnership
with civil society, which was initiated by the
pioneering CEWARN Protocol in 2002.2 This article
reviews the implementation of CEWARN’s partnerships
with civil society organisations (CSOs) for data
collection, analysis and response under the current
Strategy Framework. It identifies outstanding
challenges and lessons for (inter)governmental
conflict early-warning and response systems
(CEWRS).
This policy brief explores how African organisations envision peacemaking, how the African solutions differ from Western approaches, and to what extent the approaches are compatible. To this end, it reviews the policy frameworks and structures for peacemaking of the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). The study forms part of PeaceRep’s Global Transitions project, which examines the role of non-Western state actors and intergovernmental organisations in the management of conflicts and peace processes worldwide.
capacity and to foster the participation of non-state
actors in conflict prevention and peacemaking, the
African Union and Regional Economic Communities,
which form the building blocks of the African Peace
and Security Architecture, have established Mediation
Support Structures and developed partnerships with
civil society organisations. This report offers
comparative insights on the framework for civil
society inclusion in peacemaking and the potential
contributions of African civil society organisations to
the continued development of mediation support
capacity in the African Union, Economic Community
of West African States and Southern African
Development Community.
unrest in the foreseeable future. That is one of the
conclusions in this policy dialogue, which provides an
overview of political and economic developments relevant
to regional peace and security in Southern Africa.
While the region continues to experience isolated
armed conflicts, and while developmental backlogs
present a major risk to regional stability in the long
run, currently the most acute source of instability
stems from governance deficits, which in the past
decade have prompted crises in many of the member
states of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). SADC’s institutional framework for regional
peace and security has proven ineffective because
SADC leaders have prioritised national sovereignty
over the enforcement of democratic principles. The institutions
have little capacity as they lack material and
political support. The governance deficits and SADC’s
lacklustre conflict management may in the long run
arrest development in Southern Africa.
https://issuu.com/nordicafricainstitute/docs/entire_book_including_cover_final_version_for_diva?fbclid=IwAR2Jn8Gs2G77RU97De1CUSxQlYjEv7a8jwkb5PZfuyfh7pFmmYU7qGN-I3Y
as a means of conflict management by examining the functioning of Zimbabwe’s
power-sharing government during the interregnum of 2009–13. Based on the insider
accounts of numerous executive members, the article argues that the inter-party dynamics
in the Government of National Unity were characterised by selective co-operation and
obstruction. The extent of co-operation between ministers from the three parties in the
coalition varied depending on the domain of governance and constellation of officials
involved, rather than being exclusively determined by party strategies. New government
organs introduced to the existing executive structure to enable power-sharing failed
effectively to balance power between the three parties. The Zimbabwe African National
Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU[PF]), which had dominated government since the
introduction of majority-rule democracy in 1980, consistently flouted government protocol.
Yet inter-party relations within government improved gradually, and the power-sharing
parties generally co-operated on economic, social and infrastructure policies. Democratic
gains were minor, owing to ZANU(PF)’s resistance to reform, but the power-sharing
process considerably reduced polarisation and fostered dialogue among hostile political
elites. Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity thus illustrates that interim powersharing
can have a significant peace-building effect at the elite level. Yet it also shows
that an interim governance process is unlikely to achieve decisive democratic reforms
where parties lack commitment, engage in power-sharing with ulterior motives and
undermine reforms from within. Although interim power-sharing may foster dialogue and
ease hostility, conflict actors who internalised coercion and authoritarianism in their
habitus are unlikely to adopt a democratic political culture.
Combining a historical study with an in-depth case analysis on interim power-sharing, this PhD thesis not only constitutes the most comprehensive study on Zimbabwe’s gruelling transition, but offers valuable insights in respect of the effectiveness of power-sharing arrangements as means of containing intrastate conflicts in Africa and beyond. The book traces the Zimbabwean transition from the power-sharing negotiations to the 2013 elections, and discusses the political process in its specific historical, societal and international context. As the thesis is based on interviews with a multitude of participants of Zimbabwe’s transition, it sheds light into the internal functioning of the power-sharing executive and transitional institutions. The thesis moreover develops an expedient analytical instrument to study power-sharing mechanisms, and analyses the Zimbabwean case in respect of factors affecting the extent to which power-sharing succeeds in promoting peace, stability and democratisation. By doing so, the thesis feeds into the debate on the conditions for successful power-sharing and provides a solid empirical base for future comparative research.