Presented at the Third Conference of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Scienc... more Presented at the Third Conference of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ENPOSS), Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Madrid, Spain, 10–12 September 2014.
In this article, we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the... more In this article, we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences. The different ways in which the context-dependence and context-independence of mechanism-based explanation have been understood in the social sciences are often motivated by different and apparently incompatible understandings of what explanatory mechanisms are. Instead, we suggest that the different varieties of context-dependence are best seen as corresponding to different research goals. Rather than conflicting with one another, these goals are complementary to each other and therefore pave the way to a methodologically more cooperative approach to mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences.
In this article, we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the... more In this article, we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences. The different ways in which the context-dependence and context-independence of mechanism-based explanation have been understood in the social sciences are often motivated by different and apparently incompatible understandings of what explanatory mechanisms are. Instead, we suggest that the different varieties of context-dependence are best seen as corresponding to different research goals. Rather than conflicting with one another, these goals are complementary to each other and therefore pave the way to a methodologically more cooperative approach to mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences.
Compared to other philosophies of special sciences, the scope, object, and definition of the phil... more Compared to other philosophies of special sciences, the scope, object, and definition of the philosophy of political science remain vague. This article traces this vagueness to the changing subject matter of political science throughout its history, but argues that all social sciences are subject to radical changes in what count as their defining characteristics. Accordingly, the only legitimate definition of “philosophy of political science” is “the philosophical study of whatever happens to conventionally fall within the scope of political science at a given moment.” Moving from this assumption, this article makes the case for a unified philosophy of social science.
The present work aims at criticising the foundationalist assumptions of Methodological Individual... more The present work aims at criticising the foundationalist assumptions of Methodological Individualism (MI) in the social sciences by showing that they depend on one, but not necessarily the only, conception of the role of explanation in the construction of overall sociological theories. Philosophical arguments have been supplemented with a bird's-eye survey of contemporary social research in order to identify such conceptions in common strands of empirical research. This method tries to comply with the need of a tighter interaction between philosophy of science and working social science [6, 7]. In current social research, a sophisticated restatement of MI, known as "structural indi-vidualism", has been introduced by so-called Analytical Sociology (AS), which is gaining more and more popularity among social scientists [4]. The main idea that characterises AS is that explanations of social phenomena ought consist of detecting and detailing the mechanisms that generate th...
The present work aims at criticising the foundationalist assumptions of Methodological Individual... more The present work aims at criticising the foundationalist assumptions of Methodological Individualism (MI) in the social sciences by showing that they depend on one, but not necessarily the only, conception of the role of explanation in the construction of overall sociological theories. Philosophical arguments have been supplemented with a bird's-eye survey of contemporary social research in order to identify such conceptions in common strands of empirical research. This method tries to comply with the need of a tighter interaction between philosophy of science and working social science [6, 7]. In current social research, a sophisticated restatement of MI, known as "structural indi-vidualism", has been introduced by so-called Analytical Sociology (AS), which is gaining more and more popularity among social scientists [4]. The main idea that characterises AS is that explanations of social phenomena ought consist of detecting and detailing the mechanisms that generate th...
In this article we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the ... more In this article we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences. The different ways in which the context-dependence and context-independence of mechanism-based explanation have been understood in the social sciences are often motivated by different and apparently incompatible understandings of what explanatory mechanisms are. Instead, we suggest that the different varieties of context-dependence are best seen as corresponding to different research goals. Rather than conflicting with one another, these goals are complementary to each other and therefore pave the way to a methodologically more cooperative approach to mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences.
Taking the cue from some of Lucio Colletti's unpublished letters and writings , this article will... more Taking the cue from some of Lucio Colletti's unpublished letters and writings , this article will focus on Colletti's work from the 1967-1973 period. Here, Col-letti interprets Marx's theory of value in terms of a «real abstraction»-i.e. in terms of the alienation of individual private labours. By turning this abstraction into an object and by reifying it, capital becomes for Colletti an inherently "upside-down" social reality, the knowledge of which can only be acquired through the critique and upturning of its idealism. The originality of Colletti's Marxism lies in the powerful link it establishes between political economy and critique, between Marxism and the critique of idealism, between science and revolution.
Parlare di new materialism significa fare riferimento a una sorta di finzione o convenzione che r... more Parlare di new materialism significa fare riferimento a una sorta di finzione o convenzione che raggruppa sotto una stessa etichetta cose in parte diverse e, alle volte, fin troppo diverse per poter pensare che esista un filo rosso che le accomuni davvero tutte in maniera, per così dire, essenziale. Per questo motivo ci sembra necessario abbandonare del tutto l’approccio «tassonomico» che articola il new materialism in sottogeneri a partire da un genere che li raggruppi tutti in un insieme definito da tutti e soli quei tratti comuni a tutti gli elementi dell’insieme. Anziché da una congiunzione di tratti condivisi, il new materialism può essere definito dalla loro disgiunzione, cosicché non è più necessario che tutti vengano rinvenuti in ogni sua istanza: è sufficiente che ne sia presente almeno uno. Il new materialism appare quindi come un «prototipo» che può essere caratterizzato ricorrendo alla nozione wittgensteiniana di «somiglianze di famiglia»: come i membri di una famiglia, i vari filoni del new materialism condividono alcuni tratti, ma non necessariamente tutti gli stessi tratti. In questa ottica, ci sembra coerente usare la forma plurale e parlare di new materialisms o «neo-materialismi» per riferirsi all’insieme delle tre traiettorie qui considerate e che ora intendiamo esaminare più nel dettaglio seguendo la tripartizione proposta da Gamble, Hanan e Nail (2019).
Presented at the Third Conference of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Scienc... more Presented at the Third Conference of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ENPOSS), Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Madrid, Spain, 10–12 September 2014.
In this article, we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the... more In this article, we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences. The different ways in which the context-dependence and context-independence of mechanism-based explanation have been understood in the social sciences are often motivated by different and apparently incompatible understandings of what explanatory mechanisms are. Instead, we suggest that the different varieties of context-dependence are best seen as corresponding to different research goals. Rather than conflicting with one another, these goals are complementary to each other and therefore pave the way to a methodologically more cooperative approach to mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences.
In this article, we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the... more In this article, we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences. The different ways in which the context-dependence and context-independence of mechanism-based explanation have been understood in the social sciences are often motivated by different and apparently incompatible understandings of what explanatory mechanisms are. Instead, we suggest that the different varieties of context-dependence are best seen as corresponding to different research goals. Rather than conflicting with one another, these goals are complementary to each other and therefore pave the way to a methodologically more cooperative approach to mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences.
Compared to other philosophies of special sciences, the scope, object, and definition of the phil... more Compared to other philosophies of special sciences, the scope, object, and definition of the philosophy of political science remain vague. This article traces this vagueness to the changing subject matter of political science throughout its history, but argues that all social sciences are subject to radical changes in what count as their defining characteristics. Accordingly, the only legitimate definition of “philosophy of political science” is “the philosophical study of whatever happens to conventionally fall within the scope of political science at a given moment.” Moving from this assumption, this article makes the case for a unified philosophy of social science.
The present work aims at criticising the foundationalist assumptions of Methodological Individual... more The present work aims at criticising the foundationalist assumptions of Methodological Individualism (MI) in the social sciences by showing that they depend on one, but not necessarily the only, conception of the role of explanation in the construction of overall sociological theories. Philosophical arguments have been supplemented with a bird's-eye survey of contemporary social research in order to identify such conceptions in common strands of empirical research. This method tries to comply with the need of a tighter interaction between philosophy of science and working social science [6, 7]. In current social research, a sophisticated restatement of MI, known as "structural indi-vidualism", has been introduced by so-called Analytical Sociology (AS), which is gaining more and more popularity among social scientists [4]. The main idea that characterises AS is that explanations of social phenomena ought consist of detecting and detailing the mechanisms that generate th...
The present work aims at criticising the foundationalist assumptions of Methodological Individual... more The present work aims at criticising the foundationalist assumptions of Methodological Individualism (MI) in the social sciences by showing that they depend on one, but not necessarily the only, conception of the role of explanation in the construction of overall sociological theories. Philosophical arguments have been supplemented with a bird's-eye survey of contemporary social research in order to identify such conceptions in common strands of empirical research. This method tries to comply with the need of a tighter interaction between philosophy of science and working social science [6, 7]. In current social research, a sophisticated restatement of MI, known as "structural indi-vidualism", has been introduced by so-called Analytical Sociology (AS), which is gaining more and more popularity among social scientists [4]. The main idea that characterises AS is that explanations of social phenomena ought consist of detecting and detailing the mechanisms that generate th...
In this article we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the ... more In this article we discuss the issue of context-dependence of mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences. The different ways in which the context-dependence and context-independence of mechanism-based explanation have been understood in the social sciences are often motivated by different and apparently incompatible understandings of what explanatory mechanisms are. Instead, we suggest that the different varieties of context-dependence are best seen as corresponding to different research goals. Rather than conflicting with one another, these goals are complementary to each other and therefore pave the way to a methodologically more cooperative approach to mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences.
Taking the cue from some of Lucio Colletti's unpublished letters and writings , this article will... more Taking the cue from some of Lucio Colletti's unpublished letters and writings , this article will focus on Colletti's work from the 1967-1973 period. Here, Col-letti interprets Marx's theory of value in terms of a «real abstraction»-i.e. in terms of the alienation of individual private labours. By turning this abstraction into an object and by reifying it, capital becomes for Colletti an inherently "upside-down" social reality, the knowledge of which can only be acquired through the critique and upturning of its idealism. The originality of Colletti's Marxism lies in the powerful link it establishes between political economy and critique, between Marxism and the critique of idealism, between science and revolution.
Parlare di new materialism significa fare riferimento a una sorta di finzione o convenzione che r... more Parlare di new materialism significa fare riferimento a una sorta di finzione o convenzione che raggruppa sotto una stessa etichetta cose in parte diverse e, alle volte, fin troppo diverse per poter pensare che esista un filo rosso che le accomuni davvero tutte in maniera, per così dire, essenziale. Per questo motivo ci sembra necessario abbandonare del tutto l’approccio «tassonomico» che articola il new materialism in sottogeneri a partire da un genere che li raggruppi tutti in un insieme definito da tutti e soli quei tratti comuni a tutti gli elementi dell’insieme. Anziché da una congiunzione di tratti condivisi, il new materialism può essere definito dalla loro disgiunzione, cosicché non è più necessario che tutti vengano rinvenuti in ogni sua istanza: è sufficiente che ne sia presente almeno uno. Il new materialism appare quindi come un «prototipo» che può essere caratterizzato ricorrendo alla nozione wittgensteiniana di «somiglianze di famiglia»: come i membri di una famiglia, i vari filoni del new materialism condividono alcuni tratti, ma non necessariamente tutti gli stessi tratti. In questa ottica, ci sembra coerente usare la forma plurale e parlare di new materialisms o «neo-materialismi» per riferirsi all’insieme delle tre traiettorie qui considerate e che ora intendiamo esaminare più nel dettaglio seguendo la tripartizione proposta da Gamble, Hanan e Nail (2019).
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