In this chapter some basic notions and recent developments in the theories of judgement and truth... more In this chapter some basic notions and recent developments in the theories of judgement and truth will be applied, as a case study, to real estate estimates in order to answer the following questions: are they descriptive or evaluative judgements? Is their truth absolute or relative to some parameter? Is their truth a matter of correspondence with objective, mind-independent facts or is it a matter of coherence with some mind-dependent standards (in a broad sense of "mind-dependent" which includes cultural and social standards)? The answers to these questions will show that real estate estimates are an interesting borderline case between descriptive and evaluative judgements, absolute and relative truth, correspondence with an objective reality and coherence with mind-dependent standards.
Schnieder (2020) argues, against Orilia (2009) and Koslicki (2013), that claims of existential gr... more Schnieder (2020) argues, against Orilia (2009) and Koslicki (2013), that claims of existential grounding of the form "the fact that x exists is grounded in the fact that y is F" cannot be grounded in claims of existential dependence of the form "x existentially depends on y" and defends the view that the latter claims are grounded, via a definition of existential dependence, in the former. I will firstly argue that Schnieder's main point against the claim that existential grounding is grounded in existential dependence is not conclusive; I will then put forward a proposal concerning how claims of existential grounding can be grounded in claims of existential dependence. The proposal is a third way between those of Schnieder and Orilia/Koslicki which, although accepting the former's definition of existential dependence in terms of grounding, makes room for the latter's idea that existential dependence does the real job in structuring reality.
The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using th... more The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using the word "true", on the one hand when it is used to refer to a property of what we say or believe, here called "words' truth", on the other when it is used to refer to a feature of things in general (as when we say "he is a true friend"), here called "things' truth". I will point out how such similarities and differences may be usefully described starting from the feature of truth called "transparency" which is often considered as exclusively pertaining to words' truth. The upshot of the paper will be that Aquinas was right in considering the two kinds of truth as species of the unique genus "adaequatio rei et intellectus", but that this conclusion can be reached without any commitment to the ideology (in the Quinean sense) of the correspondence theory of truth.
Giuffrida, S., Trovato, M.R., Fattinanzi, E., Rosato, P., Oppio, A. (eds.), Valuation Science. Natural Structures, Technological Infrastructures, Cultural Superstructures, Springer,, 2024
In this chapter some basic notions and recent developments in the theories of judgement and truth... more In this chapter some basic notions and recent developments in the theories of judgement and truth will be applied, as a case study, to real estate estimates in order to answer the following questions: are they descriptive or evaluative judgements? Is their truth absolute or relative to some parameter? Is their truth a matter of correspondence with objective, mind-independent facts or is it a matter of coherence with some mind-dependent standards (in a broad sense of "mind-dependent" which includes cultural and social standards)? The answers to these questions will show that real estate estimates are an interesting borderline case between descriptive and evaluative judgements, absolute and relative truth, correspondence with an objective reality and coherence with mind-dependent standards.
By the end of the seventies the rise and fall of the correspondence theory of truth in contempora... more By the end of the seventies the rise and fall of the correspondence theory of truth in contemporary philosophy seemed to be of interest only to historians of philosophy. Having emerged in works by Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, correspondence theory had already begun to fall out of favour after Frege‟s identification of facts and true propositions; it later met its ruin, first with Wittegenstein‟s criticism of the tractarian conception of language, then with Strawson‟s questioning of the existence of facts in his attack on Austin‟s version of the correspondence theory and finally with the stones launched by Davidson‟s slingshot against the distinctness of facts 1 . Correspondence theory seemed to have been superseded on the one hand by more refined Tarski-style definitions of truth-predicates, and on the other by the growth of the deflationist stance rooted in the work of Ramsey 2 .
The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using th... more The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using the word "true", on the one hand when it is used to refer to a specific characteristic of what we say or think about, here called "words' truth", on the other when it is used to refer to a characteristic of whatever (as when we say "he is a true friend"), here called "things' truth". The main thesis here defended is that such similarities and differences may be usefully described starting from the feature of truth called "transparency" which is often considered as exclusively pertaining to words' truth.
Copyright c by Società editrice il Mulino, Bologna. Tutti i diritti sono riservati. Per altre inf... more Copyright c by Società editrice il Mulino, Bologna. Tutti i diritti sono riservati. Per altre informazioni si veda https://www.rivisteweb.it Licenza d'uso L'articoloè messo a disposizione dell'utente in licenza per uso esclusivamente privato e personale, senza scopo di lucro e senza fini direttamente o indirettamente commerciali. Salvo quanto espressamente previsto dalla licenza d'uso Rivisteweb,è fatto divieto di riprodurre, trasmettere, distribuire o altrimenti utilizzare l'articolo, per qualsiasi scopo o fine. Tutti i diritti sono riservati.
In this chapter some basic notions and recent developments in the theories of judgement and truth... more In this chapter some basic notions and recent developments in the theories of judgement and truth will be applied, as a case study, to real estate estimates in order to answer the following questions: are they descriptive or evaluative judgements? Is their truth absolute or relative to some parameter? Is their truth a matter of correspondence with objective, mind-independent facts or is it a matter of coherence with some mind-dependent standards (in a broad sense of "mind-dependent" which includes cultural and social standards)? The answers to these questions will show that real estate estimates are an interesting borderline case between descriptive and evaluative judgements, absolute and relative truth, correspondence with an objective reality and coherence with mind-dependent standards.
Schnieder (2020) argues, against Orilia (2009) and Koslicki (2013), that claims of existential gr... more Schnieder (2020) argues, against Orilia (2009) and Koslicki (2013), that claims of existential grounding of the form "the fact that x exists is grounded in the fact that y is F" cannot be grounded in claims of existential dependence of the form "x existentially depends on y" and defends the view that the latter claims are grounded, via a definition of existential dependence, in the former. I will firstly argue that Schnieder's main point against the claim that existential grounding is grounded in existential dependence is not conclusive; I will then put forward a proposal concerning how claims of existential grounding can be grounded in claims of existential dependence. The proposal is a third way between those of Schnieder and Orilia/Koslicki which, although accepting the former's definition of existential dependence in terms of grounding, makes room for the latter's idea that existential dependence does the real job in structuring reality.
The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using th... more The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using the word "true", on the one hand when it is used to refer to a property of what we say or believe, here called "words' truth", on the other when it is used to refer to a feature of things in general (as when we say "he is a true friend"), here called "things' truth". I will point out how such similarities and differences may be usefully described starting from the feature of truth called "transparency" which is often considered as exclusively pertaining to words' truth. The upshot of the paper will be that Aquinas was right in considering the two kinds of truth as species of the unique genus "adaequatio rei et intellectus", but that this conclusion can be reached without any commitment to the ideology (in the Quinean sense) of the correspondence theory of truth.
Giuffrida, S., Trovato, M.R., Fattinanzi, E., Rosato, P., Oppio, A. (eds.), Valuation Science. Natural Structures, Technological Infrastructures, Cultural Superstructures, Springer,, 2024
In this chapter some basic notions and recent developments in the theories of judgement and truth... more In this chapter some basic notions and recent developments in the theories of judgement and truth will be applied, as a case study, to real estate estimates in order to answer the following questions: are they descriptive or evaluative judgements? Is their truth absolute or relative to some parameter? Is their truth a matter of correspondence with objective, mind-independent facts or is it a matter of coherence with some mind-dependent standards (in a broad sense of "mind-dependent" which includes cultural and social standards)? The answers to these questions will show that real estate estimates are an interesting borderline case between descriptive and evaluative judgements, absolute and relative truth, correspondence with an objective reality and coherence with mind-dependent standards.
By the end of the seventies the rise and fall of the correspondence theory of truth in contempora... more By the end of the seventies the rise and fall of the correspondence theory of truth in contemporary philosophy seemed to be of interest only to historians of philosophy. Having emerged in works by Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, correspondence theory had already begun to fall out of favour after Frege‟s identification of facts and true propositions; it later met its ruin, first with Wittegenstein‟s criticism of the tractarian conception of language, then with Strawson‟s questioning of the existence of facts in his attack on Austin‟s version of the correspondence theory and finally with the stones launched by Davidson‟s slingshot against the distinctness of facts 1 . Correspondence theory seemed to have been superseded on the one hand by more refined Tarski-style definitions of truth-predicates, and on the other by the growth of the deflationist stance rooted in the work of Ramsey 2 .
The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using th... more The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using the word "true", on the one hand when it is used to refer to a specific characteristic of what we say or think about, here called "words' truth", on the other when it is used to refer to a characteristic of whatever (as when we say "he is a true friend"), here called "things' truth". The main thesis here defended is that such similarities and differences may be usefully described starting from the feature of truth called "transparency" which is often considered as exclusively pertaining to words' truth.
Copyright c by Società editrice il Mulino, Bologna. Tutti i diritti sono riservati. Per altre inf... more Copyright c by Società editrice il Mulino, Bologna. Tutti i diritti sono riservati. Per altre informazioni si veda https://www.rivisteweb.it Licenza d'uso L'articoloè messo a disposizione dell'utente in licenza per uso esclusivamente privato e personale, senza scopo di lucro e senza fini direttamente o indirettamente commerciali. Salvo quanto espressamente previsto dalla licenza d'uso Rivisteweb,è fatto divieto di riprodurre, trasmettere, distribuire o altrimenti utilizzare l'articolo, per qualsiasi scopo o fine. Tutti i diritti sono riservati.
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