Our chapter addresses two overlapping questions related to the following prompt: How does mindsha... more Our chapter addresses two overlapping questions related to the following prompt: How does mindshaping relate to and support the embodiment of rationality? This prompt can be addressed from complementary perspectives: (i) To what extent does mindshaping play a role in the embodiment of rationality? (ii) To what extent does the embodiment of rationality play a role in mindshaping? In the chapter, we survey and further explore how the philosophical, cognitive scientific, and economic studies of embodied rationality (and other embedded, extended, and enactive forms of cognition—known as 4E cognition) can provide in-roads toward addressing the above questions. Our strategy, in particular, is to explore how the integration of mindshaping with the embodiment of rationality may take different routes depending on the degree of retention/relaxation of mental representations as an explanatory construct. We introduce four, increasingly ‘radical’ concepts of embodied rationality – embodied bounded rationality, body/somatic rationality, extended rationality and radical embodied rationality – and discuss their potential integration with mindshaping.
Philosophy and anaesthesiology are disciplines that are rarely associated despite their respectiv... more Philosophy and anaesthesiology are disciplines that are rarely associated despite their respective interests in human consciousness. In this paper, we consider the advantages of integrating anaesthesiology and philosophy in the endeavour of discovering the neural correlates of state consciousness. We venture the following two-part argument. First, we argue that philosophical debates about the correlation conditions for state consciousness can be improved by focusing on how anaesthesiologists actually measure and study consciousness in practice. To this end, we argue that Integrated Information Theory provides a promising framework for discriminating features hitherto considered relevant to the identification of the neural correlates of state consciousness. Second, we argue that an improved philosophical understanding of what comprises the correlation conditions for state consciousness can, in turn, advance anaesthesiological methodologies; not only can it improve how potential evidence is gathered and assessed, but it can aid in the prevention of intraoperative awareness, increasing patient safety and well-being.
Despite on-going debates in philosophy and cognitive science, dual process theory (DPT) remains a... more Despite on-going debates in philosophy and cognitive science, dual process theory (DPT) remains a popular framework for theorizing about human cognition. Its central hypothesis is that cognitive processing can be subsumed under two generic types. In this paper, we argue that the putative success and popularity of this framework remains overstated and gives rise to certain misunderstandings. If DPT has predictive and/or explanatory power, it is through offering descriptions of cognitive phenomena via functional analysis. But functional descriptions require an individuation strategy. To date, there has been no systematic exploration of how Type 1 and Type 2 are functionally individuated. Following recent debates in philosophy of cognitive science, we consider three individuation strategies (i.e., abstraction, reification, fictionalization) and assess the legitimacy of each in relation to DPT. This leads us to the verdict that the most viable route for justifying DPT is to construe Type 1 and Type 2 processes as reifications. We conclude that, construed as reifications, the common rationales offered by proponents of DPT for demarcating Type 1 and Type 2 processes do not escape criticism and require further theoretical justification.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, 2021
A recurring theme in the history of economic thought is the idea that individuals are sometimes b... more A recurring theme in the history of economic thought is the idea that individuals are sometimes better viewed as collections of subpersonal agents, each with its own interests or goals. Modeling persons as collections of agents has proved to be a useful heuristic for investigating aberrant choice-behaviors, such as weakness of will, procrastination, addiction, and other decision anomalies that indicate internal or motivational conflict. Yet, the reasons and methods used to study subpersonal agents gives rise to a frenzied and sometimes confusing picture about who or what economic agents are, if not whole persons. In attempt to clarify this picture, this chapter investigates how the concept of the economic agent has changed following the subpersonal turn in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics.
This book concerns a classic philosophical question: “What things count as individuals?” Rather t... more This book concerns a classic philosophical question: “What things count as individuals?” Rather than addressing it from the perspective of analytic metaphysics, this volume proposes to reformulate and answer it from the perspective of scientific practices. So reformulated, the new question is: “How do scientists individuate the things they investigate and thus count them as individuals?” More precisely, our reformulated approach involves three themes: experimental practice, process, and pluralism. The three themes together comprise a unique approach to the classic problem of individuality, and exhibit the strengths of a practice-based philosophy of science. On the approach taken in this volume, insights about criteria of individuality emerge from piecemeal investigation of the problems and questions on individuation. Importantly, results of these investigations are based on individuation as that process is discovered in scientific practice, rather than on a single dominant theory or...
Philosophy and anaesthesiology are disciplines that are rarely associated despite their respectiv... more Philosophy and anaesthesiology are disciplines that are rarely associated despite their respective interests in human consciousness. In this paper, we consider the advantages of integrating anaesthesiology and philosophy in the endeavour of discovering the neural correlates of state consciousness. We venture the following twopart argument. First, we argue that philosophical debates about the correlation conditions for state consciousness can be improved by focusing on how anaesthesiologists actually measure and study consciousness in practice. We present Integrated Information Theory as a promising framework for discriminating features hitherto considered relevant to the identification of the neural correlates of state consciousness. Second, we argue that an improved philosophical understanding of what comprises the correlation conditions for state consciousness can, in turn, advance anaesthesiological methodologies; not only can it improve how potential evidence is gathered and assessed, but it can aid in the prevention of intraoperative awareness, increasing patient safety and well-being.
Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sciences, like ec... more Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sciences, like economics, psychology, and biology. Generally construed, functionalism is the view that states or processes can be individuated based on what role they play rather than what they are constituted of or realized by. Recently, Weiskopf (2011a, 2011b) has posited a reformulation of functionalism on the model-based approach to explanation. We refer to this reformulation as ‘new functionalism’. In this paper, we seek to defend new functionalism and to recast it in light of the concrete explanatory aims of the special sciences. In particular, we argue that the assessment of the explanatory legitimacy of a functional kind needs to take into account the explanatory purpose of the model in which the functional kind is employed. We aim at demonstrating this by appealing to model-based explanations from the social and behavioral sciences. Specifically, we focus on preferences and signals as functional...
textabstractThis thesis offers a philosophical perspective on the different conceptions of agency... more textabstractThis thesis offers a philosophical perspective on the different conceptions of agency and choice as they are understood and employed in economics and behavioral decision research—this perspective is two-fold: on the one hand, philosophical analysis can clarify ambiguities in definitions and concepts that can and do arise within interdisciplinary research. This is of particular importance given how philosophical concepts such as mind, cognition, and intentionality feature in economic studies of rational choice. Hence, one project of this thesis is to subject contemporary research on questions about agency and choice to such philosophical scrutiny. On the other hand, the questions and topics discussed in this thesis can be understood as an exercise in philosophy of science: they deal explicitly with questions and topics that pertain to the theoretical and empirical practices of scientists. This includes traditional microeconomic disciplines, such as decision and game theor...
Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sciences, like ec... more Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sciences, like economics, psychology, and biology. Generally construed, functionalism is the view that states or processes can be individuated based on what role they play rather than what they are constituted of or realized by. Recently, Weiskopf (2011a; 2011b) has posited a reformulation of functionalism on the model-based approach to explanation. We refer to this reformulation as 'new functionalism'. In this paper, we seek to defend new functionalism and to re-cast it in light of the broader explanatory needs of the special sciences. In particular, we argue that the assessment of the explanatory legitimacy of a functional kind needs to take into account the explanatory purpose of the model in which the functional kind is employed. We aim at demonstrating this by appealing to model-based explanations from the social and behavioral sciences. Specifically, we focus on preferences and signals as functional kinds. Our argument is intended to have the double impact of deflecting criticisms against new functionalism from the perspective of mechanistic decomposition while also expanding the scope of new functionalism to encompass the social and behavioral sciences.
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, 2021
A recurring theme in the history of economic thought is the idea that individuals are sometimes b... more A recurring theme in the history of economic thought is the idea that individuals are sometimes better viewed as collections of subpersonal agents, each with its own interests or goals. Modeling persons as collections of agents has proved to be a useful heuristic for investigating aberrant choice-behaviors, such as weakness of will, procrastination, addiction, and other decision anomalies that indicate internal or motivational conflict. Yet, the reasons and methods used to study subpersonal agents gives rise to a frenzied and sometimes confusing picture about who or what economic agents are, if not whole persons. In attempt to clarify this picture, this chapter investigates how the concept of the economic agent has changed following the subpersonal turn in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics.
Our chapter addresses two overlapping questions related to the following prompt: How does mindsha... more Our chapter addresses two overlapping questions related to the following prompt: How does mindshaping relate to and support the embodiment of rationality? This prompt can be addressed from complementary perspectives: (i) To what extent does mindshaping play a role in the embodiment of rationality? (ii) To what extent does the embodiment of rationality play a role in mindshaping? In the chapter, we survey and further explore how the philosophical, cognitive scientific, and economic studies of embodied rationality (and other embedded, extended, and enactive forms of cognition—known as 4E cognition) can provide in-roads toward addressing the above questions. Our strategy, in particular, is to explore how the integration of mindshaping with the embodiment of rationality may take different routes depending on the degree of retention/relaxation of mental representations as an explanatory construct. We introduce four, increasingly ‘radical’ concepts of embodied rationality – embodied bounded rationality, body/somatic rationality, extended rationality and radical embodied rationality – and discuss their potential integration with mindshaping.
Philosophy and anaesthesiology are disciplines that are rarely associated despite their respectiv... more Philosophy and anaesthesiology are disciplines that are rarely associated despite their respective interests in human consciousness. In this paper, we consider the advantages of integrating anaesthesiology and philosophy in the endeavour of discovering the neural correlates of state consciousness. We venture the following two-part argument. First, we argue that philosophical debates about the correlation conditions for state consciousness can be improved by focusing on how anaesthesiologists actually measure and study consciousness in practice. To this end, we argue that Integrated Information Theory provides a promising framework for discriminating features hitherto considered relevant to the identification of the neural correlates of state consciousness. Second, we argue that an improved philosophical understanding of what comprises the correlation conditions for state consciousness can, in turn, advance anaesthesiological methodologies; not only can it improve how potential evidence is gathered and assessed, but it can aid in the prevention of intraoperative awareness, increasing patient safety and well-being.
Despite on-going debates in philosophy and cognitive science, dual process theory (DPT) remains a... more Despite on-going debates in philosophy and cognitive science, dual process theory (DPT) remains a popular framework for theorizing about human cognition. Its central hypothesis is that cognitive processing can be subsumed under two generic types. In this paper, we argue that the putative success and popularity of this framework remains overstated and gives rise to certain misunderstandings. If DPT has predictive and/or explanatory power, it is through offering descriptions of cognitive phenomena via functional analysis. But functional descriptions require an individuation strategy. To date, there has been no systematic exploration of how Type 1 and Type 2 are functionally individuated. Following recent debates in philosophy of cognitive science, we consider three individuation strategies (i.e., abstraction, reification, fictionalization) and assess the legitimacy of each in relation to DPT. This leads us to the verdict that the most viable route for justifying DPT is to construe Type 1 and Type 2 processes as reifications. We conclude that, construed as reifications, the common rationales offered by proponents of DPT for demarcating Type 1 and Type 2 processes do not escape criticism and require further theoretical justification.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, 2021
A recurring theme in the history of economic thought is the idea that individuals are sometimes b... more A recurring theme in the history of economic thought is the idea that individuals are sometimes better viewed as collections of subpersonal agents, each with its own interests or goals. Modeling persons as collections of agents has proved to be a useful heuristic for investigating aberrant choice-behaviors, such as weakness of will, procrastination, addiction, and other decision anomalies that indicate internal or motivational conflict. Yet, the reasons and methods used to study subpersonal agents gives rise to a frenzied and sometimes confusing picture about who or what economic agents are, if not whole persons. In attempt to clarify this picture, this chapter investigates how the concept of the economic agent has changed following the subpersonal turn in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics.
This book concerns a classic philosophical question: “What things count as individuals?” Rather t... more This book concerns a classic philosophical question: “What things count as individuals?” Rather than addressing it from the perspective of analytic metaphysics, this volume proposes to reformulate and answer it from the perspective of scientific practices. So reformulated, the new question is: “How do scientists individuate the things they investigate and thus count them as individuals?” More precisely, our reformulated approach involves three themes: experimental practice, process, and pluralism. The three themes together comprise a unique approach to the classic problem of individuality, and exhibit the strengths of a practice-based philosophy of science. On the approach taken in this volume, insights about criteria of individuality emerge from piecemeal investigation of the problems and questions on individuation. Importantly, results of these investigations are based on individuation as that process is discovered in scientific practice, rather than on a single dominant theory or...
Philosophy and anaesthesiology are disciplines that are rarely associated despite their respectiv... more Philosophy and anaesthesiology are disciplines that are rarely associated despite their respective interests in human consciousness. In this paper, we consider the advantages of integrating anaesthesiology and philosophy in the endeavour of discovering the neural correlates of state consciousness. We venture the following twopart argument. First, we argue that philosophical debates about the correlation conditions for state consciousness can be improved by focusing on how anaesthesiologists actually measure and study consciousness in practice. We present Integrated Information Theory as a promising framework for discriminating features hitherto considered relevant to the identification of the neural correlates of state consciousness. Second, we argue that an improved philosophical understanding of what comprises the correlation conditions for state consciousness can, in turn, advance anaesthesiological methodologies; not only can it improve how potential evidence is gathered and assessed, but it can aid in the prevention of intraoperative awareness, increasing patient safety and well-being.
Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sciences, like ec... more Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sciences, like economics, psychology, and biology. Generally construed, functionalism is the view that states or processes can be individuated based on what role they play rather than what they are constituted of or realized by. Recently, Weiskopf (2011a, 2011b) has posited a reformulation of functionalism on the model-based approach to explanation. We refer to this reformulation as ‘new functionalism’. In this paper, we seek to defend new functionalism and to recast it in light of the concrete explanatory aims of the special sciences. In particular, we argue that the assessment of the explanatory legitimacy of a functional kind needs to take into account the explanatory purpose of the model in which the functional kind is employed. We aim at demonstrating this by appealing to model-based explanations from the social and behavioral sciences. Specifically, we focus on preferences and signals as functional...
textabstractThis thesis offers a philosophical perspective on the different conceptions of agency... more textabstractThis thesis offers a philosophical perspective on the different conceptions of agency and choice as they are understood and employed in economics and behavioral decision research—this perspective is two-fold: on the one hand, philosophical analysis can clarify ambiguities in definitions and concepts that can and do arise within interdisciplinary research. This is of particular importance given how philosophical concepts such as mind, cognition, and intentionality feature in economic studies of rational choice. Hence, one project of this thesis is to subject contemporary research on questions about agency and choice to such philosophical scrutiny. On the other hand, the questions and topics discussed in this thesis can be understood as an exercise in philosophy of science: they deal explicitly with questions and topics that pertain to the theoretical and empirical practices of scientists. This includes traditional microeconomic disciplines, such as decision and game theor...
Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sciences, like ec... more Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sciences, like economics, psychology, and biology. Generally construed, functionalism is the view that states or processes can be individuated based on what role they play rather than what they are constituted of or realized by. Recently, Weiskopf (2011a; 2011b) has posited a reformulation of functionalism on the model-based approach to explanation. We refer to this reformulation as 'new functionalism'. In this paper, we seek to defend new functionalism and to re-cast it in light of the broader explanatory needs of the special sciences. In particular, we argue that the assessment of the explanatory legitimacy of a functional kind needs to take into account the explanatory purpose of the model in which the functional kind is employed. We aim at demonstrating this by appealing to model-based explanations from the social and behavioral sciences. Specifically, we focus on preferences and signals as functional kinds. Our argument is intended to have the double impact of deflecting criticisms against new functionalism from the perspective of mechanistic decomposition while also expanding the scope of new functionalism to encompass the social and behavioral sciences.
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, 2021
A recurring theme in the history of economic thought is the idea that individuals are sometimes b... more A recurring theme in the history of economic thought is the idea that individuals are sometimes better viewed as collections of subpersonal agents, each with its own interests or goals. Modeling persons as collections of agents has proved to be a useful heuristic for investigating aberrant choice-behaviors, such as weakness of will, procrastination, addiction, and other decision anomalies that indicate internal or motivational conflict. Yet, the reasons and methods used to study subpersonal agents gives rise to a frenzied and sometimes confusing picture about who or what economic agents are, if not whole persons. In attempt to clarify this picture, this chapter investigates how the concept of the economic agent has changed following the subpersonal turn in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics.
This paper evaluates the relevance of the mentalism-behaviorism (MB) dichotomy in economics in li... more This paper evaluates the relevance of the mentalism-behaviorism (MB) dichotomy in economics in light of recent debates and subsequent arguments in favor of mental-ism. The MB dichotomy in economics has historical ties to debates in the history and philosophy of science concerning the foundations of psychological ex-planation. I argue that there are two problems with current conceptions of the MB dichotomy as it pertains to how economists and decision researchers interpret and gather evidence. First, it is unclear what the MB dichotomy pertains to or is about exactly—which is to say, economists and decision researchers may have different motivations for endorsing mentalism and/or for opposing behaviorism. Second, and more importantly, it is unclear how the MB dichotomy is supposed to improve or advance empirical research in economics and decision research—in particular, supporters of mentalism have the difficult task of clarifying what mentalism entails or consists in (beyond vapid appeals to folk psychology). In response to the first problem, I consider two common motivations for endorsing mentalism: one motivation appeals to the choice-theoretic foundations of economics; the other appeals to scientific practice in economics. In response to the second problem, I argue that the MB dichotomy likely won’t advance or improve scientific practice in contemporary economic settings because neither mentalism (nor behaviorism) are equipped to analyze and resolve explanatory problems that are unique to non-choice data, i.e. psychological and neuroscientific data. I conclude by discussing the limitations of functionalism, the mainstay of the mentalism defense book, and suggest alternative schema to the MB dichotomy, some of which are employed in neighboring areas of the cognitive and behavioral sciences.
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Papers by James Grayot