Up to now, a very large majority of work in the religious philosophy of life’s meaning has presum... more Up to now, a very large majority of work in the religious philosophy of life’s meaning has presumed a conception of God that is Abrahamic. In contrast, in this article I critically discuss some of the desirable and undesirable facets of Traditional African Religion’s salient conceptions of God as they bear on meaning in life. Given an interest in a maximally meaningful life, and supposing mean- ing would come from fulfilling God’s purpose for us, would it be reasonable to prefer God as char- acteristically conceived by African philosophers of religion to exist instead of the Abrahamic conception of God? At this stage of enquiry, I answer that, in respect of the range of people to whom God’s purpose would apply, a more African view of God would plausibly offer a greater mean- ing, but that, concerning what the content of God’s purpose would be, the Abrahamic view appears to offer a greater one. I conclude by reflecting on this mixed verdict and by suggesting respects in which non-purposive facets of the African and Abrahamic conceptions of God could also have impli- cations for life’s meaning.
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 2022
In this article, I briefly reply to four critics who have critically engaged with my book God, So... more In this article, I briefly reply to four critics who have critically engaged with my book God, Soul and the Meaning of Life in a special issue of the International Journal of Philosophy and Theology. I view them mainly as addressing the ‘meaning’ of God in three distinct senses, namely, in terms of how best to understand the word ‘God’ and related terms such as ‘the spiritual’, whether God is central to what gives our lives a particular sort of final value, and how beliefs about God might be central to interpreting what on the face of it are non-religious beliefs and practices in contem- porary Western society. My remarks are intended to continue the dialogue about these definitional, axiological, and hermeneutic meanings of God.
This article is part of a special issue devoted to David Benatar’s anti-natalism. There are place... more This article is part of a special issue devoted to David Benatar’s anti-natalism. There are places in his oeuvre where he contends that, while our lives might be able to exhibit some terrestrial or human meaning, that is not enough to make them worth creating, which would require a cosmic meaning that is unavailable to us. There are those who maintain, in reply to Benatar, that some of our lives do have a cosmic meaning, but I grant Benatar here that none of our lives does. I instead argue that a lack of cosmic meaning is insufficient to infer that our lives are all bad or, more carefully, bad enough to make procreation impermissible. In particular, I advance a new principle by which to judge the absence of a good to be bad, roughly according to which the more unavailable a good is, the less reason there is to exhibit negative reactive attitudes toward its absence. It follows that there is no reason to regret or be sad about the lack of cosmic meaning, given that it is impossible for us
In contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, there has been substantial debate between religious an... more In contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, there has been substantial debate between religious and secular theorists about what would make life meaningful, with a large majority of the religious philosophers having drawn on Christianity. In this article, in contrast, I draw on Judaism, with the aims of articulating characteristically Jewish approaches to life's meaning, which is a kind of intellectual history, and of providing some support for them relative to familiar Christian and Islamic approaches (salient in the Tanakh, the New Testament, and the Qur’an), which is a more philosophical enterprise. Sometimes I point out that dominant views in contemporary philosophy favor a Jewish approach to meaning relative to rivals, e.g., insofar as Judaism contends that a merely earthly life can be meaningful. Other times I suggest that Judaism provides reason to doubt dominant views in recent analytic philosophy, e.g., to the extent that the former posits a people, not merely a person, as a bearer of meaning.
On the rise over the past 20 years has been ‘moderate supernaturalism’, the view that while a mea... more On the rise over the past 20 years has been ‘moderate supernaturalism’, the view that while a meaningful life is possible in a world without God or a soul, a much greater meaning would be possible only in a world with them. William Lane Craig can be read as providing an important argument for a version of this view, according to which only with God and a soul could our lives have an eternal, as opposed to temporally limited, significance since we would then be held accountable for our decisions affecting others’ lives. I present two major objections to this position. On the one hand, I contend that if God existed and we had souls that lived forever, then, in fact, all our lives would turn out the same. On the other hand, I maintain that, if this objection is wrong, so that our moral choices would indeed make an ultimate difference and thereby confer an eternal significance on our lives (only) in a supernatural realm, then Craig could not capture the view, aptly held by moderate supernaturalists, that a meaningful life is possible in a purely natural world.
Definition of the problem
Since the origin of bioethics as a discipline, the field has been domin... more Definition of the problem Since the origin of bioethics as a discipline, the field has been dominated by consideration of two main values, well-being and morality. I cast doubt on whether those are sufficient to resolve an array of important debates about which decisions to make in respect of medicine, and I also consider whether a third, under-explored value should play a much larger role.
Arguments I provide reason to believe that the value of what makes a life meaningful is essential to being able to provide conclusive judgements about several contentious matters in bioethics. After first indicating how meaningfulness plausibly differs from rightness and happiness, I point out how it cannot be reasonably ignored when making decisions in six ‘life and death’ matters.
Conclusion My aim is not to draw any firm conclusions about what to do when it comes to these life and death topics, but rather to show that in order to arrive at any, one has to consider the category of life’s meaning, which has, until recently, been nearly absent from Western bioethics since its inception.
What do Mother Theresa, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, and the exploration of Mars teach us about the ... more What do Mother Theresa, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, and the exploration of Mars teach us about the meaning of life? World-renowned experts, David Benatar and Thaddeus Metz, give you their answers to life’s biggest question. Spoiler alert: it isn’t 42. We’ve all felt a unique sense of isolation over the past year. Is there a way to find meaning in this brave new world? Benatar argues that from the cosmic perspective, life on this pale blue dot has almost no significance. But Metz holds a more optimistic view. Discover his rules for how anyone can enrich their lives through truth, beauty, and goodness. Conversations about the Meaning of Life is a discussion with two of the most important thinkers on the topic, and includes an exclusive debate between them. If you strive to lead a more meaningful existence, and want an accessible, intelligent guide to the ultimate question, you’ll love this book. "This is, in my opinion, the best dialogue about the meaning of life in the literature. The interlocutors are two of the most important philosophers in the field and it is enlightening to hear these two titans engaging each other directly. Anyone interested in the meaning of life should read this brief and accessible work." - John G Messerly, author of The Meaning of Life.
A 10,000+ word critical overview of analytic philosophy devoted to life's meaning, with some focu... more A 10,000+ word critical overview of analytic philosophy devoted to life's meaning, with some focus on books and more recent works.
I expound and assess two theories of meaning in life informed by the indigenous sub-Saharan Afric... more I expound and assess two theories of meaning in life informed by the indigenous sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. According to one view, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes community with other human persons. According to the other view, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes vitality in oneself and others. I argue that, at least upon some refinement, both of these African conceptions of meaning merit global consideration from philosophers, but that the vitality approach is more promising than the community one for capturing a wider array of intuitions about what confers meaning on a life. I further argue, however, that there are objections that apply with comparable force to both theories; neither one does a good job of entailing that and explaining why certain types of reason and progress can make a life more meaningful. Although these objections are characteristic of a “modern” Western outlook, I maintain that they are difficult for contemporary African philosophers to ignore, and consider some ways they might respond to the objections.
In this article I critically discuss English-speaking philosophical literature addressing the que... more In this article I critically discuss English-speaking philosophical literature addressing the question of what it essentially means to speak of "life's meaning". Instead of considering what might in fact confer meaning on life, I make two claims about the more abstract, meta-ethical question of how to understand what by definition is involved in making that sort of enquiry. One of my claims is that over the past five years there has been a noticeable trend among philosophers to try to change our understanding of what talk of "life's meaning" connotes. For example, whereas most philosophers for a long while had held that such talk is about a kind of value possible in the life of human beings, recently some have argued that certain non-human parts of nature can exhibit meaningfulness, which, furthermore, is not necessarily something valuable. The second claim I advance is that there is strong reason to reject this trend, and instead for philosophers to retain the long-standing approach.
This short book critically explores the potential relevance of God or a soul for life’s meaning a... more This short book critically explores the potential relevance of God or a soul for life’s meaning as discussed in recent Anglo-American philosophical literature. There have been four broad views: God or a soul is necessary for meaning in our lives; neither is necessary for it; one or both would greatly enhance the meaning in our lives; one or both would substantially detract from it. The book familiarizes readers with all four positions, paying particular attention to the latter two, and also presents prima facie objections to them, points out gaps in research agendas and suggests argumentative strategies that merit development. (As with any text listed here, email the author for a copy, if interested.)
In this critical notice of Guy Bennett-Hunter’s Ineffability and Religious Experience, I focus on... more In this critical notice of Guy Bennett-Hunter’s Ineffability and Religious Experience, I focus on claims he makes about what makes a life meaningful. According to Bennett-Hunter, for human life to be meaningful it must obtain its meaning from what is beyond the human and is ineffable, which constitutes an ultimate kind of meaning. I spell out Bennett-Hunter’s rationale for making this claim, raise some objections to it, and in their wake articulate an alternative conception of ultimate meaning. (Free to download here: https://rdcu.be/6tP0)
A short and sweet article considering how meaning in life, as a value distinct from happiness and... more A short and sweet article considering how meaning in life, as a value distinct from happiness and morality, might plausibly figure into public policy. (Free to download here: https://rdcu.be/6ycd)
This chapter critically discusses the most salient positions about life’s meaning advanced by Koh... more This chapter critically discusses the most salient positions about life’s meaning advanced by Koheleth (or Qoheleth), the presumed author of Ecclesiastes, a book from the Hebrew Bible. Koheleth famously argues that ‘life is futility’ (or ‘vanity’) for a variety of reasons, with this chapter focusing on the three that are most recurrent in the text and have been particularly influential in the Western tradition of philosophy. These are considerations about: the mortality of humankind, the undeserved allocations of benefits and burdens we receive, and the inability to control our fate.
This article seeks an analysis of the concept that underlies prominent philosophical conceptions ... more This article seeks an analysis of the concept that underlies prominent philosophical conceptions of what makes a person's life meaningful. It contends that no promising analysis captures all and only the theories that are intuitively about meaning in life. It concludes that conceptions of life's meaning are instead united in virtue of family resemblances. Specifically, theories of what makes a life meaningful are views that answer the following kinds of partially overlapping questions: how may a person bring purpose to her life beyond pursuing happiness? how should an individual connect with intrinsic value beyond his animal nature? how might one do something worthy of great esteem or admiration?
Discussion of whether values and norms are neutral or not has mainly appeared in works on the nat... more Discussion of whether values and norms are neutral or not has mainly appeared in works on the nature of prudential rationality and morality. Little systematic has yet appeared in the up and coming field of the meaning of life. What are the respects in which the value of meaningfulness is neutral or, in contrast, partial, relational, or 'biased'? In this article, I focus strictly on answering this question. First, I aim to identify the salient, and perhaps exhaustive, respects in which issues of neutrality arise in the contexts of life's meaning. In addition to providing a taxonomy of the key points of contention, a second aim is to advance reflection about them by considering the most important arguments that have been marshalled in favour of one side or the other, particularly as they appear in recent neutral positions. I conclude that meaning in life is neutral with respect to time but not any other conditions such as agents and patients, with a third aim being to point out that this makes the value of meaning different from the kinds of non/neutrality encountered in some salient conceptions of prudence and morality.
In his book Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar argues that it is generally all things consi... more In his book Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar argues that it is generally all things considered wrong to procreate, such that if everyone acted in a morally ideal way, humanity would elect to extinguish the species. I aim to carefully question the premises and inferences that lead Benatar to draw this anti-natalist conclusion, indicating several places where one could sensibly elect to disembark from the train of argument heading toward such a radical view.
Therapists and related theorists and practitioners of mental health tend to hold one of two broad... more Therapists and related theorists and practitioners of mental health tend to hold one of two broad views about how to help patients. On the one hand, some maintain that, or at least act as though, the basic point of therapy is to help patients become clear about what they want deep down and to enable them to achieve it by overcoming mental blockages. On the other hand, there are those who contend that the aim of therapy should instead be to psychologically enable patients to live objectively desirable lives, say, ones that involve developing their inherent talents or exhibiting an authentic/strong/integrated self. In this chapter, I argue that neither of these prominent approaches is complete. Contra the former, sometimes what patients want deep down is not something to promote, and, against the latter, it can sometimes be reasonable for patients to want to sacrifice their own objective interests and for therapists to assist them in this regard. I argue that the category of meaningfulness does well at accounting for these counterexamples to the two dominant approaches, while capturing the kernels of truth in them. The proper aim of therapy, I suggest, is to enable patients to live meaningfully.
It is only in the last 50 years that life’s meaning has become a distinct field in Western philos... more It is only in the last 50 years that life’s meaning has become a distinct field in Western philosophy, and merely in the last 25 or so that debate with real substance and complexity has appeared. Using systematic, critical discussion of recent Anglo-American philosophical literature as a springboard, Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study defends several original claims about what would make a person’s life meaningful. Metz’s overarching goal in the book, an instance of ‘analytic existentialism’, is to rigorously answer the question, ‘What (if anything) do all the conditions that make a life meaningful have in common?’. An answer to such a question is a philosophical theory of meaning in life, and Metz aims not only to demonstrate that contemporary theories of life’s meaning are implausible, but also to develop a new one that avoids their problems. Primarily evaluating theories in light of the extent to which they capture the meaningfulness of the classic triad of the good, the true and the beautiful, Metz critically explores influential principles about fulfilling God’s purpose, obtaining reward in an afterlife for having been virtuous, being attracted to what merits attraction, leaving the world a better place, connecting to organic unity, and transcending oneself by connecting to what is extensive. He argues that no extant principle satisfactorily accounts for the three-fold significance of morality, enquiry, and creativity, and that most promising is a fresh theory according to which meaning in life is a matter of intelligence contoured toward fundamental conditions of human existence.
Up to now, a very large majority of work in the religious philosophy of life’s meaning has presum... more Up to now, a very large majority of work in the religious philosophy of life’s meaning has presumed a conception of God that is Abrahamic. In contrast, in this article I critically discuss some of the desirable and undesirable facets of Traditional African Religion’s salient conceptions of God as they bear on meaning in life. Given an interest in a maximally meaningful life, and supposing mean- ing would come from fulfilling God’s purpose for us, would it be reasonable to prefer God as char- acteristically conceived by African philosophers of religion to exist instead of the Abrahamic conception of God? At this stage of enquiry, I answer that, in respect of the range of people to whom God’s purpose would apply, a more African view of God would plausibly offer a greater mean- ing, but that, concerning what the content of God’s purpose would be, the Abrahamic view appears to offer a greater one. I conclude by reflecting on this mixed verdict and by suggesting respects in which non-purposive facets of the African and Abrahamic conceptions of God could also have impli- cations for life’s meaning.
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 2022
In this article, I briefly reply to four critics who have critically engaged with my book God, So... more In this article, I briefly reply to four critics who have critically engaged with my book God, Soul and the Meaning of Life in a special issue of the International Journal of Philosophy and Theology. I view them mainly as addressing the ‘meaning’ of God in three distinct senses, namely, in terms of how best to understand the word ‘God’ and related terms such as ‘the spiritual’, whether God is central to what gives our lives a particular sort of final value, and how beliefs about God might be central to interpreting what on the face of it are non-religious beliefs and practices in contem- porary Western society. My remarks are intended to continue the dialogue about these definitional, axiological, and hermeneutic meanings of God.
This article is part of a special issue devoted to David Benatar’s anti-natalism. There are place... more This article is part of a special issue devoted to David Benatar’s anti-natalism. There are places in his oeuvre where he contends that, while our lives might be able to exhibit some terrestrial or human meaning, that is not enough to make them worth creating, which would require a cosmic meaning that is unavailable to us. There are those who maintain, in reply to Benatar, that some of our lives do have a cosmic meaning, but I grant Benatar here that none of our lives does. I instead argue that a lack of cosmic meaning is insufficient to infer that our lives are all bad or, more carefully, bad enough to make procreation impermissible. In particular, I advance a new principle by which to judge the absence of a good to be bad, roughly according to which the more unavailable a good is, the less reason there is to exhibit negative reactive attitudes toward its absence. It follows that there is no reason to regret or be sad about the lack of cosmic meaning, given that it is impossible for us
In contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, there has been substantial debate between religious an... more In contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, there has been substantial debate between religious and secular theorists about what would make life meaningful, with a large majority of the religious philosophers having drawn on Christianity. In this article, in contrast, I draw on Judaism, with the aims of articulating characteristically Jewish approaches to life's meaning, which is a kind of intellectual history, and of providing some support for them relative to familiar Christian and Islamic approaches (salient in the Tanakh, the New Testament, and the Qur’an), which is a more philosophical enterprise. Sometimes I point out that dominant views in contemporary philosophy favor a Jewish approach to meaning relative to rivals, e.g., insofar as Judaism contends that a merely earthly life can be meaningful. Other times I suggest that Judaism provides reason to doubt dominant views in recent analytic philosophy, e.g., to the extent that the former posits a people, not merely a person, as a bearer of meaning.
On the rise over the past 20 years has been ‘moderate supernaturalism’, the view that while a mea... more On the rise over the past 20 years has been ‘moderate supernaturalism’, the view that while a meaningful life is possible in a world without God or a soul, a much greater meaning would be possible only in a world with them. William Lane Craig can be read as providing an important argument for a version of this view, according to which only with God and a soul could our lives have an eternal, as opposed to temporally limited, significance since we would then be held accountable for our decisions affecting others’ lives. I present two major objections to this position. On the one hand, I contend that if God existed and we had souls that lived forever, then, in fact, all our lives would turn out the same. On the other hand, I maintain that, if this objection is wrong, so that our moral choices would indeed make an ultimate difference and thereby confer an eternal significance on our lives (only) in a supernatural realm, then Craig could not capture the view, aptly held by moderate supernaturalists, that a meaningful life is possible in a purely natural world.
Definition of the problem
Since the origin of bioethics as a discipline, the field has been domin... more Definition of the problem Since the origin of bioethics as a discipline, the field has been dominated by consideration of two main values, well-being and morality. I cast doubt on whether those are sufficient to resolve an array of important debates about which decisions to make in respect of medicine, and I also consider whether a third, under-explored value should play a much larger role.
Arguments I provide reason to believe that the value of what makes a life meaningful is essential to being able to provide conclusive judgements about several contentious matters in bioethics. After first indicating how meaningfulness plausibly differs from rightness and happiness, I point out how it cannot be reasonably ignored when making decisions in six ‘life and death’ matters.
Conclusion My aim is not to draw any firm conclusions about what to do when it comes to these life and death topics, but rather to show that in order to arrive at any, one has to consider the category of life’s meaning, which has, until recently, been nearly absent from Western bioethics since its inception.
What do Mother Theresa, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, and the exploration of Mars teach us about the ... more What do Mother Theresa, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, and the exploration of Mars teach us about the meaning of life? World-renowned experts, David Benatar and Thaddeus Metz, give you their answers to life’s biggest question. Spoiler alert: it isn’t 42. We’ve all felt a unique sense of isolation over the past year. Is there a way to find meaning in this brave new world? Benatar argues that from the cosmic perspective, life on this pale blue dot has almost no significance. But Metz holds a more optimistic view. Discover his rules for how anyone can enrich their lives through truth, beauty, and goodness. Conversations about the Meaning of Life is a discussion with two of the most important thinkers on the topic, and includes an exclusive debate between them. If you strive to lead a more meaningful existence, and want an accessible, intelligent guide to the ultimate question, you’ll love this book. "This is, in my opinion, the best dialogue about the meaning of life in the literature. The interlocutors are two of the most important philosophers in the field and it is enlightening to hear these two titans engaging each other directly. Anyone interested in the meaning of life should read this brief and accessible work." - John G Messerly, author of The Meaning of Life.
A 10,000+ word critical overview of analytic philosophy devoted to life's meaning, with some focu... more A 10,000+ word critical overview of analytic philosophy devoted to life's meaning, with some focus on books and more recent works.
I expound and assess two theories of meaning in life informed by the indigenous sub-Saharan Afric... more I expound and assess two theories of meaning in life informed by the indigenous sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. According to one view, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes community with other human persons. According to the other view, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes vitality in oneself and others. I argue that, at least upon some refinement, both of these African conceptions of meaning merit global consideration from philosophers, but that the vitality approach is more promising than the community one for capturing a wider array of intuitions about what confers meaning on a life. I further argue, however, that there are objections that apply with comparable force to both theories; neither one does a good job of entailing that and explaining why certain types of reason and progress can make a life more meaningful. Although these objections are characteristic of a “modern” Western outlook, I maintain that they are difficult for contemporary African philosophers to ignore, and consider some ways they might respond to the objections.
In this article I critically discuss English-speaking philosophical literature addressing the que... more In this article I critically discuss English-speaking philosophical literature addressing the question of what it essentially means to speak of "life's meaning". Instead of considering what might in fact confer meaning on life, I make two claims about the more abstract, meta-ethical question of how to understand what by definition is involved in making that sort of enquiry. One of my claims is that over the past five years there has been a noticeable trend among philosophers to try to change our understanding of what talk of "life's meaning" connotes. For example, whereas most philosophers for a long while had held that such talk is about a kind of value possible in the life of human beings, recently some have argued that certain non-human parts of nature can exhibit meaningfulness, which, furthermore, is not necessarily something valuable. The second claim I advance is that there is strong reason to reject this trend, and instead for philosophers to retain the long-standing approach.
This short book critically explores the potential relevance of God or a soul for life’s meaning a... more This short book critically explores the potential relevance of God or a soul for life’s meaning as discussed in recent Anglo-American philosophical literature. There have been four broad views: God or a soul is necessary for meaning in our lives; neither is necessary for it; one or both would greatly enhance the meaning in our lives; one or both would substantially detract from it. The book familiarizes readers with all four positions, paying particular attention to the latter two, and also presents prima facie objections to them, points out gaps in research agendas and suggests argumentative strategies that merit development. (As with any text listed here, email the author for a copy, if interested.)
In this critical notice of Guy Bennett-Hunter’s Ineffability and Religious Experience, I focus on... more In this critical notice of Guy Bennett-Hunter’s Ineffability and Religious Experience, I focus on claims he makes about what makes a life meaningful. According to Bennett-Hunter, for human life to be meaningful it must obtain its meaning from what is beyond the human and is ineffable, which constitutes an ultimate kind of meaning. I spell out Bennett-Hunter’s rationale for making this claim, raise some objections to it, and in their wake articulate an alternative conception of ultimate meaning. (Free to download here: https://rdcu.be/6tP0)
A short and sweet article considering how meaning in life, as a value distinct from happiness and... more A short and sweet article considering how meaning in life, as a value distinct from happiness and morality, might plausibly figure into public policy. (Free to download here: https://rdcu.be/6ycd)
This chapter critically discusses the most salient positions about life’s meaning advanced by Koh... more This chapter critically discusses the most salient positions about life’s meaning advanced by Koheleth (or Qoheleth), the presumed author of Ecclesiastes, a book from the Hebrew Bible. Koheleth famously argues that ‘life is futility’ (or ‘vanity’) for a variety of reasons, with this chapter focusing on the three that are most recurrent in the text and have been particularly influential in the Western tradition of philosophy. These are considerations about: the mortality of humankind, the undeserved allocations of benefits and burdens we receive, and the inability to control our fate.
This article seeks an analysis of the concept that underlies prominent philosophical conceptions ... more This article seeks an analysis of the concept that underlies prominent philosophical conceptions of what makes a person's life meaningful. It contends that no promising analysis captures all and only the theories that are intuitively about meaning in life. It concludes that conceptions of life's meaning are instead united in virtue of family resemblances. Specifically, theories of what makes a life meaningful are views that answer the following kinds of partially overlapping questions: how may a person bring purpose to her life beyond pursuing happiness? how should an individual connect with intrinsic value beyond his animal nature? how might one do something worthy of great esteem or admiration?
Discussion of whether values and norms are neutral or not has mainly appeared in works on the nat... more Discussion of whether values and norms are neutral or not has mainly appeared in works on the nature of prudential rationality and morality. Little systematic has yet appeared in the up and coming field of the meaning of life. What are the respects in which the value of meaningfulness is neutral or, in contrast, partial, relational, or 'biased'? In this article, I focus strictly on answering this question. First, I aim to identify the salient, and perhaps exhaustive, respects in which issues of neutrality arise in the contexts of life's meaning. In addition to providing a taxonomy of the key points of contention, a second aim is to advance reflection about them by considering the most important arguments that have been marshalled in favour of one side or the other, particularly as they appear in recent neutral positions. I conclude that meaning in life is neutral with respect to time but not any other conditions such as agents and patients, with a third aim being to point out that this makes the value of meaning different from the kinds of non/neutrality encountered in some salient conceptions of prudence and morality.
In his book Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar argues that it is generally all things consi... more In his book Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar argues that it is generally all things considered wrong to procreate, such that if everyone acted in a morally ideal way, humanity would elect to extinguish the species. I aim to carefully question the premises and inferences that lead Benatar to draw this anti-natalist conclusion, indicating several places where one could sensibly elect to disembark from the train of argument heading toward such a radical view.
Therapists and related theorists and practitioners of mental health tend to hold one of two broad... more Therapists and related theorists and practitioners of mental health tend to hold one of two broad views about how to help patients. On the one hand, some maintain that, or at least act as though, the basic point of therapy is to help patients become clear about what they want deep down and to enable them to achieve it by overcoming mental blockages. On the other hand, there are those who contend that the aim of therapy should instead be to psychologically enable patients to live objectively desirable lives, say, ones that involve developing their inherent talents or exhibiting an authentic/strong/integrated self. In this chapter, I argue that neither of these prominent approaches is complete. Contra the former, sometimes what patients want deep down is not something to promote, and, against the latter, it can sometimes be reasonable for patients to want to sacrifice their own objective interests and for therapists to assist them in this regard. I argue that the category of meaningfulness does well at accounting for these counterexamples to the two dominant approaches, while capturing the kernels of truth in them. The proper aim of therapy, I suggest, is to enable patients to live meaningfully.
It is only in the last 50 years that life’s meaning has become a distinct field in Western philos... more It is only in the last 50 years that life’s meaning has become a distinct field in Western philosophy, and merely in the last 25 or so that debate with real substance and complexity has appeared. Using systematic, critical discussion of recent Anglo-American philosophical literature as a springboard, Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study defends several original claims about what would make a person’s life meaningful. Metz’s overarching goal in the book, an instance of ‘analytic existentialism’, is to rigorously answer the question, ‘What (if anything) do all the conditions that make a life meaningful have in common?’. An answer to such a question is a philosophical theory of meaning in life, and Metz aims not only to demonstrate that contemporary theories of life’s meaning are implausible, but also to develop a new one that avoids their problems. Primarily evaluating theories in light of the extent to which they capture the meaningfulness of the classic triad of the good, the true and the beautiful, Metz critically explores influential principles about fulfilling God’s purpose, obtaining reward in an afterlife for having been virtuous, being attracted to what merits attraction, leaving the world a better place, connecting to organic unity, and transcending oneself by connecting to what is extensive. He argues that no extant principle satisfactorily accounts for the three-fold significance of morality, enquiry, and creativity, and that most promising is a fresh theory according to which meaning in life is a matter of intelligence contoured toward fundamental conditions of human existence.
A large swathe of the indigenous African ethical tradition is frequently encapsulated in the maxi... more A large swathe of the indigenous African ethical tradition is frequently encapsulated in the maxim, “A person is a person through other persons.” This phrasing is an overly literal translation of some sayings that are prominent in the southern and central regions of Africa, but that resonate with most indigenous sub-Saharan cultures. This chapter articulates and motivates a philosophical interpretation of the maxim for an international readership interested in virtue (or what's often called "personhood" in the African tradition). According to the initial formulation, one should strive to become a real person, which one can do insofar as one prizes other persons’ capacity to relate harmoniously, where harmony consists of identifying with and exhibiting solidarity toward them. The chapter also explores ways of revising this theory to respond to some powerful criticisms, such as that virtue is not purely relational, but also includes some self-regarding dispositions, and that virtue can be manifested by relating to parts of the natural world, particularly to some non-human animals.
Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment, 2022
Adherents to reconciliation, restorative justice, and related approaches to dealing with social c... more Adherents to reconciliation, restorative justice, and related approaches to dealing with social conflict are well known for seeking to minimize punishment, in favor of offenders hearing out victims, making an apology, and effecting compensation for wrongful harm as well as victims forgiving offenders and accepting their reintegration into society. In contrast, I maintain that social reconciliation and similar concepts in fact characteristically require punishment but do not require forgiveness. I argue that a reconciliatory response to crime that includes punitive disavowal but not necessarily forgiveness is supported by an analogy with resolving two-person conflict and by relational facets of human dignity. I also specify a novel account of the type of penalty that is justified by reconciliation, namely, burdensome labor that is likely to foster moral reform on the part of wrongdoers and to compensate their victims, which would serve neither retributive nor deterrent functions. I illustrate this under-considered conception of punishment in contexts that include having cheated on an exam at a university, engaged in criminal behavior such as robbery, and committed atrocities during large-scale social conflict.
A Relational Moral Theory draws on neglected resources from the Global South and especially the A... more A Relational Moral Theory draws on neglected resources from the Global South and especially the African philosophical tradition to provide a new answer to a perennial philosophical question: what do all morally right actions have in common as distinct from wrong ones? Metz points out that the principles of utility and of respect for autonomy, the two rivals that have dominated western moral theory for the last two centuries, share an individualist premise. Once that common assumption is replaced by a relational perspective given prominence in African ethical thought, a different comprehensive principle, one focused on harmony or friendliness, emerges. Metz argues that this principle corrects the blind spots of the western moral principles, and has implications for a wide array of controversies in applied ethics that an international audience of moral philosophers, professional ethicists, and similar thinkers will find compelling.
Essays on Contemporary Issues in African Philosophy, 2021
While there is a budding literature on media ethics in the light of characteristic sub-Saharan mo... more While there is a budding literature on media ethics in the light of characteristic sub-Saharan moral values, there is virtually nothing on wartime reporting more specifically. Furthermore, the literature insofar as it has a bearing on wartime reporting suggests that embedded journalism and patriotic journalism are ethically justified during war. In this essay, I sketch a prima facie attractive African moral theory, grounded on a certain interpretation of the value of communal relationship, and bring out what it entails for the ways journalists should report on war. My aims are the normative ones of showing how this Afro-communal ethic can provide a unitary foundation for a wide array of plausible conclusions about reporting on war, and, in particular, can avoid objectionable implications such as support for embedded and patriotic journalism.
This article seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and ... more This article seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and similar slurs are immoral, whenever they are. It considers three major theories, roughly according to which they are immoral because they are harmful (welfarism), because they undermine autonomy (Kantianism), or because they are unfriendly (an under-considered, relational approach informed by ideas from the Global South). This article presents new objections to the former two theories, and concludes in favour of the latter rationale. Deeming slurs to be wrong insofar as they are unfriendly is shown to capture the advantages of the other theories, while avoiding their disadvantages.
In this article I critically survey non-edited books on politi- cal and legal philosophy that hav... more In this article I critically survey non-edited books on politi- cal and legal philosophy that have been composed by those working in the sub-Saharan African tradition and have ap- peared in print since 2016. These monographs principally address political, distributive, and criminal justice at the domestic level, with this article recounting the essentials of these texts as well as noting prima facie weaknesses in their positions and gaps in current research agendas. My aims are to enable readers to obtain a bird's-eye picture of key works in recent African political and legal philosophy and to sug- gest some plausible ways to advance debates.
In this paper, I aim to progress towards the philosophical goal of ascertaining what, if anything... more In this paper, I aim to progress towards the philosophical goal of ascertaining what, if anything, all mental illnesses have in common, attempting to unify a large subset of those with a relational or interpersonal dimension. One major claim is that, if we want a promising theory of mental illness, we must go beyond the dominant western accounts of mental illness/health, which focus on traits intrinsic to a person such as pain/pleasure, lethargy/ liveliness, fragmentation/integration, and falsehood/authenticity. A second major claim is that the relational facets of mental illness are plausibly understood theoretically in terms of a person's inability to identify with others or exhibit solidarity with them, relational values salient in the African philosophical tradition. I show that these two extrinsic properties explain several intuitive instances of mental illness well, including, amongst several others, being abusive, psychopathic, narcissistic, histrionic, paranoid, and phobic.
Insofar as artificial intelligence is to be used to guide automated systems in their interactions... more Insofar as artificial intelligence is to be used to guide automated systems in their interactions with humans, the dominant view is probably that it would be appropriate to programme them to maximize (expected) utility. According to utilitarianism, which is a characteristically western conception of moral reason, machines should be programmed to do whatever they could in a given circumstance to produce in the long run the highest net balance of what is good for human beings minus what is bad for them. In this essay, I appeal to values that are characteristically African––but that will resonate with those from a variety of moral-philosophical traditions, particularly in the Global South––to cast doubt on a utilitarian approach. Drawing on norms salient in sub-Saharan ethics, I provide four reasons for thinking it would be immoral for automated systems governed by artificial intelligence to maximize utility. In catchphrases, I argue that utilitarianism cannot make adequate sense of the ways that human dignity, group rights, family first, and (surprisingly) self-sacrifice should determine the behaviour of smart machines.
For four decades Ifeanyi Menkiti has addressed the question of which sort of community constitute... more For four decades Ifeanyi Menkiti has addressed the question of which sort of community constitutes personhood from a characteristically African perspective. In this chapter, I critically discuss the conceptions of how one acquires personhood through community that Menkiti has advanced, in search of the one that would most enable him to avoid prominent moral objections made to his views. In particular, his account of personhood has been criticized for insufficiently accommodating individual difference, most recently in respect of gender and sexuality. I draw on resources in Menkiti’s work for rebutting this line of criticism, but contend that, even if he can avoid that one, another, new objection looms large: because of Menkiti’s claim that reciprocity is central to community, he is committed to the view that human infants and mentally incapacitated adults lack moral standing, in the way he explicitly believes animals lack it. After showing that, according to Menkiti’s strongest conception of personhood, one counterintuitively cannot acquire it in the course of interacting with any non-persons, I articulate an alternative conception of how to understand the role of community in acquiring personhood that avoids this problem as well as the others discussed.
Recent work by comparative philosophers, global ethicists, and cross-cultural value theorists ind... more Recent work by comparative philosophers, global ethicists, and cross-cultural value theorists indicates that, unlike most Western thinkers, those in many other parts of the globe, such as indigenous Africa, East Asia, and South America, tend to prize relationality. These relational values include enjoying a sense of togetherness, participating cooperatively, creating something new together, engaging in mutual aid, and being compassionate. Global economic practices and internationally influential theories pertaining to justice, development , and normative economics over the past 50 years have been principally informed by characteristically Western and individualist values such as utility, autonomy, and capability. In this article I consider what economic appropriation, production, distribution, and consumption would look like if they were more influenced by relational values typical of non-Western worldviews, and especially the sub-Saharan ethic of ubuntu.
This chapter explores prominent respects in which humility figures into ubuntu, the southern Afri... more This chapter explores prominent respects in which humility figures into ubuntu, the southern African (and specifically Nguni) term for humanness often used to capture moral philosophies and cultures indigenous to the sub-Saharan region. The chapter considers respects in which humility is prescribed by ubuntu, understood not just as a relational normative ethic, but also as a moral epistemology. Focusing specifically on philosophical ideas published in academic fora over the past 50 years or so, the chapter contends that, although the concept of humility has not often been explicitly invoked in them to make sense of African normative ethics and moral epistemology, it is a useful lens through which to view key facets of these literate philosophies. In many ways, by ubuntu we are to be humble in respect of what an individual should claim from others, how she should appraise her own virtue, and what she may claim to know about morality (although no suggestion is made that it is some kind of ‘master virtue’ for the tradition).
Karl Popper is famous for favouring an open society, one in which the individual is treated as an... more Karl Popper is famous for favouring an open society, one in which the individual is treated as an end in himself and social arrangements are subjected to critical evaluation, which he defends largely by appeal to a Kantian ethics of respecting the dignity of rational beings. In this essay, I consider for the first time what the implications of a characteristically African ethics, instead prescribing respect for our capacity to relate communally, are for how the state should operate in an open society. I argue that while an Afro-communal moral foundation does not prescribe a closed society, it supports an open society politics and law of a sort different from the ones that Popper specifies. For Popper, the state in an open society should improve social arrangements albeit without seeking to promote a particular conception of the good life, should protect rights that merely serve the function of facilitating individual choice, and should employ majoritarian democracy to be able to avoid unwelcome rulers and policies. On all three counts, I show that a relational ethics typical of the African philosophical tradition entails different, intuitively attractive approaches to politics and law.
The most prominent strand of moral thought in the African philosophical tradition is relational a... more The most prominent strand of moral thought in the African philosophical tradition is relational and cohesive, roughly demanding that we enter into community with each other. Familiar is the view that being a real person means sharing a way of life with others, perhaps even in their fate. What does such a communal ethic prescribe for the coronavirus pandemic? Might it forbid one from social distancing, at least away from intimates? Or would it entail that social distancing is wrong to some degree, although morally permissible on balance? Or could it mean that social distancing is not wrong to any degree and could, under certain circumstances, be the right way to commune? In this article, I defend the latter view. I argue that, given an indepen- dently attractive understanding of how to value communal relationship, distancing oneself from others when necessary to protect them from serious incapacitation or harm can come at no cost to right action. However, I also discuss cases in which social distancing would evince a lack of good character, despite being the right thing to do.
In this article, I seek to answer the following questions: What would a characteristically Africa... more In this article, I seek to answer the following questions: What would a characteristically African, and specifically relational, conception of a criminal trial's final end look like? What would the Afro-relational approach prescribe for sentencing? Would its implications for this matter forcefully rival the kinds of penalties that judges in South Africa and similar jurisdictions typically mete out? After pointing out how the southern African ethic of ubuntu is well understood as a relational ethic, I draw out of it a conception of reconciliation that I advance as a strong candidate for being the proper final end of a criminal trial I argue that, far from requiring forgiveness, seeking reconciliation can provide strong reason to punish offenders Specifically, a reconciliatory sentence is one that roughly has offenders reform their characters and compensate their victims in ways the offenders find burdensome, thereby disavowing the crime and tending to foster cooperation and mutual aid I argue that this novel account of punishment is a prima facie attractive alternative to more familiar retributive and deterrence rationales, and that it entails that widespread practices such as imprisonment and mandatory minimum sentences are unjust.
In this chapter, I add to the new body of philosophical literature that addresses African approac... more In this chapter, I add to the new body of philosophical literature that addresses African approaches to just war by reflecting on some topics that have yet to be considered and by advancing different perspectives. My approach is two-fold. First, I spell out a foundational African ethic, according to which one must treat people’s capacity to relate communally with respect. Second, I derive principles from it to govern the use of force and violence, and compare and contrast their implications for war with other recent African views and especially with some prominent accounts in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. I argue that the approaches to military conflict prescribed by the Afro-communal ethic and its derivative principles differ, and in some prima facie plausible ways, from the views of thinkers that include Thomas Hurka, David Luban, Larry May, Jeff McMahan, and Michael Walzer. In particular, I conclude that the African perspectives ground some interesting and under-explored approaches to just causes for war that merit consideration, including the ideas that military conflict could in principle be justified in order to protect a people’s culture or to correct an aggressor’s vice.
Handbook of African Philosophy of Difference, 2019
There has been the recurrent suspicion that community, harmony, cohesion, and similar relational ... more There has been the recurrent suspicion that community, harmony, cohesion, and similar relational goods as understood in the African ethical tradition threaten to occlude difference. Often, it has been Western defenders of liberty who have raised the concern that these characteristically sub-Saharan values fail to account adequately for individuality, although some contemporary African thinkers have expressed the same concern. In this chapter, I provide a certain understanding of the sub-Saharan value of communal relationship and demonstrate that it entails a substantial allowance for difference. I aim to show that African thinkers need not appeal to, say, characteristically Euro-American values of authenticity or autonomy to make sense of why individuals should not be pressured to conform to a group’s norms regarding sex and gender. A key illustration involves homosexuality.
This article draws on the indigenous African intellectual tradition to ground a moral-philosophic... more This article draws on the indigenous African intellectual tradition to ground a moral-philosophical theory of leadership that is intended to rival accounts prominent in the East Asian and Western traditions. After providing an interpretation of the characteristically sub-Saharan value of communion, the article advances a philosophical account of a good leader as one who creates, sustains and enriches communal relationships and enables others to do so. The article then applies this account to a variety of topics, including what the final end of an organisation should be, how decisions ought to be made within it, who counts as a stakeholder and how to deal with non-performing or misbehaving employees. For each topic, the article notes respects in which Afro-communal leadership supports approaches that differ from those prescribed by other, more internationally familiar philosophies such as Confucianism and Kantian contract theory, and it suggests that its implications are prima facie attractive relative to them.
I present ideas about human suffering that are salient among the black peoples of sub-Saharan Afr... more I present ideas about human suffering that are salient among the black peoples of sub-Saharan Africa, reconstruct them in order to make them relevant to an international audience with philosophical interests, and urge that audience to give them consideration as alternatives or correctives to some dominant Western approaches. I first recount views commonly held by sub-Saharans about the nature, causes and cures of suffering, and then draw on them to articulate an account of it qua enervation, which rivals a neuro-physical perspective that friends of Western science would readily adopt. Then, I address the way one morally should respond to suffering, appealing to judgments about the value of community that are influential among Africans. I show that, upon theoretical refinement, an Afro-communitarianism entails an ethical analysis of suffering that seriously competes with those entailed by standard Western moral philosophies. This view instructs moral agents neither to make others suffer because they deserve it, as per Kantian retributivism, nor to do whatever will minimize suffering, à la utilitarianism. Instead, it roughly prescribes responding to suffering out of love, which can require increasing the amount of suffering in the world by taking it upon oneself, instead of leaving it to others to bear on their own.
Over the last two decades, the capabilities approach has become an increasingly influential theor... more Over the last two decades, the capabilities approach has become an increasingly influential theory of development. It conceptualises human wellbeing in terms of an individual's ability to achieve functionings we have reason to value. In contrast, the African ethic of ubuntu views human flourishing as the propensity to pursue relations of fellowship with others, such that relationships have fundamental value. These two theoretical perspectives seem to be in tension with each other; while the capabilities approach focuses on individuals as the locus of ethical value, an ubuntu ethic concentrates on the relations between individuals. In this article, we ask: to what extent is the capabilities approach compatible with this African ethical theory? We argue that, on reflection, relations play a much stronger role in the capabilities approach than often assumed. There is good reason to believe that relationality is part of the concept of a capability itself, where such relationality has intrinsic ethical value. This understanding of the ethical centrality of relations grounds new normative perspectives on the capabilities approach, and offers a more comprehensive grasp of the relevance of relationships to empirical enquiry.
In this article I spell out a conception of dignity grounded in African moral thinking that provi... more In this article I spell out a conception of dignity grounded in African moral thinking that provides a plausible philosophical foundation for human rights, focusing on the particular human right not to be executed by the state. I first demonstrate that the South African Constitutional Court’s sub-Saharan explanations of why the death penalty is degrading all counterintuitively entail that using deadly force against aggressors is degrading as well. Then, I draw on one major strand of Afro-communitarian thought to develop a novel conception of dignity as the view that what is special and inviolable about human nature is our capacity for harmonious relationships. I argue that a principle of respect for the dignity of such a capacity entails that the death penalty is an indignity but that deadly force in self- or other-defense need not be, and I contend that this African- inspired principle promises to do no worse than the more Western, Kantian principle of respect for autonomy at accounting for a broad range of human rights.
Our aims are to articulate some core philosophical positions characteristic of Traditional Africa... more Our aims are to articulate some core philosophical positions characteristic of Traditional African Religion and to argue that they merit consideration as monotheist rivals to standard interpretations of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. In particular, we address the topics of how God’s nature is conceived, how God’s will is meant to bear on human decision making, where one continues to exist upon the death of one’s body, and how long one is able to exist without a body. For each of these topics, we note how Traditional African Religion posits claims that clash with mainstream Judaism, Christianity, and Islam and that, being prima facie plausible, indicate the need for systematic cross-cultural philosophical debate.
In this article I critically discuss some recent English language books in African philosophy. Sp... more In this article I critically discuss some recent English language books in African philosophy. Specifically, I expound and evaluate key claims from books published by sub-Saharan thinkers since 2017 that address epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory and that do so in ways of interest to an audience of at least Anglo- American-Australasian analytic philosophers. My aim is not to establish a definitive conclusion about these claims, but rather to facilitate cross-cultural engagement by highlighting their relevance, at least to many western philosophers, and by presenting challenges to these claims that such philosophers would be likely to mount.
The dominant view amongst contemporary Western philosophers about the essence of a natu ral obje... more The dominant view amongst contemporary Western philosophers about the essence of a natu ral object is that it is constituted by its intrinsic properties. The ontological approach salient in the African philosophical tradition, in contrast, accounts for a thing's essence by appeal to its relational properties. The Afrorelational ontology is underdeveloped, with the primary aim of this article being to help rectify that weakness. Specifically, this article's aims are: to articulate an African approach to understanding the essence of a concrete, natural thing in terms of its relationships; to illustrate the Afrorelational approach with the examples of the self and of water; to contrast the Afrorelational characterization of the essence of the self and of water with a typically Western construal in terms of their intrinsic properties; and finally to provide an initial defence of the Afrorelational approach, both by responding to some objections facing it and by providing some new, positive reasons to take it seriously.
This article considers how global ethical matters might be approached differently in the English-... more This article considers how global ethical matters might be approached differently in the English-speaking literature if values salient in sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia were taken seriously. Specifically, after pointing out how indigenous values in both of these major parts of the world tend to prescribe honouring harmonious relationships, the article brings out what such an approach to morality entails for political power, foreign relations and criminal justice. For each major issue, it suggests that harmony likely has implications that differ from approaches that currently dominate Western thought, namely those of utility, autonomy and capability. Lacking the space to systematically defend harmony as a fundamental value, it nonetheless urges theorists not to neglect it in future work.
In “Global Knowledge Frameworks and the Tasks of Cross-Cultural Philosophy,” Leigh Jenco searches... more In “Global Knowledge Frameworks and the Tasks of Cross-Cultural Philosophy,” Leigh Jenco searches for the conception of knowledge that best justifies the judgment that one can learn from non-local traditions of philosophy. Jenco considers four conceptions of knowledge, namely, in catchwords, the esoteric, Enlightenment, hermeneutic, and self- transformative conceptions of knowledge, and she defends the latter as more plausible than the former three. In this critical discussion of Jenco’s article, I provide reason to doubt the self-transformative conception, and also advance a fifth, pluralist conception of knowledge that I contend best explains the prospect of learning from traditions other than one’s own.
In “Are Certain Knowledge Frameworks More Congenial to the Aims of Cross-Cultural Philosophy? A Q... more In “Are Certain Knowledge Frameworks More Congenial to the Aims of Cross-Cultural Philosophy? A Qualified Yes,” Leigh Jenco responds to an article in which I had argued for a similar conclusion. I had contended roughly that the positing of objective truth combined with a fallibilist epistemology best explains why a philosopher from one culture could learn something substantial from another culture. In her response, Jenco contends that this knowledge framework does not account adequately for the intuition that various philosophical traditions have an equal standing and that traditions other than one’s own are not to be considered inferior. In addition, according to Jenco, an appeal to objective truth on the part of one epistemic culture is unavoidably oppressive, or overly risks being so, with regard to another one. In this brief reply, I argue that an appeal to objective truth in the realms of epistemology and morality in fact makes the most sense of Jenco’s concerns about inegalitarianism and oppression.
In this article I critically discuss Professor Oladele Abiodun Balogun's reflections on the prope... more In this article I critically discuss Professor Oladele Abiodun Balogun's reflections on the proper final ends of doing philosophy and related sorts of abstract, speculative, or theoretical inquiry. Professor Balogun appears to argue that one should undertake philosophical studies only insofar as they are likely to make a practical difference to people's lives, particularly by contributing to politico-economic development, or, in other words, that one should eschew seeking knowledge for its own sake. However, there is one line of thought from Professor Balogun, about philosophy being able to make life meaningful, that I argue ultimately-perhaps contrary to his intentions-entails that it can be appropriate to some degree to pursue philosophy that is unlikely to ameliorate poverty and similar social ills. My central aims in this article are to identify Professor Balogun's strongest argument against pursuing any knowledge for its own sake and to argue that an appeal to meaningfulness constitutes a strong, competing reason to seek out some of it.
What should be the aim when teaching matters of culture to students in public high schools and un... more What should be the aim when teaching matters of culture to students in public high schools and universities in Africa? One approach, which is parochial, would focus exclusively on imparting local culture, leaving students unfamiliar with, or perhaps contemptuous of, other cultures around the world. A second, cosmopolitan approach would educate students about a wide variety of cultures in Africa and beyond it, leaving it up to them which interpretations, values, and aesthetics they will adopt. A third way, in between these two, would be to give some priority to understanding and enriching local culture, while being open to and not remaining ignorant of other cultures. In this article, a work of moral philosophy, I argue for this third alternative by rebutting arguments for the other two approaches and by showing that it uniquely follows from a plausible African ethic informed by indigenous ideals of communion.
There is a kernel of truth in the claim that Western philosophy and practice of education is indi... more There is a kernel of truth in the claim that Western philosophy and practice of education is individualistic; theory in Euro-America tends to prize properties that are internal to a human being, such as her autonomy, rationality, knowledge, pleasure, desires, self-esteem and self- realisation, and education there tends to adopt techniques focused on the individual placed at some distance from others. What is striking about other philosophical–educational traditions in the East and the South is that they are typically much more communitarian. I argue that since geographical terms such as ‘Western’, ‘African’ and the like are best construed as picking out properties that are salient in a region, it is fair to conclude that the Western is individualist and that the African is communitarian. What this means is that if I am correct about a noticeable contrast between philosophies of education typical in the West and in sub- Saharan Africa, and if there are, upon reflection, attractive facets of communitarianism, then those in the West and in societies influenced by it should in some real sense become less Western, in order to take them on.
Since the transition to a constitutional order, in what respects have cultures in higher educatio... more Since the transition to a constitutional order, in what respects have cultures in higher education institutions in South Africa become Africanised, and, going forward, how should they be? In this chapter I provide an overview of the major different forms that Africanisation of institutional culture could take, and I then indicate the respects in which South African universities have or have not taken them on board over the past 20 years. In addition, I provide the first comprehensive critical discussion of the major reasons that have been given for Africanising. Specifically, I distinguish between five rationales for Africanising institutional culture, namely, those appealing to relativism, democracy, redress, civilisation and identity, bring out their different implications for the forms that Africanisation should take, and argue that some of these rationales are philosophically much more promising than others. I conclude that the rationales of redress, civilisation and identity together make a compelling case for a moderate form of Africanising the institutional culture of public universities, one that would be much more robust than what has appeared so far on the democratic landscape in South Africa.
From the perspective of an African ethic, analytically interpreted as a philosophical principle o... more From the perspective of an African ethic, analytically interpreted as a philosophical principle of right action, what are the proper final ends of a publicly funded university and how should they be ranked? To answer this question, I first provide a brief but inclusive review of the literature on Africanising higher education from the past 50 years, and contend that the prominent final ends suggested in it can be reduced to five major categories. Then, I spell out an intuitively attractive African moral theory and apply it to these five final ends, arguing that three of them are appropriate but that two of them are not. After that, I maintain that the African moral theory prescribes two additional final ends for a public university that are not salient in the literature. Next, I argue that employing the African moral theory as I do enables one to rebut several criticisms of Africanising higher education that have recently been made from a liberal perspective. I conclude by posing questions suitable for future research.
The aim of this article is to establish that current thought about the point of a publicly funded... more The aim of this article is to establish that current thought about the point of a publicly funded university faces a dilemma. On the one hand, influential and attractive ‘macro’-level principles about how state resources ought to be accountably used entail that academic freedom should be utilised solely for the sake of social justice or some other concrete public good. Standard theories of public morality entail that an academic’s responsibility is entirely to be ‘responsive’ or ‘relevant’ to her social context in the way she teaches and researches. On the other hand, ‘micro’-level self-conceptions of teachers and researchers include the idea that it can be proper to use academic freedom in order to discover and impart knowledge that is unlikely to foster social justice, however construed. Probably most academics accept the idea that ‘knowledge for its own sake’ can often merit pursuit and transmission. In this article, I use the most space to defend the second horn of the dilemma, the micro-level perspective, by indicating just how counterintuitive the macro one is. As a foil I critically discuss a recent report by the South African Council on Higher Education, which occasions awareness of the position that the right to academic freedom is exhausted by a duty to benefit society. However, I conclude by noting prima facie defences of the first horn, pointing out that dominant accounts of institutional ethics forbid scholars from seeking knowledge for its own sake, and hence indicating the need to resolve an antinomy about the proper final ends of a state university.
Concomitant with the rise of rationalizing accountability in higher education has been an increas... more Concomitant with the rise of rationalizing accountability in higher education has been an increase in theoretical reflection about the forms accountability has taken and the ones it should take. The literature is now peppered by a wide array of distinctions (e.g. internal/external, inward/ outward, vertical/horizontal, upward/downward, professional/public, political/economic, soft/ hard, positive/negative), to the point that when people speak of ‘accountability’ they risk speaking past one another, having some of these distinctions in mind and not others. Furthermore, often these distinctions are vague and cross-cut each other in ways that are as yet unclear. The field could benefit from having a comprehensive framework in which to place these distinctions and to view their relations. My aim in this article is to provide an analytical tool by which to classify important debate about what accountability in higher education has been and ought to be. Beyond organizing such debate, this schema will serve the purposes of revealing ambiguities in terms, conflations of ideas, assumptions that warrant questioning, and gaps in present research agendas.
In this article, written for the generally educated reader, I summarize my latest thinking about ... more In this article, written for the generally educated reader, I summarize my latest thinking about a dilemma that I believe current theoretical reflection faces about the proper ultimate aims of a public university. Specifically, I make the following three major points: (1) On the one hand, all dominant theories of how properly to spend public resources entail that academics should not pursue knowledge for its own sake and should rather devote their energies toward promoting some concrete public good (such as citizenship, justice, autonomy or the like). (2) On the other hand, that view of the academic enterprise entails patent absurdities. (3) The dilemma is best resolved by articulating a new theory of how public resources ought to be spent, one according to which the point of the state and its public institutions ought to be to _balance_ the realization of final goods.
Philosophy is rational enquiry that addresses fundamental matters of human life and that transcen... more Philosophy is rational enquiry that addresses fundamental matters of human life and that transcends science in some way. For example, biologists and chemists appeal to physical facts when explaining what transpires in the world, but philosophers (and specifically ontologists) consider whether there is only a physical realm and whether there is evidence of anything spiritual such as God. Cosmologists claim to know some facts about the universe, whereas philosophers (epistemologists) try to ascertain how it is they know and why astrologers do not know. Sociologists describe how people behave using value-free language, while philosophers (ethicists) prescribe how they morally ought to behave and distinguish between good and bad ways of living. What follow are three examples of ways in which philosophers are particularly well qualified to address difficult questions pertaining to COVID-19. My aim is not to provide answers here, but rather to demonstrate that compelling answers are not obvious and would require sustained and careful philosophical enquiry.
I aim to answer the questions of whether reactive practices such as gratitude and punishment are ... more I aim to answer the questions of whether reactive practices such as gratitude and punishment are inherently expressive, and, if so, in what respect. I distinguish seven ways in which one might plausibly characterise reactive practices as essentially expressive in nature, and organise them so that they progress in a dialectical order, from weakest to strongest. I then critically discuss objections that apply to the strongest conception, questioning whether it co-heres with standard retributive understandings of why, when and where the reactive practice of punishment is justified.
Censure theory (or intrinsic expressionism) is the view that the political community must punish ... more Censure theory (or intrinsic expressionism) is the view that the political community must punish those who break just laws in proportion to their injustice because it thereby discharges its weighty obligation to express proportionate disapproval of injustice. This view has begun receiving systematic attention in the Anglo-American philosophical literature only in the last 25 years as theorists have sought a backward-looking justification of punishment that avoids the problems facing familiar forms of retributivism. What I do here is focus on the meta-ethical underpinnings of the view, seeking to answer the question of what makes claims about proportionate censure true or false. In virtue of what is it the case that one form of censure is stronger than another or that punishment is the censure fitting injustice? Are these propositions true merely because of social conventions, or is there an objective fact of the matter to which these propositions correspond? Such questions have been scarcely addressed, but it is urgent to do so in a systematic way. I defend an objectivist, or realist, account of the truth-conditions for proportionate censure.
A collection of chapters by a variety of academics devoted to expounding Bhutan's policy of Gross... more A collection of chapters by a variety of academics devoted to expounding Bhutan's policy of Gross National Happiness. My contributions address mainly basic definitional issues (chap. 1) and the concept of good governance (chap. 14).
For more than 40 years, the Kingdom of Bhutan has eschewed evaluating its socio-economic status i... more For more than 40 years, the Kingdom of Bhutan has eschewed evaluating its socio-economic status in terms of Gross Domestic Product and has instead done so under the heading of ‘Gross National Happiness’ (GNH). As part of the upswing in international interest in well-being as the proper final end of development, it would be apt to critically explore the approach that has been in use for several decades. In this article, I expound the central elements of GNH and discuss their strengths and weaknesses from a moral-philosophical perspect- ive. I conclude that while GNH covers some blind spots missed by influential Western indices with which readers are likely to be more familiar, the latter, along with Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach, also have corrections to offer the former, inviting a fascinating cross-cultural exchange about how to understand the nature of well-being for purposes of public policy.
With his new book, A Theory of Truces, Nir Eisikovits has succeed in producing the most comprehen... more With his new book, A Theory of Truces, Nir Eisikovits has succeed in producing the most comprehensive and insightful book to exist on the nature and morality of truces during international military conflict. In it he plausibly argues that thought about such conflict should avoid binary terms such as long-lasting peace and all-out war, and instead must readily acknowledge conditions ‘in between’ them, such as cease-fires and agreements to limit belligerence to certain times. In this critical notice of Eisikovits’ book, I have two major aims, in light of the fact that in it he does not systematically engage with the contemporary literature on and positions in just war theory. One aim is to situate Eisikovits’ analysis of truces in that context, and to contend that he has implicitly founded a new field that would be aptly labelled jus interruptus bellum as distinct from jus in bello and jus ex bello. Another is to build on Eisikovits’ ethical appraisal of truces, by considering what principles of just war theory entail for them.
There is a deep tension between liberalism and retributivism. On the face of it, one cannot coher... more There is a deep tension between liberalism and retributivism. On the face of it, one cannot coherently believe liberalism about the fundamental purpose of the state and retributivism about the basic end of legal punishment, given widely held and well-motivated or what I call ‘standard’ conceptions of these views. My aims in this article are to differentiate the types of conflict between liberalism and retributivism, to identify the strongest and most problematic type of conflict between them, to demonstrate that existing strategies in the literature that might be invoked to resolve this conflict fail, and to present a new, conclusive way to resolve it. The solution lies in changing the standard conception of liberalism, which change, I argue, is warranted on independent grounds. Liberalism, up to now, has been conceived in a way that fails to best capture liberal intuitions. Upon improving our understanding of what liberal purposes essentially are, it becomes clear that retributive punishment is not merely logically consistent with them, but also partially constitutive of them.
Can a state seek to promote a thick conception of the good (such as fostering a kind of meaning o... more Can a state seek to promote a thick conception of the good (such as fostering a kind of meaning or excellence in people's lives) without treating its citizens disrespectfully? The predominant answer among friends of the principle of respect for persons is "no." The most powerful Kantian objection to non-liberalism or perfectionism is the claim that citizens who do not share the state's conception of the good would be wronged in that the state would treat a certain way of life as more important than its citizens' capacities to choose their own ways of life. I sketch a new non-liberal principle for political decision-making and show that, unlike other forms of non-liberalism, it is not vulnerable to this major respect-based objection. 'Open perfectionism' is the view that state enforcement of a conception of the good favoured by the majority is permissible if and only if the minority has the substantial ability to avoid the territory in which the conception of the good is enforced. I argue that it is a realistic possibility for some non-liberal states to provide a fair opportunity to their dissenters to avoid the imposition of non-liberal policies and that the Kantian liberal's central complaint would not apply to non-liberal states if they were to provide such an opportunity. The principle of respect for persons grounds the most influential argument for liberalism, and so showing that open perfectionism is consistent with liberal intuitions about free choice promises to help to transcend the long-standing conflict between non-liberalism and Kantian liberalism.
Routine testing is a practice whereby medical professionals ask all patients whether they would l... more Routine testing is a practice whereby medical professionals ask all patients whether they would like an HIV test, regardless of whether there is anything unique to a given patient that suggests the presence of HIV. In three respects I aim to offer a fresh perspective on the debate about whether a developing country with a high rate of HIV infection morally ought to adopt routine testing. First, I present a neat framework that organises the moral issues at stake, bringing out the basic principles involved and exhibiting their logical relationships. Second, appealing to the Kantian principle of respect for the dignity of persons, I offer a thorough justification for routine testing when it serves as a gateway to anti-retroviral treatment (ART). Third, I present a respect-based defence of the controversial and novel thesis that routine testing is morally justified even if ART is unaffordable or otherwise unavailable.
In an article previously published in this journal, Phillip Montague critically surveys and rejec... more In an article previously published in this journal, Phillip Montague critically surveys and rejects a handful of contemporary attempts to explain why state punishment is morally justified. Among those targeted is one of my defences of the censure theory of punishment, according to which state punishment is justified because the political community has a duty to express disapproval of those guilty of injustice. My defence of censure theory supposes, per argumentum, that there is always some defeasible moral reason for the state to proportionately punish the guilty, and then demonstrates that censure theory best entails and explains this intuition. Montague does not question the intuition, but instead argues that three rival theories of punishment, including his societal-defence view, account for it to no worse a degree than my censure theory. In this article I defend my initial argument, noting resources for its defence that Montague does not appreciate and that, I maintain, provide those who believe that there is always pro tanto injustice in the state failing to proportionately punish the guilty reason to adopt censure theory over all competitors, including Montague’s societal-defence theory.
South African law currently forbids those seeking to arrange a surrogate motherhood agreement fro... more South African law currently forbids those seeking to arrange a surrogate motherhood agreement from creating a child that will not be genetically related to at least one of them. For a surrogacy contract to be legally valid, there must be a ‘genetic link’ between the child created through a surrogate and the parents who will raise it. This law is currently being challenged in the High Court of South Africa, and in this article I critically explore salient ethical facets of the dispute. I argue that the law is unjust and should be revised.
This article principally addresses the likely e ects of global warming on health in developing co... more This article principally addresses the likely e ects of global warming on health in developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, northern Africa and the Middle East as well as how medical professionals, such as doctors, nurses, bioethicists and public health researchers, should respond to them in light of ubuntu and Islam, values characteristically held in those regions.
I critically examine the South African university student and worker protests of 2015/2016 in lig... more I critically examine the South African university student and worker protests of 2015/2016 in light of moral principles governing the use of force that are largely uncontested in both the contemporary Western and African philosophies of just war, violence and threats. Amongst these principles are: “discrimination”, according to which force should be directed not towards innocent bystanders but instead should target those particularly responsible for injustice; “likely success”, meaning that, instead of being counter-productive, the use of force must be reasonably expected to advance a just cause; and “last resort”, which entails that only the least force necessary to rebut injustice should be employed. I invoke these and related principles to appraise a wide array of types of student/worker protests, noting which of them accorded with the principles and which did not. I also reply to defences that some South Africans have recently made of protesting with coercion and destruction.
A philosophical reflection on how dealing with coronavirus has reduced meaning in many of our liv... more A philosophical reflection on how dealing with coronavirus has reduced meaning in many of our lives.
A popular opinion piece in which I argue, contra much contemporary Western ethics, and by appeal ... more A popular opinion piece in which I argue, contra much contemporary Western ethics, and by appeal to the African ethic of ubuntu, that it can be reasonable to feel survivor's guilt.
A 1000 word popular opinion piece on Desmond Tutu's interpretation of ubuntu, and some defense of... more A 1000 word popular opinion piece on Desmond Tutu's interpretation of ubuntu, and some defense of it from common criticisms. Composed in honour of his 86th birthday.
A brief analysis of poetic justice, a defense of the claim that there is a parallel poetic injust... more A brief analysis of poetic justice, a defense of the claim that there is a parallel poetic injustice, and some explanation of our reactions towards them.
I aim to answer the questions of whether reactive practices such as gratitude and punishment are ... more I aim to answer the questions of whether reactive practices such as gratitude and punishment are inherently expressive, and, if so, in what respect. I distin-guish seven ways in which one might plausibly characterise reactive prac-tices as essentially expressive in nature, and organise them so that they prog-ress in a dialectical order, from weakest to strongest. I then critically discuss objections that apply to the strongest conception, questioning whether it co-heres with standard retributive understandings of why, when and where the reactive practice of punishment is justified. 1.
In her essay, “Global Knowledge Frameworks and the Tasks of Cross-Cultural Philosophy,” Leigh Jen... more In her essay, “Global Knowledge Frameworks and the Tasks of Cross-Cultural Philosophy,” Leigh Jenco proposes that certain knowledge frameworks may, in virtue of their accessibility to erstwhile outsiders, be more congenial to the aims of cross-cultural philosophy. Her co-symposiasts use Jenco’s essay to further the discussion on different aspects of this claim. Steve Fuller contests whether postcolonialism is the right lens through which cross-cultural encounters should be studied. David H. Kim suggests that an inclusive multifactorial account of frameworks relevant to cross-cultural philosophy may be more apt for the aims of this sub-discipline. Thaddeus Metz seeks to provide reason to doubt Jenco’s self-transformative conception, and also advance another, pluralist conception of knowledge. Miljana Milojevic reinterprets Jenco’s knowledge frameworks as different conceptualizations of knowledge used in attempts to justify the neglect of non-Western traditions.
In this chapter I expound “African Modal Relationalism,” Kai Horsthemke’s label for my theory of ... more In this chapter I expound “African Modal Relationalism,” Kai Horsthemke’s label for my theory of animal rights with a sub-Saharan pedigree, and I defend it from several criticisms he has recently made of it in his book Animals and African Ethics. Central to my theory, developed in the light of some values salient in indigenous African thought, is the claim that a being has a greater moral status, the more it is in principle capable of relating communally with characteristic human beings. Horsthemke maintains that this principle is anthropocentric and speciesist, is poorly motivated relative to his egalitarian-individualist approach, and does not have the implications that I contend. I aim to rebut these and related objections, contending that African Modal Relationalism is in fact a promising way to philosophically ground animal rights.
In an article previously published in this Journal, Anthony Oyowe critically engages with my atte... more In an article previously published in this Journal, Anthony Oyowe critically engages with my attempt to demonstrate how the human rights characteristic of South Africa's Constitution can be grounded on a certain interpretation of Afro-communitarian values that are often associated with talk of ubuntu. Drawing on recurrent themes of human dignity and communal relationships in the sub-Saharan tradition, I have advanced a moral-philosophical principle that I argue entails and plausibly explains a wide array of individual rights to civil liberties, political power, criminal procedures and economic resources. Oyowe's most important criticism of my theory is in effect that it is caught in a dilemma: Either the principle I articulate can account for human rights, in which case it does not count as communitarian, or it does count as the latter, but cannot account for the former. In this article, I reply to Oyowe, contending that he misinterprets key facets of my theory to the point ...
In recent work, David Bilchitz advances two important claims about South African constitutional l... more In recent work, David Bilchitz advances two important claims about South African constitutional law. One claim is that, because animals have a dignity that demands respect, the Constitution ought to be amended so that animals are explicitly deemed to be 'persons' and hence entitled to protection under the Bill of Rights. Of course, not all the rights in the Constitution's second chapter would apply to animals; clearly, if animals have dignity, respect for it would not require according them a right to vote. However, according to Bilchitz, it would be apt to consider animals expressly to have rights of bodily integrity and freedom of movement, among others.
In this chapter I critically discuss work in sub-Saharan moral philosophy that has been written i... more In this chapter I critically discuss work in sub-Saharan moral philosophy that has been written in English in the post-independence era. (I set aside Francophone texts, as they have not been nearly as influential in ethics as they have been in metaphysics and method.) I begin by providing an overview of the profession (section “Nature and History of the Profession”), after which I consider some of the major issues in normative ethics, particularly concerning the nature of good character (section “Normative Ethics: Good and Bad Character”) and right action (section “Normative Ethics: Right and Wrong Action”). Then, I discuss some of the more noteworthy research in applied ethics (section “Applied Ethics”), and finally take up the key issues in metaethics (section “Metaethics”). My aim is to highlight discussions that should be of interest to an ethicist working anywhere in the world and to focus on ideas characteristic of the sub-Saharan region that are under-appreciated not merely for the purpose of comparative ethics, but also for substantive moral argumentation. In particular, there are communitarian and vitalist approaches to the good and the right commonly held by sub-Saharan philosophers that international scholars should take seriously as genuine rivals to the utilitarian, Kantian, social contract, divine command, care-oriented and Aristotelian outlooks that dominate global discussions of how to be and act.
I seek to advance enquiry into the point of a public higher education institution by drawing on i... more I seek to advance enquiry into the point of a public higher education institution by drawing on ideals salient in the sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. There are relational, and specifically communal, values prominently held by African thinkers that I use to ground a promising rival to the dominant contemporary Western, and especially Anglo-American, accounts of what a university ultimately ought to achieve, which focus mainly on autonomy, truth, and citizenship. My aims are not merely comparative, contrasting an Afro-communal approach with other ones that have been more globally influential, but also substantive. Although the theory of a university’s point that I articulate and defend has an African pedigree, I work to show that it should be taken seriously by a global audience, for plausibly capturing a variety of intuitions and claims that are widely shared.
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Since the origin of bioethics as a discipline, the field has been dominated by consideration of two main values, well-being and morality. I cast doubt on whether those are sufficient to resolve an array of important debates about which decisions to make in respect of medicine, and I also consider whether a third, under-explored value should play a much larger role.
Arguments
I provide reason to believe that the value of what makes a life meaningful is essential to being able to provide conclusive judgements about several contentious matters in bioethics. After first indicating how meaningfulness plausibly differs from rightness and happiness, I point out how it cannot be reasonably ignored when making decisions in six ‘life and death’ matters.
Conclusion
My aim is not to draw any firm conclusions about what to do when it comes to these life and death topics, but rather to show that in order to arrive at any, one has to consider the category of life’s meaning, which has, until recently, been nearly absent from Western bioethics since its inception.
as a springboard, Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study defends several original claims about what would make a person’s life meaningful. Metz’s overarching goal in the book, an instance of ‘analytic existentialism’, is to rigorously answer the question, ‘What (if anything) do all the conditions that make a life meaningful have in common?’. An answer to such a question is a philosophical theory of meaning in life, and Metz aims not only to demonstrate that contemporary theories of life’s meaning are implausible, but also to develop a new one that avoids their problems. Primarily evaluating theories in light of the extent to which they capture the meaningfulness of the classic triad of the good, the true and the beautiful, Metz critically explores influential principles about fulfilling God’s purpose, obtaining reward in an afterlife for having been virtuous, being attracted to what merits attraction, leaving the world a better place, connecting to organic unity, and transcending oneself by connecting to what is extensive. He argues that no extant principle satisfactorily accounts for the three-fold significance of morality, enquiry, and creativity, and that most promising is a fresh theory according to which meaning in life is a matter of intelligence contoured toward fundamental conditions of human existence.
Since the origin of bioethics as a discipline, the field has been dominated by consideration of two main values, well-being and morality. I cast doubt on whether those are sufficient to resolve an array of important debates about which decisions to make in respect of medicine, and I also consider whether a third, under-explored value should play a much larger role.
Arguments
I provide reason to believe that the value of what makes a life meaningful is essential to being able to provide conclusive judgements about several contentious matters in bioethics. After first indicating how meaningfulness plausibly differs from rightness and happiness, I point out how it cannot be reasonably ignored when making decisions in six ‘life and death’ matters.
Conclusion
My aim is not to draw any firm conclusions about what to do when it comes to these life and death topics, but rather to show that in order to arrive at any, one has to consider the category of life’s meaning, which has, until recently, been nearly absent from Western bioethics since its inception.
as a springboard, Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study defends several original claims about what would make a person’s life meaningful. Metz’s overarching goal in the book, an instance of ‘analytic existentialism’, is to rigorously answer the question, ‘What (if anything) do all the conditions that make a life meaningful have in common?’. An answer to such a question is a philosophical theory of meaning in life, and Metz aims not only to demonstrate that contemporary theories of life’s meaning are implausible, but also to develop a new one that avoids their problems. Primarily evaluating theories in light of the extent to which they capture the meaningfulness of the classic triad of the good, the true and the beautiful, Metz critically explores influential principles about fulfilling God’s purpose, obtaining reward in an afterlife for having been virtuous, being attracted to what merits attraction, leaving the world a better place, connecting to organic unity, and transcending oneself by connecting to what is extensive. He argues that no extant principle satisfactorily accounts for the three-fold significance of morality, enquiry, and creativity, and that most promising is a fresh theory according to which meaning in life is a matter of intelligence contoured toward fundamental conditions of human existence.