I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as... more
I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based” properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that some standard assumptions about causal competition need to be revised.
We examine cases of emergent behavior in physics, and argue for an account of emergence based on features of the phase space portraits of certain dynamical systems. On our account, the phase space portraits of systems displaying emergent... more
We examine cases of emergent behavior in physics, and argue for an account of emergence based on features of the phase space portraits of certain dynamical systems. On our account, the phase space portraits of systems displaying emergent behavior are topologically inequivalent to those of the systems from which they ‘emerge’. This account gives us an objective sense in which emergent phenomena are qualitatively novel, without involving the difficulties associated with downward causation and the like. We also argue that the role of complexity in emergence has been overstated: emergent behavior can occur in very simple systems, and even when it occurs in complex systems it is the qualitative novelty of that behavior, rather that the complexity of the system, that matters for emergence.
Philosophers and scientists often describe theories, laws, and explanations as applying to the world at different 'levels'. The idea of a 'level of application' is often used to demarcate disciplinary or sub-disciplinary boundaries in the... more
Philosophers and scientists often describe theories, laws, and explanations as applying to the world at different 'levels'. The idea of a 'level of application' is often used to demarcate disciplinary or sub-disciplinary boundaries in the sciences. For instance, stoichiometric laws and quantum mechanical laws might be said to describe chemical phenomena at different levels. More generally, the idea of levels is used to distinguish more fundamental laws or theories from less fundamental ones: more fundamental theories are those that apply at more fundamental levels.
The concept of emergence appears in various places within the literature on expertise and expert practice. Here, I examine some of these applications of emergence in the light of two prominent accounts of emergence from the philosophy of... more
The concept of emergence appears in various places within the literature on expertise and expert practice. Here, I examine some of these applications of emergence in the light of two prominent accounts of emergence from the philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. I evaluate these accounts with respect to several specific contexts in which emergence seems to be an appropriate way of characterizing expertise in groups. While it is sometimes assumed that emergent phenomena are in some way inexplicable, the two accounts of emergence I discuss highlight ways in which the concept of emergence relates to specific styles of explanation.
E is the letter, if not the word, in today’s sciences of mind. E adjectives proliferate. Nowadays it is hard to avoid claims that cognition – perceiving, imagining, decision-making, planning – is best understood in E terms of some sort.... more
E is the letter, if not the word, in today’s sciences of mind. E adjectives proliferate. Nowadays it is hard to avoid claims that cognition – perceiving, imagining, decision-making, planning – is best understood in E terms of some sort. The list of E-terms is long: embodied, enactive, extended, embedded, ecological, engaged, emotional, expressive, emergent and so on.
This short piece explains: the big idea behind this movement; how it is inspired by empirical findings; why it matters; and what questions the field will face in the future. It focuses on the stronger and weaker ways that different E-approaches understand cognition as depending deeply on the dynamic ways in which cognizers use their bodies to engage with wider world.
This article analyses the publications resulting from Japanese whaling research over the last decade to ascertain what findings have resulted, what value these finding have and whether the findings, if valuable, could be researched in... more
This article analyses the publications resulting from Japanese whaling research over the last decade to ascertain what findings have resulted, what value these finding have and whether the findings, if valuable, could be researched in other ways. The Institute of Cetacean Research in Japan funds the whaling. The discussion will revolve around what the Institute says that it is doing with the whaling programs and what the research papers actually conclude.
This article analyses the publications resulting from Japanese whaling research over the last decade to ascertain what findings have resulted, what value these finding have and whether the findings, if valuable, could be researched in... more
This article analyses the publications resulting from Japanese whaling research over the last decade to ascertain what findings have resulted, what value these finding have and whether the findings, if valuable, could be researched in other ways. The Institute of Cetacean Research in Japan funds the whaling. The discussion will revolve around what the Institute says that it is doing with the whaling programs and what the research papers actually conclude.
Over the last few decades, psychologists have amassed a great deal of evidence that our thinking is strongly influenced by a number of biases. This research appears to have important implications for moral methodology. It seems likely that... more
Over the last few decades, psychologists have amassed a great deal of evidence that our thinking is strongly influenced by a number of biases. This research appears to have important implications for moral methodology. It seems likely that these biases affect our thinking about moral issues, and a fuller awareness of them might help us to find ways to counteract their influence, and so to improve our moral thinking. And yet there is little or no reference to such biases in the philosophical literature on many pressing, substantive moral questions. In this paper, I make a start on repairing this omission in relation to one such question, the ‘Aid Question’, which concerns how much, if anything, we are morally required to give to aid agencies. I begin by sketching a number of biases that seem particularly likely to affect our thinking about that question. I then go on to review the psychological research on ‘debiasing’ – that is, on attempts to counteract the influence of such biases. And finally I discuss and illustrate certain strategies for counteracting the influence of the biases in question on our thinking about the Aid Question.
It has become increasingly common recently to construe human natureas setting some pretty stringent limits to moral endeavour. Many consequentialists, in particular, take considerations concerning human nature to defeat certain demanding... more
It has become increasingly common recently to construe human natureas setting some pretty stringent limits to moral endeavour. Many consequentialists, in particular, take considerations concerning human nature to defeat certain demanding norms that would otherwise follow from their theory. One argument is that certain commitments ground psychological incapacities that prevent us from doing what would maximize the good. Another is that we would be likely to suffer some kind of psychological demoralization if we tried to become significantly more selfless. I argue that influential versions of both of these arguments underestimate our deliberative resources, and also fail to examine the kind of moral sources that may be able to sustain rigorous moral endeavour. Pessimism about our capacities for such endeavour results from the neglect of these factors, rather than from uncovering any significant limitations in human nature.
The appeal I am making is (roughly speaking) for aid specialists to do more to help those of us who aren’t aid specialists to arrive at judgements about the effects of the work of (voluntary) aid agencies that we have at least some reason... more
The appeal I am making is (roughly speaking) for aid specialists to do more to help those of us who aren’t aid specialists to arrive at judgements about the effects of the work of (voluntary) aid agencies that we have at least some reason to think accurate. In §1, I say a little about why it is difficult for us to form such judgements at present. In §2, I argue that the fact that it is so difficult for us to do so has certain negative consequences, especially if the effects of (at least some of) the work aid agencies do are in fact good enough to imply that we should give to them. These negative consequences give those who are in a position to make it easier for us to arrive at such judgements strong reasons to do so. In §3, I argue that there are certain measures that aid specialists in particular are in a good position to take that would make it easier for us to arrive at such judgements. Hence my appeal to aid specialists to take such measures. In §4, I articulate and respond to a number of objections that might be made to my argument. I finish, in §5, with a brief review.