Papers by Fionn Bennett
Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 2019
This paper takes a fresh, unprejudiced look at the testimony and evidence pertaining to the “othe... more This paper takes a fresh, unprejudiced look at the testimony and evidence pertaining to the “otherworldly sounds” (θαύματ᾽ ἀκοῦσαι) that “inspired oracles” in ancient Greece were supposed to have heard while in the throes of a “theoleptic fit”. It argues that the available information can be read in such a way as to suppose that there is a “rational” explanation for the pretention. In other words, the oracles concerned mastered certain concentration techniques that had the effect of transforming their bodies into a “remote sensing technology” which gave them the ability to “tune in to” circumambient electromagnetic activity. Hence the “voices” of the Muses and Gods that inspired oracles said they heard while in a cataleptic trance were merely the acoustic signature of a stimulus imputable to electromagnetic activity that is normally inaudible because it is higher or lower than the Hertzian frequency range covering what counts as “effective perceived noise” for the average “abled” human listener.
Semiotica: Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, 2020
In the course of his painstaking study of ancient verse, Ferdinand de Saussure came up with an in... more In the course of his painstaking study of ancient verse, Ferdinand de Saussure came up with an intriguing theory about the phonetics of the poetry he scanned. He postulated that the “jeux phoniques” he detected in the texts he analysed was proof that their authors were attempting to “parasite” the surface level meaning of their verse with a “hypotexte”. This hypotexte consisted of “anagrams” of “mots thèmes” whose phonetic properties were “isosyllabically diffracted” throughout the rest of the host text.
Today it is generally accepted that Saussure was wrong about this. Few however maintain that what he discerned in the phonetic depths of the verse he auscultated was no more than the figment of a fertile imagination. But if this be so, what exactly had he detected?
This paper maintains that what Saussure stumbled upon was the trace of a contribution made to ancient verse by melodically and metrically organised sounds. This was inevitable. Virtually all the texts he probed were “carmina sacra” that were composed to be sung and accompanied by music. This musical accompaniment had a decisive impact on the phonetics of the “lexemic” words in the Poetry that has survived. This is so because sung verse cannot “euphoniously” accommodate a musical accompaniment unless its phonetics constituents are selected, concatenated and intoned in such a way as to follow the melodic contours and rhythm patterns that modulate their articulation. In addition, the point of making verse consist both of melodically organised arrangements of sound and of organisations of sound in which one can recognise ordinary words was not simply ornamental. The real point was to bi nature what one was hearing. In other words, the goal was to “over-signify” the usual meanings of the “logocentric” words in the verse with a separate but complementary meaning and narrative encoded in melodised tones and metered rhythms. Why qualify the accompanying music as “acousmatic voices”? Because the music in question was added to song to give a voice to whichever tutelary divinity the song was performed to honour.
That’s what makes “acousmatic voices” an especially apt epithet for characterising the melodically and rhythmically structured bodies of sound Saussure so presciently discerned in the phonetic depths of the poésie phonissante he probed. The point of their being in poetry was to give a voice to the agencies to whom the object or occasion of verse is beholden for its Being-in-the-world.
Recherches anglaises et nord américaines, 2004
This essay “heliocentrically” elucidates Jacques Derrida’s grammatological “exappropriation” of l... more This essay “heliocentrically” elucidates Jacques Derrida’s grammatological “exappropriation” of language and, therefore, the explicable. To do so, it analyses three things: (1) Derrida’s relationship to the “logocentric” determination of language (2) his relationship to the Rabbinical theory of the origin of language and (3) how he makes the former “bow down” to the latter. This essay also submits Derrida’s grammatological ambitions to a deconstuctive reading on the following points: (a) the “scientific” status of the “(non)concept” of “différance”, (b) the viability of alternative, non-grammatological re-determinations of the explicable, (c) how Derrida’s own grammatological project is unable to withstand the “protocols of reading” he uses to “deconstruct” rivals reconfigurations of the explicable and, finally, (d) the ethnocentrism intrinsic to the grammatology program.
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“Never has such a succession of non sequiturs played such an important role in the... more Abstract:
“Never has such a succession of non sequiturs played such an important role in the history of philosophy!” That is Andrew Feenberg’s (2005) opinion of Heidegger’s contribution to the philosophy of technology. He is seconded in his disproval by Don Ihde (2010) who rejects Heidegger’s “völkisch techno-romanticism” and “reactionary modernism”. Along with Peter-Paul Verbeek (2011), Ihde also berates Heidegger’s “externalist”, “high altitude”, “one size fits all” analysis of the “essence” of technology. And his view that Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is an apologia for inhumanity is echoed, inter alia, by Soren Riis (2011).
Faced with assessments as damning as these, some readers will conclude that the days when Heidegger was a legitimate reference for the philosophy of technology are over. Others will be less rash and conclude that philosophy of technology readers would benefit from a fresh ‘close reading’ of Heidegger. First to see why and to what extent the views expressed above are ill-informed, reductive, self-defeating and largely groundless. Second to see how disturbingly oblivious their authors are to the limitations, compromises and risks posed by the “descriptivist”, “empiricist”, “bottom up” perspectives they oppose to Heidegger’s “top down perspective”. Finally, and above all, a patient re-reading of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology creates an opportunity to make the case that his estimation of the role of technology in degrading modern humanity’s ecological life support systems is as relevant today as ever and the solutions he proposes are altogether appropriate.
Desirous to be of service to such a readership, this paper offers a summary of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. It focuses in particular on the enigmatic claim that technology is “supremely perilous” and for that very reason a source of “salvation”. Along the way it looks at the way the extra-technological aspects of his thought inform and condition his discourse on technology. Particular attention is paid to what Heidegger says about the Sacred, Ethics, “Ethology”, Art and how his views on these things are factored into what he says about technology. To conclude it considers whether a determination of technology that conforms to Heidegger’s thought is viable in practice and if it is would adopting it entail adjustments 21st century humanity could accept in principle. We also consider if it is acceptable and viable to NOT embrace Heidegger’s philosophy of technology.
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Semiotics, 2017
Among the Hellenes in archaic “Song culture” it was axiomatic that when the “inspired” aede decla... more Among the Hellenes in archaic “Song culture” it was axiomatic that when the “inspired” aede declaimed “sacred song” (θέσπις ἀοιδή), the voice of the divine itself sounded forth. But what credited such a claim? What property of “melic verse” encoded the voice of the Gods? Pursuant to what semiotic rationale? To answer these questions this article looks at (1) what counted as the “divine” for the early Hellenes, (2) how the “inspired” aede was able to “source” it, (3) how he made it afford intelligence about cosmopoiesis and ontogenesis and, finally, (4) how he gave this intelligence an expression that was legible to his listeners. The case is made that information about cosmopoiesis was encoded in the melodies and meter that accompanied the ordinary words in the verse the aede composed and performed. The semiotic rationale behind this claim was a mimetic correspondence between (i) the “arithmological character” of the melodies and rhythms structuring the sounds one heard in the song and (ii) the “arithmology” used to quantify the blends of cosmic energies that powered the song’s subject matter into its “complexion” and its Being-in-the-world. As a result, listening to “sacred song” amounted to hearing two narratives about the object of the song:- one in the “profane”, ordinary words of mortals recounting what it means "sub species hominis", the other in melody and metre relating its “sacral”, "cosmopoietic" significance.
Key words
Archaic Melic Verse; Sacred Song; Hieroglossia; Semiotics and Mousiké; Encoding environmental affordance; Semiotics and Arithmology
This article revisits the controversy inaugurated in 1833 with the publication of De Aristotelis ... more This article revisits the controversy inaugurated in 1833 with the publication of De Aristotelis categoriis, a work in which F.A. Trendelenburg’s affirms that Aristotle’s ‘categories of Being’ are merely replicas of the grammatical categories of ancient Greek. With a view to putting Trendelenburg’s theory to the test, I begin by pointing out that his theory would be untenable if one could demonstrate that Aristotle’s thought exercised a decisive impact on the evolution of Greek Grammar. I then point out that at least one grammatical category of the Greek language – the verbal voice – quite definitely reflects the influence of Aristotle’s ideas on using language rationally. To prove the point, I compare the way this grammatical category was defined in the first Alexandrian téchnai grammatikai with what we know of the way it was used in earlier times.
Two things come to light in this comparison. The first is the fact that the Alexandrians modelled their ideas on the correct way to use the verbal voices after the way Aristotle defines the condition of possibility and necessary modalities of movement and change in his Physics. Second this linguistic prescriptivism entrained the suppression of an earlier, radically different determination of the verbal voice. What corroborates this particularly well is the way Aristotle define “self-affectedness” (αὐτοπάθεια). For him it is ‘absurd’ and ‘barbaric’ that movement and change can affect the subject of a verb without it being affected by some exterior agency. Hence all that ‘apparent’ self-affectedness should be taken to mean is that the apparent self-mover or self-changer is exhibiting ‘μεταβολῆς ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ ἄλλο’. In other words, the self-changer is simultaneously the agent, instrument and patient of the observed change because one of its parts acts on the rest as though it was other than what it acts upon.
This view on self-change was taken up and adapted to the verbal voice by the Alexandrian philologists by giving “middle voiced” verbs an exclusively reflexive or reciprocal function (ἀντανακλαστική). Using the middle voice to speak of ‘spontaneous’, ‘intransitive’ self-affectedness is pointedly ruled out.
This contrasts significantly with the way the verbal voice was used prior to then. For in earlier times it was common to use the middle voice to refer to thoughts, emotions or events occurring in the natural world as though they were due to the influence of inscrutable agencies acting intransitively ‘through’ the subject of the verb from somewhere in its interior. With Jan Gonda, I take this to be symptomatic of the currency of “animistic” beliefs common to ‘primitive’ cultures the world over. However, because Aristotle decreed that this was an irrational and barbaric way to conceive the causes of anything, the Alexandrian philologists decided that any linguistic resource that lent itself to expressing such a belief had to be redefined or interdicted.
From this it follows that the evolution of the ‘correct’ way to use the verbal voice was decisively influenced by philosophical dogmas on the ‘rational’ way to speak of causation, movement and change. It also follows that Aristotle’s categories of Being (e.g. ‘disposition’, activity, passivity) were not prescribed by the grammatical categories of the Greek language. Au contraire, his thought conditioned the rational way to define and use grammar and speech. However, because this seems to refute the Trendelenburg hypothesis does not mean I accept the diametrically opposed view, to wit ‘first structuring thought then structured language’. Instead I ‘deterritorialise’ the debate opposing Trendelenburg and his debunkers by placing the question en abyme in relation to what we now know of the dynamics of ‘language shift’. This allows me to argue that the choice between the alternatives ‘Structuring language then structured thought’ or ‘Structuring thought then structured language’ is meaningless because structured thought, structured language and the dynamics of their relationship are decisively impacted by factors that this choice leaves out of account.
Marburg Journal of Religion, Aug 18, 2020
Troubled by the consequences of humanity’s inability to engineer a sustainable “modus vivendi” wi... more Troubled by the consequences of humanity’s inability to engineer a sustainable “modus vivendi” with the planet it inhabits, this paper asks if part of the solution might not lie in the conception of a “function system” specifically designed to negotiate an “entente cordiale” with our more-than-human Lebenswelt. It considers the communication strategies premised by the tenets of ‘constructivism’ and ‘realism’ and demonstrates that they lead nowhere. Neither do those wrought of “consilient” syntheses of these two approaches. It therefore proposes something “radical”. It suggests that a model to follow to deal with the communication challenge at issue might be found in the “magical worldview”. I define this as a “pre-rational rationality” against which both “Modernist” and “Post-modernist” rationalities define themselves in the way they forswear any mediating role for a “transcendental agency” acting as a middleman between the human and non-human worlds. To keep considerations within manageable limits I confine myself to “incantatory magic” in archaic Greece, focusing in particular on those aspects of it which illustrate how it facilitated “dialogue” between humankind and its non-human Other. Key to success in making this dialogue “meaningful” was the “music” composed and performed by inspired “Poet-Singers”. First by giving a voice and a language to the astro-meteoro-hydro-geological realities of the place where the client community dwelt; Second, by making the intelligence related through this language a source code out of which the community synthesised its “encyclopaedia” and organised the totality of the ways it interfaced with the world; Thirdly, by using the “enchantment” of hearing it a means to instil in its listeners a desire to observe modes of perceiving, thinking, desiring and behaving whose net effect was to foster an “ethological attunement” between the community and the natural environment. I conclude by making the case that there is nothing far-fetched about asking Religion and Science to embrace this rationalism, factor it into their respective acceptations of “progress” and, in tandem, negotiate an “entente cordiale” between Nature and Global Society.
This article investigates the intersemiotic relationship between "music" and "ordinary language" ... more This article investigates the intersemiotic relationship between "music" and "ordinary language" in "melic poetry" at a time called "song culture". It argues that the point of combining these two very different "semiospheres" in melic verse was to make the latter "di-glossic" and "bi-narrative". More precisely, the goal was to "oversignify" the ordinary meanings of ordinary words by conferring upon them an "etymonic truth" encoded in melodized tones and metered rhythms. Because this etymonic truth stood for the contribution made by various cosmopoietic agencies to the ontogenesis of the poem's subject, including the "music" through which this truth was expressed in melic verse gave the latter the ability to "epi-phon-ize" its denotata to the power of their "cosmic significance". Obviously, melic verse could not have been used to do this without "deporting" words and language from their ordinary acceptations and applications and "transporting" them towards meanings encoded in music. However this "deterritorialization" never entailed a full "reterritorialisation" upon the terrain of the etymonic truth encoded in melody and meter. Indeed poets made sure that no amount of allegoresis or etymological ingenuity enabled their publics' to accost and appropriate the truth they encoded in music. Hence, the relationship between musical semiosis and semiosis encoded in words consisted of a sort of "intersemiotic dynamic equilibrium" in which language was continuously evolving towards a non-linguistic expression of meaning which conferred truth upon it and what it means without ever reaching the goal this evolution was undertaken to attain. This paper explores the mechanics of this intersemiotic dynamic equilibrium.
Keywords: Ancient Greek Verse; poikilia and bi-narrativity; musical meaning in "Song Culture" ; music and truth; music and hieroglossia; semiotics of melic poetry; intermedial intertextuality.
From Worlds of Possibles to Possible Worlds: On Post-nihilism and Dwelling - DasQuestões, 2021
The goal of this paper is to challenge the objections raised by scholars in the Environmental Hum... more The goal of this paper is to challenge the objections raised by scholars in the Environmental Humanities to the use of “the spiritual” as a mediating resource between humankind and the beleaguered planet we live on. It does this in two ways. First by arguing that the incubi they want to exorcise by placing a “cordon sanitaire” around the spiritual can be withstood without resorting to anything as radical as its complete exclusion. Second, by showing that the interest of such an initiative has nothing to do with promoting theistic supernaturalism or the intention of belittling humankind. Its interest lies in its “instrumental value”. In other words, the point is to adopt a “consequentialist standpoint” to assess the worth of various ways to address our climate change emergency and consider what works and what does not. If after an unprejudiced assessment it is determined that applications of the spiritual can be engineered which help in fostering improved Man-Nature relations – and do so without being Trojan horse for “metaphysical hoaxes” and “totalising métarécits” –, it is the rejection of the spiritual that ceases to be valid. To prove there is nothing farfetched about the idea, this paper looks at the role given to the spiritual (to daimonion) in archaic Greece and the way it promoted an “entente cordiale” between humankind and humankind’s Other. I show that it was able to attain this result by submitting both humankind and its non-human Other to a “cosmodicy” which constrained both to (1) relate and interact with one other on an “I-Thou” basis and (2) to make seeking the felicity of one a function of seeking the felicity of the other.
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Music theorists Jean Molino and Jean-Jacques Nattiez believe music has a “unity” an... more Abstract :
Music theorists Jean Molino and Jean-Jacques Nattiez believe music has a “unity” and a “universality”. They are founded upon man’s biology and his “neuro-cognitive faculties”. On the basis of this assumption they affirm that music has meaning if a human “interpretant” is around to confer meaning on it and deny that music can be meaningful in any other way. To assess the feasibility and creditworthiness of such a theory, this paper adopts an essentially eco-critical perspective. The case is made that founding musical symbolism exclusively on an “anthropological ontology” is problematic, unworkable and, ultimately, disserves the interests of anthropos, the intended beneficiary. It also asks if it is prudent to buy into a purely homocentric musicology in an age when humanity’s poor relations with the natural environment are imperilling our ecological conditions of possibility. Instead of that, it supposes that it would be better to follow the advice of eco-musicologists R. Murray Schafer and use music to give nature a voice and a language and use the intelligence it communicates as a resource for restoring an entente cordiale with our more-than-human surroundings.
Irish Contemporary Landscapes in Literature and the Arts, 2012
Everyone knows to what extent language depends on norms agreed upon by men in a given linguistic ... more Everyone knows to what extent language depends on norms agreed upon by men in a given linguistic community. It is also recognised that languages are highly influenced by exchange between different linguistic communities. But language also depends on its ability to translate into words life-sustaining information it receives from its natural environment. To find out how this happens, this paper takes an “ethnoecological” look at glossopoiesis in ancient Ireland. It focuses in particular on Poetic “nature study” arguing that this specialised ecological knowledge had the effect of synchronising the Gaelic tongue to the rhythms of the land the gaelophone community lived upon. But the influence of Poetic wisdom on ordinary language wasn’t direct. It operated via a special, extra-lexical speech (bérla fortchuide na filidh). This paper explores the ways this speech influenced and even constitutes the Gaelic language.
Langage, interprétation, représentation : perspectives pluriculturelles, transhistoriques et interdisciplinaires, 2022
In this article the reader is treated to a critique of language science in the West since Ferdina... more In this article the reader is treated to a critique of language science in the West since Ferdinand de Saussure from the perspective of the philosophy of language adhered to by the creators of Sanskrit in Vedic India. Like the Maharishi Sri Aurobindo, its authors take exception to the idea that the study of language cannot be “scientific” unless we assume that there is a necessary, complete and unbridgeable difference between the order of words and the order of the phenomena that words are supposed to signify. For the authors this amounts to supposing not merely that language cannot be considered a representation of anything ‘real’, it actually makes language an enemy of any attempt to represent what its speakers perceive, think, feel and are. To argue that this is neither a fatalité nor anything that anyone should be satisfied with, the authors look at what Sri Aurobindo teaches us about the role played by “root sounds” and “mantras” in the Sanskrit language. While doing so they make us understand how words in Sanskrit can be considered a living extension not just of the physical and perceived qualities of the realities these words referred to but also of the very act of creation itself at work in, through and as the phonetic substance of these words.
Hallucinating under the influence of mescaline, Aldous Huxley had difficulty answering questions ... more Hallucinating under the influence of mescaline, Aldous Huxley had difficulty answering questions about the things he saw. Significantly, queries about time, space and quiddity were particularly problematic. He said such questions were relevant to objects one finds in the “universe” he left behind when he entered the “mescalin experience”. Desirous to account for Huxley’s apparent “aphasia”, the present essay undertakes an “aetiology” of what Huxley referred to as “common language”. It postulates that Huxley’s difficulties reflect the fact that the language he was using is an apophantical tool of a particular “Beatific vision”. Not the “continually changing apocalypse” of “pure becoming” Huxley beheld whilst hallucinating. Rather those “thaumatos phasmata” Plato spoke of in various Dialogues. The ones we see if our perceptions are modulated in such a way that everything we observe appears ‘static’, ‘eidetic’ or ‘monadic’. In other words, a vision of the world that prevents us apprehending the “luminous bliss” Huxley witnessed in his “mescalin experience”. Besides substantiating the claim that common language has been “annexed” or “suborned” by Plato’s eidetic phasmata, this essay assesses how well Huxley succeeds in his attempts to translate his Beatific Vision of Chaos into a language designed to make it unspeakable.
XVII-XVIII. Revue de la société d'études anglo-américaines des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, 2005
Abstract:
In 1628 William Harvey published De motu cordis exposing his revolutionary ideas on ... more Abstract:
In 1628 William Harvey published De motu cordis exposing his revolutionary ideas on the operations of the heart and the circulatory system. One result was the destruction of the theoretical basis of formerly dominant, i.e., Greek ideas concerning the brain, thought, and psycho-pathology. But this revolution went largely unnoticed in 17th century literature. At any rate, numerous writers of the age (Casaubon, Burton, More, Temple, Swift, Shaftsbury) put forward ideas on “Melancholy”, “Inspiration”, “Enthusiasm” and mental health and illness that were essentially those of Hippocrates. Even many of those who consciously contested the Greek models nevertheless continued to ‘decline’ their discourses in terms of a conceptual taxonomy they inherited from Alcmaeon, Aristotle, Galen, etc. All of which raises the (echt-foucaultian) question : how Greek was “the space of knowledge” in the 17th century literary and scientific logomachy about the anatomy of the mind, of thought and of reason ?
Conference Presentations by Fionn Bennett
Paper delivered the 12.10.2017 at the Freie Universität Berlin at a conference on Pathos und Polis.
This paper looks at the way “euphrosynē” was instilled in ancient polis members in order to feder... more This paper looks at the way “euphrosynē” was instilled in ancient polis members in order to federate them around community-binding ideals, values and aspirations. Its point of departure is Gorgias’s comments in his “Encomium to Helen” on the “incantatory magic” administered by “meteorologists”, rhetoricians and philosophers. The case is made that Orpheus, the Sophists and Plato are the exemplars of these three kinds of magician. While all three had in common the goal of “bewitching” their respective publics’ into feeling “delight” (τέρψις) while doing what each enchanter wanted them to do, they were nevertheless antipodes apart when it came to the finalities sub-served by their incantations. This is so because each of them ascribed to irreconcilably opposed cosmopolitical paradigms. It was therefore inevitable that they should also differ as to the laws and customs (νόμοι καὶ νόμιμα) polis-members ought to observe to order their lives both publicly and in private. These three magicians also differed in the techniques of persuasion (πιθανουργία) they used to seduce their respective publics’ into compliance. For if all three depended on “pleasure” to “drug” community members into compliance, they disagreed on what pleasure should be taken to mean. Just as they diverged on how it ought to be administered, experienced and engineered into a resource for organising the polis and regulating the ethos of the people belonging to it. The paper concludes by asking if the discussed applications of Euphrosyne may not have valuable lessons to offer us on how to address our own Cosmopolitical crisis.
Subsection Headings
1. Introduction - Polis and ‘Pathos’?
2. Who were the Meteōrolόgoi in Gorgias’ Defence of Helen?
3. What Cosmopolitics and Parainetics were subserved by the “Magic” (ἐπῳδή) practiced by the inspired meteōrológos?
4. Eu-ph(e)ro-synē and Dikaiosynē
5. “Song” as a Community Normatising Resource
6. How to make a “sound statue” (ἀγάλμα φωνή) of théia dynamis
7. The Psychotropic effects of exposure to the Magic of θέσπις ἀοιδή
8. The Twilight of Orphic “Song culture” and the Emergence of the Sophistic paideía in the Classical Age
9. The insidious Societal and Political consequences of the Magic administered by Sophistic “ῥητορικὴ τέχνη”
10. Classical Philosophy’s – qualified – reinstatement Orphic Euphrosynē for Cosmopolitical and Parainetic End Uses
11. Socrates versus Marsyas – turning Euphrosynē into Sophrosynē
12. Concluding Remarks: What praxis of Euphrosynē for the Cosmopolitical crisis of nostrum aevum?
Drafts by Fionn Bennett
This article explains how Cratylus most likely understood the “natural correctness” of names. It ... more This article explains how Cratylus most likely understood the “natural correctness” of names. It focuses on the notion that “naturally correct names” are in some sense “consubstantial” with the “nature” of whatever they reveal as a name. It starts by considering what is said in the dialogue about the phonetics of words and the “physics” of their corelative “δηλούμενα”. Then it looks for the *tertium quid* that allows words and things to share the same “nature” without either of them losing their status of being either a properly linguistic phenomenon or an entirely other-than-linguistic "φύσει ὄντα". Relying on Pythagorean ideas on diakosmesis and ontogenesis I argue that the “co-naturing” missing link boils down to the “arithmological formulation” (λόγος) of the physical energy involved in the generation of physical objects. Evidently, the replication of the same “λόγος” in the pressure applied by one’s vocal apparatus on the air passing through it to produce sound, justified the assumption that the resulting φωνή is a true-to-life “acoustic signature” of the “φύσις” of the φύσει ὄντα in question. I go on to argue that the phonation which “reveals” the etymonic “true nature” of a φύσει ὄντα had nothing to do with the qualities of the sounds thanks to which we can identify “semantically meaningful” words. It was instead in the “musical” qualities of the correct intonation of the “semantically meaningful” sounds.
Draft
Friedrich Nietzsche blames the “Eleatic concept of Being” for the “error” of our belief in the ex... more Friedrich Nietzsche blames the “Eleatic concept of Being” for the “error” of our belief in the existence of self-contained, standalone “subjects” and “objects”. He also accuses language of being the “perpetual advocate” of this error in as much as “every word, every sentence we utter speaks in its favour”. To credit this view, this paper focuses on three points: (1) the way the Eleatic concept of Being influenced the ontological theorising of Plato and Aristotle, (2) the decisive impact their “Science of Being” exerted on their ideas on the “rational” way to use language to speak about “what-truly-is” and (3) how their way of co-organising the “categories of Being” and the “categories of language” has resulted in a language, our language, which cannot be used without, ipso facto, experiencing things and world, ourselves and others as replicants of the Eleatic “One”.
Edited Volume by Fionn Bennett
Langage et Pensée - Language, Interpretation, Representation: Cross-Cultural, Transhistorical and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 2022
What paths does the apprehension of the real travel along before reaching its manifestation in th... more What paths does the apprehension of the real travel along before reaching its manifestation in the form of signs, words and language? What hermeneutic and semiotic engineering is involved in the elaboration of these resources that prefigure and structure the thinkable, knowable, possible? Above all, why is it important to ponder over the diversity of the paths embarked upon in this enterprise? These are some of the questions raised in this volume. To provide them with answers, it brings together contributions from researchers whose specialisations range from Indigenous Studies to Sign Systems Studies, via the Philosophy of Language, Sinology, Amazonian shamanism, Indology, etc. Among the many noteworthy outcomes of their efforts is a greater awareness of the fact that, in the margins of the views about the “apophantic” powers of language that currently dominate the West, there are perfectly viable alternatives. By accompanying these scholars in their exploration of these alternatives, readers are rewarded with yet unsuspected insights into the meaning-affording potential of words and language. They are also supplied with a framework and a perspective from which to define and characterise the limits and shortcoming of currently dominant ideas pertaining to the nature, vocation, applications and meaning-affording powers of language.
Announcements by Fionn Bennett
Das Questões: Filosofia Tradução Arte, 2021
with Léna Balaud, Fionn Bennett, Hilan Bensusan, Antoine Chopot, Aha Else, Sofya Gevorkyan, Cédri... more with Léna Balaud, Fionn Bennett, Hilan Bensusan, Antoine Chopot, Aha Else, Sofya Gevorkyan, Cédric Mong-Hy, Frédéric Neyrat, Elzahrã Osman, Jarrad Reddekop, Casey Rentmeester, Carlos A. Segovia, and Bronislaw Szerszynski
This volume’s purpose is to examine new perspectives on worlding in light of what looks like a shift recently registered in the politics of theory, one which has led from the exploration of the possible into the subsequent investigation of the compossible, i.e. from the counter-capitalist drive towards deterritorialisation (whose flag capitalism hoists today to an unprecedented degree) into the post-capitalist reinvention of new existential territories (partly virtual, partly already real) at the interface of modern frustrations and the logics of the otherwise, thus encouraging (against despotic encodings and active nihilisms alike) a re-stitching of liberation (Dionysus) and dwelling (Apollo) on behalf of what might be labelled a cosmopolitics and a poetics of care.
It includes papers on questions of order, chaos, immanence, transcendence, singularity, and variation; post-foundational and meta-foundational axiomatics around notions like Grund, Abgrund, and multi-centricity; cosmopolitical pragmatics of alliance; the poetics of dwelling against the politics of devastation; the metaphysics of the others; the narratives of new complex existential niches; and extra-modern ontologies and cosmologies. Ultimately, then, it is dedicated to exploring the contours of the Otherwise on behalf of a non-minimalist philosophical paradigm: that of Worlding.
Tim Ingold speaks of drawing “lines” and making “knots,” Donna Haraway of “string figuring.” These and other similar expressions hint beyond today’s object-oriented fever and dystopian dismay. Yet by putting together this volume we want to move forward on their track in new, unhackneyed ways; for not only do we wish to picture specific modalities of be(com)ing with and their logics: we aim, too, at studying their conceptual backstage, memories, and margins.
The volume, on the other hand, divides into three sections: “Integrals” contains reflections out of which specific notional areas and volumes, but also problems, arise. “Derivatives,” in contrast, brings together drifts into the otherwise that make audible, and readable, some of the otherwise’s multiform voices. “Constellations,” finally, shakes the dust that forms the soil of what deserves to be thought, sensed, and experimented with.
Our gratitude to all those who have generously contributed a piece to the volume’s music.
Sofya Gevorkyan
Carlos A. Segovia
Call for Papers by Fionn Bennett
The organisers of the HHH-2023 conference invite paper proposals from their colleagues in the Hum... more The organisers of the HHH-2023 conference invite paper proposals from their colleagues in the Human Sciences who can elucidate the hermeneutical and semiotic principles which were operative in the ideas that peoples in earlier times and in non-Western cultures entertained about the languages they spoke. We are particularly interested in proposals which investigate the belief that, in one guise or another, language is “a gift from the Gods to men”. What does this mean? Why was such a conceit taken seriously? What counted as “the Sacred”? What hermeneutic and semiotic ingenuity was utilised to interpret what it betokened and in forging these interpretations into signs, significance and language? The interest of seeking answers to these questions isn’t limited to everything that is fascinating about these enigmas all unto themselves. It also creates an opportunity to gain as yet unsuspected insights into the meaning-affording potential of words and language. More than that, it offers us a framework and a perspective from which to identify and typify the limits and shortcoming of currently dominant ideas pertaining to the nature, vocation, applications and “apophantic” powers of language.
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Papers by Fionn Bennett
Today it is generally accepted that Saussure was wrong about this. Few however maintain that what he discerned in the phonetic depths of the verse he auscultated was no more than the figment of a fertile imagination. But if this be so, what exactly had he detected?
This paper maintains that what Saussure stumbled upon was the trace of a contribution made to ancient verse by melodically and metrically organised sounds. This was inevitable. Virtually all the texts he probed were “carmina sacra” that were composed to be sung and accompanied by music. This musical accompaniment had a decisive impact on the phonetics of the “lexemic” words in the Poetry that has survived. This is so because sung verse cannot “euphoniously” accommodate a musical accompaniment unless its phonetics constituents are selected, concatenated and intoned in such a way as to follow the melodic contours and rhythm patterns that modulate their articulation. In addition, the point of making verse consist both of melodically organised arrangements of sound and of organisations of sound in which one can recognise ordinary words was not simply ornamental. The real point was to bi nature what one was hearing. In other words, the goal was to “over-signify” the usual meanings of the “logocentric” words in the verse with a separate but complementary meaning and narrative encoded in melodised tones and metered rhythms. Why qualify the accompanying music as “acousmatic voices”? Because the music in question was added to song to give a voice to whichever tutelary divinity the song was performed to honour.
That’s what makes “acousmatic voices” an especially apt epithet for characterising the melodically and rhythmically structured bodies of sound Saussure so presciently discerned in the phonetic depths of the poésie phonissante he probed. The point of their being in poetry was to give a voice to the agencies to whom the object or occasion of verse is beholden for its Being-in-the-world.
“Never has such a succession of non sequiturs played such an important role in the history of philosophy!” That is Andrew Feenberg’s (2005) opinion of Heidegger’s contribution to the philosophy of technology. He is seconded in his disproval by Don Ihde (2010) who rejects Heidegger’s “völkisch techno-romanticism” and “reactionary modernism”. Along with Peter-Paul Verbeek (2011), Ihde also berates Heidegger’s “externalist”, “high altitude”, “one size fits all” analysis of the “essence” of technology. And his view that Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is an apologia for inhumanity is echoed, inter alia, by Soren Riis (2011).
Faced with assessments as damning as these, some readers will conclude that the days when Heidegger was a legitimate reference for the philosophy of technology are over. Others will be less rash and conclude that philosophy of technology readers would benefit from a fresh ‘close reading’ of Heidegger. First to see why and to what extent the views expressed above are ill-informed, reductive, self-defeating and largely groundless. Second to see how disturbingly oblivious their authors are to the limitations, compromises and risks posed by the “descriptivist”, “empiricist”, “bottom up” perspectives they oppose to Heidegger’s “top down perspective”. Finally, and above all, a patient re-reading of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology creates an opportunity to make the case that his estimation of the role of technology in degrading modern humanity’s ecological life support systems is as relevant today as ever and the solutions he proposes are altogether appropriate.
Desirous to be of service to such a readership, this paper offers a summary of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. It focuses in particular on the enigmatic claim that technology is “supremely perilous” and for that very reason a source of “salvation”. Along the way it looks at the way the extra-technological aspects of his thought inform and condition his discourse on technology. Particular attention is paid to what Heidegger says about the Sacred, Ethics, “Ethology”, Art and how his views on these things are factored into what he says about technology. To conclude it considers whether a determination of technology that conforms to Heidegger’s thought is viable in practice and if it is would adopting it entail adjustments 21st century humanity could accept in principle. We also consider if it is acceptable and viable to NOT embrace Heidegger’s philosophy of technology.
Key words
Archaic Melic Verse; Sacred Song; Hieroglossia; Semiotics and Mousiké; Encoding environmental affordance; Semiotics and Arithmology
Two things come to light in this comparison. The first is the fact that the Alexandrians modelled their ideas on the correct way to use the verbal voices after the way Aristotle defines the condition of possibility and necessary modalities of movement and change in his Physics. Second this linguistic prescriptivism entrained the suppression of an earlier, radically different determination of the verbal voice. What corroborates this particularly well is the way Aristotle define “self-affectedness” (αὐτοπάθεια). For him it is ‘absurd’ and ‘barbaric’ that movement and change can affect the subject of a verb without it being affected by some exterior agency. Hence all that ‘apparent’ self-affectedness should be taken to mean is that the apparent self-mover or self-changer is exhibiting ‘μεταβολῆς ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ ἄλλο’. In other words, the self-changer is simultaneously the agent, instrument and patient of the observed change because one of its parts acts on the rest as though it was other than what it acts upon.
This view on self-change was taken up and adapted to the verbal voice by the Alexandrian philologists by giving “middle voiced” verbs an exclusively reflexive or reciprocal function (ἀντανακλαστική). Using the middle voice to speak of ‘spontaneous’, ‘intransitive’ self-affectedness is pointedly ruled out.
This contrasts significantly with the way the verbal voice was used prior to then. For in earlier times it was common to use the middle voice to refer to thoughts, emotions or events occurring in the natural world as though they were due to the influence of inscrutable agencies acting intransitively ‘through’ the subject of the verb from somewhere in its interior. With Jan Gonda, I take this to be symptomatic of the currency of “animistic” beliefs common to ‘primitive’ cultures the world over. However, because Aristotle decreed that this was an irrational and barbaric way to conceive the causes of anything, the Alexandrian philologists decided that any linguistic resource that lent itself to expressing such a belief had to be redefined or interdicted.
From this it follows that the evolution of the ‘correct’ way to use the verbal voice was decisively influenced by philosophical dogmas on the ‘rational’ way to speak of causation, movement and change. It also follows that Aristotle’s categories of Being (e.g. ‘disposition’, activity, passivity) were not prescribed by the grammatical categories of the Greek language. Au contraire, his thought conditioned the rational way to define and use grammar and speech. However, because this seems to refute the Trendelenburg hypothesis does not mean I accept the diametrically opposed view, to wit ‘first structuring thought then structured language’. Instead I ‘deterritorialise’ the debate opposing Trendelenburg and his debunkers by placing the question en abyme in relation to what we now know of the dynamics of ‘language shift’. This allows me to argue that the choice between the alternatives ‘Structuring language then structured thought’ or ‘Structuring thought then structured language’ is meaningless because structured thought, structured language and the dynamics of their relationship are decisively impacted by factors that this choice leaves out of account.
Keywords: Ancient Greek Verse; poikilia and bi-narrativity; musical meaning in "Song Culture" ; music and truth; music and hieroglossia; semiotics of melic poetry; intermedial intertextuality.
Music theorists Jean Molino and Jean-Jacques Nattiez believe music has a “unity” and a “universality”. They are founded upon man’s biology and his “neuro-cognitive faculties”. On the basis of this assumption they affirm that music has meaning if a human “interpretant” is around to confer meaning on it and deny that music can be meaningful in any other way. To assess the feasibility and creditworthiness of such a theory, this paper adopts an essentially eco-critical perspective. The case is made that founding musical symbolism exclusively on an “anthropological ontology” is problematic, unworkable and, ultimately, disserves the interests of anthropos, the intended beneficiary. It also asks if it is prudent to buy into a purely homocentric musicology in an age when humanity’s poor relations with the natural environment are imperilling our ecological conditions of possibility. Instead of that, it supposes that it would be better to follow the advice of eco-musicologists R. Murray Schafer and use music to give nature a voice and a language and use the intelligence it communicates as a resource for restoring an entente cordiale with our more-than-human surroundings.
In 1628 William Harvey published De motu cordis exposing his revolutionary ideas on the operations of the heart and the circulatory system. One result was the destruction of the theoretical basis of formerly dominant, i.e., Greek ideas concerning the brain, thought, and psycho-pathology. But this revolution went largely unnoticed in 17th century literature. At any rate, numerous writers of the age (Casaubon, Burton, More, Temple, Swift, Shaftsbury) put forward ideas on “Melancholy”, “Inspiration”, “Enthusiasm” and mental health and illness that were essentially those of Hippocrates. Even many of those who consciously contested the Greek models nevertheless continued to ‘decline’ their discourses in terms of a conceptual taxonomy they inherited from Alcmaeon, Aristotle, Galen, etc. All of which raises the (echt-foucaultian) question : how Greek was “the space of knowledge” in the 17th century literary and scientific logomachy about the anatomy of the mind, of thought and of reason ?
Conference Presentations by Fionn Bennett
Subsection Headings
1. Introduction - Polis and ‘Pathos’?
2. Who were the Meteōrolόgoi in Gorgias’ Defence of Helen?
3. What Cosmopolitics and Parainetics were subserved by the “Magic” (ἐπῳδή) practiced by the inspired meteōrológos?
4. Eu-ph(e)ro-synē and Dikaiosynē
5. “Song” as a Community Normatising Resource
6. How to make a “sound statue” (ἀγάλμα φωνή) of théia dynamis
7. The Psychotropic effects of exposure to the Magic of θέσπις ἀοιδή
8. The Twilight of Orphic “Song culture” and the Emergence of the Sophistic paideía in the Classical Age
9. The insidious Societal and Political consequences of the Magic administered by Sophistic “ῥητορικὴ τέχνη”
10. Classical Philosophy’s – qualified – reinstatement Orphic Euphrosynē for Cosmopolitical and Parainetic End Uses
11. Socrates versus Marsyas – turning Euphrosynē into Sophrosynē
12. Concluding Remarks: What praxis of Euphrosynē for the Cosmopolitical crisis of nostrum aevum?
Drafts by Fionn Bennett
Edited Volume by Fionn Bennett
Announcements by Fionn Bennett
This volume’s purpose is to examine new perspectives on worlding in light of what looks like a shift recently registered in the politics of theory, one which has led from the exploration of the possible into the subsequent investigation of the compossible, i.e. from the counter-capitalist drive towards deterritorialisation (whose flag capitalism hoists today to an unprecedented degree) into the post-capitalist reinvention of new existential territories (partly virtual, partly already real) at the interface of modern frustrations and the logics of the otherwise, thus encouraging (against despotic encodings and active nihilisms alike) a re-stitching of liberation (Dionysus) and dwelling (Apollo) on behalf of what might be labelled a cosmopolitics and a poetics of care.
It includes papers on questions of order, chaos, immanence, transcendence, singularity, and variation; post-foundational and meta-foundational axiomatics around notions like Grund, Abgrund, and multi-centricity; cosmopolitical pragmatics of alliance; the poetics of dwelling against the politics of devastation; the metaphysics of the others; the narratives of new complex existential niches; and extra-modern ontologies and cosmologies. Ultimately, then, it is dedicated to exploring the contours of the Otherwise on behalf of a non-minimalist philosophical paradigm: that of Worlding.
Tim Ingold speaks of drawing “lines” and making “knots,” Donna Haraway of “string figuring.” These and other similar expressions hint beyond today’s object-oriented fever and dystopian dismay. Yet by putting together this volume we want to move forward on their track in new, unhackneyed ways; for not only do we wish to picture specific modalities of be(com)ing with and their logics: we aim, too, at studying their conceptual backstage, memories, and margins.
The volume, on the other hand, divides into three sections: “Integrals” contains reflections out of which specific notional areas and volumes, but also problems, arise. “Derivatives,” in contrast, brings together drifts into the otherwise that make audible, and readable, some of the otherwise’s multiform voices. “Constellations,” finally, shakes the dust that forms the soil of what deserves to be thought, sensed, and experimented with.
Our gratitude to all those who have generously contributed a piece to the volume’s music.
Sofya Gevorkyan
Carlos A. Segovia
Call for Papers by Fionn Bennett
Today it is generally accepted that Saussure was wrong about this. Few however maintain that what he discerned in the phonetic depths of the verse he auscultated was no more than the figment of a fertile imagination. But if this be so, what exactly had he detected?
This paper maintains that what Saussure stumbled upon was the trace of a contribution made to ancient verse by melodically and metrically organised sounds. This was inevitable. Virtually all the texts he probed were “carmina sacra” that were composed to be sung and accompanied by music. This musical accompaniment had a decisive impact on the phonetics of the “lexemic” words in the Poetry that has survived. This is so because sung verse cannot “euphoniously” accommodate a musical accompaniment unless its phonetics constituents are selected, concatenated and intoned in such a way as to follow the melodic contours and rhythm patterns that modulate their articulation. In addition, the point of making verse consist both of melodically organised arrangements of sound and of organisations of sound in which one can recognise ordinary words was not simply ornamental. The real point was to bi nature what one was hearing. In other words, the goal was to “over-signify” the usual meanings of the “logocentric” words in the verse with a separate but complementary meaning and narrative encoded in melodised tones and metered rhythms. Why qualify the accompanying music as “acousmatic voices”? Because the music in question was added to song to give a voice to whichever tutelary divinity the song was performed to honour.
That’s what makes “acousmatic voices” an especially apt epithet for characterising the melodically and rhythmically structured bodies of sound Saussure so presciently discerned in the phonetic depths of the poésie phonissante he probed. The point of their being in poetry was to give a voice to the agencies to whom the object or occasion of verse is beholden for its Being-in-the-world.
“Never has such a succession of non sequiturs played such an important role in the history of philosophy!” That is Andrew Feenberg’s (2005) opinion of Heidegger’s contribution to the philosophy of technology. He is seconded in his disproval by Don Ihde (2010) who rejects Heidegger’s “völkisch techno-romanticism” and “reactionary modernism”. Along with Peter-Paul Verbeek (2011), Ihde also berates Heidegger’s “externalist”, “high altitude”, “one size fits all” analysis of the “essence” of technology. And his view that Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is an apologia for inhumanity is echoed, inter alia, by Soren Riis (2011).
Faced with assessments as damning as these, some readers will conclude that the days when Heidegger was a legitimate reference for the philosophy of technology are over. Others will be less rash and conclude that philosophy of technology readers would benefit from a fresh ‘close reading’ of Heidegger. First to see why and to what extent the views expressed above are ill-informed, reductive, self-defeating and largely groundless. Second to see how disturbingly oblivious their authors are to the limitations, compromises and risks posed by the “descriptivist”, “empiricist”, “bottom up” perspectives they oppose to Heidegger’s “top down perspective”. Finally, and above all, a patient re-reading of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology creates an opportunity to make the case that his estimation of the role of technology in degrading modern humanity’s ecological life support systems is as relevant today as ever and the solutions he proposes are altogether appropriate.
Desirous to be of service to such a readership, this paper offers a summary of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. It focuses in particular on the enigmatic claim that technology is “supremely perilous” and for that very reason a source of “salvation”. Along the way it looks at the way the extra-technological aspects of his thought inform and condition his discourse on technology. Particular attention is paid to what Heidegger says about the Sacred, Ethics, “Ethology”, Art and how his views on these things are factored into what he says about technology. To conclude it considers whether a determination of technology that conforms to Heidegger’s thought is viable in practice and if it is would adopting it entail adjustments 21st century humanity could accept in principle. We also consider if it is acceptable and viable to NOT embrace Heidegger’s philosophy of technology.
Key words
Archaic Melic Verse; Sacred Song; Hieroglossia; Semiotics and Mousiké; Encoding environmental affordance; Semiotics and Arithmology
Two things come to light in this comparison. The first is the fact that the Alexandrians modelled their ideas on the correct way to use the verbal voices after the way Aristotle defines the condition of possibility and necessary modalities of movement and change in his Physics. Second this linguistic prescriptivism entrained the suppression of an earlier, radically different determination of the verbal voice. What corroborates this particularly well is the way Aristotle define “self-affectedness” (αὐτοπάθεια). For him it is ‘absurd’ and ‘barbaric’ that movement and change can affect the subject of a verb without it being affected by some exterior agency. Hence all that ‘apparent’ self-affectedness should be taken to mean is that the apparent self-mover or self-changer is exhibiting ‘μεταβολῆς ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ ἄλλο’. In other words, the self-changer is simultaneously the agent, instrument and patient of the observed change because one of its parts acts on the rest as though it was other than what it acts upon.
This view on self-change was taken up and adapted to the verbal voice by the Alexandrian philologists by giving “middle voiced” verbs an exclusively reflexive or reciprocal function (ἀντανακλαστική). Using the middle voice to speak of ‘spontaneous’, ‘intransitive’ self-affectedness is pointedly ruled out.
This contrasts significantly with the way the verbal voice was used prior to then. For in earlier times it was common to use the middle voice to refer to thoughts, emotions or events occurring in the natural world as though they were due to the influence of inscrutable agencies acting intransitively ‘through’ the subject of the verb from somewhere in its interior. With Jan Gonda, I take this to be symptomatic of the currency of “animistic” beliefs common to ‘primitive’ cultures the world over. However, because Aristotle decreed that this was an irrational and barbaric way to conceive the causes of anything, the Alexandrian philologists decided that any linguistic resource that lent itself to expressing such a belief had to be redefined or interdicted.
From this it follows that the evolution of the ‘correct’ way to use the verbal voice was decisively influenced by philosophical dogmas on the ‘rational’ way to speak of causation, movement and change. It also follows that Aristotle’s categories of Being (e.g. ‘disposition’, activity, passivity) were not prescribed by the grammatical categories of the Greek language. Au contraire, his thought conditioned the rational way to define and use grammar and speech. However, because this seems to refute the Trendelenburg hypothesis does not mean I accept the diametrically opposed view, to wit ‘first structuring thought then structured language’. Instead I ‘deterritorialise’ the debate opposing Trendelenburg and his debunkers by placing the question en abyme in relation to what we now know of the dynamics of ‘language shift’. This allows me to argue that the choice between the alternatives ‘Structuring language then structured thought’ or ‘Structuring thought then structured language’ is meaningless because structured thought, structured language and the dynamics of their relationship are decisively impacted by factors that this choice leaves out of account.
Keywords: Ancient Greek Verse; poikilia and bi-narrativity; musical meaning in "Song Culture" ; music and truth; music and hieroglossia; semiotics of melic poetry; intermedial intertextuality.
Music theorists Jean Molino and Jean-Jacques Nattiez believe music has a “unity” and a “universality”. They are founded upon man’s biology and his “neuro-cognitive faculties”. On the basis of this assumption they affirm that music has meaning if a human “interpretant” is around to confer meaning on it and deny that music can be meaningful in any other way. To assess the feasibility and creditworthiness of such a theory, this paper adopts an essentially eco-critical perspective. The case is made that founding musical symbolism exclusively on an “anthropological ontology” is problematic, unworkable and, ultimately, disserves the interests of anthropos, the intended beneficiary. It also asks if it is prudent to buy into a purely homocentric musicology in an age when humanity’s poor relations with the natural environment are imperilling our ecological conditions of possibility. Instead of that, it supposes that it would be better to follow the advice of eco-musicologists R. Murray Schafer and use music to give nature a voice and a language and use the intelligence it communicates as a resource for restoring an entente cordiale with our more-than-human surroundings.
In 1628 William Harvey published De motu cordis exposing his revolutionary ideas on the operations of the heart and the circulatory system. One result was the destruction of the theoretical basis of formerly dominant, i.e., Greek ideas concerning the brain, thought, and psycho-pathology. But this revolution went largely unnoticed in 17th century literature. At any rate, numerous writers of the age (Casaubon, Burton, More, Temple, Swift, Shaftsbury) put forward ideas on “Melancholy”, “Inspiration”, “Enthusiasm” and mental health and illness that were essentially those of Hippocrates. Even many of those who consciously contested the Greek models nevertheless continued to ‘decline’ their discourses in terms of a conceptual taxonomy they inherited from Alcmaeon, Aristotle, Galen, etc. All of which raises the (echt-foucaultian) question : how Greek was “the space of knowledge” in the 17th century literary and scientific logomachy about the anatomy of the mind, of thought and of reason ?
Subsection Headings
1. Introduction - Polis and ‘Pathos’?
2. Who were the Meteōrolόgoi in Gorgias’ Defence of Helen?
3. What Cosmopolitics and Parainetics were subserved by the “Magic” (ἐπῳδή) practiced by the inspired meteōrológos?
4. Eu-ph(e)ro-synē and Dikaiosynē
5. “Song” as a Community Normatising Resource
6. How to make a “sound statue” (ἀγάλμα φωνή) of théia dynamis
7. The Psychotropic effects of exposure to the Magic of θέσπις ἀοιδή
8. The Twilight of Orphic “Song culture” and the Emergence of the Sophistic paideía in the Classical Age
9. The insidious Societal and Political consequences of the Magic administered by Sophistic “ῥητορικὴ τέχνη”
10. Classical Philosophy’s – qualified – reinstatement Orphic Euphrosynē for Cosmopolitical and Parainetic End Uses
11. Socrates versus Marsyas – turning Euphrosynē into Sophrosynē
12. Concluding Remarks: What praxis of Euphrosynē for the Cosmopolitical crisis of nostrum aevum?
This volume’s purpose is to examine new perspectives on worlding in light of what looks like a shift recently registered in the politics of theory, one which has led from the exploration of the possible into the subsequent investigation of the compossible, i.e. from the counter-capitalist drive towards deterritorialisation (whose flag capitalism hoists today to an unprecedented degree) into the post-capitalist reinvention of new existential territories (partly virtual, partly already real) at the interface of modern frustrations and the logics of the otherwise, thus encouraging (against despotic encodings and active nihilisms alike) a re-stitching of liberation (Dionysus) and dwelling (Apollo) on behalf of what might be labelled a cosmopolitics and a poetics of care.
It includes papers on questions of order, chaos, immanence, transcendence, singularity, and variation; post-foundational and meta-foundational axiomatics around notions like Grund, Abgrund, and multi-centricity; cosmopolitical pragmatics of alliance; the poetics of dwelling against the politics of devastation; the metaphysics of the others; the narratives of new complex existential niches; and extra-modern ontologies and cosmologies. Ultimately, then, it is dedicated to exploring the contours of the Otherwise on behalf of a non-minimalist philosophical paradigm: that of Worlding.
Tim Ingold speaks of drawing “lines” and making “knots,” Donna Haraway of “string figuring.” These and other similar expressions hint beyond today’s object-oriented fever and dystopian dismay. Yet by putting together this volume we want to move forward on their track in new, unhackneyed ways; for not only do we wish to picture specific modalities of be(com)ing with and their logics: we aim, too, at studying their conceptual backstage, memories, and margins.
The volume, on the other hand, divides into three sections: “Integrals” contains reflections out of which specific notional areas and volumes, but also problems, arise. “Derivatives,” in contrast, brings together drifts into the otherwise that make audible, and readable, some of the otherwise’s multiform voices. “Constellations,” finally, shakes the dust that forms the soil of what deserves to be thought, sensed, and experimented with.
Our gratitude to all those who have generously contributed a piece to the volume’s music.
Sofya Gevorkyan
Carlos A. Segovia