Academic publications by Ling Li
Asian Journal of Law and Society, 2023
This article presents a theory of the order of power to explain the dynamics and interaction betw... more This article presents a theory of the order of power to explain the dynamics and interaction between the political and legal orders in China’s courts. This theory posits that the political order is embodied in the extensive administrative ranking system (ARS) of the PRC and has a systematic impact on the legal order regardless of the subject matter. The ARS is a system that regulates power relations between various institutional and personal actors in all key power fields, including courts. The order-of-power theory argues that the political order relativizes law during the processes of legal implementation, application, and enforcement. This theory provides a coherent explanation of judicial behavioral patterns in different subject matters, such as the centralization of criminal investigations in some crimes but not others, the distribution of corruption in China's courts and the outcome patterns of administrative litigation. This theory challenges the conventional wisdom that the political order and the legal order in China’s courts are partitioned based on the subject matter and asserts the opposite: the impact of the political order is systemic, comprehensive and applicable to the entire legal field across subject matters. This article fills a knowledge gap in Chinese law and politics, where the ARS has received little attention except in recent studies on administrative litigation. The article also identifies two distinct features of the ARS, its multi-dimensionality and interconnectivity, our current understanding of which is disproportionately poor in relation to their significance.
In this article, I examine how privileged exchange opportunities in parochial corruption in China... more In this article, I examine how privileged exchange opportunities in parochial corruption in China’s courts become marketized and made accessible to those who do not enjoy a relational-tie. To that end, I first analyze the conceptual features of guanxi, a particularistic relationship between two (or more) individuals who share a dyadic non-transferable relational-tie, as well as the operational rationale of guanxi-based exchange. Then I proceed to investigate what has led to the marketization of guanxi-based parochial corruption. The answer lies in the emergence of professional “judicial brokers”, particularly lawyers, who are best positioned to broker corrupt deals between judges and litigants. I also explain how a self-executable payment scheme, thanks to the asymmetry of anti-corruption measures, is developed to help solve the enforcement problem of illegal corrupt transactions. Finally, I provide some preliminary comparative reflections on guanxi and informal networks in other legal systems.
This article traces policy and institutional changes in relation to the two campaign programs (20... more This article traces policy and institutional changes in relation to the two campaign programs (2013-2017) led by President Xi Jinping and examines the causes for their high impact. The findings are threefold. First, Xi’s Campaign is more impactful than previous not because of any innovative and radical policies that break from previous practices. On the contrary, both campaign programs followed familiar scripts and relied on enforcement tools that were made available to the Party before 2012. Second, what are attributable to the high impact of Xi’s Campaign are the strength of Campaign leaders’ resolves and their ability to mobilize resources, methodical adjustment and productivity improvement within the pre-existing regulatory framework. Third, the Central Committee of Discipline and Inspection, as the main driver of the Campaign, becomes more powerful as the result of the Campaign, not the other way around. These findings provide preliminary evidence that the institutionalization of the Party has progressed to a stage where informal politics occurs within the boundaries of formal institutions.
China Law and Society Review, 2019
By focusing on the underlit corners of authoritarian governance in China, this article challenges... more By focusing on the underlit corners of authoritarian governance in China, this article challenges the thesis that constitutions matter to authoritarian regimes because they provide solutions for problems of governance. We argue to the contrary: the constitution appeals to the Chinese Communist Party (the Party or the CCP) because it does not provide solutions to fundamental issues of governance. Instead, such issues are kept out of the constitution so that they can be addressed by the Party through other regulatory mechanisms outside of the constitutional realm. In support of our thesis, we provide a unique review of the most up-to-date authoritative research on three key constitutional issues: central-local relations, party-state relations and power relations in the Politburo. These three issues correspond to three distinctive fields in China studies that were treated only in isolation but here we consider them together under the single framework of authoritarian constitutional governance.
By tracing the historical development of the relation between the Chinese Communist Party and Chi... more By tracing the historical development of the relation between the Chinese Communist Party and China’s courts, this article finds that in order to subjugate the state as a whole to its superior power, the Party has confined judicial power to a ranking order which it has determined and administered. It follows that courts can compel compliance with the law by non-state actors or state actors of lower rank but not by state actors of equal or higher rank than theirs. These arrangements are essential for the Party to maintain its control over judicial affairs of political significance without preempting the capacity of courts to regulate social and economic activities of low or no immediate interests to the Party. These arrangements also contribute to both the authoritarian and paternalistic roles that the Party has assumed in its relation with courts, which explains the puzzling nearly schizophrenic character that courts have displayed in the course of their activities.
Asian Journal of Law & Society, 2023
This article presents a theory of the order of power to explain the dynamics and interaction betw... more This article presents a theory of the order of power to explain the dynamics and interaction between the political and legal orders in China’s courts. This theory posits that the political order is embodied in the extensive administrative ranking system (ARS) of the PRC and has a systematic impact on the legal order regardless of the subject matter. The ARS is a system that regulates power relations between various institutional and personal actors in all key power fields, including courts. The order-of-power theory argues that the political order relativizes law during the processes of legal implementation, application, and enforcement. This theory provides a coherent explanation of judicial behavioral patterns in different subject matters, such as the centralization of criminal investigations in some crimes but not others, the distribution of corruption in China's courts and the outcome patterns of administrative litigation. This theory challenges the conventional wisdom that the political order and the legal order in China’s courts are partitioned based on the subject matter and asserts the opposite: the impact of the political order is systemic, comprehensive and applicable to the entire legal field across subject matters. This article fills a knowledge gap in Chinese law and politics, where the ARS has received little attention except in recent studies on administrative litigation. The article also identifies two distinct features of the ARS, its multi-dimensionality and inter-connectivity, our current understanding of which is disproportionately poor in relation to their significance.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate the variances of the mode of operation of single-pa... more The objective of this paper is to demonstrate the variances of the mode of operation of single-party states. In particular, it identifies the CCP’s invocation of its own authority as an independent seat of power and source of legitimacy as a defining feature of China’s party-state, which is different from the “mono-organization” depicted by T. H. Rigby in conceptualization and from the “dual state” modelled by Ernst Fränkel in practice. This paper also employs new evidence of the active operation of the Party’s disciplinary institution in the 1950s to contrast its mode of operation of today, as demonstrated in the erection of the new anticorruption body: National Supervision Commission, which has caught wide attention from observers both domestic and overseas. By focusing on how the Party manages its relation with the state at different times, this paper provides evidence that the Party continues to rely on its own seat of power to launch critical reforms, which defines the mode of operation of China’s party-state.
目前关于腐败的研究大多集中在从宏观上分析腐败产生的政治、经济与社会环境。本文则从微观层面上分析腐败行为，特别是：贿赂行为是如何在行贿人和受贿人的操作下进行的。在此基础上，本文特别探讨为什么“关系... more 目前关于腐败的研究大多集中在从宏观上分析腐败产生的政治、经济与社会环境。本文则从微观层面上分析腐败行为，特别是：贿赂行为是如何在行贿人和受贿人的操作下进行的。在此基础上，本文特别探讨为什么“关系”在腐败交换行为中有不可替代的重要性。通过具体的实证分析，本文得出结论：贿赂行为的过程不是一些无序的分散行为的简单集合，而是遵循特定的规则和惯例。这些规则和惯例可以被视为替代市场来推动腐败进行的非正式交换机制。本文论证了“关系”以及与此相关的一系列行为正是这种非正式交换机制的具体体现。它的主要功能是：通过将腐败交换与社会交换稼接以排除妨碍腐败交易进行的法律、道德和认知障碍并将腐败参与者的交易安全风险、道德成本和认知失调最小化。目前学界通常认为：是中国的“关系”文化诱发了腐败。本文持相反观点：即，是腐败制造了“关系”文化，因为“关系”作为一种替代市场的非正式交换机制是腐败的必要组成部分。
《法律与社会科学》 2012年第九卷 第28-62页
目前关于腐败的研究大多集中在从宏观上分析腐败产生的政治、经济与社会环境。本文则从微观层面上分析腐败行为，特别是：贿赂行为是如何在行贿人和受贿人的操作下进行的。在此基础上，本文特别探讨为什么“关系... more 目前关于腐败的研究大多集中在从宏观上分析腐败产生的政治、经济与社会环境。本文则从微观层面上分析腐败行为，特别是：贿赂行为是如何在行贿人和受贿人的操作下进行的。在此基础上，本文特别探讨为什么“关系”在腐败交换行为中有不可替代的重要性。通过具体的实证分析，本文得出结论：贿赂行为的过程不是一些无序的分散行为的简单集合，而是遵循特定的规则和惯例。这些规则和惯例可以被视为替代市场来推动腐败进行的非正式交换机制。本文论证了“关系”以及与此相关的一系列行为正是这种非正式交换机制的具体体现。它的主要功能是：通过将腐败交换与社会交换稼接以排除妨碍腐败交易进行的法律、道德和认知障碍并将腐败参与者的交易安全风险、道德成本和认知失调最小化。目前学界通常认为：是中国的“关系”文化诱发了腐败。本文持相反观点：即，是腐败制造了“关系”文化，因为“关系”作为一种替代市场的非正式交换机制是腐败的必要组成部分。
This article traces and analyzes the longitudinal changes of the operative structure, rules and p... more This article traces and analyzes the longitudinal changes of the operative structure, rules and practices of the Party disciplinary institution not for the purpose of appraising its performance in corruption control but to demonstrate how the Party regulates its own enforcement agency through institutionalizing the disciplinary decision-making process. To that end, this article identifies and explains the exact measures that the Party has used to delegate authority to the Party’s disciplinary institution in a systematic and institutionalized manner without losing control over the disciplinary outcome. It also identifies three features of the institutionalization process: concentration and centralization of disciplinary power and further depoliticization of disciplinary activities.
Journal of Contemporary China, 2019
This article traces the process of Xi Jinping’s campaign in 2012-2017 and explains how an anticor... more This article traces the process of Xi Jinping’s campaign in 2012-2017 and explains how an anticorruption effort has been transformed into an exercise of power-consolidation for his office. The findings of this article are three-fold. First, the power-consolidation process has benefited from a combination of an ideological campaign and a disciplinary campaign, which were not only synchronized but also feed into one another to achieve a shared goal. Second, the campaign became politicized around midterm and intensified afterwards. The pace of progress of the campaign coincided with Xi Jinping’s advancement of power. Third, the most significant outcome of Xi Jinping’s campaign is not the numbers of disciplined corrupt officials but the paradigm-change in the disciplinary regime of the Party: first, the reversal of the depoliticization process of the Party’s disciplinary regime; second, the retention of temporarily mobilized anticorruption resources; and third the simplification of evidence production procedure. The combined result is a considerable expansion of the CCDI’s anticorruption investigative capacities and a significant increase of Xi Jinping’s leverage to impose political loyalty and compliance upon Party officials in the future.
Free access to Full-text of this article at this link:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2018.1497911?scroll=top&needAccess=true
International Political Science Review 39 (5), 634-646, 2018
In this article, I offer an economic analysis of the characteristics that are associated with cor... more In this article, I offer an economic analysis of the characteristics that are associated with corruption when it is facilitated through social exchange or “guanxi” as it is called in China. To that end, I challenge the framework applied in classic social exchange theories and contend that social exchange shall be distinguished from market exchange based on whether the intention to exchange is concealed and not on the exchanging parties’ subjective reflections on the nature and outlook of their exchange relationship. I also identify that corruption participants rely on a self-executable operating mechanism to facilitate negotiation and enforcement of exchange terms instead of the informal reputational system that is used in ordinary social exchange. In addition, I explain how the involvement of professional brokers democratizes guanxi-based corruption and extends the otherwise privileged exchange opportunities to those beyond the guanxi networks with lowered cost.
Journal of Comparative Law
In her article ‘Transparency, Propaganda and Disinformation: “Managing” anticorruption inform... more In her article ‘Transparency, Propaganda and Disinformation: “Managing” anticorruption information in China’ Dr Li Ling examines the quality of access to information—both fact and propaganda orientated—relating to corruption and anticorruption in China and how that affects understanding about corruption. The essay shows that the availability of corruption-related information has dramatically increased since 2012, largely as a result of not only expanded anticorruption efforts but also the introduction of various social media platforms. There have been improvements in the release of corruption-related laws and regulations and of information about important procedural decisions made during the disciplinary and judicial processes of individual corruption cases. However, provision of detailed information about specific decisions has been reduced, and limits on the access to the source of information controlled by governmental authorities makes it difficult for ordinary citizens to take an accurate and independent view of events. Moreover, while release to the public of accurate factual information remains limited, propagandistic anticorruption information is produced in abundance and circulated to the public with much greater intensity and growing sophistication. In the past five years, great efforts have been made by the Party to improve the acceptance of anticorruption propaganda and to increase the content diversity of anticorruption propaganda. The purpose of anticorruption propaganda continues to be a localization of problems of corruption by characterizing corruption offenders as trust-breaching and venal opportunists who have deserted the cause of the Party and fallen prey to beguiling bribers. Thus, the Party is able to portray itself both as a victim of the crimes of corruption and as a crusader against corruption, legitimately striving to have its moral image repaired and integrity restored.
"Despite its rampant presence, judicial corruption in China has often been
regarded as idiosync... more "Despite its rampant presence, judicial corruption in China has often been
regarded as idiosyncratically deviant behavior of a few black sheep eluding
prescribed judicial conduct. This entrenched assumption has both discouraged
in-depth investigation of the phenomenon of judicial corruption and inhibited
a proper understanding of the functioning of China’s courts. Through an
empirically grounded examination of how court rulings tainted by corruption
are processed, this article found that judicial corruption in China is an
institutionalized activity which is systemically inherent in the particular
decision-making mechanism, guided by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP)’s instrumental rule-by-law ideal. In investigating what has contributed
to the institutionalization of judicial corruption, the paper also examines the
interplay between law and Party politics in China’s courts. Its findings,
therefore, also shed light on behind-the-court-room judicial activities and on
the enduring perplexity of the gap between the law in the book and the law in
action."
Unlike most current academic studies on corruption in China, which focus on the theme of how poli... more Unlike most current academic studies on corruption in China, which focus on the theme of how political, economic and social environments have caused corruption at the macro-level, this paper takes a micro-view. It concentrates on the question of how corruption, notably bribery, takes place between a briber and the bribed. Moreover, it examines what exact role guanxi-practice plays in corrupt exchange and, more importantly, why it constitutes a critical element. Through in-depth case-studies derived from extensive fieldwork, this paper comes to the conclusion that the micro-level operation of corruption in China is not due to some haphazard aggregation of sporadic acts but follows certain rules and codes of conduct, which should be seen as an informal institutional mechanism facilitating the contracting process of corrupt exchange. This paper also demonstrates that guanxi-practice embodies such rules and codes of conduct. Such conduct purports to remove the legal, moral and cognitive barriers impeding the contracting process of corrupt exchange by grafting a corrupt agreement upon a social setting, in which risk of exchange safety is controlled, and moral costs and cognitive dissonance are reduced. Therefore, this paper contends that the causality link between guanxi-practice and corruption is the inverse of the view held by many. It is not that the participants of corruption are compelled to corrupt conduct because of the existence of the guanxi-practice, but on the contrary, these participants adopt guanxi-practice as an alternative operating mechanism that facilitates corruption.
Op-eds, blog posts by Ling Li
Uploads
Academic publications by Ling Li
Free access to Full-text of this article at this link:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2018.1497911?scroll=top&needAccess=true
regarded as idiosyncratically deviant behavior of a few black sheep eluding
prescribed judicial conduct. This entrenched assumption has both discouraged
in-depth investigation of the phenomenon of judicial corruption and inhibited
a proper understanding of the functioning of China’s courts. Through an
empirically grounded examination of how court rulings tainted by corruption
are processed, this article found that judicial corruption in China is an
institutionalized activity which is systemically inherent in the particular
decision-making mechanism, guided by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP)’s instrumental rule-by-law ideal. In investigating what has contributed
to the institutionalization of judicial corruption, the paper also examines the
interplay between law and Party politics in China’s courts. Its findings,
therefore, also shed light on behind-the-court-room judicial activities and on
the enduring perplexity of the gap between the law in the book and the law in
action."
Op-eds, blog posts by Ling Li
Free access to Full-text of this article at this link:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2018.1497911?scroll=top&needAccess=true
regarded as idiosyncratically deviant behavior of a few black sheep eluding
prescribed judicial conduct. This entrenched assumption has both discouraged
in-depth investigation of the phenomenon of judicial corruption and inhibited
a proper understanding of the functioning of China’s courts. Through an
empirically grounded examination of how court rulings tainted by corruption
are processed, this article found that judicial corruption in China is an
institutionalized activity which is systemically inherent in the particular
decision-making mechanism, guided by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP)’s instrumental rule-by-law ideal. In investigating what has contributed
to the institutionalization of judicial corruption, the paper also examines the
interplay between law and Party politics in China’s courts. Its findings,
therefore, also shed light on behind-the-court-room judicial activities and on
the enduring perplexity of the gap between the law in the book and the law in
action."
In this conversation with Teng Biao, I try to understand: What are the common denominators that have created an affinity between this group and the Trump administration? In other words, what are the specific qualities of Trump’s leadership that resonated so strongly with his Chinese supporters? The answers to these questions are important and remain relevant despite the end of Trump’s presidency, which will undoubtedly dampen the enthusiasm of his supporters to various extents across the board.
It is a newly established decision-making body at the highest rank that is mandated to decide on issues concerning legislative initiatives, judicial policies and policy issues on law and enforcement, compliance of law and dissemination of law to the general public. The predecessor of the Central Party CCGAL first emerged in 2017 as one of the Central Leading-Groups headed by the General Party-Secretary (GPS) Xi Jinping, which was upgraded quickly to the status of a commission in 2018 as a component of the most expansive and far-reaching Action Plan on the Restructure of Party-State Institutions 深化党和国家机构改革方案 (hereinafter 2018 Restructure Plan).
Original source:
https://madeinchinajournal.com/2019/05/23/xi-jinpings-succession-what-did-the-west-get-wrong/
• Many commentators believe that Xi Jinping violated a cornerstone of the Party's "succession norm" by removing term limits for the PRC Chairman in 2018. Despite its popularity, this belief is ill-founded.
• The day when the head of the Party truly abdicates his entitlement to choose his own successor will be the day when the Party is ready to surrender itself to constitutional rule, but for now this is a very distant prospect.
• Deng Xiaoping's invention of choosing two successors down the line