The staff of animal shelters are frequently confronted with challenging ethical decisions. They h... more The staff of animal shelters are frequently confronted with challenging ethical decisions. They have to decide which animals to take in, which ones to provide with medical treatment, and which ones to abort, kill, or euthanize, as well as assessing which animals are likely to find a forever home. There are more animals in need than shelters can reasonably take care of. In this chapter, it is argued that some animal shelters fulfill the conditions that make triage protocols necessary: they operate with a limited financial budget, limited space, limited medical resources, limited time, and limited staff. It is suggested that requirements presented for triage in humans can be fruitfully extended and applied to the context of animal shelters, and it is shown what this could look like in practice. In particular, the focus lies on the following criteria: i) maximizing benefit; ii) justice; iii) medical criteria; iv) lifespan considerations; v) fair decision-making; vi) patient will; vii) re-evaluation of triage decisions and changes in the therapeutic goal; and viii) burden of triage and staff support. The establishment of triage protocols for shelters will make the decision-making process less arbitrary, fairer, and more transparent. Furthermore, it is argued that in situations where conflicts and disagreement persist amongst shelter staff, an external ethics board could be called in to help analyze and potentially resolve some of the remaining ethical issues.
Human-wildlife interactions frequently lead to conflicts – about the fair use of natural resource... more Human-wildlife interactions frequently lead to conflicts – about the fair use of natural resources, for example. Various principled accounts have been proposed to resolve such interspecies conflicts. However, the existing frameworks are often inadequate to the complexities of real-life scenarios. In particular, they frequently fail because they do not adequately take account of the qualitative importance of individual interests, their relative importance, and the number of individuals affected. This article presents a limited aggregation account designed to overcome these shortcomings and thus to facilitate decision-making in real-world human-wildlife conflicts.
Transforming food systems: ethics, innovation and responsibility. Edited by: Donald Bruce and Ann Bruce, 2022
Human and animal interests are often in conflict. In many situations, however, it is unclear how ... more Human and animal interests are often in conflict. In many situations, however, it is unclear how to evaluate and weigh competing human and animal interests, as the satisfaction of the interests of one group often inevitably occurs at the expense of those of the other group. Human-animal conflicts of this kind give rise to ethical questions. If animals count morally for their own sake, then we must ask in which cases the satisfaction or frustration of the interests of humans and animals in conflict situations is justified or unjustified from an ethical perspective. In this article, we argue that limited aggregation accounts represent a promising means for resolving interspecies conflicts. The reason for this is that they can appropriately consider the qualitative relevance of interests, their relative importance to each other, and the number of individuals affected. For our argument, we start from the premise that animals count morally for their own sake, albeit to a lesser extent than humans. That is, we accept the view that animals may be used, for example, as a source of food or in animal research. However, as we will show, many basic interests of animals are sufficiently similar to human interests and can thus be compared to them. Hence, they ought to be aggregated in cases of conflict with human interests. We illustrate our account and its practical implications with the real-world example of a human-animal conflict during the outbreak of a zoonotic diseases among farmed animals. We conclude that, in many cases, animal interests ought to be given more importance than they currently receive, which includes distributing the burdens and risks of farming practices more fairly.
Justice and food security in a changing climate, 2021
Over 60% of all epidemics have a zoonotic origin, that is, they result from the transmission of i... more Over 60% of all epidemics have a zoonotic origin, that is, they result from the transmission of infectious diseases from animals to humans. The spill-over of diseases often happens because humans exploit and use animals. In this article, I outline the four most common interfaces that favour the emergence and spread of zoonotic infectious diseases: wildlife hunting, small-scale farming, industrialised farming practices and live animal markets. I analyse which practices serve human food security-and thus have a non-trivial purpose-and which predominantly have an economic purpose or serve as a symbol of wealth. I conclude that many practices that increase the risk for zoonotic infectious disease outbreaks actually do not contribute to the survival and food security of humans. I make two arguments in turn. First, I argue that in cases where the consumption and use of animal products does not contribute to the food security of a population, then this population has a duty to abstain from them, since they impose a grave and avoidable risk to themselves as well as to innocent third-parties. However, some communities must sometimes rely on practices that increase the risk of emergence and transmission of zoonotic infectious diseases, because they have no healthy alternatives. That is, the food security of the local population depends on the consumption and use of risky animal products. The second argument I advance is that, in such scenarios, the international community has a duty to provide the communities concerned with alternative food options, as well as economic and educational opportunities and technologies, in order to reduce the spill-over risk of infectious diseases. Given that abstention from such practices contributes significantly to the public good and benefits the international community, the latter has a corresponding duty to provide local communities which abandon such practices with alternatives.
Human encroachment on the habitats of wild animals and the dense living conditions of farmed anim... more Human encroachment on the habitats of wild animals and the dense living conditions of farmed animals increase spill-over risk of emerging infectious diseases from animals to humans (such as COVID-19). In this article, we defend two claims: First, we argue that in order to limit the risk of emerging infectious disease outbreaks in the future, a One Health approach is needed, which focuses on human, animal, and environmental health. Second, we claim that One Health should not solely be grounded in collaborations between veterinary, medical, and environmental scientists, but should also involve more dialogue with animal and environmental ethicists. Such an interdisciplinary approach would result in epidemiology-driven measures that are ethically legitimate.
The purpose of this article is to show that animal rights are not necessarily at odds with the us... more The purpose of this article is to show that animal rights are not necessarily at odds with the use of animals for research. If animals hold basic moral rights similar to those of humans, then we should consequently extend the ethical requirements guiding research with humans to research with animals. The article spells out how this can be done in practice by applying the seven requirements for ethical research with humans proposed by Ezekiel Emanuel, David Wendler and Christine Grady to animal research. These requirements are i) social value, ii) scientific validity, iii) independent review, iv) fair subject selection, v) favorable risk-benefit ratio, vi) informed consent, and vii) respect for research subjects. In practice, this means that we must reform the practice of animal research to make it more similar to research with humans, rather than completely abolish the former. Indeed, if we banned animal research altogether, then we would also deprive animals of its potential benefits-which would be ethically problematic.
Humans have always been plagued by epidemics caused primarily by infectious diseases that origina... more Humans have always been plagued by epidemics caused primarily by infectious diseases that originated from animals, especially wildlife. The establishment of sustained transmission from initial spillover events involves the interplay of complex mechanisms that are difficult to understand. However, there is consensus that direct or indirect contact of humans with animals and their body fluids (an “animal-human interface”) is essential for a successful cross-species transmission. Whilst humans have coexisted with domestic and wild animals for millennia, several anthropogenic factors have intensified the animal-human interface in recent decades, increasing our interactions with animals, and consequently, the risk of disease spillover.
This special issue of Bioethica Forum is dedicated to the theme of disability and ethics - a conn... more This special issue of Bioethica Forum is dedicated to the theme of disability and ethics - a connection that has taken on considerable importance due to recent events.
While human vulnerability has been discussed for some time in the contemporary philosophy and bio... more While human vulnerability has been discussed for some time in the contemporary philosophy and bioethics literature, animal vulnerability has received less attention. In this article, I investigate whether the concept of vulnerability, as it is currently used in bioethics, can be meaningfully extended to animals. Furthermore, I discuss the ethical implications of ascribing vulnerability to animals and I show what vulnerability discourse can add to debates on animal ethics. In a first step, I analyze the conditions of vulnerability ascription. By taking as my basis the definition of vulnerability presented by Martin, Tavaglione and Hurst (2014), I demonstrate that some animals fulfil the conditions of vulnerability ascription. I explore the ethical implications of vulnerability ascriptions in three domains: livestock farming, animal experimentation, and animals living in the wild. I argue that many groups of animals currently qualify as particularly vulnerable and should be afforded special protection so that they receive what they are due. I conclude by outlining the differences between vulnerability and sentience ascriptions: while sentience is a sufficient reason to ascribe moral status to a being, vulnerability draws our attention to those who are more likely to be denied what they are due.
A apparaître dans un oeuvre collectif sur la vulnérabilité animale (Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre), 2019
Les différents codes d'éthique régissant l'expérimentation médicale semblent s'accorder sur un po... more Les différents codes d'éthique régissant l'expérimentation médicale semblent s'accorder sur un point : les personnes particulièrement vulnérables devraient bénéficier d'une protection spéciale et d'une attention supplémentaire. Certain-e-s philosophes ont récemment soutenu que les animaux sensibles non humains devraient être également considérés comme des sujets d'expérimentation vulnérables, et ainsi bénéficier de protections similaires à celles des êtres humains vulnérables dans la recherche médicale : leur utilisation ne devrait être permise que dans des conditions tout à fait restreintes. Dans cet article, je demande si le concept de vulnérabilité, tel qu'il est utilisé en bioéthique, devrait effectivement être étendu aux animaux de laboratoire et, si tant est que la réponse soit affirmative, ce qu'il implique du point de vue éthique pour l'expérimentation animale. Je soutiens que de nombreux animaux de laboratoire devraient être considérés comme des sujets d'expérimentation vulnérables dans la mesure où ils courent un risque plus élevé de subir des dommages additionnels ou des torts. Toutefois, le fait d'identifier les animaux de laboratoire comme sujets d'expérimentation vulnérables n'entraîne pas nécessairement une interdiction générale de l'expérimentation animale, mais exige plutôt la prise en compte équitable de leurs intérêts.
Abstract : There is general agreement that particularly vulnerable individuals in medical research should be afforded special protection and attention. Recently, it has been argued by some authors that sentient nonhuman animals in experiments should also be identified as vulnerable research subjects. Consequently, these animals should benefit from similar protections as vulnerable humans in research: their use would only be allowed under well-restricted conditions. In this article, I investigate whether the concept of vulnerability, as it is used in bioethics can indeed be meaningfully extended to laboratory animals, and if so, what it implies for the practice of animal research from an ethical point of view. I claim that many research animals indeed qualify as vulnerable research subjects insofar as they are at high risk of incurring unjustified harm and wrongs. However, identifying research animals as vulnerable research subjects does not necessarily result in a general prohibition of animal research. Rather, it results in a claim for the fair consideration of animals interests.
Background: Implicit biases are present in the general population and among professionals in vari... more Background: Implicit biases are present in the general population and among professionals in various domains, where they can lead to discrimination. Many interventions are used to reduce implicit bias. However, uncertainties remain as to their effectiveness.
Methods: We conducted a systematic review by searching ERIC, PUBMED and PSYCHINFO for peer-reviewed studies conducted on adults between May 2005 and April 2015, testing interventions designed to reduce implicit bias, with results measured using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) or sufficiently similar methods.
Results 30 articles were identified as eligible. Some techniques, such as engaging with others’ perspective, appear unfruitful, at least in short term implicit bias reduction, while other techniques, such as exposure to counterstereotypical exemplars, are more promising. Robust data is lacking for many of these interventions.
Conclusions Caution is thus advised when it comes to programs aiming at reducing biases. This does not weaken the case for implementing widespread structural and institutional changes that are multiply justified.
There is broad agreement that humans can be wronged independently of their incurring any harm, th... more There is broad agreement that humans can be wronged independently of their incurring any harm, that is, when their welfare is not affected. Examples include unnoticed infringements of privacy, ridiculing unaware individuals, or disregarding individuals’ autonomous decision-making in their best interest. However, it is less clear whether the same is true of animals—that is, whether moral agents can wrong animals in situations that do not involve any harm to the animals concerned. In order to answer this question, I concentrate on the illustrative case of treating animals in a demeaning yet harmless way that would be disrespectful if humans were concerned. I discuss whether such actions are permissible or unjustifiably discriminatory from a moral point of view. I conclude that moral agents cannot directly wrong animals without harming them and thus do not owe it to a particular animal to refrain from such actions. However, if the actions increase the likelihood that animal abuse will occur, this presents a strong indirect reason against performing them. Thus, the reasons for refraining from such actions are merely indirect rather than direct.
In the literature on medical ethics, it is generally admitted that vulnerable persons or groups d... more In the literature on medical ethics, it is generally admitted that vulnerable persons or groups deserve special attention, care or protection. One can define vulnerable persons as those having a greater likelihood of being wronged – that is, of being denied adequate satisfaction of certain legitimate claims. The conjunction of these two points entails what we call the Special Protection Thesis. It asserts that persons with a greater likelihood of being denied adequate satisfaction of their legitimate claims deserve special attention, care or protection. Such a thesis remains vague, however, as long as we do not know what legitimate claims are. This article aims at dispelling this vagueness by exploring what claims we have in relation to health care – thus fleshing out a claim-based conception of vulnerability. We argue that the Special Protection Thesis must be enriched as follows: If individual or group X has a greater likelihood of being denied adequate satisfaction of some of their legitimate claims to (i) physical integrity, (ii) autonomy, (iii) freedom, (iv) social provision, (v) impartial quality of government, (vi) social bases of self-respect or (vii) communal belonging, then X deserves special attention, care or protection. With this improved understanding of vulnerability, vulnerability talk in healthcare ethics can escape vagueness and serve as an adequate basis for practice.
Vulnerability has been extensively discussed in medical research, but less so in health care. Thu... more Vulnerability has been extensively discussed in medical research, but less so in health care. Thus, who are the vulnerable in this domain still remains an open question. One difficulty in their identification is due to the general criticism that vulnerability is not a property of only some but rather of everyone. By presenting a philosophical analysis of the conditions of vulnerability ascription, we show that these seemingly irreconcilable understandings of vulnerability are not contradictory. Rather, they are interdependent: they refer to the same concept with different likelihoods of manifestation. We argue that the general vulnerability of living beings relies on their having certain types of interests. In health care, those individuals are particularly vulnerable who are more likely to have these interests unjustly considered. They should be afforded special protection in order to receive what is due to everyone, but which they are likely to fail to receive.
The staff of animal shelters are frequently confronted with challenging ethical decisions. They h... more The staff of animal shelters are frequently confronted with challenging ethical decisions. They have to decide which animals to take in, which ones to provide with medical treatment, and which ones to abort, kill, or euthanize, as well as assessing which animals are likely to find a forever home. There are more animals in need than shelters can reasonably take care of. In this chapter, it is argued that some animal shelters fulfill the conditions that make triage protocols necessary: they operate with a limited financial budget, limited space, limited medical resources, limited time, and limited staff. It is suggested that requirements presented for triage in humans can be fruitfully extended and applied to the context of animal shelters, and it is shown what this could look like in practice. In particular, the focus lies on the following criteria: i) maximizing benefit; ii) justice; iii) medical criteria; iv) lifespan considerations; v) fair decision-making; vi) patient will; vii) re-evaluation of triage decisions and changes in the therapeutic goal; and viii) burden of triage and staff support. The establishment of triage protocols for shelters will make the decision-making process less arbitrary, fairer, and more transparent. Furthermore, it is argued that in situations where conflicts and disagreement persist amongst shelter staff, an external ethics board could be called in to help analyze and potentially resolve some of the remaining ethical issues.
Human-wildlife interactions frequently lead to conflicts – about the fair use of natural resource... more Human-wildlife interactions frequently lead to conflicts – about the fair use of natural resources, for example. Various principled accounts have been proposed to resolve such interspecies conflicts. However, the existing frameworks are often inadequate to the complexities of real-life scenarios. In particular, they frequently fail because they do not adequately take account of the qualitative importance of individual interests, their relative importance, and the number of individuals affected. This article presents a limited aggregation account designed to overcome these shortcomings and thus to facilitate decision-making in real-world human-wildlife conflicts.
Transforming food systems: ethics, innovation and responsibility. Edited by: Donald Bruce and Ann Bruce, 2022
Human and animal interests are often in conflict. In many situations, however, it is unclear how ... more Human and animal interests are often in conflict. In many situations, however, it is unclear how to evaluate and weigh competing human and animal interests, as the satisfaction of the interests of one group often inevitably occurs at the expense of those of the other group. Human-animal conflicts of this kind give rise to ethical questions. If animals count morally for their own sake, then we must ask in which cases the satisfaction or frustration of the interests of humans and animals in conflict situations is justified or unjustified from an ethical perspective. In this article, we argue that limited aggregation accounts represent a promising means for resolving interspecies conflicts. The reason for this is that they can appropriately consider the qualitative relevance of interests, their relative importance to each other, and the number of individuals affected. For our argument, we start from the premise that animals count morally for their own sake, albeit to a lesser extent than humans. That is, we accept the view that animals may be used, for example, as a source of food or in animal research. However, as we will show, many basic interests of animals are sufficiently similar to human interests and can thus be compared to them. Hence, they ought to be aggregated in cases of conflict with human interests. We illustrate our account and its practical implications with the real-world example of a human-animal conflict during the outbreak of a zoonotic diseases among farmed animals. We conclude that, in many cases, animal interests ought to be given more importance than they currently receive, which includes distributing the burdens and risks of farming practices more fairly.
Justice and food security in a changing climate, 2021
Over 60% of all epidemics have a zoonotic origin, that is, they result from the transmission of i... more Over 60% of all epidemics have a zoonotic origin, that is, they result from the transmission of infectious diseases from animals to humans. The spill-over of diseases often happens because humans exploit and use animals. In this article, I outline the four most common interfaces that favour the emergence and spread of zoonotic infectious diseases: wildlife hunting, small-scale farming, industrialised farming practices and live animal markets. I analyse which practices serve human food security-and thus have a non-trivial purpose-and which predominantly have an economic purpose or serve as a symbol of wealth. I conclude that many practices that increase the risk for zoonotic infectious disease outbreaks actually do not contribute to the survival and food security of humans. I make two arguments in turn. First, I argue that in cases where the consumption and use of animal products does not contribute to the food security of a population, then this population has a duty to abstain from them, since they impose a grave and avoidable risk to themselves as well as to innocent third-parties. However, some communities must sometimes rely on practices that increase the risk of emergence and transmission of zoonotic infectious diseases, because they have no healthy alternatives. That is, the food security of the local population depends on the consumption and use of risky animal products. The second argument I advance is that, in such scenarios, the international community has a duty to provide the communities concerned with alternative food options, as well as economic and educational opportunities and technologies, in order to reduce the spill-over risk of infectious diseases. Given that abstention from such practices contributes significantly to the public good and benefits the international community, the latter has a corresponding duty to provide local communities which abandon such practices with alternatives.
Human encroachment on the habitats of wild animals and the dense living conditions of farmed anim... more Human encroachment on the habitats of wild animals and the dense living conditions of farmed animals increase spill-over risk of emerging infectious diseases from animals to humans (such as COVID-19). In this article, we defend two claims: First, we argue that in order to limit the risk of emerging infectious disease outbreaks in the future, a One Health approach is needed, which focuses on human, animal, and environmental health. Second, we claim that One Health should not solely be grounded in collaborations between veterinary, medical, and environmental scientists, but should also involve more dialogue with animal and environmental ethicists. Such an interdisciplinary approach would result in epidemiology-driven measures that are ethically legitimate.
The purpose of this article is to show that animal rights are not necessarily at odds with the us... more The purpose of this article is to show that animal rights are not necessarily at odds with the use of animals for research. If animals hold basic moral rights similar to those of humans, then we should consequently extend the ethical requirements guiding research with humans to research with animals. The article spells out how this can be done in practice by applying the seven requirements for ethical research with humans proposed by Ezekiel Emanuel, David Wendler and Christine Grady to animal research. These requirements are i) social value, ii) scientific validity, iii) independent review, iv) fair subject selection, v) favorable risk-benefit ratio, vi) informed consent, and vii) respect for research subjects. In practice, this means that we must reform the practice of animal research to make it more similar to research with humans, rather than completely abolish the former. Indeed, if we banned animal research altogether, then we would also deprive animals of its potential benefits-which would be ethically problematic.
Humans have always been plagued by epidemics caused primarily by infectious diseases that origina... more Humans have always been plagued by epidemics caused primarily by infectious diseases that originated from animals, especially wildlife. The establishment of sustained transmission from initial spillover events involves the interplay of complex mechanisms that are difficult to understand. However, there is consensus that direct or indirect contact of humans with animals and their body fluids (an “animal-human interface”) is essential for a successful cross-species transmission. Whilst humans have coexisted with domestic and wild animals for millennia, several anthropogenic factors have intensified the animal-human interface in recent decades, increasing our interactions with animals, and consequently, the risk of disease spillover.
This special issue of Bioethica Forum is dedicated to the theme of disability and ethics - a conn... more This special issue of Bioethica Forum is dedicated to the theme of disability and ethics - a connection that has taken on considerable importance due to recent events.
While human vulnerability has been discussed for some time in the contemporary philosophy and bio... more While human vulnerability has been discussed for some time in the contemporary philosophy and bioethics literature, animal vulnerability has received less attention. In this article, I investigate whether the concept of vulnerability, as it is currently used in bioethics, can be meaningfully extended to animals. Furthermore, I discuss the ethical implications of ascribing vulnerability to animals and I show what vulnerability discourse can add to debates on animal ethics. In a first step, I analyze the conditions of vulnerability ascription. By taking as my basis the definition of vulnerability presented by Martin, Tavaglione and Hurst (2014), I demonstrate that some animals fulfil the conditions of vulnerability ascription. I explore the ethical implications of vulnerability ascriptions in three domains: livestock farming, animal experimentation, and animals living in the wild. I argue that many groups of animals currently qualify as particularly vulnerable and should be afforded special protection so that they receive what they are due. I conclude by outlining the differences between vulnerability and sentience ascriptions: while sentience is a sufficient reason to ascribe moral status to a being, vulnerability draws our attention to those who are more likely to be denied what they are due.
A apparaître dans un oeuvre collectif sur la vulnérabilité animale (Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre), 2019
Les différents codes d'éthique régissant l'expérimentation médicale semblent s'accorder sur un po... more Les différents codes d'éthique régissant l'expérimentation médicale semblent s'accorder sur un point : les personnes particulièrement vulnérables devraient bénéficier d'une protection spéciale et d'une attention supplémentaire. Certain-e-s philosophes ont récemment soutenu que les animaux sensibles non humains devraient être également considérés comme des sujets d'expérimentation vulnérables, et ainsi bénéficier de protections similaires à celles des êtres humains vulnérables dans la recherche médicale : leur utilisation ne devrait être permise que dans des conditions tout à fait restreintes. Dans cet article, je demande si le concept de vulnérabilité, tel qu'il est utilisé en bioéthique, devrait effectivement être étendu aux animaux de laboratoire et, si tant est que la réponse soit affirmative, ce qu'il implique du point de vue éthique pour l'expérimentation animale. Je soutiens que de nombreux animaux de laboratoire devraient être considérés comme des sujets d'expérimentation vulnérables dans la mesure où ils courent un risque plus élevé de subir des dommages additionnels ou des torts. Toutefois, le fait d'identifier les animaux de laboratoire comme sujets d'expérimentation vulnérables n'entraîne pas nécessairement une interdiction générale de l'expérimentation animale, mais exige plutôt la prise en compte équitable de leurs intérêts.
Abstract : There is general agreement that particularly vulnerable individuals in medical research should be afforded special protection and attention. Recently, it has been argued by some authors that sentient nonhuman animals in experiments should also be identified as vulnerable research subjects. Consequently, these animals should benefit from similar protections as vulnerable humans in research: their use would only be allowed under well-restricted conditions. In this article, I investigate whether the concept of vulnerability, as it is used in bioethics can indeed be meaningfully extended to laboratory animals, and if so, what it implies for the practice of animal research from an ethical point of view. I claim that many research animals indeed qualify as vulnerable research subjects insofar as they are at high risk of incurring unjustified harm and wrongs. However, identifying research animals as vulnerable research subjects does not necessarily result in a general prohibition of animal research. Rather, it results in a claim for the fair consideration of animals interests.
Background: Implicit biases are present in the general population and among professionals in vari... more Background: Implicit biases are present in the general population and among professionals in various domains, where they can lead to discrimination. Many interventions are used to reduce implicit bias. However, uncertainties remain as to their effectiveness.
Methods: We conducted a systematic review by searching ERIC, PUBMED and PSYCHINFO for peer-reviewed studies conducted on adults between May 2005 and April 2015, testing interventions designed to reduce implicit bias, with results measured using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) or sufficiently similar methods.
Results 30 articles were identified as eligible. Some techniques, such as engaging with others’ perspective, appear unfruitful, at least in short term implicit bias reduction, while other techniques, such as exposure to counterstereotypical exemplars, are more promising. Robust data is lacking for many of these interventions.
Conclusions Caution is thus advised when it comes to programs aiming at reducing biases. This does not weaken the case for implementing widespread structural and institutional changes that are multiply justified.
There is broad agreement that humans can be wronged independently of their incurring any harm, th... more There is broad agreement that humans can be wronged independently of their incurring any harm, that is, when their welfare is not affected. Examples include unnoticed infringements of privacy, ridiculing unaware individuals, or disregarding individuals’ autonomous decision-making in their best interest. However, it is less clear whether the same is true of animals—that is, whether moral agents can wrong animals in situations that do not involve any harm to the animals concerned. In order to answer this question, I concentrate on the illustrative case of treating animals in a demeaning yet harmless way that would be disrespectful if humans were concerned. I discuss whether such actions are permissible or unjustifiably discriminatory from a moral point of view. I conclude that moral agents cannot directly wrong animals without harming them and thus do not owe it to a particular animal to refrain from such actions. However, if the actions increase the likelihood that animal abuse will occur, this presents a strong indirect reason against performing them. Thus, the reasons for refraining from such actions are merely indirect rather than direct.
In the literature on medical ethics, it is generally admitted that vulnerable persons or groups d... more In the literature on medical ethics, it is generally admitted that vulnerable persons or groups deserve special attention, care or protection. One can define vulnerable persons as those having a greater likelihood of being wronged – that is, of being denied adequate satisfaction of certain legitimate claims. The conjunction of these two points entails what we call the Special Protection Thesis. It asserts that persons with a greater likelihood of being denied adequate satisfaction of their legitimate claims deserve special attention, care or protection. Such a thesis remains vague, however, as long as we do not know what legitimate claims are. This article aims at dispelling this vagueness by exploring what claims we have in relation to health care – thus fleshing out a claim-based conception of vulnerability. We argue that the Special Protection Thesis must be enriched as follows: If individual or group X has a greater likelihood of being denied adequate satisfaction of some of their legitimate claims to (i) physical integrity, (ii) autonomy, (iii) freedom, (iv) social provision, (v) impartial quality of government, (vi) social bases of self-respect or (vii) communal belonging, then X deserves special attention, care or protection. With this improved understanding of vulnerability, vulnerability talk in healthcare ethics can escape vagueness and serve as an adequate basis for practice.
Vulnerability has been extensively discussed in medical research, but less so in health care. Thu... more Vulnerability has been extensively discussed in medical research, but less so in health care. Thus, who are the vulnerable in this domain still remains an open question. One difficulty in their identification is due to the general criticism that vulnerability is not a property of only some but rather of everyone. By presenting a philosophical analysis of the conditions of vulnerability ascription, we show that these seemingly irreconcilable understandings of vulnerability are not contradictory. Rather, they are interdependent: they refer to the same concept with different likelihoods of manifestation. We argue that the general vulnerability of living beings relies on their having certain types of interests. In health care, those individuals are particularly vulnerable who are more likely to have these interests unjustly considered. They should be afforded special protection in order to receive what is due to everyone, but which they are likely to fail to receive.
In this open access book, Angela K. Martin thoroughly addresses what human and animal vulnerabili... more In this open access book, Angela K. Martin thoroughly addresses what human and animal vulnerability are, how and why they matter from a moral point of view, and how they compare to each other. By first defining universal and situational human vulnerability, Martin lays the groundwork for investigating whether sentient nonhuman animals can also qualify as vulnerable beings. She then takes a closer look at three different contexts of animal vulnerability: animals used as a source of food, animals used in research, and the fate of wild animals.
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Papers by Angela K. Martin
transmission. Whilst humans have coexisted with domestic and wild animals for millennia, several anthropogenic factors have intensified the animal-human interface in recent decades, increasing our interactions with animals, and consequently, the risk of disease spillover.
Abstract : There is general agreement that particularly vulnerable individuals in medical research should be afforded special protection and attention. Recently, it has been argued by some authors that sentient nonhuman animals in experiments should also be identified as vulnerable research subjects. Consequently, these animals should benefit from similar protections as vulnerable humans in research: their use would only be allowed under well-restricted conditions. In this article, I investigate whether the concept of vulnerability, as it is used in bioethics can indeed be meaningfully extended to laboratory animals, and if so, what it implies for the practice of animal research from an ethical point of view. I claim that many research animals indeed qualify as vulnerable research subjects insofar as they are at high risk of incurring unjustified harm and wrongs. However, identifying research animals as vulnerable research subjects does not necessarily result in a general prohibition of animal research. Rather, it results in a claim for the fair consideration of animals interests.
Methods: We conducted a systematic review by searching ERIC, PUBMED and PSYCHINFO for peer-reviewed studies conducted on adults between May 2005 and April 2015, testing interventions designed to reduce implicit bias, with results measured using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) or sufficiently similar methods.
Results
30 articles were identified as eligible. Some techniques, such as engaging with others’ perspective, appear unfruitful, at least in short term implicit bias reduction, while other techniques, such as exposure to counterstereotypical exemplars, are more promising. Robust data is lacking for many of these interventions.
Conclusions
Caution is thus advised when it comes to programs aiming at reducing biases. This does not weaken the case for implementing widespread structural and institutional changes that are multiply justified.
that vulnerability is not a property of only some but rather of everyone. By presenting a philosophical analysis of the conditions of vulnerability ascription, we show that these seemingly irreconcilable understandings of vulnerability are not
contradictory. Rather, they are interdependent: they refer to the same concept with different likelihoods of manifestation. We argue that the general vulnerability of living beings relies on their having certain types of interests. In health care, those individuals are particularly vulnerable who are more likely to have these interests unjustly considered. They should be afforded special protection in order to receive what is due to everyone, but which they are likely to fail to receive.
transmission. Whilst humans have coexisted with domestic and wild animals for millennia, several anthropogenic factors have intensified the animal-human interface in recent decades, increasing our interactions with animals, and consequently, the risk of disease spillover.
Abstract : There is general agreement that particularly vulnerable individuals in medical research should be afforded special protection and attention. Recently, it has been argued by some authors that sentient nonhuman animals in experiments should also be identified as vulnerable research subjects. Consequently, these animals should benefit from similar protections as vulnerable humans in research: their use would only be allowed under well-restricted conditions. In this article, I investigate whether the concept of vulnerability, as it is used in bioethics can indeed be meaningfully extended to laboratory animals, and if so, what it implies for the practice of animal research from an ethical point of view. I claim that many research animals indeed qualify as vulnerable research subjects insofar as they are at high risk of incurring unjustified harm and wrongs. However, identifying research animals as vulnerable research subjects does not necessarily result in a general prohibition of animal research. Rather, it results in a claim for the fair consideration of animals interests.
Methods: We conducted a systematic review by searching ERIC, PUBMED and PSYCHINFO for peer-reviewed studies conducted on adults between May 2005 and April 2015, testing interventions designed to reduce implicit bias, with results measured using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) or sufficiently similar methods.
Results
30 articles were identified as eligible. Some techniques, such as engaging with others’ perspective, appear unfruitful, at least in short term implicit bias reduction, while other techniques, such as exposure to counterstereotypical exemplars, are more promising. Robust data is lacking for many of these interventions.
Conclusions
Caution is thus advised when it comes to programs aiming at reducing biases. This does not weaken the case for implementing widespread structural and institutional changes that are multiply justified.
that vulnerability is not a property of only some but rather of everyone. By presenting a philosophical analysis of the conditions of vulnerability ascription, we show that these seemingly irreconcilable understandings of vulnerability are not
contradictory. Rather, they are interdependent: they refer to the same concept with different likelihoods of manifestation. We argue that the general vulnerability of living beings relies on their having certain types of interests. In health care, those individuals are particularly vulnerable who are more likely to have these interests unjustly considered. They should be afforded special protection in order to receive what is due to everyone, but which they are likely to fail to receive.