The political history of Western feminism is typically described as encompassing various "waves" ... more The political history of Western feminism is typically described as encompassing various "waves" of theory and practice, with each wave building on, but also going beyond, an earlier wave. Thus, the second wave (1968-1980s) is seen as taking up and radicalizing the first wave (1848-1920) struggle for political rights by expanding the concept of rights and of politics itself beyond the confines of the formal political sphere; the third wave (1991-?) is seen as taking up and radicalizing the second wave's concept of "women" as the political subject of feminism. Handy though this periodization may be, it has left many feminists wondering which wave they are in anymore. Some feminists argue that the various waves have given way to "intersectional feminism." Still, that description does not address the fundamental question of what kind of critical political work the concept of a "wave" was supposed to do in the first place. It was not until 1968 that people started talking about feminism in terms of different waves, and that feminism came to be understood as having a history at all. This shift allowed feminists to root their political demand for change in a historical democratic struggle for social justice, not least as a way of countering the popular view of the women's liberation movement as an impossibly utopian project made up by a bunch of social malcontents.
Panel at the Conference "Political Theory in Times of Uncertainty"
27-29 September 2023, Bremen,... more Panel at the Conference "Political Theory in Times of Uncertainty" 27-29 September 2023, Bremen, Germany https://www.timesofuncertainty.org/
Submission Deadline: January 8, 2023
Political institutions are expressions of and instruments for dealing with uncertainty. Their design reflects the extent to which contingency is seen as a threat or as a potential. On the one hand, institutions hedge uncertainty by making principles and procedures durable and creating certainty of expectations. On the other hand, they can promote or protect uncertainty. Elections, for example, ensure that the composition of future governments remains indeterminate. While their contingency-reducing function has been researched extensively, the manifold ways in which institutions embrace uncertainty beyond periodical elections is not sufficiently explored. This panel investigates the relationship between institutions and uncertainty from a wide range of political theoretical perspectives. While normative theories are often accused of not making enough room for contingent political practices, postfoundationalist theories are reproached for celebrating contingency for its own sake and romanticizing experiences of uncertainty. This panel puts these attributions to the test and initiates a dialogue on “institutions of uncertainty” among different positions in political theory and related (sub)disciplines. To what extent do institutions not only contain uncertainty, but also productively manage contingency, ensure the responsiveness of political practice to changing contexts or guarantee the potentially disorderly influence of non- institutionalized popular power? To explore these questions, we invite contributions that interrogate concrete institutions or approaches to institutional theory regarding their specific take on the institutionalization of uncertainty. We explicitly encourage submissions that help bridge the supposed opposition between normative vs. postfoundational, systematic vs. historical and Western vs. global approaches to the study of political institutions.
The deadline for submissions of paper proposals (max. 500 words) is January 8th, 2023. The panel will be held in English. Proposals should be sent to sara.gebh@univie.ac.at and manon.westphal@uni- muenster.de.
Radical democracy is accused of having two so-called deficits: specifically, a normative and an i... more Radical democracy is accused of having two so-called deficits: specifically, a normative and an institutional one. An offensive defense against these accusations characterizes radical democratic theory not only as a critical inquiry activity, but engages its critics, firstly, by identifying a groundless ground of radical democracy and thus facilitating a dialogue with more established democratic theories. And secondly, by strengthening its utopian moment and establishing the identification of alternative futures, explicitly institutional ones, as its core competence. Thereby, radical democratic theory goes beyond mere questioning, without having to resort to ultimate justifications or models and without counteracting its core feature, contingency affirmation. Radical democracy, understood as thinking in alternatives, only lives up to its potential, when a possibility-disclosing dimension is added to its critical-questioning dimension. -- Radikaler Demokratietheorie werden insbesondere zwei Defizite unterstellt, ein normatives und ein institutionelles. Eine offensive Verteidigung gegen diese Vorwürfe charakterisiert radikale Demokratietheorie nicht nur als kritische Befragungsaktivität, sondern geht auf die Kritik ein, indem sie, erstens, einen grundlosen Grund der Radikaldemokratie identifiziert und damit den Austausch mit etablierteren Demokratietheorien erleichtert. Und zweitens, indem ihr utopisches Moment gestärkt und das Aufzeigen institutioneller alternativer Zukünfte als Kernkompetenz der radikalen Demokratietheorie verstanden wird. In diesem Sinne geht sie über eine reine Befragung hinaus, ohne auf Letztbegründungen oder Modelle zurückgreifen zu müssen und ohne ihr Alleinstellungsmerkmal, die Kontingenzaffirmation, zu konterkarieren. Radikaldemokratie, verstanden als Denken in Alternativen, schöpft erst dann ihr Potenzial aus, wenn zur kritisch-befragenden Dimension eine möglichkeitseröffnende hinzukommt.
Dissertation, The New School for Social Research, 2022
The specter of disorder shapes the idea of democracy. What democratic government has come to mean... more The specter of disorder shapes the idea of democracy. What democratic government has come to mean today is fundamentally influenced by a cautious, if not outright hostile position towards disorder (stasis). To investigate the link between democracy and disorder, this dissertation follows a two-pronged approach: I aim to, first, reconstruct the history of democratic ideas as one that is shaped by the specter of disorder and, second, systematize and explore the potential of the concept of democratic stasis. While from antiquity until the beginning of the 19th century democracy is condemned as a regime of constant quarrel (rejection of democracy), during the saddle time the rule of the people not only loses its negative connotation, but also its hitherto intimate link to excessive freedom and disorder. In its moment of triumph, democracy becomes pacified (republicanization of democracy). The contemporary constellation, the agonistic turn, remains under the impression of the specter of disorder. While conflict is appreciated, democracy is conceptualized as a momentary practice rather than an institutionalizable form (rarification of democracy). Building on these historical-reconstructive considerations, I discuss how disorder relates to democracy beyond its rejection, republicanization or rarification. I propose to reclaim freedom as democracy’s animating principle, introduce the concept of democratic stasis, and refocus our attention towards the inherent unruliness that the democratic project used to imply. Because the notion of democratic stasis allows for normative differentiations between politicizations that deepen and those that aim to demolish democracy, on the one hand, and for the institutionalization of democratic self-rule, on the other, it holds the potential to conceptualize democracy as both a practice and a form. These considerations are first building blocks for a theory of disorderly democracy. This dissertation proposes to trace the life of democracy through its relationship with disorder. The integration of stasis into the democratic imaginary not only reveals the multifarious ways in which it shapes the hegemonic idea of modern democracy but also discloses novel possibilities for democratic futures. Only if we face the specter of disorder, acknowledge its potency, and reframe stasis as a genuinely democratic quality, we can think democracy otherwise.
That democracy is in crisis is a truism today. In recent years, many commentators have identified... more That democracy is in crisis is a truism today. In recent years, many commentators have identified the disintegration of truth and facts as the core threat to democratic societies, and accordingly call for restoring our political sense of reality. In turn, this workshop proceeds from the conviction that we face at least as severe a crisis of our political sense of possibility: a crisis of political imagination. It has become increasingly difficult to even imagine democratic politics and democratic futurity differently, that is, significantly departing from the status quo of the minimal model of present, liberal western democracy. The infamous TINA dictum emblematically attests to the outright rejection of political creativity under the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. While democratic creativity withers away, progressive change seems to be outsourced to the field of technology, in terms of planned and anticipable 'innovation'. This is all the more fatal in times of ecological disaster, where democratic political action is increasingly challenged by calls for establishing 'authoritarian environmentalism', often accompanied with technocratic ideas of climate engineering.
From Kant to Habermas cosmopolitanism carries with it the hope of moral, legal, cultural and poli... more From Kant to Habermas cosmopolitanism carries with it the hope of moral, legal, cultural and political fairness and ultimately global peace. By referring back to the philosopher who coined the term, Diogenes the Cynic, my paper proposes a radically different understanding of cosmopolitanism: as a skeptical position rather than an ideal endpoint of human solidarity. I argue that Diogenes' version of cosmopolitanism can best be reconstructed by focussing on the motif of shamelessness, which enables us to appreciate cosmopolitanism as a critical endeavour that acknowledges the conceptual paradox of the cosmopolis. Different than many modern versions that are trapped in the search for a headquarters of the cosmos, Diogenes embraces mobility, non-conformism and the no-place as the origin of critique. Instead of letting only ideas travel, the shameless cosmopolitanism I propose emphasizes the potential that lies in the act of physically transgressing borders while acting politically and therewith challenging the common equation of legal with political identity and agency. Thus, Diogenes' performative philosophy is of paramount importance for today due to its absolute opposition to imperialist tendencies.
With the concept of democratic disobedience this paper introduces a justification for civil disob... more With the concept of democratic disobedience this paper introduces a justification for civil disobedience that differs from the traditional account of liberal civil disobedience primarily in two aspects: first, the grounds on which disobedient actions are justified and second, the scope of legitimate demands within this mode of protest. To demonstrate the potential of this new mode of justification it is applied to the case of anti-abortion activism in the U.S.The liberal concept of civil disobedience is based on the idea that in cases of blatant injustices civil disobedience is a means to trump and correct democratic decisions in the name of justice. Democratic disobedience, on the other hand, does not invoke an external corrective instance, but rather bases its justification on the assumption that the democratic process is inherently imperfect and therefore inevitably produces democratic deficits, i.e. incongruities between the will of the citizens and governmental politics. Contrary to the liberal model, democratic disobedience does not refer to pre-political or metaphysical concepts like justice, God or personal conscience, but grounds its justification in the conflictual practice of democratic decision-making processes. This theoretical reorientation expands the legitimate reasons for civil disobedience beyond strict violations of justice. To counterbalance this tendency democratic disobedience is strictly confined to demand only a reintroduction into the political decision-making process and, accordingly, the justification for democratic disobedience expires if a political reengagement with the issue in question is successfully triggered – and this includes the case in which the sovereign reaffirms the policy. By virtue of this construction liberal and democratic disobedience can co-exist and complement each other depending on the particular context and the justifying reasons for civil disobedience. What renders the concept of democratic disobedience especially valuable, however, is that this new formulation avoids any tendencies towards an instrumental understanding of democracy and justifies disobedience rather as a productive form of participation than as a parasitic external revising mechanism that limits democratic self-government.
The political history of Western feminism is typically described as encompassing various "waves" ... more The political history of Western feminism is typically described as encompassing various "waves" of theory and practice, with each wave building on, but also going beyond, an earlier wave. Thus, the second wave (1968-1980s) is seen as taking up and radicalizing the first wave (1848-1920) struggle for political rights by expanding the concept of rights and of politics itself beyond the confines of the formal political sphere; the third wave (1991-?) is seen as taking up and radicalizing the second wave's concept of "women" as the political subject of feminism. Handy though this periodization may be, it has left many feminists wondering which wave they are in anymore. Some feminists argue that the various waves have given way to "intersectional feminism." Still, that description does not address the fundamental question of what kind of critical political work the concept of a "wave" was supposed to do in the first place. It was not until 1968 that people started talking about feminism in terms of different waves, and that feminism came to be understood as having a history at all. This shift allowed feminists to root their political demand for change in a historical democratic struggle for social justice, not least as a way of countering the popular view of the women's liberation movement as an impossibly utopian project made up by a bunch of social malcontents.
Panel at the Conference "Political Theory in Times of Uncertainty"
27-29 September 2023, Bremen,... more Panel at the Conference "Political Theory in Times of Uncertainty" 27-29 September 2023, Bremen, Germany https://www.timesofuncertainty.org/
Submission Deadline: January 8, 2023
Political institutions are expressions of and instruments for dealing with uncertainty. Their design reflects the extent to which contingency is seen as a threat or as a potential. On the one hand, institutions hedge uncertainty by making principles and procedures durable and creating certainty of expectations. On the other hand, they can promote or protect uncertainty. Elections, for example, ensure that the composition of future governments remains indeterminate. While their contingency-reducing function has been researched extensively, the manifold ways in which institutions embrace uncertainty beyond periodical elections is not sufficiently explored. This panel investigates the relationship between institutions and uncertainty from a wide range of political theoretical perspectives. While normative theories are often accused of not making enough room for contingent political practices, postfoundationalist theories are reproached for celebrating contingency for its own sake and romanticizing experiences of uncertainty. This panel puts these attributions to the test and initiates a dialogue on “institutions of uncertainty” among different positions in political theory and related (sub)disciplines. To what extent do institutions not only contain uncertainty, but also productively manage contingency, ensure the responsiveness of political practice to changing contexts or guarantee the potentially disorderly influence of non- institutionalized popular power? To explore these questions, we invite contributions that interrogate concrete institutions or approaches to institutional theory regarding their specific take on the institutionalization of uncertainty. We explicitly encourage submissions that help bridge the supposed opposition between normative vs. postfoundational, systematic vs. historical and Western vs. global approaches to the study of political institutions.
The deadline for submissions of paper proposals (max. 500 words) is January 8th, 2023. The panel will be held in English. Proposals should be sent to sara.gebh@univie.ac.at and manon.westphal@uni- muenster.de.
Radical democracy is accused of having two so-called deficits: specifically, a normative and an i... more Radical democracy is accused of having two so-called deficits: specifically, a normative and an institutional one. An offensive defense against these accusations characterizes radical democratic theory not only as a critical inquiry activity, but engages its critics, firstly, by identifying a groundless ground of radical democracy and thus facilitating a dialogue with more established democratic theories. And secondly, by strengthening its utopian moment and establishing the identification of alternative futures, explicitly institutional ones, as its core competence. Thereby, radical democratic theory goes beyond mere questioning, without having to resort to ultimate justifications or models and without counteracting its core feature, contingency affirmation. Radical democracy, understood as thinking in alternatives, only lives up to its potential, when a possibility-disclosing dimension is added to its critical-questioning dimension. -- Radikaler Demokratietheorie werden insbesondere zwei Defizite unterstellt, ein normatives und ein institutionelles. Eine offensive Verteidigung gegen diese Vorwürfe charakterisiert radikale Demokratietheorie nicht nur als kritische Befragungsaktivität, sondern geht auf die Kritik ein, indem sie, erstens, einen grundlosen Grund der Radikaldemokratie identifiziert und damit den Austausch mit etablierteren Demokratietheorien erleichtert. Und zweitens, indem ihr utopisches Moment gestärkt und das Aufzeigen institutioneller alternativer Zukünfte als Kernkompetenz der radikalen Demokratietheorie verstanden wird. In diesem Sinne geht sie über eine reine Befragung hinaus, ohne auf Letztbegründungen oder Modelle zurückgreifen zu müssen und ohne ihr Alleinstellungsmerkmal, die Kontingenzaffirmation, zu konterkarieren. Radikaldemokratie, verstanden als Denken in Alternativen, schöpft erst dann ihr Potenzial aus, wenn zur kritisch-befragenden Dimension eine möglichkeitseröffnende hinzukommt.
Dissertation, The New School for Social Research, 2022
The specter of disorder shapes the idea of democracy. What democratic government has come to mean... more The specter of disorder shapes the idea of democracy. What democratic government has come to mean today is fundamentally influenced by a cautious, if not outright hostile position towards disorder (stasis). To investigate the link between democracy and disorder, this dissertation follows a two-pronged approach: I aim to, first, reconstruct the history of democratic ideas as one that is shaped by the specter of disorder and, second, systematize and explore the potential of the concept of democratic stasis. While from antiquity until the beginning of the 19th century democracy is condemned as a regime of constant quarrel (rejection of democracy), during the saddle time the rule of the people not only loses its negative connotation, but also its hitherto intimate link to excessive freedom and disorder. In its moment of triumph, democracy becomes pacified (republicanization of democracy). The contemporary constellation, the agonistic turn, remains under the impression of the specter of disorder. While conflict is appreciated, democracy is conceptualized as a momentary practice rather than an institutionalizable form (rarification of democracy). Building on these historical-reconstructive considerations, I discuss how disorder relates to democracy beyond its rejection, republicanization or rarification. I propose to reclaim freedom as democracy’s animating principle, introduce the concept of democratic stasis, and refocus our attention towards the inherent unruliness that the democratic project used to imply. Because the notion of democratic stasis allows for normative differentiations between politicizations that deepen and those that aim to demolish democracy, on the one hand, and for the institutionalization of democratic self-rule, on the other, it holds the potential to conceptualize democracy as both a practice and a form. These considerations are first building blocks for a theory of disorderly democracy. This dissertation proposes to trace the life of democracy through its relationship with disorder. The integration of stasis into the democratic imaginary not only reveals the multifarious ways in which it shapes the hegemonic idea of modern democracy but also discloses novel possibilities for democratic futures. Only if we face the specter of disorder, acknowledge its potency, and reframe stasis as a genuinely democratic quality, we can think democracy otherwise.
That democracy is in crisis is a truism today. In recent years, many commentators have identified... more That democracy is in crisis is a truism today. In recent years, many commentators have identified the disintegration of truth and facts as the core threat to democratic societies, and accordingly call for restoring our political sense of reality. In turn, this workshop proceeds from the conviction that we face at least as severe a crisis of our political sense of possibility: a crisis of political imagination. It has become increasingly difficult to even imagine democratic politics and democratic futurity differently, that is, significantly departing from the status quo of the minimal model of present, liberal western democracy. The infamous TINA dictum emblematically attests to the outright rejection of political creativity under the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. While democratic creativity withers away, progressive change seems to be outsourced to the field of technology, in terms of planned and anticipable 'innovation'. This is all the more fatal in times of ecological disaster, where democratic political action is increasingly challenged by calls for establishing 'authoritarian environmentalism', often accompanied with technocratic ideas of climate engineering.
From Kant to Habermas cosmopolitanism carries with it the hope of moral, legal, cultural and poli... more From Kant to Habermas cosmopolitanism carries with it the hope of moral, legal, cultural and political fairness and ultimately global peace. By referring back to the philosopher who coined the term, Diogenes the Cynic, my paper proposes a radically different understanding of cosmopolitanism: as a skeptical position rather than an ideal endpoint of human solidarity. I argue that Diogenes' version of cosmopolitanism can best be reconstructed by focussing on the motif of shamelessness, which enables us to appreciate cosmopolitanism as a critical endeavour that acknowledges the conceptual paradox of the cosmopolis. Different than many modern versions that are trapped in the search for a headquarters of the cosmos, Diogenes embraces mobility, non-conformism and the no-place as the origin of critique. Instead of letting only ideas travel, the shameless cosmopolitanism I propose emphasizes the potential that lies in the act of physically transgressing borders while acting politically and therewith challenging the common equation of legal with political identity and agency. Thus, Diogenes' performative philosophy is of paramount importance for today due to its absolute opposition to imperialist tendencies.
With the concept of democratic disobedience this paper introduces a justification for civil disob... more With the concept of democratic disobedience this paper introduces a justification for civil disobedience that differs from the traditional account of liberal civil disobedience primarily in two aspects: first, the grounds on which disobedient actions are justified and second, the scope of legitimate demands within this mode of protest. To demonstrate the potential of this new mode of justification it is applied to the case of anti-abortion activism in the U.S.The liberal concept of civil disobedience is based on the idea that in cases of blatant injustices civil disobedience is a means to trump and correct democratic decisions in the name of justice. Democratic disobedience, on the other hand, does not invoke an external corrective instance, but rather bases its justification on the assumption that the democratic process is inherently imperfect and therefore inevitably produces democratic deficits, i.e. incongruities between the will of the citizens and governmental politics. Contrary to the liberal model, democratic disobedience does not refer to pre-political or metaphysical concepts like justice, God or personal conscience, but grounds its justification in the conflictual practice of democratic decision-making processes. This theoretical reorientation expands the legitimate reasons for civil disobedience beyond strict violations of justice. To counterbalance this tendency democratic disobedience is strictly confined to demand only a reintroduction into the political decision-making process and, accordingly, the justification for democratic disobedience expires if a political reengagement with the issue in question is successfully triggered – and this includes the case in which the sovereign reaffirms the policy. By virtue of this construction liberal and democratic disobedience can co-exist and complement each other depending on the particular context and the justifying reasons for civil disobedience. What renders the concept of democratic disobedience especially valuable, however, is that this new formulation avoids any tendencies towards an instrumental understanding of democracy and justifies disobedience rather as a productive form of participation than as a parasitic external revising mechanism that limits democratic self-government.
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27-29 September 2023, Bremen, Germany https://www.timesofuncertainty.org/
Submission Deadline: January 8, 2023
Political institutions are expressions of and instruments for dealing with uncertainty. Their design reflects the extent to which contingency is seen as a threat or as a potential. On the one hand, institutions hedge uncertainty by making principles and procedures durable and creating certainty of expectations. On the other hand, they can promote or protect uncertainty. Elections, for example, ensure that the composition of future governments remains indeterminate. While their contingency-reducing function has been researched extensively, the manifold ways in which institutions embrace uncertainty beyond periodical elections is not sufficiently explored.
This panel investigates the relationship between institutions and uncertainty from a wide range of political theoretical perspectives. While normative theories are often accused of not making enough room for contingent political practices, postfoundationalist theories are reproached for celebrating contingency for its own sake and romanticizing experiences of uncertainty. This panel puts these attributions to the test and initiates a dialogue on “institutions of uncertainty” among different positions in political theory and related (sub)disciplines. To what extent do institutions not only contain uncertainty, but also productively manage contingency, ensure the responsiveness of political practice to changing contexts or guarantee the potentially disorderly influence of non- institutionalized popular power? To explore these questions, we invite contributions that interrogate concrete institutions or approaches to institutional theory regarding their specific take on the institutionalization of uncertainty. We explicitly encourage submissions that help bridge the supposed opposition between normative vs. postfoundational, systematic vs. historical and Western vs. global approaches to the study of political institutions.
The deadline for submissions of paper proposals (max. 500 words) is January 8th, 2023. The panel will be held in English. Proposals should be sent to sara.gebh@univie.ac.at and manon.westphal@uni- muenster.de.
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Radikaler Demokratietheorie werden insbesondere zwei Defizite unterstellt, ein normatives und ein institutionelles. Eine offensive Verteidigung gegen diese Vorwürfe charakterisiert radikale Demokratietheorie nicht nur als kritische Befragungsaktivität, sondern geht auf die Kritik ein, indem sie, erstens, einen grundlosen Grund der Radikaldemokratie identifiziert und damit den Austausch mit etablierteren Demokratietheorien erleichtert. Und zweitens, indem ihr utopisches Moment gestärkt und das Aufzeigen institutioneller alternativer Zukünfte als Kernkompetenz der radikalen Demokratietheorie verstanden wird. In diesem Sinne geht sie über eine reine Befragung hinaus, ohne auf Letztbegründungen oder Modelle zurückgreifen zu müssen und ohne ihr Alleinstellungsmerkmal, die Kontingenzaffirmation, zu konterkarieren. Radikaldemokratie, verstanden als Denken in Alternativen, schöpft erst dann ihr Potenzial aus, wenn zur kritisch-befragenden Dimension eine möglichkeitseröffnende hinzukommt.
While from antiquity until the beginning of the 19th century democracy is condemned as a regime of constant quarrel (rejection of democracy), during the saddle time the rule of the people not only loses its negative connotation, but also its hitherto intimate link to excessive freedom and disorder. In its moment of triumph, democracy becomes pacified (republicanization of democracy). The contemporary constellation, the agonistic turn, remains under the impression of the specter of disorder. While conflict is appreciated, democracy is conceptualized as a momentary practice rather than an institutionalizable form (rarification of democracy).
Building on these historical-reconstructive considerations, I discuss how disorder relates to democracy beyond its rejection, republicanization or rarification. I propose to reclaim freedom as democracy’s animating principle, introduce the concept of democratic stasis, and refocus our attention towards the inherent unruliness that the democratic project used to imply. Because the notion of democratic stasis allows for normative differentiations between politicizations that deepen and those that aim to demolish democracy, on the one hand, and for the institutionalization of democratic self-rule, on the other, it holds the potential to conceptualize democracy as both a practice and a form. These considerations are first building blocks for a theory of disorderly democracy.
This dissertation proposes to trace the life of democracy through its relationship with disorder. The integration of stasis into the democratic imaginary not only reveals the multifarious ways in which it shapes the hegemonic idea of modern democracy but also discloses novel possibilities for democratic futures. Only if we face the specter of disorder, acknowledge its potency, and reframe stasis as a genuinely democratic quality, we can think democracy otherwise.
27-29 September 2023, Bremen, Germany https://www.timesofuncertainty.org/
Submission Deadline: January 8, 2023
Political institutions are expressions of and instruments for dealing with uncertainty. Their design reflects the extent to which contingency is seen as a threat or as a potential. On the one hand, institutions hedge uncertainty by making principles and procedures durable and creating certainty of expectations. On the other hand, they can promote or protect uncertainty. Elections, for example, ensure that the composition of future governments remains indeterminate. While their contingency-reducing function has been researched extensively, the manifold ways in which institutions embrace uncertainty beyond periodical elections is not sufficiently explored.
This panel investigates the relationship between institutions and uncertainty from a wide range of political theoretical perspectives. While normative theories are often accused of not making enough room for contingent political practices, postfoundationalist theories are reproached for celebrating contingency for its own sake and romanticizing experiences of uncertainty. This panel puts these attributions to the test and initiates a dialogue on “institutions of uncertainty” among different positions in political theory and related (sub)disciplines. To what extent do institutions not only contain uncertainty, but also productively manage contingency, ensure the responsiveness of political practice to changing contexts or guarantee the potentially disorderly influence of non- institutionalized popular power? To explore these questions, we invite contributions that interrogate concrete institutions or approaches to institutional theory regarding their specific take on the institutionalization of uncertainty. We explicitly encourage submissions that help bridge the supposed opposition between normative vs. postfoundational, systematic vs. historical and Western vs. global approaches to the study of political institutions.
The deadline for submissions of paper proposals (max. 500 words) is January 8th, 2023. The panel will be held in English. Proposals should be sent to sara.gebh@univie.ac.at and manon.westphal@uni- muenster.de.
--
Radikaler Demokratietheorie werden insbesondere zwei Defizite unterstellt, ein normatives und ein institutionelles. Eine offensive Verteidigung gegen diese Vorwürfe charakterisiert radikale Demokratietheorie nicht nur als kritische Befragungsaktivität, sondern geht auf die Kritik ein, indem sie, erstens, einen grundlosen Grund der Radikaldemokratie identifiziert und damit den Austausch mit etablierteren Demokratietheorien erleichtert. Und zweitens, indem ihr utopisches Moment gestärkt und das Aufzeigen institutioneller alternativer Zukünfte als Kernkompetenz der radikalen Demokratietheorie verstanden wird. In diesem Sinne geht sie über eine reine Befragung hinaus, ohne auf Letztbegründungen oder Modelle zurückgreifen zu müssen und ohne ihr Alleinstellungsmerkmal, die Kontingenzaffirmation, zu konterkarieren. Radikaldemokratie, verstanden als Denken in Alternativen, schöpft erst dann ihr Potenzial aus, wenn zur kritisch-befragenden Dimension eine möglichkeitseröffnende hinzukommt.
While from antiquity until the beginning of the 19th century democracy is condemned as a regime of constant quarrel (rejection of democracy), during the saddle time the rule of the people not only loses its negative connotation, but also its hitherto intimate link to excessive freedom and disorder. In its moment of triumph, democracy becomes pacified (republicanization of democracy). The contemporary constellation, the agonistic turn, remains under the impression of the specter of disorder. While conflict is appreciated, democracy is conceptualized as a momentary practice rather than an institutionalizable form (rarification of democracy).
Building on these historical-reconstructive considerations, I discuss how disorder relates to democracy beyond its rejection, republicanization or rarification. I propose to reclaim freedom as democracy’s animating principle, introduce the concept of democratic stasis, and refocus our attention towards the inherent unruliness that the democratic project used to imply. Because the notion of democratic stasis allows for normative differentiations between politicizations that deepen and those that aim to demolish democracy, on the one hand, and for the institutionalization of democratic self-rule, on the other, it holds the potential to conceptualize democracy as both a practice and a form. These considerations are first building blocks for a theory of disorderly democracy.
This dissertation proposes to trace the life of democracy through its relationship with disorder. The integration of stasis into the democratic imaginary not only reveals the multifarious ways in which it shapes the hegemonic idea of modern democracy but also discloses novel possibilities for democratic futures. Only if we face the specter of disorder, acknowledge its potency, and reframe stasis as a genuinely democratic quality, we can think democracy otherwise.