Aurora Sottimano

Unions have continued to play an important role before and during the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia since 2011. Lebanon has also witnessed a variety of strikes and sit-ins in 2012. On the one hand, electricity workers staged the longest ever strike in Lebanese history and employees managed to establish new unions, sometimes after a long struggle. On the other hand, the fragmentation of Lebanese unions is second to none because they are divided along party political lines. How independent and..

The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power is a very timely and insightful book that looks at the changing geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean while maintaining a global perspective, which is perhaps the most appropriate way of examining a geopolitical region or sub-system, especially at this point in time. According to the editors, Spyridon N. Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris, the purpose of the book is to contribute to the understanding of the Eastern Mediterranean, given its increased importance, as well as to provide a picture of the effects of Multipolarity (consequences, challenges, perils and opportunities) on this regional level. Lastly, it aspires to become part of the larger debate about ‘the potential ramifications and sustainability of a multipolar era in the Eastern Mediterranean’ (p. xviii). The volume comprises 16 chapters from authors coming from Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, Iran, and beyond. There is thus a good balance of pers...

Aurora Sottimano’s chapter (Chapter 7) focuses on the exiled political opposition, the Syrian National Council, later replaced by the National Coalition of Opposition Forces (NC), and the Syrian Interim Government (SIG). While the Local Coordination Councils, revolutionary experiments in alternative democratic governance, enjoyed domestic legitimacy, the external opposition, largely made up of exiles whose funding and backing came from external governments, struggled to acquire it. In an attempt to coordinate opposition governance, local councils were brought under the authority of the NC, which had some nominal successes, e.g. in
holding local elections in the early phase. However, the NC’s efforts disintegrated due to internal squabbles and corruption and its main achievement was to facilitate humanitarian assistance on the ground. The Syrian Interim Government was designed to have greater coordinating presence on the ground and it did gain greater legitimacy in the majority of rebel held territories and enabled greater coordination of local councils and civil- military cooperation, although its commitment to preserving existing state institutions (to prevent state fragmentation) undermined
trust on the ground. However, donors bypassed the SIG to fund local councils directly or else reduced their commitments over time; insufficient funding from the international community prevented the SIG from paying its employees on the ground in Syria, opening the way for militant groups to fill the vacuum. Sottimano argues there was a period in 2015 just prior to Russian intervention when significant progress in alternative governance was made by the opposition, but it was not properly supported by external funders. Thus, the relationship of the outside and inside opposition was more complex than a simplistic binary of local  'authenticity’ and external ‘illegitimacy.’

ABSTRACTThis paper will cast a closer look at the alleged ‘legitimacy’ of the Syrian regime and will show that the two main legitimating credentials of Bashar al-Asad – namely, his nationalist and reformist missions – carry with them an array of implicit norms and commitments, which shape the Syrian state–society relationship in such a way as to draw non-state actors into the spheres of power. Moreover this paper will examine various regional and international framings of legitimacy in relation to the Syrian war, charting the transition between diplomatic narratives of negotiation and intervention, humanitarian and security imperatives, religious conflict and war on terror. In so doing, the paper will question the common understanding of legitimacy as an evaluative concept embracing a variety of issues which play a role in justifying and maintaining effective political authority. Rather than exploring the legal validity or the moral justification for existing political institutions – as the notion of legi...

1. Introduction: Changing Discourse under the Ba’th Raymond Hinnebusch 2. Ideology And Discourse in the Era of Ba’thist Reforms: Towards an Analysis of Authoritarian Governmentality Aurora Sottimano 3. It’s the Mentality, Stupid: Syria’s Turn to the Private Sector Kjetil Selvik

The ‘resistance front’ comprising Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, and—until 2012—Hamas is one of the most enduring examples of a regional alliance, a pillar of Syria’s foreign policy and a determining factor shaping the trajectory of the Syrian conflict. This chapter examines Syrian politics within the ‘resistance front’ and its trajectory from the original anti-Israel formulation to a counterinsurgency force during the Syrian conflict. These developments demand that we reconsider the ideological assumptions, strategies, and capabilities of the ‘resistance front’ partnership while reassessing the connection between Syrian domestic and foreign policy.

Abstract: This paper looks at the political economy of modern Syria from a non-economicist perspective. Foucault’s synthetic understanding of power, identity and knowledge enables us to decipher a level of intelligibility of economic practices that mainstream economic and political analysis cannot capture. From this perspective, the paper aims at uncovering the role of economic discourse in the maintenance and transformation of relations of power. It shows how the institution of a national economy under the Ba’th linked a field of knowledge, an area of political intervention and a whole morality in specific ways, which still affect how Syrian governments respond to economic and political challenges. At a theoretical level, the paper aims at showing how the articulation of the discursive space relative to the economy is at the heart of the constitution of modern individual and collective identities. As such economic discourse is an instrument of modern strategies of government, which...

This paper argues for the need of a better understanding of the drivers of forced migration as a prerequisite for devising effective policies to confront what is called in the west the ‘refugee crisis’. The macro level drivers that sparked and sustain forced mass migration from the MENA region are complex and multifaceted, nevertheless there is little doubt that the increase in the recent scale of migration flows has been largely tied to the ongoing war in Syria.
The Syrian conflict is the epitome of Mary Kaldor’s ‘new wars’, in which the civilian population is a main target of  the conflict: displacement and depopulation are not accidental or ‘collateral damage’ but intentional war techniques and governmental strategies adopted by warring parties. The main aim of this paper is to analyze these strategies as a determinant cause of the mass exodus in the Syrian war context. Secondly, the paper argues for a regional contextualization of migration trends after the Arab Spring. Domestic political developments in Middle East countries – from Lebanon’s direct involvement in the Syrian conflict to the military takeover in Egypt – need to be considered to explain patterns and trajectories of forced migration. Finally, the paper takes issue with the way in which questions of migration and security have become woven together in European policy making. The paper shows that that the so-called ‘migration crisis’ can be more accurately described as a policy driven crisis and a crisis of refugee protection. This shift in perspective and analytical focus (from border security to macro-drivers and from linear to circular migration) provides insights that can help to inform more effective policy responses and to assess the new territories of power that migration is bringing to the fore.

The alliance between Syria and Iran and the formation of the so called ‘axis of resistance’ is one of the most fascinating and enduring example of a regional alliance, a pillar of Syria foreign policy and a determining factor in the trajectory of the Syrian conflict. To understand why secular Syria, the ‘beating heart of Arabism’, choose to align its foreign policy with the revolutionary Islamic Republic we have to look back at the transformation in Syrian politics under Hafez al-Asad, when Syria was in the process of establishing its prowess in the turbulent region (as part of its strategy to confront the Israeli ‘permanent aggression’) while it confronted a domestic rebellion.

Formed as a response to the direct challenges posed to Syria and Iran by Iraq, Israel and the U.S. since 1980, the alliance with the Islamic Republic and its protégée Hezbollah boosted Syria’s regional position and contributed to its successful ‘balancing’ with international and regional powers. Concurrently, Syria continued to act as a swing state between Arab regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq) in order to consolidate an Arab front against the Zionist enemy. The alliance with Iran also served to legitimise the Asad regime, both domestically and regionally, and to contain Islamist opposition.  Under Bashar al-Asad, Syria embraced the resistance front as a continuation of Hafez’ nationalist policy of sumud (steadfastness), with a renewed antiimperialist stance against regional (Israel) and international (U.S.) interference. This posture has been a key element of Syria’s regional strategy and authoritarian upgrading. 

Since Syria is situated at the heart of a region traditionally penetrated by international powers and ravaged by armed conflicts, it comes as no surprise that Syrian foreign policy often took priority over domestic concerns, as many analysts maintain. Besides, the Bonapartist nature of the Syrian regime allegedly made domestic opinion largely irrelevant to policy making.  This paper does not rule out the explanatory power of systemic explanations: Syrian and Iranian behaviour is in great part derived from the exceptionally unstable systemic arena within which these states operate, magnified by the context of the bipolar world and its demise. Syrian leaders crafted foreign policy on a balancing strategy between rivals and enemies centred on the regional role of Syria as champion of the Arab cause . Regional power balancing and regime survival required powerful regional friends like Iran and Hezbollah acting as deterrents, superpowers as international supporters, and Gulf monarchies as rich donors.

Yet any comprehensive analysis of Syrian foreign policy and alliance making requires a more nuanced view of the links between policy making and foreign and domestic threats. The Syria-Iran alliance was part of an ‘omnibalancing’ strategy designed to confront external threats and domestic challenges to state leadership while aiming at attaining ‘strategic parity’ with Israel.  Both the nationalist struggle and regime consolidation required mass mobilisation to channel national energies and ensure unconditional support to leaders, whose main claim to legitimacy was a commitment to Arab nationalism. 

At a time when nationalist struggle, state building and regime consolidation coincided, Hafez al-Asad’s balancing policies successfully addressed the contradiction between the revisionism rooted in the Pan-Arab identity of Syria - the liberation of Palestine and the unification of the Arab umma - and geopolitical realities - the division of the Arab front and the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world - while consolidating the regime.  In the new regional and local context in which Bashar al-Asad operated in his first ten years - one in which state-led Pan-Arabism was already dead, non-state actors have emerged as powerful political agents and a growing radicalisation of the disillusioned, embittered masses was directly challenging Arab autocrats -  the Syrian regime confronted an ever-increasing need for sustained mobilisation to support the ‘resistance front’ regime while facing its inability to either live up to its own legitimation claims or reform.

The onset of the Arab Spring has revealed a variety of complexities in the front, yet its ‘resistance’ discourse – though in a twisted form - has shaped the trajectory of the Syrian uprising in a decisive way. The Syrian regime and its allies have linked the repression of the uprising to their counter-hegemonic discourse while Syria used a range of repressive measures against rebels and opposition groups; Hezbollah gained greater strategic depth; and Iran reinstated its ‘regional alignment’ strategy and influence.  With the adoption of the western ‘war on terror’, we are seeing a re-articulation of the Syrian nationalist discourse and foreign policy as well as the transformation of the front into a transnational counterinsurgency coalition. These developments demand that we reconsider the ideological assumptions, capabilities, and persistence of the resistance front while reassessing the connection between Syrian domestic and foreign policy.

Turkey’s geographical position close to the conflict areas of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan has attracted large numbers of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Many observers agree that the Turkish Government has responded quickly and responsibly, and at great financial cost, to the influx of Syrians seeking shelter from the ongoing civil war. In 2011, Turkey’s expectation, in line with a good part of the international community, was that the Assad regime would not last long. Therefore, the Turkish government declared in October 2011 an open door policy towards refugees fleeing Syria and extended to them a legal framework known as “temporary protection”, which granted a much clearer legal status for the refugees. The government committed itself to the main requirements of the international refugee law and human rights, including the principle of “non-refoulement” and the provision of basic humanitarian services such as health and shelter. 

The persistence of the conflict and the ever-growing number of refugees has created a set of tough challenges for Turkey. First, according to the UNHCR, 2.75 million Syrian refugees currently reside in Turkey. Second, it is becoming increasingly clear that refugees are not about to return home anytime soon. This brings up a range of very difficult policy issues for the Turkish government – from offering refugees the possibility to remain in Turkey to addressing urgent education, employment, health, shelter issues with a long-term perspective. Third, only about 10% of the Syrian migrants live in the 26 camps located in ten provinces around the country. Approximately 90% have settled throughout Turkey by their own means.  The refugee population outside camps has grown significantly and has now surpassed two million.

Outside refugee camps, Syrians are often concentrated in residential neighbourhoods were different groups of immigrants and Turkish citizens share public space and services that are mainly provided by the government. Assisting urban refugees who are “often invisible and dispersed among local people in poor communities”  rather than concentrated in well-maintained camps is more complex: the identification of the target population,  and the most vulnerable among them, is harder and it involves different governmental agencies. Finally, the presence of growing numbers of Syrians in Turkey is deeply impacting on host communities economically and socially as well as politically . All the above has serious implications for the refugees themselves as well as for the social, economic and spatial transformation of recipient cities across the country.

This study analyses the findings of a field research carried out in August 2014 and June 2016 in the Altındağ district of Ankara, including a survey of 168 families (154 Syrian families – predominantly from Aleppo city and its countryside – and 14 Turkish ones) carried out by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) various interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with Syrian and Turkish residents, and participant  observation in three of the poorer neighbourhoods (mahalle) of the district: Ulubey, Önder and Doğu , known for having a high concentration of poor Syrian refugees and Syrian shops and other businesses (ex. Hawala offices, real estate offices and restaurants).

Besides presenting the first assessment of Syrian refugees’ households needs and protection risks in the Altındağ district, this study explores the social, economic and legal conditions of Syrian refugees in Altındağ and highlights the need for a spatial understanding of vulnerability: in Altındağ we find zones governed by subalterns and controlled by informality, formal and informal negotiations through which Syrian refugees experience and re-construct their subalternity. The aim of this study is to analyze how such practices contribute to the re-production of the  fragmented social and economic landscape of the city of Ankara in the framework of larger processes of urban and societal transformation.

Internal divisions, ambiguities in American and Western attitudes, the hesitation of its diplomatic and financial backers and its lack of influence on the ground – sharply criticised by opposition groups based within Syria - have so far prevented the consolidation of the National Coalition and its satellite bodies as a legitimate and effective political representation of the Syrian opposition. The absence of political leadership and the internal fissures that plague the opposition representative bodies are not only a consequence of a split between
exiled opposition and domestic groups, but also a reflection of sharp differences in strategic thinking about a number of points: the trajectory of the revolution, the necessity to negotiate with the regime in view of a negotiated transition; the need for regional and international alliances in order to achieve regime change; and foreign military intervention. Other sensitive points in the ongoing debate on transitional governance include the de-Ba'thification of government institutions, the decentralisation of administrative power, and the autonomy of
local administration council and civil society. These are not mere ideological positions, but part and parcel of different models for political transition that this paper will discuss.
This paper aims at assessing the dual lack of legitimacy (domestic ‘irrelevance’ and foreign neglect) of the Syrian Interim Government, its role and impact in ‘liberated’ areas where autonomous administration structures have emerged. The activities of the interim government and of local councils in rebel held areas provide excellent case studies for an analysis of the conceptual and political problems around discourses of legitimacy, representation, revolution and transition in both the international debate and in domestic Syrian politics.

The Syrian business community is fragmented and dispersed: from micro to big business, domestic and expatriate, supporters and opponents of the regime.  Expectations that it would play a determinant role in Syria’s political transition from authoritarian rule have been so far frustrated.  To explore Syrian businessmen’s political alignments and influence on current Syrian politics, we need to consider the historical relation between the Syrian regime and business circles as well as the economic dynamics of the current conflict.

ABSTRACT
This paper will cast a closer look at the alleged legitimacy of the Syrian regime and will show that the two main legitimating credentials of Bashar al-Asad – namely, his nationalist and reformist missions – carry with them an array of implicit norms and commitments, which shape the Syrian state – society relationship in such a way as to draw non-state actors into the spheres of power.
Moreover this paper will examine various regional and international framings of legitimacy in relation to the Syrian war, charting the transition between diplomatic narratives of negotiation and intervention, humanitarian and security imperatives, religious conflict and war on terror. In so doing, the paper will question the common understanding of legitimacy as an evaluative concept embracing a variety of issues which play a role in justifying and maintaining effective political authority. Rather than exploring the
legal validity or the moral justification for existing political institutions – as the notion of legitimacy suggests – my focus is on the persistent grip of power mechanisms and strategies of government which elicit discipline and compliance with the dicta of authoritarian  rulers,  and  on  how  patterns  of  authoritarian state – society relations are established, justified and adapted to changing circumstances. An analysis of the imbrications of legitimacy and domination, I believe, will help us to understand the magnitude of current events in Syria and will contribute to a reflection about how we can achieve and sustain the movement away from  authoritarianism.

Moving from the revolutionary rhetoric prominent in the early days of President Hafez al-Assad's regime to the present stance of the country's economic reformers and rising business class, this new study traces the evolution of Baathist ideological discourse in ...

Internal divisions, ambiguities in Western attitudes, the reluctance of its backers and its own lack of influence on the ground prevented the National Coalition and its satellite bodies from acting as a legitimate and effective political representative of the Syrian opposition. Yet as this chapter demonstrates, the middle phase of the conflict did see genuine efforts by the political opposition – in particular the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) – to increase its coordination with the Local Councils, and build institutions – all of which had the potential to offer a more robust alternative to both the regime and ISIS. Amidst the discourse of failure, and particularly after the turning point of Russian intervention in 2015, these fledgling achievements have largely been forgotten. Yet the current debate about the (re)construction of local order in Syria still revolves around the same conflictual issues tackled by the SIG: the preservation of governmental institutions, the decentralisation of administrative power, and the autonomy of local structures within a negotiated transition. As the SIG experience has shown, underlining such debates are unresolved questions about transition from and continuity with pre-war governance models – which have important implications for the future of Syria.