Papers by Daniele Molinari
Erkenntnis, 2024
Thought experiments are fictional narratives that widen our cognitive horizons both in the scienc... more Thought experiments are fictional narratives that widen our cognitive horizons both in the sciences and in philosophy. In the present paper we argue that they can perform this function by bringing one’s perspective into view. Despite being traditionally conceived as devices that transmit true propositions to their readers, thought experiments are also particularly apt to express a specific theoretical perspective through the use of imagination. We suggest that this is a significant epistemic feature that is often overlooked in the debate. After presenting our analysis of thought experiments (Section 2) and of the role that imagination plays in them (Section 3), we revisit Galileo Galilei’s use of imaginary cases in light of our account (Section 4). We show that the main aims of Galileo’s thought experiments are to highlight how different perspectives endorsed by fictional characters affect imagination and to invite readers to actively engage in perspectives that are different from their own. This results in a clash of perspectives which plays a crucial epistemic role (Section 5). Readers of thought experiments do not passively absorb information, but critically assess the other’s perspective. In the final part of the paper, we individuate different ways in which readers can react to thought experiments.
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Discipline Filosofiche XXXII, 2 (forthcoming), 2022
The current debate on literary cognitivism in the philosophy of fiction typically assumes that we... more The current debate on literary cognitivism in the philosophy of fiction typically assumes that we can rigorously distinguish between fictional and factual, and focuses on the question of whether and how works of fiction can impart propositional knowledge to the reader. In this paper we suggest that this way of framing the debate may be problematic. We argue that works of fiction almost inevitably include a reference to the real world and that—contrary to what is usually assumed—the exchange between fiction and reality is vivid as well as potentially fruitful. We shed a new light on these complex dynamics by building on the metaphors of trade exchange and smuggling between the two worlds. While the current debate exclusively focuses on cognitively relevant goods that "officially" cross the border through "customs", as it were, we show that exchanges between fiction and reality run deeper. Indeed, as we show, a substantial part of the cognitive impact that we derive from fiction goes "under the table" and is "smuggled" from fiction to reality. As such, it bypasses the audience's conscious control, which in turn explains the manipulative force that fiction can exert. Smuggling takes place when cognitively relevant contents are passed on to the reader in subliminal ways, as it happens when they imprint implicit biases or prejudices, shift perspectives or subtly modify habits or patterns of behavior. By elaborating on the metaphors of trade exchange and smuggling, we aim at presenting a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the relations between fiction and reality and on the impact that imagination has on our real-world beliefs.
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Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2022
In the last few years several philosophers have highlighted the social dimension of imagination. ... more In the last few years several philosophers have highlighted the social dimension of imagination. In this paper I argue that thought experiments prompt social uses of imaginings, if we understand them as props in games of make-believe. In prescribing to imagine stories that develop through fictional narratives, authors of thought experiments prompt their readers to engage in the same imaginative project – at least in its salient aspects – and to endorse their conclusions. Contributions on this topic focused on cases where coordination across imaginers is successful at once. However, this is not the end of the story. I draw attention to situations where this is not the case, as the practice of thought experimentation often proceeds through criticism, rejections, and amendments. I focus on cases where imaginers do not endorse the conclusion proposed by the author of a thought experiment and either (i) fully reject the principles of generation, (ii) draw different fictional truths from the same principles, or (iii) amend the principles. Although cases of imaginative disharmony are usually dismissed as failures, I acknowledge them as fruitful steps in the cognitive advancement achievable by thought experiments. Cooperative imaginers challenge the rules of the game in meaningful ways, which leads to enhancing fictional scenarios and framing them through different perspectives.
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Argumenta Issue 11, 2020
According to a recent philosophical claim, "works of fiction are thought experiments" (Elgin 2007... more According to a recent philosophical claim, "works of fiction are thought experiments" (Elgin 2007: 47), though there are relevant differences, as the role of spoilers shows – they can ruin a novel but improve the understanding we can gain through a thought experiment. In the present article I will analyze the role of spoilers and argue for a more differentiated perspective on the relation between literature and thought experiments. I will start with a short discussion of different perspectives on thought experiments and argue that the mental-model view and the conception of games of make-believe are most promising for developing the present analogy. Then I will assess the similarities and differences between thought experiments and other works of fiction. I will focus on the role of spoilers and, more generally, on the foretaste context, of which they are part. This context guides readers of literary works of art to draw their attention to the literary and aesthetic quality of the text. In the case of thought experiments, on the other hand, it (i) prompts them to accept the presence of fictional elements in worldly-cognitive works and (ii) draws their attention towards cognitively relevant elements of the story. A discussion of Borges' Pierre Menard in the last part will show that literary works of art become thought experiments if they are embedded in an appropriate foretaste context. Spoilers, thus, unveil that even works which – due to their length or plenty of detail – usually are not considered thought experiments, can perform similar cognitive functions.
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Other Stuff by Daniele Molinari
The Junkyard, 2021
Imagination is ubiquitous and plays a central role in the most diverse contexts; we can wonder "w... more Imagination is ubiquitous and plays a central role in the most diverse contexts; we can wonder "what would really happen if…", or "what would I actually feel in such a situation…" as well as imagine the most bizarre, dramatic or funny events just for entertainment, to express ourselves or to develop emotional bonds. No matter how you slice it-imagination is not just one thing. It is, rather, a heterogenous family of activities that serve different purposes (Kind 2013). These activities have in common that they seem to be free, unlimited and fancy. When it comes to assuming an epistemic role, however, as it is the case in thought experiments, imagination needs, according to a widely held view, to remain within certain boundaries, and to have some kind of "anchoring" in reality and its most basic principles. Yet, thought experiments are fictional narratives that prescribe imagining counterfactual (or even counterpossible) scenarios. This raises the question of whether and how their cognitive value depends on constraints that guarantee the significance of fictional scenarios for the real world. This issue has been acknowledged in recent literature. Positing constraints on epistemic uses of imagination would allow us to establish external criteria to determine whether we have successfully used imagination to advance our cognitive horizons. This is not a straightforward task, though. Michael Stuart (2020) has argued that there is no single type of constraint at work in scientific imagination and that some thought experiments have been successful precisely in virtue of their violating relevant constraints. For him, scientific imagination is epistemically relevant not primarily in virtue of its being constrained, but rather because it is "productively anarchic". This indicates that not only imagination, but also the constraints that are imposed on it, are heterogenous. We suggest that the debate on constraints in epistemic uses of imagination can be enriched if we take a step back and return to a more fundamental question: why thought experiments? What are the reasons that prompt us to engage in this kind of imaginative activity? Our central claim is that one of the most important reasons why we conduct thought experiments is that they provide powerful tools to philosophers and scientists for sharing their perspectives on reality, theories, words, etc, with others.
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Conference Announcements by Daniele Molinari
by Carlo Altini, Mario DeCaro, costantino esposito, Carla Bagnoli, Antonella Del Prete, Daniele Molinari, Lorenzo Cozzi, Sofia Pirandello, Francesco Malaguti, Francesca Fidelibus, Beatrice Beccari, Elena Fusar Poli, Lorenzo Testa, Federico Rampinini, Guido Bianchini, Edoardo Vaccargiu, Fiorenza Manzo, Roberto Zambiasi, and Marco Miglino Programma del convegno
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June 7-9, University of Parma
PRISMA (Parma Research Group on Imagination in the Sciences, in the... more June 7-9, University of Parma
PRISMA (Parma Research Group on Imagination in the Sciences, in the philosophy of Mind and in the Arts)
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Papers by Daniele Molinari
Other Stuff by Daniele Molinari
Conference Announcements by Daniele Molinari
PRISMA (Parma Research Group on Imagination in the Sciences, in the philosophy of Mind and in the Arts)
PRISMA (Parma Research Group on Imagination in the Sciences, in the philosophy of Mind and in the Arts)