I am associate professor of Political Science. Among the other things, I am also Co-founder of the research project (and spin-off at University of Milan) Voices from the Blogs.
As long as parties are interested in policies, they will always have incentives for influencing t... more As long as parties are interested in policies, they will always have incentives for influencing the cabinet bargaining process, although they do not necessarily shape its outcome to the same extent. Being a member of the invested government, for example, should increase the leverage a party enjoys when bargaining over the cabinet programme. Nevertheless, depending on institutional and political conditions, non-cabinet parties may also play a role in affecting cabinet policy positions. Despite being widely recognised in the theoretical ...
ABSTRACT By relying on survey-data from the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) project... more ABSTRACT By relying on survey-data from the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) project, we run a number of simulated scenarios assuming that parties are mainly interested in vote-maximizing, and we compute for each election the distribution of party ideological positions that corresponds to a Nash Equilibrium along a onedimensional space. This is accomplished through an original package that we have developed in R that implements Merill and Adams (2001) iterative algorithm. The equilibrium party policy positions so derived constitute our counterfactual scenario against which the actual (perceived) position of parties are compared with. The aim of the comparison is to understand the nature of the electoral incentives facing parties, and deriving insights on real party system competition.
ABSTRACT By relying on survey-data from the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) project... more ABSTRACT By relying on survey-data from the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) project, we run a number of simulated scenarios assuming that parties are mainly interested in vote-maximizing, and we compute for each election the distribution of party ideological positions that corresponds to a Nash Equilibrium along a onedimensional space. This is accomplished through an original package that we have developed in R that implements Merill and Adams (2001) iterative algorithm. The equilibrium party policy positions so derived constitute our counterfactual scenario against which the actual (perceived) position of parties are compared with. The aim of the comparison is to understand the nature of the electoral incentives facing parties, and deriving insights on real party system competition.
As long as parties are interested in policies, they will always have incentives for influencing t... more As long as parties are interested in policies, they will always have incentives for influencing the cabinet bargaining process, although they do not necessarily shape its outcome to the same extent. Being a member of the invested government, for example, should increase the leverage a party enjoys when bargaining over the cabinet programme. Nevertheless, depending on institutional and political conditions, non-cabinet parties may also play a role in affecting cabinet policy positions. Despite being widely recognised in the theoretical ...
ABSTRACT By relying on survey-data from the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) project... more ABSTRACT By relying on survey-data from the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) project, we run a number of simulated scenarios assuming that parties are mainly interested in vote-maximizing, and we compute for each election the distribution of party ideological positions that corresponds to a Nash Equilibrium along a onedimensional space. This is accomplished through an original package that we have developed in R that implements Merill and Adams (2001) iterative algorithm. The equilibrium party policy positions so derived constitute our counterfactual scenario against which the actual (perceived) position of parties are compared with. The aim of the comparison is to understand the nature of the electoral incentives facing parties, and deriving insights on real party system competition.
ABSTRACT By relying on survey-data from the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) project... more ABSTRACT By relying on survey-data from the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) project, we run a number of simulated scenarios assuming that parties are mainly interested in vote-maximizing, and we compute for each election the distribution of party ideological positions that corresponds to a Nash Equilibrium along a onedimensional space. This is accomplished through an original package that we have developed in R that implements Merill and Adams (2001) iterative algorithm. The equilibrium party policy positions so derived constitute our counterfactual scenario against which the actual (perceived) position of parties are compared with. The aim of the comparison is to understand the nature of the electoral incentives facing parties, and deriving insights on real party system competition.
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Papers by Luigi Curini