Il seguente articolo è il tentativo di una dissertazione riguardante il fisicalismo non riduttivo... more Il seguente articolo è il tentativo di una dissertazione riguardante il fisicalismo non riduttivo. Per la trattazione delle sue problematiche, soprattutto quella dell'emergentismo, ha come punto di riferimento l'articolo di Tim Crane “The Significance of Emergence” uscito nel 2001 su Physicalism and Its Discontents, curato da Barry Loewer and Grant Gillett per Cambridge University Press. Per quanto riguarda invece un'analisi critica del senso e dei limiti di questo paradigma, ci rifacciamo soprattutto a “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism” di Jaegwon Kim in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association Vol. 63, No. 3 (Nov, 1989). Partiremo dunque da un'analisi della tematica principale come presentataci dai su citati autori, cercando poi di collocarla – più in generale ma, speriamo, anche più in profondità – come nodo problematico del paradigma naturalistico stesso, per come almeno esso si riscontra in Filosofia della Mente.
This final work is focused on Eugen Fink’s meditations upon the problem of the beginning of philo... more This final work is focused on Eugen Fink’s meditations upon the problem of the beginning of philosophy. He approaches this primary issue with the question “Is an introduction to philosophy possible?”. In a course of lectures held in Freiburg in 1946 - with the straightforward title “Introduction to philosophy” - in order to attempt an answer to his question Fink traces the philosophies of two great thinkers, as well as his teachers: Husserl and Heidegger. Fink’s goal is to pull out from their respective thoughts an indication, a path, by which it’s possible to institute a proper introduction to philosophy. Following this approach, our purpose is to show how - and why - phenomenology is the privileged ground for a genuine evaluation of this issue. The thesis is structured following a trend similar to that of Fink’s lessons; we develop the theme of “the beginning” starting from a general introduction - which for us is precisely represented by those lessons - and then we study Husserl’s and Heidegger’s thought in depth. All analyses deal with phenomenology - and so, are themselves carried out phenomenologically. For this reason, we take into account the most fundamental topics of phenomenology, such as the theory of intentionality, the concept of phenomenon, the transcendental turn, the horizon of Lebenswelt. All these issues will be seen in terms of the different meanings proposed and developed by Husserl, Heidegger and Fink. At the same time, however, the goal of this work is to bring out the common perspective within which these concepts were designed - not merely to linger on the undoubted differences. The first chapter sets out the content of Fink’s lessons. First the difference between philosophy and non-philosophy is established - the latter being both the positive sciences, and the thought of the common man. The gap is represented by the question about the being of things, ie the ontological problem of being. The state in which man finds himself outside of and before philosophy is called naivety: this is the absence of the fundamental question about the being of the world and of worldly things. This definition of the essential character of philosophy, however, has the disadvantage of being made in the negative: it just says what philosophy is not; it doesn’t investigate - specifically - the background-essence of philosophy. Fink starts by referring to the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger exactly for this reason. The pre-philosophical naivety is now shown, respectively, by the concept of natural attitude and ontological indifference. By “natural attitude” Husserl wants to point out the specific way in which things are taken by the everyday man: it corresponds with the full - natural - acceptance of things as they are simply given. Alongside this reflection there is that of Heidegger, which roots naivety in a further dimension of the human being - namely, in the existential dimension. With Heidegger the characteristic mode of men in everyday life is indifference toward the being of things – i.e. in- difference to the fundamental difference, the ontological difference between Being and beings (entities). The task now is to establish whether Husserl - in his writings and lectures - directly addresses the problem of the beginning. Therefore, the second chapter deals - now in depth - with the phenomenological concept of natural attitude; precisely, with its difference from the transcendental attitude. A first step is taken by explaining what constitutes the possibility of transition from the natural attitude to the transcendental - the philosophical - one. Then, with regard to this matter we take up some of the criticisms that Fink advances against phenomenology by referring to his early writings: in this context, the close relationship between the problem of pre-philosophical naivety and the proper sense of phenomenology will begin to emerge. As a frame of what has already been said, a small section is dedicated to deepening the notion of the transcendental in Husserl’s phenomenology, with particular attention to the Kantian influences in it. The third chapter is fully focused on a fundamental concept of phenomenology: intentionality. Starting from the canonical - but too introductory - definition of "being aware of”, intentionality will be determined as the essential nature of every consciousness, its aboutness. After removing any possible misunderstandings - psychological or empiricist - we take into account the lectures held by Heidegger at the university of Marburg in 1925. We focus on the criticisms made against Husserl’s theory of intentionality, especially with regard to the role that intentionality plays in the whole complex of phenomenology: according to Heidegger, intentionality as the fundamental structure of consciousness constrains to a concept of being which is too “narrow”, not able to restore the “breadth” of the authentic inquiry into being. Finally - similarly to that done previously with Fink’s assessments - we outline the concept of phenomenology independently developed by Heidegger, as it emerges from his criticisms. In conclusion, we try to propose a general profile of those characters that are fully supported and carried out by the phenomenology of all three of our authors. With explicit reference to §7 of Heidegger’s Sein und Zein (“Being and Time”), and with the help of Von Hermann’s famous essay - Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl (“The concept of phenomenology in Heidegger and Husserl”) - something like a “minimalist” concept of phenomenology will be outlined.
Il seguente articolo è il tentativo di una dissertazione riguardante il fisicalismo non riduttivo... more Il seguente articolo è il tentativo di una dissertazione riguardante il fisicalismo non riduttivo. Per la trattazione delle sue problematiche, soprattutto quella dell'emergentismo, ha come punto di riferimento l'articolo di Tim Crane “The Significance of Emergence” uscito nel 2001 su Physicalism and Its Discontents, curato da Barry Loewer and Grant Gillett per Cambridge University Press. Per quanto riguarda invece un'analisi critica del senso e dei limiti di questo paradigma, ci rifacciamo soprattutto a “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism” di Jaegwon Kim in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association Vol. 63, No. 3 (Nov, 1989). Partiremo dunque da un'analisi della tematica principale come presentataci dai su citati autori, cercando poi di collocarla – più in generale ma, speriamo, anche più in profondità – come nodo problematico del paradigma naturalistico stesso, per come almeno esso si riscontra in Filosofia della Mente.
This final work is focused on Eugen Fink’s meditations upon the problem of the beginning of philo... more This final work is focused on Eugen Fink’s meditations upon the problem of the beginning of philosophy. He approaches this primary issue with the question “Is an introduction to philosophy possible?”. In a course of lectures held in Freiburg in 1946 - with the straightforward title “Introduction to philosophy” - in order to attempt an answer to his question Fink traces the philosophies of two great thinkers, as well as his teachers: Husserl and Heidegger. Fink’s goal is to pull out from their respective thoughts an indication, a path, by which it’s possible to institute a proper introduction to philosophy. Following this approach, our purpose is to show how - and why - phenomenology is the privileged ground for a genuine evaluation of this issue. The thesis is structured following a trend similar to that of Fink’s lessons; we develop the theme of “the beginning” starting from a general introduction - which for us is precisely represented by those lessons - and then we study Husserl’s and Heidegger’s thought in depth. All analyses deal with phenomenology - and so, are themselves carried out phenomenologically. For this reason, we take into account the most fundamental topics of phenomenology, such as the theory of intentionality, the concept of phenomenon, the transcendental turn, the horizon of Lebenswelt. All these issues will be seen in terms of the different meanings proposed and developed by Husserl, Heidegger and Fink. At the same time, however, the goal of this work is to bring out the common perspective within which these concepts were designed - not merely to linger on the undoubted differences. The first chapter sets out the content of Fink’s lessons. First the difference between philosophy and non-philosophy is established - the latter being both the positive sciences, and the thought of the common man. The gap is represented by the question about the being of things, ie the ontological problem of being. The state in which man finds himself outside of and before philosophy is called naivety: this is the absence of the fundamental question about the being of the world and of worldly things. This definition of the essential character of philosophy, however, has the disadvantage of being made in the negative: it just says what philosophy is not; it doesn’t investigate - specifically - the background-essence of philosophy. Fink starts by referring to the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger exactly for this reason. The pre-philosophical naivety is now shown, respectively, by the concept of natural attitude and ontological indifference. By “natural attitude” Husserl wants to point out the specific way in which things are taken by the everyday man: it corresponds with the full - natural - acceptance of things as they are simply given. Alongside this reflection there is that of Heidegger, which roots naivety in a further dimension of the human being - namely, in the existential dimension. With Heidegger the characteristic mode of men in everyday life is indifference toward the being of things – i.e. in- difference to the fundamental difference, the ontological difference between Being and beings (entities). The task now is to establish whether Husserl - in his writings and lectures - directly addresses the problem of the beginning. Therefore, the second chapter deals - now in depth - with the phenomenological concept of natural attitude; precisely, with its difference from the transcendental attitude. A first step is taken by explaining what constitutes the possibility of transition from the natural attitude to the transcendental - the philosophical - one. Then, with regard to this matter we take up some of the criticisms that Fink advances against phenomenology by referring to his early writings: in this context, the close relationship between the problem of pre-philosophical naivety and the proper sense of phenomenology will begin to emerge. As a frame of what has already been said, a small section is dedicated to deepening the notion of the transcendental in Husserl’s phenomenology, with particular attention to the Kantian influences in it. The third chapter is fully focused on a fundamental concept of phenomenology: intentionality. Starting from the canonical - but too introductory - definition of "being aware of”, intentionality will be determined as the essential nature of every consciousness, its aboutness. After removing any possible misunderstandings - psychological or empiricist - we take into account the lectures held by Heidegger at the university of Marburg in 1925. We focus on the criticisms made against Husserl’s theory of intentionality, especially with regard to the role that intentionality plays in the whole complex of phenomenology: according to Heidegger, intentionality as the fundamental structure of consciousness constrains to a concept of being which is too “narrow”, not able to restore the “breadth” of the authentic inquiry into being. Finally - similarly to that done previously with Fink’s assessments - we outline the concept of phenomenology independently developed by Heidegger, as it emerges from his criticisms. In conclusion, we try to propose a general profile of those characters that are fully supported and carried out by the phenomenology of all three of our authors. With explicit reference to §7 of Heidegger’s Sein und Zein (“Being and Time”), and with the help of Von Hermann’s famous essay - Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl (“The concept of phenomenology in Heidegger and Husserl”) - something like a “minimalist” concept of phenomenology will be outlined.
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The thesis is structured following a trend similar to that of Fink’s lessons; we develop the theme of “the beginning” starting from a general introduction - which for us is precisely represented by those lessons - and then we study Husserl’s and Heidegger’s thought in depth. All analyses deal with phenomenology - and so, are themselves carried out phenomenologically. For this reason, we take into account the most fundamental topics of phenomenology, such as the theory of intentionality, the concept of phenomenon, the transcendental turn, the horizon of Lebenswelt. All these issues will be seen in terms of the different meanings proposed and developed by Husserl, Heidegger and Fink. At the same time, however, the goal of this work is to bring out the common perspective within which these concepts were designed - not merely to linger on the undoubted differences.
The first chapter sets out the content of Fink’s lessons. First the difference between philosophy and non-philosophy is established - the latter being both the positive sciences, and the thought of the common man. The gap is represented by the question about the being of things, ie the ontological problem of being. The state in which man finds himself outside of and before philosophy is called naivety: this is the absence of the fundamental question about the being of the world and of worldly things.
This definition of the essential character of philosophy, however, has the disadvantage of being made in the negative: it just says what philosophy is not; it doesn’t investigate - specifically - the background-essence of philosophy. Fink starts by referring to the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger exactly for this reason. The pre-philosophical naivety is now shown, respectively, by the concept of natural attitude and ontological indifference. By “natural attitude” Husserl wants to point out the specific way in which things are taken by the everyday man: it corresponds with the full - natural - acceptance of things as they are simply given. Alongside this
reflection there is that of Heidegger, which roots naivety in a further dimension of the human being - namely, in the existential dimension. With Heidegger the characteristic mode of men in everyday life is indifference toward the being of things – i.e. in- difference to the fundamental difference, the ontological difference between Being and beings (entities).
The task now is to establish whether Husserl - in his writings and lectures - directly addresses the problem of the beginning. Therefore, the second chapter deals - now in depth - with the phenomenological concept of natural attitude; precisely, with its difference from the transcendental attitude. A first step is taken by explaining what constitutes the possibility of transition from the natural attitude to the transcendental - the philosophical - one. Then, with regard to this matter we take up some of the criticisms that Fink advances against phenomenology by referring to his early writings: in this context, the close relationship between the problem of pre-philosophical naivety and the proper sense of phenomenology will begin to emerge. As a frame of what has already been said, a small section is dedicated to deepening the notion of the transcendental in Husserl’s phenomenology, with particular attention to the Kantian influences in it.
The third chapter is fully focused on a fundamental concept of phenomenology: intentionality. Starting from the canonical - but too introductory - definition of "being aware of”, intentionality will be determined as the essential nature of every consciousness, its aboutness. After removing any possible misunderstandings - psychological or empiricist - we take into account the lectures held by Heidegger at the university of Marburg in 1925. We focus on the criticisms made against Husserl’s theory of intentionality, especially with regard to the role that intentionality plays in the whole complex of phenomenology: according to Heidegger, intentionality as the fundamental structure of consciousness constrains to a concept of being which is too “narrow”, not able to restore the “breadth” of the authentic inquiry into being. Finally - similarly to that done previously with Fink’s assessments - we outline the concept of phenomenology independently developed by Heidegger, as it emerges from his criticisms.
In conclusion, we try to propose a general profile of those characters that are fully supported and carried out by the phenomenology of all three of our authors. With explicit reference to §7 of Heidegger’s Sein und Zein (“Being and Time”), and with the help of Von Hermann’s famous essay - Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl (“The concept of phenomenology in Heidegger and Husserl”) - something like a “minimalist” concept of phenomenology will be outlined.
The thesis is structured following a trend similar to that of Fink’s lessons; we develop the theme of “the beginning” starting from a general introduction - which for us is precisely represented by those lessons - and then we study Husserl’s and Heidegger’s thought in depth. All analyses deal with phenomenology - and so, are themselves carried out phenomenologically. For this reason, we take into account the most fundamental topics of phenomenology, such as the theory of intentionality, the concept of phenomenon, the transcendental turn, the horizon of Lebenswelt. All these issues will be seen in terms of the different meanings proposed and developed by Husserl, Heidegger and Fink. At the same time, however, the goal of this work is to bring out the common perspective within which these concepts were designed - not merely to linger on the undoubted differences.
The first chapter sets out the content of Fink’s lessons. First the difference between philosophy and non-philosophy is established - the latter being both the positive sciences, and the thought of the common man. The gap is represented by the question about the being of things, ie the ontological problem of being. The state in which man finds himself outside of and before philosophy is called naivety: this is the absence of the fundamental question about the being of the world and of worldly things.
This definition of the essential character of philosophy, however, has the disadvantage of being made in the negative: it just says what philosophy is not; it doesn’t investigate - specifically - the background-essence of philosophy. Fink starts by referring to the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger exactly for this reason. The pre-philosophical naivety is now shown, respectively, by the concept of natural attitude and ontological indifference. By “natural attitude” Husserl wants to point out the specific way in which things are taken by the everyday man: it corresponds with the full - natural - acceptance of things as they are simply given. Alongside this
reflection there is that of Heidegger, which roots naivety in a further dimension of the human being - namely, in the existential dimension. With Heidegger the characteristic mode of men in everyday life is indifference toward the being of things – i.e. in- difference to the fundamental difference, the ontological difference between Being and beings (entities).
The task now is to establish whether Husserl - in his writings and lectures - directly addresses the problem of the beginning. Therefore, the second chapter deals - now in depth - with the phenomenological concept of natural attitude; precisely, with its difference from the transcendental attitude. A first step is taken by explaining what constitutes the possibility of transition from the natural attitude to the transcendental - the philosophical - one. Then, with regard to this matter we take up some of the criticisms that Fink advances against phenomenology by referring to his early writings: in this context, the close relationship between the problem of pre-philosophical naivety and the proper sense of phenomenology will begin to emerge. As a frame of what has already been said, a small section is dedicated to deepening the notion of the transcendental in Husserl’s phenomenology, with particular attention to the Kantian influences in it.
The third chapter is fully focused on a fundamental concept of phenomenology: intentionality. Starting from the canonical - but too introductory - definition of "being aware of”, intentionality will be determined as the essential nature of every consciousness, its aboutness. After removing any possible misunderstandings - psychological or empiricist - we take into account the lectures held by Heidegger at the university of Marburg in 1925. We focus on the criticisms made against Husserl’s theory of intentionality, especially with regard to the role that intentionality plays in the whole complex of phenomenology: according to Heidegger, intentionality as the fundamental structure of consciousness constrains to a concept of being which is too “narrow”, not able to restore the “breadth” of the authentic inquiry into being. Finally - similarly to that done previously with Fink’s assessments - we outline the concept of phenomenology independently developed by Heidegger, as it emerges from his criticisms.
In conclusion, we try to propose a general profile of those characters that are fully supported and carried out by the phenomenology of all three of our authors. With explicit reference to §7 of Heidegger’s Sein und Zein (“Being and Time”), and with the help of Von Hermann’s famous essay - Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl (“The concept of phenomenology in Heidegger and Husserl”) - something like a “minimalist” concept of phenomenology will be outlined.